Malcolm Gladwell (the author of The Tipping Point and Blink) has an excellent article in this week’s issue of The New Yorker. The piece is primarily focused on the downfall of Enron, but it also includes some interesting passages that are thought-provoking in terms of intelligence, homeland security and counterterrorism:
The national-security expert Gregory Treverton has famously made a distinction between puzzles and mysteries. Osama bin Ladenâ€™s whereabouts are a puzzle. We canâ€™t find him because we donâ€™t have enough information. The key to the puzzle will probably come from someone close to bin Laden, and until we can find that source bin Laden will remain at large.
The problem of what would happen in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein was, by contrast, a mystery. It wasnâ€™t a question that had a simple, factual answer. Mysteries require judgments and the assessment of uncertainty, and the hard part is not that we have too little information but that we have too much. The C.I.A. had a position on what a post-invasion Iraq would look like, and so did the Pentagon and the State Department and Colin Powell and Dick Cheney and any number of political scientists and journalists and think-tank fellows. For that matter, so did every cabdriver in Baghdad.
The distinction is not trivial. If you consider the motivation and methods behind the attacks of September 11th to be mainly a puzzle, for instance, then the logical response is to increase the collection of intelligence, recruit more spies, add to the volume of information we have about Al Qaeda. If you consider September 11th a mystery, though, youâ€™d have to wonder whether adding to the volume of information will only make things worse. Youâ€™d want to improve the analysis within the intelligence community; youâ€™d want more thoughtful and skeptical people with the skills to look more closely at what we already know about Al Qaeda. Youâ€™d want to send the counterterrorism team from the C.I.A. on a golfing trip twice a month with the counterterrorism teams from the F.B.I. and the N.S.A. and the Defense Department, so they could get to know one another and compare notes.
If things go wrong with a puzzle, identifying the culprit is easy: itâ€™s the person who withheld information. Mysteries, though, are a lot murkier: sometimes the information weâ€™ve been given is inadequate, and sometimes we arenâ€™t very smart about making sense of what weâ€™ve been given, and sometimes the question itself cannot be answered. Puzzles come to satisfying conclusions. Mysteries often donâ€™t.
….That same transformation is happening in the intelligence world as well. During the Cold War, the broad context of our relationship with the Soviet bloc was stable and predictable. What we didnâ€™t know was details. As Gregory Treverton, who was a former vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council, writes in his book â€œReshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information:â€
Then the pressing questions that preoccupied intelligence were puzzles, ones that could, in principle, have been answered definitively if only the information had been available: How big was the Soviet economy? How many missiles did the Soviet Union have? Had it launched a â€œbolt from the blueâ€ attack? These puzzles were intelligenceâ€™s stock-in-trade during the Cold War.
With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Treverton and others have argued that the situation facing the intelligence community has turned upside down. Now most of the world is open, not closed. Intelligence officers arenâ€™t dependent on scraps from spies. They are inundated with information. Solving puzzles remains critical: we still want to know precisely where Osama bin Laden is hiding, where North Koreaâ€™s nuclear-weapons facilities are situated. But mysteries increasingly take center stage. The stable and predictable divisions of East and West have been shattered. Now the task of the intelligence analyst is to help policymakers navigate the disorder. Several years ago, Admiral Bobby R. Inman was asked by a congressional commission what changes he thought would strengthen Americaâ€™s intelligence system. Inman used to head the National Security Agency, the nationâ€™s premier puzzle-solving authority, and was once the deputy director of the C.I.A. He was the embodiment of the Cold War intelligence structure. His answer: revive the State Department, the one part of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment that isnâ€™t considered to be in the intelligence business at all. In a post-Cold War world of â€œopenly available information,â€ Inman said, â€œwhat you need are observers with language ability, with understanding of the religions, cultures of the countries theyâ€™re observing.â€ Inman thought we needed fewer spies and more slightly batty geniuses.
These passages raise a critical question: is the US intelligence community still expending too much effort trying to solve “puzzles,” and not enough at uncovering “mysteries”? The massive emphasis within the intelligence community budget on the raw collection of SIGINT, ELINT, MASINT, etc. seems to support that contention. Does this distinction explain many of the notable intelligence failures (e.g. WMD’s in Iraq) in the past decade? And what should the intelligence community be doing to get better at solving “mysteries”? The aforementioned “batty geniuses” are part of the equation, but so are new collaborative tools, such as Intellipedia, to synthesize information and discover new insights.
For more on this topic, check out the book that Gladwell references in the article, Gregory Treverton’s “Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information”.