http://www.hlswatch.com/2007/09/05/nuclear-defense-reaches-out-to-small-boats/ News and analysis of critical issues in homeland security today. Sat, 11 Feb 2012 12:26:31 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1 http://www.hlswatch.com/2007/09/05/nuclear-defense-reaches-out-to-small-boats/comment-page-1/#comment-77274 William R. Cumming Thu, 06 Sep 2007 07:20:10 +0000 http://www.hlswatch.com/2007/09/05/nuclear-defense-reaches-out-to-small-boats/#comment-77274 Curiosity killed the cat! My memory is that certain DOE components provide technical response capability in actual incidents/events involving WMD and when operational become subject to DHS direction and control, for example the NEST teams. What do we know of the formal arrangements between DHS and DOE for this operational transfer when needed, the verification of DOE capabilities by DHS of the assets, and when actually deployed the persons, units, organizations, in both DOE and DHS that provide everything from command and control, to plume evaluation, PARs (Protective Action Recommendations), entry and re-entry decisions, decontamination, monitoring, and of course the always necessary perimeter control for access and egress, and finally cleanup? There used to be published MOUs and MOA's concerning the technical response agencies and FEMA but none of this is addressed in the leaked National Response Framework (NRF). Is this the black hole of response? Curiosity killed the cat! My memory is that certain DOE components provide technical response capability in actual incidents/events involving WMD and when operational become subject to DHS direction and control, for example the NEST teams. What do we know of the formal arrangements between DHS and DOE for this operational transfer when needed, the verification of DOE capabilities by DHS of the assets, and when actually deployed the persons, units, organizations, in both DOE and DHS that provide everything from command and control, to plume evaluation, PARs (Protective Action Recommendations), entry and re-entry decisions, decontamination, monitoring, and of course the always necessary perimeter control for access and egress, and finally cleanup? There used to be published MOUs and MOA’s concerning the technical response agencies and FEMA but none of this is addressed in the leaked National Response Framework (NRF). Is this the black hole of response?

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