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	<title>Comments on: Customs-Trade Security Program Scrutinized</title>
	<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2008/05/27/customs-trade-security-program-scrutinized/</link>
	<description>News and analysis of critical issues in homeland security today.</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2008 06:23:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Thomas Glenn</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2008/05/27/customs-trade-security-program-scrutinized/#comment-106029</link>
		<dc:creator>Thomas Glenn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2008 14:05:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.hlswatch.com/2008/05/27/customs-trade-security-program-scrutinized/#comment-106029</guid>
		<description>It is well-documemented within the C-TPAT minimum security criteria that members must be proactive and act responsively to potential threats to cargo en route to the U.S. The GAO's report is not new news. This is after all a 'partnership' against terrorism, and as such, the Wal-Marts and Maersk Lines and HPH Terminals of the world must be expected to (and be given the chance to) fulfill their end of the bargain.  Rest assured, Walmart and Target certainly do not want their names attached to a terrorist-infiltrated ocean container, and it it this brand protection factor (along with the promise of quicker times through ports) that drives top companies to remain vigilant and manage their own supply chain security. It should also be noted that the C-TPAT certifications you mention that are probationally approved prior to completion of all security requirements are the exception, not the rule - only those shippers with long, flawless histories of U.S. importing will be granted the probational status.  

So let's level set here.  The mission for C-TPAT is to be a "voluntary government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security." GAO Report notwithstanding, there has NOT been a significant threat against a U.S. port since 9/11, and international supply chain volumes and cycle times have improved, given the reduced number of inspections and priority processing. But are we nevertheless saying the program is a failure because GAO points out a potential security breach? 

I agree that the U.S. needs to take every step to ensure that our borders are secure, but folks, the show must go on, so there has to be a balance, otherwise we will find that our ports become gridlocked with containers moving at a snail's pace through ports, waiting for every one of the 20+ million boxes to be scanned or inspected. In this way, disruption of supply chains will become the norm, lead times and carrying costs will increase, and ultimately every American will feel the pinch in their pocketbooks.  

Who wins then?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is well-documemented within the C-TPAT minimum security criteria that members must be proactive and act responsively to potential threats to cargo en route to the U.S. The GAO&#8217;s report is not new news. This is after all a &#8216;partnership&#8217; against terrorism, and as such, the Wal-Marts and Maersk Lines and HPH Terminals of the world must be expected to (and be given the chance to) fulfill their end of the bargain.  Rest assured, Walmart and Target certainly do not want their names attached to a terrorist-infiltrated ocean container, and it it this brand protection factor (along with the promise of quicker times through ports) that drives top companies to remain vigilant and manage their own supply chain security. It should also be noted that the C-TPAT certifications you mention that are probationally approved prior to completion of all security requirements are the exception, not the rule - only those shippers with long, flawless histories of U.S. importing will be granted the probational status.  </p>
<p>So let&#8217;s level set here.  The mission for C-TPAT is to be a &#8220;voluntary government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security.&#8221; GAO Report notwithstanding, there has NOT been a significant threat against a U.S. port since 9/11, and international supply chain volumes and cycle times have improved, given the reduced number of inspections and priority processing. But are we nevertheless saying the program is a failure because GAO points out a potential security breach? </p>
<p>I agree that the U.S. needs to take every step to ensure that our borders are secure, but folks, the show must go on, so there has to be a balance, otherwise we will find that our ports become gridlocked with containers moving at a snail&#8217;s pace through ports, waiting for every one of the 20+ million boxes to be scanned or inspected. In this way, disruption of supply chains will become the norm, lead times and carrying costs will increase, and ultimately every American will feel the pinch in their pocketbooks.  </p>
<p>Who wins then?</p>
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		<title>By: William R. Cumming</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2008/05/27/customs-trade-security-program-scrutinized/#comment-105908</link>
		<dc:creator>William R. Cumming</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 14:35:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.hlswatch.com/2008/05/27/customs-trade-security-program-scrutinized/#comment-105908</guid>
		<description>Self-reporting and paper audits don't cut it when it comes to WMD defense.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Self-reporting and paper audits don&#8217;t cut it when it comes to WMD defense.</p>
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