Homeland Security Watch

This is the  fourth in a series:

Fragments from September 10, 2001 (Monday)

Fragments from September 10, 2001… Losing momentum with Mexico (Tuesday)

Fragments from September 10, 2001… Climbing carefully into the Hindu Kush (Wednesday)

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The September 4 draft of NSPD-9 was tightly focused on eliminating the threat of al-Qaeda.  In one of several post-9/11 edits, the scope of the classified directive was expanded to the “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life.”

On September 20, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress.  He said,

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.

Americans are asking “Why do they hate us?”

They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other…

We have seen their kind before. They’re the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking, “How will we fight and win this war?”

We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network…

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.  Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us.

Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail.

In the days after September 11 it was clear:  freedom and fear, good and evil, light and darkness were engaged in deadly struggle.  We were certain of our role.

In a coincidence of the kind required by second-rate fiction, on the day before the attacks — eight years ago today — the Congressional Research Service released a new report entitled, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors. Kenneth Katzman, a long-time regional specialist, opens his analysis with,

Signs continue to point to a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as a rise in the scope of threat posed by the independent network of exiled Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin.

During the 1980s and the early 1990s, Iran and terrorist groups it sponsors were responsible for the most politically significant acts of Middle Eastern terrorism. Although Iran continues to actively sponsor terrorist groups, since 1997 some major factions within Iran have sought to change Iran’s image to that of a more constructive force in the region. Pressured by international sanctions and isolation, Sudan and Libya appear to have sharply reduced their support for international terrorist groups, and Sudan has told the United States it wants to work to achieve removal from the “terrorism list.”

Usama bin Ladin’s network, which is independently financed and enjoys safehaven in Afghanistan, poses an increasingly significant threat to U.S. interests in the Near East and perhaps elsewhere. The primary goals of bin Ladinand his cohort are to oust pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and gain removal of U.S. troops from the region. Based on U.S. allegations of past plotting by the bin Ladin network, suggest that the network wants to strike within the United States itself.

Katzman then proceeds to list and assess twenty — very – distinct terrorist organizations.  He is clear on the al-Qaeda threat, “Over the past six years, Al-Qaida (Arabic for “the base”), the network of Usama bin Ladin, has evolved from a regional threat to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf to a global threat to U.S. citizens and national security interests.”  In my judgment,  someone reading the report on September 10 would have perceived al-Qaeda as cause for serious concern, but presenting far less than an existential threat to the United States.  The nineteen other terrorist organizations would fall even lower on the risk list.

Iraq is listed by Katzman among the region’s five state sponsors of terrorism, but is the last to be considered and is judged much less than a clear-and-present danger.  Notice Iraq is not even mentioned in the report’s opening, quoted above.

With an even-handedness that is the pre-eminent art form of CRS, Katzman concludes his disaster-eve assessment by reviewing seven counter-terrorism strategies.  No singularly effective policy prescription is found.

On September 10 the threat was seen and recognized.  The need for urgent action was known.  The complexity of the situation was acknowledged.  We struggled with the possibility — probability — of unintended consequences. 

No doubt the morning of September 11 sharpened our attention and our resolve.  It did not, however, transform our realities, or our options, or the boundary of our wisdom.  Even so, we felt compelled — at least I joined many others in feeling compelled — to greater action.

Much of this action has been productive.  Our own capacity for collaborating, sharing information, and coordinating prevention, mitigation, and response has been enhanced.  The capacity of our adversary has been  distracted, disrupted, and diminished. 

But we have also allowed ourselves to be distracted.  We have given our adversaries the tools to portray us as vulgar and vicious.  We have allowed our most cherished values and institutions to be disrupted through the fear of a few.  We have allowed the claims of security to diminish our commitment to liberty.

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The children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond the self.  They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self-interest. The children of light are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than their own will.  They are usually foolish because they do not know the power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the national and international community… It must be understood that the children of light are foolish not merely because they underestimate the power of self-interest among the children of darkness. They underestimate this power among themselves. (The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, Reinhold Niebuhr)

This is the third in a series:

Fragments from September 10, 2001 (Monday)

Fragments from September 10, 2001… Losing momentum with Mexico (Tuesday)

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Hours before the Mexican President landed at Dulles, the Bush administration’s National Security Council held its first principals meeting with al-Qaeda on the agenda.

At the September 4 meeting, the principals approved the draft presidential directive with little discussion. Rice told us that she had, at some point, told President Bush that she and his other advisers thought it would take three years or so for their al Qaeda strategy to work. (Report of the 9/11 Commission, page 213)

National Security Presidential Directive 9 remains classified.  It was also amended in the days after September 11 before being signed by the President on October 25, 2001.

Credible sources indicate the original draft authorized a sustained effort to seek Taliban cooperation to eliminate al-Qaeda.  The Taliban government in Kabul, while not officially recognized, was seen as a potential contributor to  regional stability.  If the Taliban would give up Osama and his cohorts, the United States had no particular  interest in how Afghanistan’s internal  divisions played out.

While NSPD-9 cannot be quoted, the September policy draft — it is widely reported – reflected  many details from a months-old memorandum that has been declassified.  In a late 2000 proprosal entitled,  Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida (sic) then White House advisor Richard Clarke, argued for a range of actions, including:

• “Identify and destroy camps or portions of camps run by known terrorists while classes are in session.  To take advantage fully of this initiative, we would need to have special teams ready for covert entry in to destroyed camps to acquire intelligence for locating terrorist cells outside Afghanistan.”
• Launch an interagency effort including the Treasury department’s Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, State Department and DEA counter-drug operations, and the “FBI’s programs to translate and analyze material obtained from domestic surveillance authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the operate multi-agency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in major metropolitan areas.  And recent funding to support Customs, IRS, and INS participation in JTTFs must be sustained and expanded.”
• “Continue and expand the Predator UAV program.”

Clarke’s recommendations regarding Pakistan were carefully framed.  Pakistani cooperation would be crucial to eliminating the al-Qaeda threat, but for such cooperation to be effective and sustained it must reflect realities in Pakistan.  He wrote, “We need to keep in mind that Pakistan has been most willing to cooperate with us on terrorism when its role is invisible or at least plausibly deniable to the powerful Islamist right wing (in Pakistan).” 

Eight years ago Pakistan was the target of tough international sanctions. Clarke suggested positive strategic engagement with Pakistan  including, for example, “Helping to build up a secular educational system that ends rural Pakistan’s exclusive reliance on the fundamentalist madrassas.”

Preference was  given to continuity in Kabul, while removing, “the more extreme wing of the Taliban from power.” But Clarke’s proposal also included  giving, “massive support to anti-Taliban groups such as the Northern Alliance led by Ahamd Shah Masood.”

Masood was a charismatic Tajik who led an anti-Taliban insurgency called the Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (among other monikers).  In the West this was known as the Northern Alliance since it was strongest among the non-Pashtuns of Northern Afghanistan. 

During an April, 2001 trip to address the European Parliament, Masood warned, “My message to President Bush is the following: If he isn’t interested in peace in Afghanistan, if he doesn’t help the Afghan people to arrive at their objective of peace, the Americans and the rest of the world will have to face the problems.”

Prior to the September 4 NSC decision, US aid to the Northern Alliance had been minimal.  Masood’s coalition was thought to have insufficient support among Pashtuns to have a reasonable chance of governing  Afghanistan.  With NSPD-9 the decision was made to support Masood as part of a collection of carrots and sticks to substantially reduce al-Qaeda’s capacity.

Then five days later — eight years ago today — Ahmad Shah Masood was assassinated, probably by al-Qaeda.  After spending years seeking an alliance with the US,  he died unaware of the NSC decision.

When reading the 9/11 Commission report — with full knowledge of how the plot reaches climax — we may well squirm at delayed decisions and non-decisions.  The delay between the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 and the September 4 decision must have been maddening for Clarke and others assigned to the terrorist watch.

But with the same value of hindsight, I do not squirm over the substance of the decisions that were finally undertaken.   What I find is clear-eyed, tough, multi-dimensional application of influence and power. The decisions are realistic about what the United States can and cannot or, perhaps, should not do.

If those who criticize “September 10 thinking” mean to attack avoiding decisions, ignoring problems, and bureaucratic delay, I will join them.

But let’s not get self-righteous.  According to the 9/11 Commission the NSC Deputies Committee gave significant attention to  the new administration’s counterterrorism policy on March 7, 2001.   A first draft of NSPD-9 was circulated on June 7. (Pages 203-204).  The Commission quotes Steven Hadley as saying, “For the government, we moved it along as fast as we could move it along.” (Page 205)  Any of us who have worked in any large organization, public or private, will recognize the realism in Hadley’s comment.

Eight years after 9/11 — and after thousands of deaths and billions of dollars — I read about the plan that Condi Rice said would take three years to implement and Clarke guessed might take five.  I am left wondering, should we have stayed closer to that deliberate product of “September 10 thinking”, instead of the much more aggressive stance spawned post-9/11?

Eight years later we are re-considering negotiations with the Taliban.  We are still looking for authentic and effective anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. We are constantly pushing Pakistan to take stronger action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Pashtuns are still a puzzle.  Perhaps the biggest change is the number of Predators we deploy.

We are powerful.  But we are not all powerful.  Humility is not only a virtue, it is a practical policy.  When Hadley circulated the first draft of NSPD-9 he warned it was “admittedly ambitious.”  It was also restrained in comparison to its successor strategies.  There can be wisdom in restaint.

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For our increased power related our will and purpose to vaster and vaster entanglement with other wills and purposes, which made it impossible for any single will to prevail or any specific human goal of history easily to become the goal of all mankind. (The Irony of American History, Reinhold Niebuhr)

Yesterday Senators Lieberman and Collins, chairman and ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, introduced  the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009.

Senator Lieberman explained, “Our bill would strengthen security at labs using the most dangerous pathogens, improve our capabilities to assess the threat of terrorists acquiring WMD, ensure that citizens get critical safety information, and develop a means for quickly delivering life-saving drugs to areas that have been attacked.”

According to a joint statement available on the Senate Committee’s website, the legislation would also,

• Require HHS to designate the most dangerous pathogens which have significant potential to be used effectively in a biological attack.
• Require DHS to set new security standards for labs using the most dangerous pathogens, including risk assessments, personnel reliability programs, and staff training.
• Require a national strategy for dispensing antibiotics and other medicines to the public and expand a pilot program for using the Postal Service to dispense them. 
• Require communications plans to convey instructions to the public – including whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place – in the critical moments after an attack.
• Support a National Bioforensics Analysis Center to identify the perpetrator of a WMD attack rapidly. 
• Provide personal medical kits to emergency responders in order to enable them to respond quickly to a WMD attack without jeopardizing their own safety. 
• Require DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide better terrorism threat and risk assessments to the public.
• Promote citizen and community preparedness for WMD attacks, including by authorizing grants to States.

The  bill is not yet available via the Thomas website. The Senate Committee’s website  provides a pdf of  the proposed legislation.

A web-based means for employers to verify the legal status of employees went into effect for government contractors on Tuesday, September 8.

According to Chris Strohm with NextGov, “After months of delay, the Homeland Security Department implemented a rule requiring most federal contractors and subcontractors to use its E-Verify system to prove employees working on government contracts are legally in the country.”

The rule has been the subject of an extended court challenge by business groups and civil liberties organizations.   The ACLU has argued, “The E-Verify system is based on the Homeland Security and Social Security Administration databases, which have unacceptably high error rates involving U.S. citizens’ records. Discrepancies between workers’ Social Security numbers and Social Security Administration records can result from many innocent factors including clerical errors, name changes due to marriage or divorce or the common use of multiple surnames.”

In July the Migration Policy Institute released a report recommending several key improvements in the E-Verify program.

On Friday a federal district court dismissed an injunction plea, which triggered implementation of the rule. The Department of Homeland Security’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) agency provides details on E-Verify at the USCIS website.

This is the second in a series begun on Monday, September 7.

Late on Tuesday, September 4, 2001 the President of Mexico, Vicente Fox, arrived in Washington D.C.  for a state visit.  On Wednesday key members of the US and Mexican cabinets met together. 

Significant attention was given to developing a bilateral approach to immigration reform. President Bush cautioned, “This is a complex issue,” he said. “It’s going to take a while to bring all the different interests to the table. But we’ve made good progress so far.”

But — with White House blessing — the Mexican President pressed hard for quick action on immigration. “We must, and we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end of this very year, which will allow us before the end of our respective terms to make sure that there are no Mexicans who have not entered this country legally in the United States and that those Mexicans who have come into the country do so with the proper documents,” Fox said.  (See more from CNN.)

CNN also reported, “He and Bush also are expected to discuss anti-drug efforts and a shared border-control program.” 

On Thursday, September 6 President Fox addressed a joint session of Congress.  Included in his remarks:

Take for example our common struggle against the scourge of drugs. It should be clear by now that no government, however powerful, will be able to defeat on its own the forces of transnational organized crime that lie behind drug trafficking. Intense cooperation is required to confront this threat, and trust is certainly a prerequisite of cooperation. This is why, since I took office last year, Mexico has enhanced its cooperation with U.S. authorities. We have arrested key drug kingpins and have extradited drug traffickers wanted by the United States Justice. However, much more needs to be done. Trust will be crucial to enhance intelligence and information-sharing between both governments. We’re committed to becoming a full partner with the United States in the fight against drugs… 

That night Lou Dobbs was in the CNN anchor’s chair for Kelly Wallace’s report on the speech and related news:

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: I’m willing to consider ways to — for a guest worker to earn green card status. And yet I fully recognize there are a lot of people who’ve stood in line, who’ve said I’ll abide by the laws of the United States. And we’re trying to work through a formula that will not penalize the person who’s chosen the legal route and at the same time recognize the contribution the undocumented has made.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

WALLACE: Another big issue: conservative critics who believe President Fox’s plan would basically reward those immigrants who broke the law to enter the U.S. No one, Lou, really expecting a big agreement by the end of this year, but everyone believing President Fox’s visit has increased the urgency on an issue Congress and the president likely to focus on in the months ahead.

Lou, back to you.

DOBBS: Kelly, very comforting language used by the president, talking about guest workers, not referring to these people as illegal aliens, but rather undocumented workers. All of this, I presume, designed to soften some of the tension between the two men over the issue and also to, perhaps, assuage the Latino voting public.

WALLACE: Well, certainly — you certainly know, Lou, that right off the bat the administration was very concerned that it was sort of being accused of supporting blanket amnesty for Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. illegally. President Bush saying he is against the “A” word.

And so you do see him talking about a guest worker program; maybe finding some middle ground. Allowing more Mexicans to come to the U.S., part of this guest worker program, to work here and, of course, to have some benefits and send that money back to Mexico. It’s a way of some middle ground. Obviously a big political issue that — the fight is just ahead.

Lou, back to you.

Lou did not comment and moved on to the next story, a 200-point plunge in the Dow Jones.  But I wonder if this is when Lou Dobbs began to perceive the potential for exploiting the “A word”?

On September 10, 2001 we were actively engaged in seeking innovative bipartisan and bilateral solutions to immigration, drug enforcement, and border issues between the United States and Mexico.  Lou Dobbs was not yet pandering for viewers.

Should we repudiate such September 10 thinking? 

Almost eight years to the day after President Fox landed in Washington, his successor reported to the Mexican Congress on his intense struggle against murderous drug cartels. 

On September 2, 2009, CBS News reported, “‘The past year has been a different year,’ said President Felipe Calderón during his third state of the nation address Wednesday. Different must be a euphemism for horrible. This was bound to be a difficult year to summarize for Mexico’s beleaguered President. In the past year he has been battered with several challenges: the world economic recession, the influenza outbreak, diminishing oil resources, the worst drought the country has seen in years, escalating drug violence, topped by the world’s belief that Mexico is ungovernable.”

Instead of repudiating September 10 thinking, we might mourn the opportunities lost in the years since.

According to the 9/11 Commission report,

On September 7 (2000), the Predator flew for the first time over Afghanistan.  When Clarke saw video taken during the trial flight, he described the imagery to Berger as “truly astonishing,” and he argued immediately for more flights seeking to find Bin Laden and target him for cruise missle or air attack.

Page 189-190

The BBC is reporting, “Three men have been found guilty of plotting to kill thousands of people by blowing up planes flying from London to America with home-made liquid bombs.”

The convictions, announced late on Monday, stem from arrests made in 2006. Law enforcement authorities indicate the plot was close to execution at the time of the arrests.

According to the BBC, “The plot is believed by intelligence sources to have been directed by al-Qaeda. The BBC understands that the key contact for the plotters in Pakistan was a British man, Rashid Rauf. He was reported to have been killed in November 2008 by a US missile strike against militants in Pakistan.”

Uncovering the plot resulted in a sudden ban on passenger-carried liquids. Regulations have since been regularized to manage the risk while allowing small amounts of liquids in carry-ons.

The Transportation Security Administration allows, “3-1-1 for carry-ons = 3.4 ounce bottle or less (by volume); 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-top bag; 1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin. One-quart bag per person limits the total liquid volume each traveler can bring. 3.4 oz. container size is a security measure.” Other TSA carry-on guidance is available here.

According to the Guardian, the 2006 operation exposed substantive differences — and strained relations — between British and US counterterrorist organizations.  There continues to be a US tendency to make arrests earlier, while the Brits extend surveillance as long as possible in order to flesh-out terrorists connections.

Does anyone know who coined “September 10 thinking” as a term of opprobrium? Does someone have Bill Safire on speed dial? He’s the expert on such origins.

Last week Abe Greenwald used the Curse of the Tenth to attack George Will’s Tuesday column, “Time to get out of Afghanistan“.  The neo-con attacks the tory with,

His column represents September 10 thinking, only worse. On September 10, we thought doing “only what can be done from offshore” was keeping us safe. Today we know how insufficient were our measures. On September 10, we thought a handful of special ops could mind a border that runs nearly half the lateral distance of the United States. Today we know that that terrain is endlessly accommodating to vast enemy armies. On September 10, we thought a monochromatic wasteland like Afghanistan didn’t “matter.” Today we know better.

There is little worse than to be on the wrong side of history.  But how do you know when you’ve been left behind?  To me the currents usually seem to swirl every which way.

This Friday it will be eight years from the day. We each remember where we were when we first heard, when we first saw the towers smoking or the Pentagon’s deep wound. How did it change your worldview, the range of options you consider reasonable, your perception of reality?

Was there a flash of clarity in that moment?  Or since?  What meaning have you made of the memories?

For me the 911 attack — while tactically audacious and unexpected  – was not a strategic surprise.  It fit a pattern that could be observed from, at least,  the 1993 WTC attack, to the double-trouble embassy bombings, to blasting a hole in the USS Cole.  We knew — or should have known — another state-side attack was coming. 

Just as we should anticipate another audacious attack sometime, somewhere inside the US… sooner now than later.

Perhaps because I was not surprised, my sense of discontinuity from September 10 to September 12 is less pronounced than for some others.  I am as motivated to prevent and mitigate as before.  I did not then — and do not now — expect complete success.

Eight years later — as on September 10, 2001 — I am concerned by our predilection for surprise.  Surprise can prompt over-reaction. I am as worried about our over-reaction amplifying harm as our adversaries’  capacity to cause harm.  

Fundamental to asymmetric warfare is luring the more powerful enemy into hurting itself.  Too often al-Qaeda has been successful in doing this. Some may see this concern as evidence of my ”September 10 thinking.”  If so,  I accept the critique.

To better understand September 10 thinking, I have looked back to what I was reading before the attack.  My sample is far from rigorous.  It depends mostly on my reading list having online archives easily available.  You may have a radically different reading-list.  If so, I hope you might use the comment function to remind us of our shared reality on the evening before “everything changed.”

Some quick samples:

The American Rome: On the theory of virtuous empire by Lewis H. Lapham in the August, 2001 Harpers magazine.  Lapham opens with a quote from Graham Greene, “Innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm.”  I don’t know about Greene, but Lapham makes the bell-less leper the United States, a bumbling bringer of harm.  During the 2000 election campaign no less than George W. Bush cautioned, “If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. And our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that’s why we’ve got to be humble, and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom.”  There was awareness of imperial hubris and its potential effect.

Bystanders to Genocide by Samantha Power in the September Atlantic. The author now serves on the White House National Security Staff.  Eight years ago she wrote,

Why did the United States not do more for the Rwandans at the time of the killings? Did the President really not know about the genocide, as his marginalia suggested? Who were the people in his Administration who made the life-and-death decisions that dictated U.S. policy? Why did they decide (or decide not to decide) as they did? Were any voices inside or outside the U.S. government demanding that the United States do more? If so, why weren’t they heeded? And most crucial, what could the United States have done to save lives?

We were being self-critical regarding how and why we make the most important decisions of when and where to apply US power.

Or perhaps you were reading How suicide bombers are made by Fiamma Nirenstein in the September, 2001 Commentary.  I recall being troubled by the essay’s tone.  But after September 11, I read it with different eyes and ears.

Are these September 10, 2001 questions and concerns irrelevant to us eight years later?  I don’t think so.  And if we were — as the 9/11 Commission so persuasively documented — aware of so much then, what might this tell us of our awareness and readiness today?

For the remainder of this week, please join me — pending breaking news and deferring to my colleagues’ posts — in considering what a September 10 mindset might tell us.

Over drinks late last week a senior military man — and long-time friend — surprised me by insisting it was time to cut a deal and (mostly) get out of Afghanistan. 

All I did was stammer, “I’m not there yet.” 

In this morning’s New York Times, Nick Kristoff is quoting a neighbor of mine to make a similar argument. 

Kristoff concludes, “The solution is neither to pull out of Afghanistan nor to double down. Rather, we need to continue our presence with a lighter military footprint, limited to training the Afghan forces and helping them hold major cities, and ensuring that Al Qaeda does not regroup. We must also invest more in education and agriculture development, for that is a way over time to peel Pashtuns away from the Taliban.”

Kristoff’s column reports on – and to my reading – may soften, the informed opinion of several national security and intelligence heavy-weights regarding the right choice for Afghanistan.  His sources include a neighbor (two hollers over and atop a taller mountain).

In his blog, my neighbor,  Howard P. Hart writes, “Given the realities of Afghan society, and the nature of the insurgents we are fighting, I believe that President Obama’s new strategy is a guaranteed recipe for failure, and is, in fact, self-defeating. While in theory we will lose fewer troops by abandoning aggressive search-and-kill missions, we will be setting up targets across the country that are perfectly suited to the insurgent’s attack capabilities.”

But what grabs my attention — in addition to reading this from a neighbor whom I respect — is Howard’s argument that a different strategy is better suited for dealing with AQ in Pakistan.  In the same blog post he writes,

Al-Qaeda has long since fled to Pakistan, where it is now firmly ensconced. Al-Qaeda should be fought in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan, where we are actually fighting the Taliban and other insurgents. IF we were to abandon Afghanistan and small units of al-Qaeda were to return, they could easily be attacked by raids by U.S. Special Forces troops based in Pakistan. We do not need to fight a major war against a completely unrelated enemy – the Taliban and other insurgent groups – in order to fight and defeat al-Qaeda.

As regular readers of  The Watch have noticed (and sometimes complained about), I give significant attention to Pakistan — especially FATA. But I  seldom deal with Afghanistan.  This is largely because the region’s homeland security threats are, to my way of thinking, mostly concentrated across the Durand Line from Afghanistan.

But my general sense has been we must persist in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan in order to maximize our impact against AQ and related targets in Pakistan.   My well-informed neighbor — and others — disagree.

Writing from far outside our neighborhood, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, offers something between what we think-we-know of the McChrystal plan and what Kristof and Howard suggest.  In today’s Washington Post, Rashid writes,

To emerge from this mess with even moderately credible Afghan partners will be difficult, but it has to be done. (The Americans could start by forcing Karzai to create a government that includes all leading opposition figures.) Without a partner, the United States becomes nothing but an occupying force that Afghans will resist and NATO will not want to support. Holbrooke’s skills as a power broker will be sorely tested, with his past successes in the Balkans a cakewalk compared with this perilous path. The Obama administration can come out of this quagmire if it aims low, targets the bad guys, builds a regional consensus, keeps the American public on its side and gives the Afghans what they really want — just the chance to have a better life. There is no alternative but for the United States to remain committed to rebuilding a minimalist state in Afghanistan. Nothing less will stop the Taliban and al-Qaeda from again using Afghanistan and now Pakistan to wreak havoc in the region and around the world.

My neighbor has me second-guessing my prior position.  For this, I thank him.  But Rashid makes an argument that still makes sense to me.  It is not my decision to make, thank God.  But in the next few weeks “we” (the sovereign plural of a republic) will choose… and after we choose, it will not be possible to retrieve the options available today.

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Prior posts on this topic in The Watch include:

Pashtun pride pressures US plans (August 30)

Can we take advantage of our adversary’s arrogance? (June 10)

You, me, Obama, Osama, and Omar: Climbing higher into the Hindu Kush (March 30)

In the Washington Post’s Saturday Style section Brigid Schulte brings us a great feature story on the down-and-dirty of catching H1N1.  She packs alot of facts into a  personal context.  Read her story at How, Gulp! You Get Sick.

This week the CDC released child care guidelines.

Friday the Pan American Health Organization released a new regional update on H1N1 infection.

Friday’s Wall Street Journal had a good update on vaccine development: Swine flu remains mild as vaccine advances.

This morning Ari B. Bloomekatz, Andrew Blankstein and Cara Mia DiMassa report in the Los Angeles Times, “A mammoth forest fire that killed two firefighters and has burned more than 147,000 acres was an act of arson, authorities said Thursday as they launched a homicide investigation into the deaths. Officials said they determined that the largest brush fire in the history of Los Angeles County was the result of arson after investigators examined forensic evidence from scorched landscape off Angeles Crest Highway, north of La Cañada Flintridge. The spot is believed to be the source of origin of the Station fire.”  (Please read the entire report.)

A few days ago a reader passed along information on the DHS “First Observer” program.  Enclosed with the Email was a brief blurb promoting a training event, “By participating in this 9-11 web cast, you will be a certified First Observer. You and thousands like you will help us put together pieces of complex security puzzles and allow us to solve those puzzles and prevent Attacks in a way we were unable to do prior to September 11, 2001.”

The reader had entitled the Email, “Calling George Orwell,” but otherwise reserved comment.

On the street where I grew up our first observers were Alice Bobo, wife of the firefighter next door, and across the street my Aunt Mae, wife of my grandmother’s half-brother Bob.  They were our intelligence service, border security team, and public health unit all wrapped into a wonderfully collaborative and unified operation.  I have never since encountered a surveillance and response capacity quite as effective.

And Alice Bobo’s “mint tea” (two red-and-white peppermint candies boiled into a cup of spring water) could mitigate a range of childhood disasters.

Together Mrs. Bobo and Aunt Mae  handled the whole block and most of the alley north of Fulton street.  If some eight-year-old tried a cigarette, one of them (both prodigious smokers) would let his or her mother know.  When the Morgan’s mother was gone and there was no food, Aunt Mae would show up with some of her Hungarian Goulash, which I have since learned was much more Midwestern than Magyar, but boy was it good.  Someone else would bring food the next day, and the next, until Mrs. Morgan returned.

One Sunday morning while we were at breakfast, Mrs. Bobo called my Dad about a little girl being beat up at a house two blocks away.  He ran out faster than I had ever (have ever) seen him move.  Dad returned shortly after with the girl.  She stayed with us a few days.

Okay, not exactly international terrorism.  Not exactly a 5.0 hurricane or a 7.5 earthquake.  But not entirely irrelevant either.

What Aunt Mae and Mrs. Bobo did was combine ongoing close-in  surveillance with trusted communication.  They took  coordinated action to prevent, mitigate and respond.  They were there, and organized others, to assist in recovery. 

Bad stuff — evil stuff — happened in my home town.  We were more Peyton Place or Harper Valley than Mayberry.  Maybe everyplace is a kind of Bedford Falls, it just depends on how many George Baileys you’ve got. We were more resilient because of Aunt Mae, Mrs. Bobo, and men and women like them. 

I’ve been thinking about how small-town neighbors communicate and cooperate while visiting the QHSR National Dialogue and listening in on the last few health care town halls. 

Small towns have their own deep dysfunctions.  But there is a discipline — and grace? — that comes from knowing you have to live with the guy who just offered his (idiotic) opinion.  “Now Jimmy, I know where you’re comin’ from…” (and you really do) and he knows where you’re comin’ from too.  You’ve  come together from those two different places for the last forty years and here you are again.

This may be some of what we saw in the friendship of Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy.  They had, after all, been in ongoing communication for over thirty years.  Capitol Hill can be like a small town.

I was reminded of these realities on Wednesday while seated in a board room with a major city’s business leadership working on private sector risk-readiness.  “What we have to do first,” one of the leaders said quietly, “is start talking to each other more and build trusted relationships. Once we have that foundation in place, we can achieve a great deal.  Without that, nothing much worthwhile will happen.”

The vocabulary is different, the setting is dramatically changed, but the human realities are the same.  Aunt Mae and Alice Bobo knew their community, cared about their community, and the community trusted, supported, and worked with them.

Whether certified or not, these are the observers we need.  This may be close to what Secretary Napolitano had in mind when she told the Council of Foreign Relations,

Has the United States government done everything it can to educate and engage the American people? The answer there is no. For too long we’ve treated the public as a liability to be protected rather than an asset in our nation’s collective security…  So here’s how we’re looking at this. First, with respect to individuals and the private sector, we’re taking a much closer look at how we can support and inform our greatest asset, individual citizens, and with them the private sector. You are the ones who know if something is not right in your communities, such as a suspicious package or unusual activity. (See complete remarks)

I probably don’t want a latter-day Alice Bobo “deputized” to enter information in compliance with 28 CFR, Part 23. But I expect George Orwell’s Big Brother is only possible where there are too few George Baileys actively engaged in their communities and neighborhoods.  With Aunt Mae and Alice Bobo working with the rest of us, Big Brother ain’t got a chance… and neither do others who wish us harm.

One of my colleagues asks his students to answer the question posed in the title of this post.  The assignment is difficult in at least two ways.  The question requires a reflection not typically encountered in their day to day homeland security work.  The students — experienced, erudite and articulate — are also asked to begin their response with a slide show.

Most of the students come from organizations caressed by the Angel of Death-By-PowerPoint.  So answering a profound question seriously, engagingly, and with a significant verbal constraint adds extra degrees of difficulty.

Mark is today’s guest blogger.  He works for the TSA.  [Update: "Mark" is Mark A. Holmstrup.  He is a Supervisory Field Attorney for TSA.]  Mark’s response to the question follows immediately after today’s public service message.

[Start Today's Public Service Message]

If you have not yet contributed to the second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Dialogue, please consider doing so, and click on this link to get started.  The Dialogue will allow you to reflect on “your place in homeland security and the place of homeland security in your world.”  And you can use words. No powerpoint required.

[End Today's Public Service Message]

Now back to our regularly scheduled post.

Late yesterday Louis Sahagun filed the following with the Los Angeles Times:

Authorities have established a “crime scene” this afternoon around the area where the Station fire began last week. U.S. Forest Service and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department investigators cordoned off a charred hillside next to Angeles Crest Highway. Under a 20-foot-tall oak tree that had been scorched by fire, three investigators sifted through dirt and ash near mile marker 29, about 2 1/2 miles north of La Cañada Flintridge. Investigators declined to comment. The highway, California 2, remains closed to the public.

When I teach in California it doesn’t take long before the prospect of arson-as-terrorism is raised.  So far, arson-as-personal-titillation is more common.  But a purposeful “scorched-earth” strategy would be much easier than many other modes of terrorist attack carried out.

As far as I know, the only documented uses of arson as a modern terrorist technique is an Earth Liberation Front operation early in this decade and more recently in Seattle.  Do you know of other examples?

Secretary Napolitano has five priorities:

• Guarding against terrorism
• Securing our borders
• Smart and tough enforcement of immigration laws
• Preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters
• Unifying and maturing DHS

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review – or at least the public dialogue around the QHSR — is organized around these  priorities.  A “senior official,” who would never talk to me again if I mentioned his name, told me the use of the Secretary’s priorities to frame the QHSR is an example of “over eager staffing” and a “bad idea” that is skewing strategic thinking.  He added that, “the Secretary probably hasn’t even noticed yet.” 

The senior official is trying to “open up the discussion to more interesting, or just more frames.”   Good idea.  Good luck.   I’m hoping this post helps and thanks for giving me permission to report your concerns.

I have already offered my own oblique critique of the current process, even while I commend the Department’s intentions and efforts.

The Secretary’s priorities are entirely fine.  They are perfectly reasonable  operational goals.  I have not, however, been able to – without considerable creativity – convert them into a meaningful strategy for homeland security.

According to the White House website, President Obama frames homeland security around some “guiding principles” and  seven verbs.

The President’s highest priority is to keep the American people safe. He is committed to ensuring the United States is true to our values and ideals while also protecting the American people. The President is committed to securing the homeland against 21st century threats by preventing terrorist attacks and other threats against our homeland, preparing and planning for emergencies, and investing in strong response and recovery capabilities. We will help ensure that the Federal Government works with states and local governments, and the private sector as close partners in a national approach to prevention, mitigation, and response.

The verbs with their objects are:

• Defeat terrorism worldwide
• Strengthen our bio and nuclear security
• Improve intelligence capability and information
• Ensuring a secure global digital information and communications infrastructure
• Promote resiliency of our physical and social infrastructure
• Pursue comprehensive transborder security
• Ensure effective incident management

Interesting to compare and contrast these seven with Secretary Napolitano’s five. 

By weaving together the President’s Cairo speech (and his remarks on Ramadan last evening) and John Brennan’s CSIS speech I have a pretty clear framing of a policy-strategy-operations continuum for counterterrorism.  In most other areas of homeland security I hear and read about priorities, goals, operations, budgets and tactics. But I have a hard time finding anything that strikes me as homeland security policy or strategy. 

Some will say policy (and strategy) is a matter of pretty is as pretty does.  I take the point.  My colleague Chris Bellavita would, probably, argue that it doesn’t matter all that much what is said, written, or earnestly intended,  but what actually emerges in behavior.  Yes, that is the real world.

But it is also my experience that what is written can, especially overtime, influence how we think and what we do.   Writing exposes sloppy thinking and hidden attitudes. Writing exposes relationships and opportunities.  Writing is — or can be — the genesis of new worlds. 

For Karl Popper writing is as “real” as the physical world and the world of human perception.  He called the physical, world 1, and  perception, world 2.  Popper named the written word and its products world 3.  In 1978 Popper concluded a University of Michigan lecture with this explanation of how these three frames interact.

Our minds are the creators of world 3; but world 3 in its turn not only informs our minds, but largely creates them. The very idea of a self depends on world 3 theories, especially upon a theory of time which underlies the identity of the self, the self of yesterday, of today, and of tomorrow… Our relationship to our work is a feedback relationship: our work grows through us, and we grow through our work. This growth, this self-transcendence, has a rational side and a non-rational side. The creation of new ideas, of new theories, is partly non-rational. It is a matter of what is called ‘intuition’ or ‘imagination’.  But intuition is fallible, as is everything human. Intuition must be controlled through rational criticism, which is the most important product of human language. This control through criticism is the rational aspect of the growth of knowledge and of our personal growth. It is one of the three most important things that make us human. The other two are compassion, and the consciousness of our fallibility.

I wonder if the paucity of attention given – so far — to a written homeland security strategy is due to the criticism it will inevitably attract.  The criticism will be delivered with little compassion and even less consciousness of fallibility.  Much of the criticism will be gratuitious and self-serving, won’t help much, and may even hurt in substantive ways.

Better to just keep our heads down and do, instead of writing or saying much about it, I can imagine practical men and women concluding.

But still, without world 3 our experience of world 1 and world 2 is narrowed, impoverished, and even threatened. 

As you contribute to the QHSR – and please do contribute — season your criticism with compassion and significant creativity.  It seems to me that the QHSR is the most promising process for producing a meaningful expression of homeland security strategy.

The Station Fire is now 22 percent contained.   Communications towers and other assets atop Mt. Wilson continue to be threatened.  Firefighters warn the risk remains high for a break-out on the Northern and Southeastern flanks of the fire. (More from the Los Angeles Times)

Photo by Don Bartletti, Los Angeles Times

Photo by Wayne Smith

Photo by Gina Ferazzi, Los Angeles Times