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	<title>Comments on: Templates, uncertainty, imagination, thinking and doing homeland security</title>
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		<title>By: John Glenn, MBCI</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/20/templates-uncertainty-imagination-thinking-and-doing-homeland-security/comment-page-1/#comment-139036</link>
		<dc:creator>John Glenn, MBCI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 23 May 2010 12:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.hlswatch.com/?p=9389#comment-139036</guid>
		<description>Too many Risk management/Business Continuity templates, especially those software-generated, are little more than &quot;check the box&quot; while trying to stuff square pegs into round holes. (OK - no more clichés.) No two organizations are the same (or units within an organization) - risk management, from identification and avoidance/mitigation to recovery can use a checklist &lt;b&gt;providing&lt;/b&gt; the people using it understand it only &lt;b&gt;is&lt;/b&gt; a checklist. Practitioners must, with Subject Matter Expert input, think beyond the checklist. Planning to avoid/mitigate threats very much requires human inquisitiveness and responses need to be entered into &quot;rubber banded&quot; boxes (i.e., boxes that expand to accommodate the content).

BTW, Mr Cumming, what is &quot;WH?&quot; White House? You wrote that &quot;since WWII the WH has tried to convince many of its infallibility&quot; then you wrote &quot;Are Americans so childish as to think that the President can save them from all their disasters...?&quot; Either the pols should change their tune (preferred), they should step up to the plate and meet their commitment to the people, or the people should consider all government talk just so much &quot;hot air.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Too many Risk management/Business Continuity templates, especially those software-generated, are little more than &#8220;check the box&#8221; while trying to stuff square pegs into round holes. (OK &#8211; no more clichés.) No two organizations are the same (or units within an organization) &#8211; risk management, from identification and avoidance/mitigation to recovery can use a checklist <b>providing</b> the people using it understand it only <b>is</b> a checklist. Practitioners must, with Subject Matter Expert input, think beyond the checklist. Planning to avoid/mitigate threats very much requires human inquisitiveness and responses need to be entered into &#8220;rubber banded&#8221; boxes (i.e., boxes that expand to accommodate the content).</p>
<p>BTW, Mr Cumming, what is &#8220;WH?&#8221; White House? You wrote that &#8220;since WWII the WH has tried to convince many of its infallibility&#8221; then you wrote &#8220;Are Americans so childish as to think that the President can save them from all their disasters&#8230;?&#8221; Either the pols should change their tune (preferred), they should step up to the plate and meet their commitment to the people, or the people should consider all government talk just so much &#8220;hot air.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: William R. Cumming</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/20/templates-uncertainty-imagination-thinking-and-doing-homeland-security/comment-page-1/#comment-139032</link>
		<dc:creator>William R. Cumming</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 22 May 2010 14:27:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.hlswatch.com/?p=9389#comment-139032</guid>
		<description>Plans almost never reveal their &quot;Planning Basis&quot; meaning what they actually are designed to do or how they will be scaled up for larger events. But the planning process can fill some large gaps and at least avoid the classic failure represented by those who are handing out their business cards in a real world event. Trust in the competence and knowledge basis of those running the crisis response is crucial to having a hope to succeed. 

What bothers me is that since WWII the WH has tried to convince many of its infallibilty in handling many crisis that in fact it cannot handle. Are Americans so childish as to think that the President can save them from all their disasters, personal, local, widespread or even of national or international scope? Apparently yes that is the thought process and so President&#039;s falling short will suffer the fallout from that failure.

Mobilization elements and logistics often ignored in many plans.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Plans almost never reveal their &#8220;Planning Basis&#8221; meaning what they actually are designed to do or how they will be scaled up for larger events. But the planning process can fill some large gaps and at least avoid the classic failure represented by those who are handing out their business cards in a real world event. Trust in the competence and knowledge basis of those running the crisis response is crucial to having a hope to succeed. </p>
<p>What bothers me is that since WWII the WH has tried to convince many of its infallibilty in handling many crisis that in fact it cannot handle. Are Americans so childish as to think that the President can save them from all their disasters, personal, local, widespread or even of national or international scope? Apparently yes that is the thought process and so President&#8217;s falling short will suffer the fallout from that failure.</p>
<p>Mobilization elements and logistics often ignored in many plans.</p>
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		<title>By: Philip J. Palin</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/20/templates-uncertainty-imagination-thinking-and-doing-homeland-security/comment-page-1/#comment-139021</link>
		<dc:creator>Philip J. Palin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 May 2010 09:43:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.hlswatch.com/?p=9389#comment-139021</guid>
		<description>Mr. Botterell, thank you. I was not aware of the Clarke text.  I have ordered it.  If it is as good as the publisher&#039;s blurb, I will order a box full and begin distributing free to colleagues.

Recently I was in conversation with some long-time, very smart, and professionally committed emergency planners.  They have been assigned to a regional catastrophic planning process.  During the conversation one of them remarked, &quot;We have to stop talking about this as a plan. You can&#039;t plan a catastrophe.&quot;  

The group seemed to quickly agree that the more potentially catastrophic an event, the less suited it is for detailed tactical plans.  The group never came up with a consensus term to replace &quot;plan.&quot;  Some of the options were &quot;strategy&quot; or &quot;framework&quot; or not trying to go beyond a Concept of Operations.

The shared, if inarticulate, understanding was that our intellectual and operational preparations for catastrophe must not obscure our limitations.  

I agree with Clarke&#039;s point that this small group&#039;s readiness to embrace the reality of their limitations is unusual... it was also empowering to their preparations.

Which to Bill Cumming&#039;s point I will add, there is a need for much more self-examination and self-criticism at every level of governance (beginning with the individual citizen) regarding the limitations of each and, as a result, the need for effective collaboration by all.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Botterell, thank you. I was not aware of the Clarke text.  I have ordered it.  If it is as good as the publisher&#8217;s blurb, I will order a box full and begin distributing free to colleagues.</p>
<p>Recently I was in conversation with some long-time, very smart, and professionally committed emergency planners.  They have been assigned to a regional catastrophic planning process.  During the conversation one of them remarked, &#8220;We have to stop talking about this as a plan. You can&#8217;t plan a catastrophe.&#8221;  </p>
<p>The group seemed to quickly agree that the more potentially catastrophic an event, the less suited it is for detailed tactical plans.  The group never came up with a consensus term to replace &#8220;plan.&#8221;  Some of the options were &#8220;strategy&#8221; or &#8220;framework&#8221; or not trying to go beyond a Concept of Operations.</p>
<p>The shared, if inarticulate, understanding was that our intellectual and operational preparations for catastrophe must not obscure our limitations.  </p>
<p>I agree with Clarke&#8217;s point that this small group&#8217;s readiness to embrace the reality of their limitations is unusual&#8230; it was also empowering to their preparations.</p>
<p>Which to Bill Cumming&#8217;s point I will add, there is a need for much more self-examination and self-criticism at every level of governance (beginning with the individual citizen) regarding the limitations of each and, as a result, the need for effective collaboration by all.</p>
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		<title>By: William R. Cumming</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/20/templates-uncertainty-imagination-thinking-and-doing-homeland-security/comment-page-1/#comment-139011</link>
		<dc:creator>William R. Cumming</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2010 14:12:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.hlswatch.com/?p=9389#comment-139011</guid>
		<description>Well templates have their problems. There was a template all the way back in the Federal Civil Defense Program for the STATES, then called CPG-101, evolving to SLG-101 (with attachment G for terroris in 2000-note pre-9/11) and now of course back to CPG-101 identifier. Several years ago in a very very expensive contract, the contractor reviewed state plans under SLG 101 (without Annex G) and still flunked over 50% of the states. Well the STATEs because of their reliance on property taxes have become the weak sisters in the Federal system. Can they be relied on? We saw in Katrina maybe not! There has been up to a 25% reduction in EM and HS capability because of the recession. Does anyone care? My suggestion is a permanent 24% pickup for the 500 largest metropolitian areas for public safety including, HS, EM, EMT, Public Health, Fire and Police. These top 500 are in fact NATIONAL Assets and should not be allowed to deteriorate in any future that can be anticipated. There is NO way the feds could recreate this local capability.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well templates have their problems. There was a template all the way back in the Federal Civil Defense Program for the STATES, then called CPG-101, evolving to SLG-101 (with attachment G for terroris in 2000-note pre-9/11) and now of course back to CPG-101 identifier. Several years ago in a very very expensive contract, the contractor reviewed state plans under SLG 101 (without Annex G) and still flunked over 50% of the states. Well the STATEs because of their reliance on property taxes have become the weak sisters in the Federal system. Can they be relied on? We saw in Katrina maybe not! There has been up to a 25% reduction in EM and HS capability because of the recession. Does anyone care? My suggestion is a permanent 24% pickup for the 500 largest metropolitian areas for public safety including, HS, EM, EMT, Public Health, Fire and Police. These top 500 are in fact NATIONAL Assets and should not be allowed to deteriorate in any future that can be anticipated. There is NO way the feds could recreate this local capability.</p>
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		<title>By: Art Botterell</title>
		<link>http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/05/20/templates-uncertainty-imagination-thinking-and-doing-homeland-security/comment-page-1/#comment-139008</link>
		<dc:creator>Art Botterell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2010 11:42:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.hlswatch.com/?p=9389#comment-139008</guid>
		<description>&quot;Compliance documents,&quot; we call them.  They replace creative problem identification, problem solving and team building with mere administrative procedure.  Which is much easier and less risky, and many practitioners are quietly grateful.

In Lee Clarke&#039;s1999 book &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&amp;bookkey=3635987&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster&lt;/a&gt; he argues that plans for catastrophic events are (quoting from the University of Chicago Press website) &quot;fundamentally rhetorical: the plans have no chance to succeed, yet they serve both the organizations and the public as symbols of control, order, and stability... Clarke concludes that society would be safer, smarter, and fairer if organizations could admit their limitations.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Compliance documents,&#8221; we call them.  They replace creative problem identification, problem solving and team building with mere administrative procedure.  Which is much easier and less risky, and many practitioners are quietly grateful.</p>
<p>In Lee Clarke&#8217;s1999 book <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&amp;bookkey=3635987" rel="nofollow">Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster</a> he argues that plans for catastrophic events are (quoting from the University of Chicago Press website) &#8220;fundamentally rhetorical: the plans have no chance to succeed, yet they serve both the organizations and the public as symbols of control, order, and stability&#8230; Clarke concludes that society would be safer, smarter, and fairer if organizations could admit their limitations.&#8221;</p>
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