My contention of the military generally performing better transboundary setting is linked directly to the way the military trains, a process where imaginative thinking ahead is emphasized as the cognitive goal, and where response flexibility to unpredictable threats constitutes a performance norm rather than exception. Albeit a gross oversimplification, I will also contend that the military operates largely within the tenets described by Boyd’s OODA Loop (for those not familiar with the concept , “Certain to Win”, the book written by one of Boyd’s close associates, Chet Richards, and published by Xlibris in 2004, will provide a perfect introduction.) It is, therefore, quite regrettable that most senior civil servants involved in disaster responses do not even know what OODA Loop is. It is then really not very surprising that with its performance ability, its materiel, its expertise in complex logistics, and its ability to rapidly generate a well defined operational structure based on command and control principles, the military offers a highly attractive alternative to costly, indecisive, and both blundering and timid civilian responses to catastrophic events.

Many of the civilian readers will bristle at my usage of the command and control (C2) concept. It must be constantly borne in mind that, military as it may be, the notion has nothing to do with the rigid, Prussian army-like, and awfully heavy-handed organization that operates along the inflexible lines of chains of stiff-necked command. Today, command and control refer not to directing ones forces in a manner one would command toy soldiers, but to the command and control of battle space. The side that commands that space and exercises its total control wins, since the attributes inherent to C2 assure operational initiative: one does not respond but anticipates and intercepts. Adverse events have minimal chance of evolving into major disasters causing their own chains of colateral destruction. Properly trained operational thinking allows anticipation of such events, and either their timely interception or even prevention from ever taking place. Command and control of a complex, dynamic, and unpredictable system is not among the typical cognitive attributes of a lawyer or administrator trained in linear thinking and suddenly thrown into the role of an operational or even strategic commander (but see Bill Donovan!)

Civilian agencies, with their jurisdictions defined either by law, by custom, or prior territorial voracity exercise C2 only within their narrowly defined spheres of competence. With unconventional disasters (e.g., the Gulf) being inherently transboundary, one has several “mini-C2” processes going on, with essentially no coordination by a single command authority whose actions are based on shared purpose, the latter in turn based on clearly identified actionable understanding among all actors that defines the manner in which the tasked mission is executed.

The approach based on unity of purpose and actionable understanding results in a clearly identified and highly specific mission (i.e., to say “recover from disaster” is not quite enough!), on which the available intellectual and material resources are then focused. Presently, civilian agencies are incapable of performing along such lines (the existence of NRF and ICS notwithstanding). What is worse, they do not anticipate using such approach operationally, despite protestations to the contrary, promises of cooperation, and the fact that examples of how successful such approach may be has been amply provided by military operations that often had no combat component at all.

In order to accept such examples as real and deserving one’s full attention, one must divest oneself from whatever dislike of the word “military” one might have (if that is, indeed, the case), and think of military operations as those of any other complex (NOT intricate!) system, e.g., healthcare. In such systems, non-linear events are the rule, and the habitual Newtonian destructuring to ever smaller parts in order to understand and interact with the whole that bureaucracies embrace, will, rather inevitably, lead to magnification rather than reduction of the original mega-crisis. Once the required mental transformation takes place, it will be much easier for the civilian personnel to learn from the military, and to adopt and adapt many of their operational approaches.

The transformation I call for is entirely possible. After all, nobody screams “FOUL” when the ultrasound sensor is applied to the belly of a pregnant woman in order to check the well being of an unborn child. Yet, the ultrasound device employed traces its origin directly to sonar and its quite murderous applications in antisubmarine warfare. Thus, In order to improve and be effective we must abandon prejudices and open our embarrassingly parochial minds to inventions and creativity of others. That openness will, in turn, help us to view and use our armed forces in the proper context of their role and function in the modern society.

One must constantly remember that it is NOT the role of any of the military services to function as the national first responder par excellence, the function imposed upon the military merely because the resources and appropriately trained personnel are there. In truth, the military represents an auxiliary force whose involvement must be subject to the command and control by the civilian authority. However, that authority must be fully cognizant with the effective use of the military; a British general, Sir Rupert Smith, analyzed these interdependencies thoroughly in his “The Utility of Force” (Knopf, 2007), and showed that the mere application of force is not enough, and may even result in grossly adverse consequences when implemented in separation from the realities of the environment in which that force is employed. In the present case, the environment means politics, inter- and intra-agency relationships, disparate organizational cultures of actors, etc., while the concept of “force” means the totality of all available resources thrown at the disaster. As Sir Rupert argues, there are times when less force and more understanding of the operational setting combined with a higher degree of collaboration and cooperation will attain a much better result than a blind, furious, and largely uncoordinated assault by many.

Today, the civilian response to disasters is best exemplified by what we see following a major car accident: police, firefighters, paramedics, journalists, morbidity seekers, and even a stray dog are all in attendance, all milling aimlessly but furiously around, most with a profound aura of self-importance, few with anything to do, most basking in the glare of strobe lights, and the sound of crackling radios, ALL immersed in the general excitement akin to that of fans at the football game, while only a tiny group single-mindedly devoted to the purpose of extricating the victim from a badly mangled car. The military, on the other hand, and the best example here is the New Orleans rescue operation conducted under the command of General Honore, executes its actions with the clear understanding of the mission ahead, and the resultant subordination and focus of all actions to the demands of that mission, and to the attainment of success. It follows, then, that if we wish to be effective, if we wish our civilian force to have full utility, we must develop at the level of the civilian strategic and operational command similar qualities of operational cooperation and collaboration that the military developed during the past decades. That such transition can be made is witnessed by the shift within the armed forces from bitterly divided individual services that fought each other for significance, funding, and role in national defense strategies to a vast organization, more like a corporation, where different functions are now subordinated not to the importance of individual divisions, but to the effectiveness of the corporation itself.

Curiously, the tools for the suggested transgenesis of the civilian world exist at both the military and the civilian side: the Teams of Leaders (ToL) concept, and the presidentially directed National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative. The ToL concept has been introduced by the US Army in response to its rapidly expanding mission profile, and the increasingly greater need to cooperate with civilian authorities in operations of essentially only a minimal military nature. It is a highly structured method allowing to rapidly develop the spirit and functionality of intense cooperation and collaboration among disparate organizations interacting within a highly complex, and dynamically changing environment. The concept has been adapted for civilian use by a ToL center recently created jointly by a US and a Canadian university, and it is now successfully applied at the executive level (i.e., civilian equivalent of strategic/operational command) to solving problems in a near-nightmarishly complex setting of the national and international healthcare. A series of symposia to be conducted during the next several months will introduce ToL as one of the powerful solutions to the problem of training civilians in the art of control and command based on interagency cooperation and collaboration, and a jointly developed shared purpose. Amalgamation of ToL within the NSPD training program would provide a powerful stimulus to help transforming agency-centered attitudes currently permeating echelons of Senior Executive Service (SES) into the equivalent of civilian “jointness” necessary for any measure of success.

In sum, several things must take place for the military to function efficiently and effectively within the structure of civilian directed, non-military operations. First of all, civilians must abandon the near-paralyzing fear of things military, and must understand the way modern armed forces function within the fabric of a modern civilian world. Secondly, civilian leaders must learn through adoption, adaptation, and training the art of effective operational command of resources put at their disposal, and the ability to control and use these resources as a combined, focused force rather than a set of specialized but independent and disconnected tools. Thirdly, civilian command authorities must abandon their traditional linear approach to problems, and substitute it with the flexible pattern of interactions with a complex system based on the combined ToL/OODA Loop action patterns. Finally, the civilian world must also accept the fact that in crisis, adherence to rules, protocols, and process hampers efficiency: none of the bureaucratic methods have been created with emergencies, but with a steady-state administration process in mind. In emergencies, there is no time for adherence to regulations whose only effect are debates, delays, inefficiency, and loss of operational initiative. Emergencies require action, and – as the military has learned through millennia of acting on the battlefield – the local commander must be granted full initiative, rather than be subject to a heavy-handed control by the headquarters minder. This is only possible when missions are specific, clear, and the “commander’s intent” is perfectly understood by all participating in the operation. In truth, these are the operational tenets dictated by the common sense. However, common sense is not always embraced by the bureaucratic process, and unless the civilian world dealing with catastrophic events learns to accept this truth, and choose common sense rather than the due process as the guiding principle, we will do nothing but inevitably fail, and then once again assure the nation that “next time we shall do better.”

While Barham has responded to Mr. Cumming’s riposte and not to my questions, I am in – vigorous – agreement with what he writes immediately above.

What neither of our newest contributors addressed — at least to my satisfaction — is the vulnerability all of us seem to see in the weakness of civilian capacity.

I do not worry over a Seven Days in May scenario. I am concerned by a gradual weakening of civilian capacity and credibility combined with strong and competent military capacity.

If I project into the delta of civil-military capacity a nation-shaking catastrophe, I am not sanguine regarding the consequences. But my purpose is to increase civilian capacity, not reduce — or malign — military capacity.

In any case, good encouragement for a Thursday post too long delayed.

Mobilization plans of the German army were nothing but the equivalent of our preparedness, i.e., the general ability to respond to what is largely predictable and where the only difference is the relatively small variation in intensity of the triggering event (“all hazard” response philosophy). Hence, we are relatively well prepared to deal with hurricanes (are we?), floods, forrest fires, etc. We are disastrously unprepared to deal with events that are intensely transbounbdary in nature, such as natural mega-events, pandemics, large scale terrorism, catastrophic scale industrial accidents, or wide-spread civil disturbances. Our civilian responders are not trained to operate in the setting of extreme fluidity of the operational environment, and their civilian superiors (administrators) have hardly any experience in work at the level of strategic or even operational headquarters. We have politicians turned strategic experts overnight, and journalists professing operational expertise after listening to a few briefings. Their actions and comments affect all others, both in the chain of administrative command, and among the general public that is typically ignorant of the true nature of the triggering event. Consequently, all actions are characterized by timidity, uncertainty of approach, fear of political and administrative consequences that such actions may evoke, and near complete inability to see the world through spectacles other than one’s own. What emerges is a myopic, narrow-minded, and patently ineffective senior command that hampers ground-level activities, amplifies bureaucracy as a bulwark against uncertainty, and promotes strict adherence to an inefficient “plan” as a much safer alternative to sound operational improvisation suggested by people in direct contact with the calamity itself. In the world of military operations, commanders with such traits are rapidly relieved of command: they are the cause of unnecessary casualties, and may cost the victory. In the world of civil service, senior officials of similar caliber thrive, get promoted, and in the process acquire even more power: avoiding to “rock the boat” keeps them safely away this most heinous of crimes in any public administration.

What follows as the consequence of public (civiilian) adminsitration preferring process over operational flexibility of the military, is a vast delay in effective response to crisis. The latter is eventually elicited by the criticism voiced with increasing force by lucid outside observers (many of them either serving or retired general/flag officers. In a rather curious fashion, the increased pressure and demand for decisiveness provide adequate protection against public criticism for potentially drastic actions which would otherwise cost one’s civil service head. The mounting pressure also offers a shield against political downfall: the dramatic action, suitably accompanied by a truly Hecdtorian message will now be vieweda sign of moral fiber and of true resolve rather than a sign of belatedly returning common sense. Interestingly, while such delayed actions triggered by the mounting public pressure may be enough to save careers of civil servants and their political masters, they are rarely if ever enough to offer adequate protection to the victims affected by the disaster. In the military world this is known as a rout. Civilians call it a “measure of success.”

In the military reality, doctrine provides the essence of the manner in which the war is fought. The plan provides a rough outline of how we would like it be fought. The operational reality is, however, always different from even the best prepared plan. Thus, preparedness which assured that at least the first steps are executed sensibly is substituted by readiness, i.e., the ability to counteract the unexpected, exploit its characteristics to own benefit, adapt, overcome, and move forward. Such flexibility can be attained only through intensive training, and such training simply does not exist in the civilian world, whose principal preoccupation has been always centered on devising “plans” and on adherence to the “process.”

Embarassingly enogh, the new flight of emergency managers educated by our universities and colleges has virtually no intensive operational training at all. Instead, the belief that a master’s or doctoral degree in emergency management appear to be are sufficient to assure success in operations executed under often immense pressure, in face of overwhelming odds, and under incessant onslaught of unpredictability. Academics, often adverse to the military thought, typically with only dim view of what military really is and what is its role in the modern society, have no foundation to proivide the required operational training. First responders working as lecturers at colleges and universities provide nothing but exposure to tactical level thinking. Operational and strategic training does not exist, and its absence shows when the unexpected knowcks at the door. In the end, like now, the civilian world knocks on the door of the military, doing it too late, and asking for the near impossible – transforming a resounding roout into a resounding success. Than taking credit for it.

There is no question that both in the civilian and the military worlds the “plan” and the “process” have their role, and that both are important under normal, “steady state” conditions. But when an unconventional crisis occurs, attributes other than the ability to stick to the plan enforced through the steps of a familiar process must prevail. History of public administration as much as of military operations is replete with disasters caused by those in power or command who followed the plan rather than responded to the reality, and who were incapable of anticipating the first wave of consequences elicited by their actions, not to mention the third, or even higher level of such consequences. In truth, there are no “unintended consequences.” There are only consequences either ignored as improbable or unseen, because we are unwilling to take a peek over the fence of our own parochialism. Freedom from such constraints can be achieved only through appropriate and intense training. Civilians, for whatever reason, do not see its value, and focus on development of qualities that, in the pressure of “combat” prove consistently worthless. For the military, on the other hand, such training makes the difference between life and death, and it is because of such training that the military, while accepting the necessity of planning, is the first to reject a plan when it conflicts with the operational reality on the ground.

One of the benefits of asynchronous communication is the opportunity to pause, reflect, and think before responding. For the moment, I will take advantage of that benefit.

1) The USA is one of only a few countries that separate security from defense. We require use of the Stafford Act to do what many countries do seamlessly.
2)If you followed the Rolling Stone/General McChrystal thing, you surely noted that there were no opinions by senior retired military arguing against civilian control or not supporting the General’s removal. In 234 years, for the life of me, I cannot find basis nor understand this fear of Seven Days in May expressed on occassion.
3) The issue that our Washington “Ellite” seem incapable of grasping is that – due to technology (how we can communicate and where we can build)and changes in a globalized world -what we like to note as Low Probability, High Impact events have become “Absolute-Certainty, Low-Predictability, High-Impact” incidents that take place all the time.

Some refer to General Honore as the “CAT 5 General” but nothing indicates senior decision makers have incorporated the lesson. Consider this:

Researchers note that there are “disasters that go beyond typical disasters.” The latter have come to be noted as “catastrophes.” Most notably would be 9/11, the 2004 Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and in 2010, the earthquakes in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

By virtue of unusual scale, a previously unknown cause, or an atypical combination of sources, responders face challenges that are indeed novel, the facts and implications of which cannot be completely assimilated in the moment of crisis.

These events are not only characterized by high stakes—the likelihood of major losses (to life, limb, property, heritage, or other highly valued social or private assets) – but they have shared striking similarities, inasmuch as they foster destabilization of leaders in charge of response and reconstruction efforts, and the whole of communities.

Catastrophes generally exhibit a high level of uncertainty about just what the outcomes will be and a high degree of contingency – significant variability in the possible outcomes that may result under different choices of action. Much is at stake, and the results will depend on what we do—but we do not know for certain which course of action will be best.

These events are thus distinguished from more familiar or routine emergencies and conventional disasters by the presence of significantly new circumstances and different kinds of intellectual challenges, thus the use of the terminology unconventional crises.
The main characteristic of unconventional events is that they are exceedingly difficult to map. This can be due to (a) the technical complexity of response efforts; (b) an unusually complex geography of affected areas; (c) the potential for a crisis suddenly to affect systems and interests that initially seemed remote ; (d) a bewildering kaleidoscope of stakeholders; or (e) confusing, overwhelming, or, conversely, insufficient information. With high degree of difficulty in “mapping” the operational environment, we now require decision making under circumstance with hyper complex characteristics.

Planning for the unconventional crisis should include civilian agencies, military, private sector, and communities. While we have this in some sense, it has not been formulated, stated or therefore understood at all levels as a function of a specific type of crisis. Therefore we get dithering when we need decision making and adaptability.

When these type events occur, we cannot afford military paranoia.

First, full disclosure: I have followed this dialogue over the weekend because of being informed by Barham.
My thoughts follow:
1) Mr Cumming replies only “well an interesting comment.” Seriously that’s it? But wait for it -”events not subject to command control”
Sir, if you wish to be taken seriously in your concern for militarization of supposedly civilian owned process it would seem important to recognize that “command control” is indeed exercise of power to include application of resources. I believe that’s what incident command and NIMS is all about. Control of chaos may be a high human “desire”???, but most importantly, it is required if communities are to survive on their own terms.

2) As to complexity requiring collaboration – absolutely! We face in Erwan Lagadec’s terms “unconventional crisis” requiring unconventional leadership. The “team of leaders” construct was developed – believe it or not, Mr. Cumming by two Army Generals and is being implemented in EUCOM across multipleorganizational boundaries.

3)Your points in this post concerning selection of a serving SECNAV to lead a planning effort and what the legal words imply would draw more serious consideration, if your comments were not so tinged with sarcasm, and contempt for the military and the Navy in particular. To the point you write:
“Who in the civil agencies thinks a former STATE governor and current SECNAV knows a thing about large scale domestic civil crisis management and response. Well we are about to find out. Oh that’s right the US NAVY is not yet a nuclear navy and still runs largely on fossil fuels. Good luck RAY!”

Well sir, who in this COUNTRY thinks the civilian side that you tout so highly for their planning and knowledge believes 70 plus days into Deepwater has even a clue about how to fix things?

As a Navy guy, any event occuring in open ocean, at depth of 5000ft is day one minute one a most severe crisis. The issue required day one response, not letting BP play out to see how well they did, or even giving decision making about “who pays” a primary consideration. This may not be a battlefield, but lack of thinking of it as one was pure and unnecessary folly. While you worry about Seven Days in May, a whole region is under unrelenting attack with no near term solution at hand.

Who indeed might think and act appropriately?

First, just to be doubly clear, I do NOT perceive the SecNav’s appointment to lead the Gulf restoration planning process to be an example of militarization. I understand Mr. Mabus has been appointed for reasons unrelated to his SecNav role and this assignment will not include Department of Navy staff or resources.

Second, while I would argue my concerns related to militarization are evidence-based, I will admit the evidence is somewhat (even extremely) dated and drawn mostly from outside the United States. Further I will readily admit that both the DOD and National Guard have great resources and have demonstrated considerable competence responding to emergencies and disasters.

I broadly agree (with lots of footnotes) with Barham’s assessment that, “It (the military) is simply trained to perform in the world of battlefield ambiguity while senior civilian managers are trained to perform best in the predictable, solid world of bureaucratic rules contemplated as far from the site of hot action as it is only possible.”

It is the paucity of education, training, and professional development of civilian homeland security personnel that is at the heart of my concern.

Over the last sixty years – and especially the last 35 years – the US defense community has become an expert producer and distributor of intellectual capital. In my judgment we increasingly defer to and depend on the military because we have so successfully invested in their competence and capacity.

But Barham, are you entirely unconcerned at the growing delta between civilian and military capacity? At some point doesn’t the delta become more than an operational issue and become a matter of constitutional concern? Is there any limitation you would place on what is an appropriate military role in prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery for domestic emergencies and disasters?