Homeland Security Presidential Directives: affirm and adapt, delegate and revise, or abrogate with simple elegance
This is a continuation of yesterday’s post. The following is taken from a late 2008 memorandum recommending how to effectively treat the 24 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) that were extant in December 2008. There is a rumor circulating that the National Security Staff will shift its focus from substantive re-writes of HSPDs to concise clarification of policy and strategy. This was also a recommendation of this memorandum (see yesterday’s post).
The recommendations made below emerged from a consultation with several State homeland security leaders following Mr. Obama’s election.
Recommended Action for Specific HSPDs
HSPD – 1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
Abrogate and replace (see annex for draft)
HSPD – 2: Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 3: Homeland Security Advisory System
Delegate and Revise. This is a notorious system that undermines public confidence in Homeland Security. But sudden abrogation would complicate several current procedures for jurisdictional alert and response.
HSPD – 4: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version exists that does a good job of communicating strategic intent.
HSPD – 5: Management of Domestic Incidents
Affirm and Adapt. This is foundational to several other HSPDs. The current HSPD needs much more attention to resilience, mitigation, the role of State partners, key issues of civil-military relations, and de-conflicting White House leadership roles.
HSPD – 6: Integration and Use of Screening Information
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
Delegate and Revise. It is possible that an outcome of the review and revision process may be a new Presidential strategy statement related to this issue. But, if so, the strategy statement should be disentangled from the significant operational and even tactical scope of the current HSPD.
HSPD – 8: National Preparedness
Affirm and Adapt. Given both its content and relationship with other HSPDs this is among the most important HSPDs. But it will require very substantial adjustments. It may be the worst written and most confusing of all existing HSPDs.
HSPD – 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version exists that does a good job of communicating strategic intent.
HSPD – 11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
Delegate and Revise (in tandem with HSPD 6)
HSPD – 12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 13: Maritime Security Policy
Affirm and Adapt. This may be the most thoughtfully constructed of the current HSPDs and offers – in contrast with the other documents – the distinction between policy/strategy and operations/management as the goal of White House direction.
HSPD – 14: Domestic Nuclear Detection
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 15: U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version has not been developed. The lack of a non-classified overview lessens the likelihood of a layered and networked strategy of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
HSPD – 16: National Strategy for Aviation Strategy
Delegate and Revise. It is possible that an outcome of the review and revision process may be a new Presidential strategy statement related to this issue. But, if so, the strategy statement should be disentangled from the significant operational and even tactical scope of the current HSPD.
HSPD – 17: Nuclear Materials Information Program
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version has not been developed. The lack of a non-classified overview lessens the likelihood of a layered and networked strategy of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
HSPD – 18: Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Affirm and Adapt. There is a need for more robust attention to the role of the States, private sector, and public education in developing core resilience.
HSPD – 19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
Delegate and Revise
HSPD – 20: National Continuity Policy
Affirm and Adapt. Careful review of possible second and third order effects should be undertaken in the process of adaptation.
HSPD – 21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness
Affirm and Adapt. As with most of the current HSPDs the document focuses so much attention on how that why is obscured. It has now been 12 months since promulgation. Adaptation could provide for more focus on the strategic rationale and outcome.
HSPD-22: Domestic Chemical Defense
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version has not been developed. The lack of a non-classified overview lessens the likelihood of a layered and networked strategy of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
HSPD-23: Computer Network Monitoring and Cyber-Security
This is classified and outside the purview of this report. A non-classified version has not been developed. The lack of a non-classified overview lessens the likelihood of a layered and networked strategy of prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
HSPD-24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security
Delegate and Revise (in tandem with HSPD 6 and HSPD 11)
(End of the original 2008 memorandum)
In my experience the most effective written guidance on policy or strategy is concise — even simple — and reinforced through constant communication and engagement. In my world policy explains the goal and why it has been selected. Strategy explains broadly how the goal will be advanced. A Presidential statement should usually attend to both policy and strategy. As the National Security Staff considers how to translate the HSPDs into more effective forms, here are some key characteristics of effective strategic guidance. (I think these are derived from someone else, but I don’t remember who):
Developing strategy as simple rules is not simple. It takes hard thinking, testing, revising, and experience. But in the end the simple rules provide effective guidance in a way a whole library of specific-use strategies cannot. Best wishes in your important work.
