Homeland Security Watch

News and analysis of critical issues in homeland security

June 25, 2013

Does Moneyball have anything for homeland security?

Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Christopher Bellavita on June 25, 2013

Moneyball is an informal name given to sabermetrics.

Sabermetrics comes from the acronym SABR, the Society for American Baseball Research. Specifically, sabermetrics is about using non-traditional statistics to determine how baseball players perform.  More generally, it is about using numbers to measure performance.

This is going to be the homeland security link. The enterprise continues to have problems connecting spending to performance.  There’s less homeland security money to spend.  Where should it go?

The theological response includes the chant “risk-based.” The political answer is more nuanced.  But I’m getting ahead of myself.

I’m thinking about Moneyball in part because the Oakland A’s took four games from the New York Yankees earlier in June.  The A’s have a 60 million dollar team salary; the Yankees spend 203 million.

I’m also thinking about Moneyball because of an article I read last week by John Bridgeland and Peter Orsazag called Can Government Play Moneyball?: “How a new era of fiscal scarcity could make Washington work better.”

The A’s get credit for popularizing sabermetrics.  In 2002, they were expected to use their 41 million dollar team salary to compete against teams like the Yankees (with their 215 million dollar payroll).

Michael Lewis’s “Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game” gives the details.  Several people in the A’s hierarchy wanted to make resource allocation decisions based on a broad range of rigorous statistical analysis.  They wanted to supplement, if not replace, the traditional measures used by experienced baseball men — mostly gut feel — to decide how to spend money. There’s a vivid scene in the Moneyball movie that shows how baseball scouts reacted to the new rules.  Not well.  But the A’s went to the playoffs in 2002 and 2003.

Sabermetrics got the credit.  Other teams and sports took notice.  Moneyball — “replacing scouts’ traditional beliefs and biases about players with data-intensive studies of what skills actually contribute most to winning” — arrived.

Bridgeland and Orsazag think we can do something like moneyball with government spending.

They start their article with this:

Based on our rough calculations, less than $1 out of every $100 of government spending is backed by even the most basic evidence that the money is being spent wisely. As former officials in the administrations of Barack Obama (Peter Orszag) and George W. Bush (John Bridgeland), we were flabbergasted by how blindly the federal government spends. In other types of American enterprise, spending decisions are usually quite sophisticated, and are rapidly becoming more so: baseball’s transformation into “moneyball” is one example. But the federal government—where spending decisions are largely based on good intentions, inertia, hunches, partisan politics, and personal relationships—has missed this wave.

The authors offer anecdotes and data to support questioning the relationship between spending and performance.  That’s not a new insight.  But it’s a measure of how jaded you’ve become if you can read without surprise that the Scared Straight-type programs increases criminal behavior rather than decreases it, or that a member of congress can respond to a data-based program suggestion by saying ““You and your staff may have your Ph.D.s, but you have no clue…. “We don’t need any of your fancy analysis.”

I’m sure you have your own stories.

The authors believe things can change:

We’re optimistic too, even though the obstacles to moneyball in government are daunting. Absent major changes in campaign finance, special interests that profit from blind budgeting will still have a powerful means of thwarting reform. Agencies’ staff will roll their eyes at the next round of “budget reforms,” wait out the incumbent, and then continue business as usual. And members of Congress will stay wedded to their legacy programs.

But we believe the federal budget crunch will force change. Already, many cities have had to choose between fewer cops and fewer teachers; between slower ambulance response and less-frequent garbage removal. The federal government is now beginning to face similarly stark choices. Do we really want to furlough hundreds of FBI agents at a time of heightened threats? Or lay off air-traffic controllers? Do we really want big cuts at the National Institutes of Health or to early-childhood-education investments, both of which are engines of economic growth? Do we really want to eat our seed corn?

Does moneyball (as metaphor or program) have anything to offer homeland security? Something is needed.

In yesterday’s Homeland Security Watch, Beckner wrote about a fiscally irresponsible and data-blind proposal to almost double the size of the border patrol and reincarnate SBInet.

Also yesterday the Government Accountability Office provided what seems to be their annual reminder that

According to FEMA officials, neither program [ Emergency Management Performance Grants and Assistance to Firefighters Grants programs] has a standardized tool with which to validate the performance data that are self-reported by recipients; additionally, the regions are inconsistent in their approaches to verifying program performance data. The absence of a formal established validation and verification procedure, as directed by Circular No. A-11, could lead to the collection of erroneous performance data.

A friend recently sent me a collection of articles making the same point.  Here’s a sample (with my emphasis):

Cybersecurity — DHS IG Says Department Lacks Strategic Plan To Implement Cybersecurity Mandate. The Government Computer News .. cites a “recently released” report by the DHS Office of Inspector General which says DHS’ efforts at implementing the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2010 “are hampered by a lack of a strategic plan with long-term goals and metrics”….

New border policy – House Committee Approves Border Security Legislation. All 32 members of the House Committee on Homeland security voted Wednesday in support of legislation by Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX) that would “require the Department of Homeland Security to establish metrics and a roadmap for additional enforcement before seeking additional enforcement spending….”

Old border policy – Napolitano, McCain Discuss Border Security, Immigration Reform In Arizona.  KPHO-TV Phoenix notes differences in gauging border security between Napolitano and Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer. KPHO says that while “Napolitano says the border is the safest it’s been in decades,” Brewer argues the border won’t be secure until local residents indicate as much. Meanwhile, “McCain said at this point there is no way to gauge when the border is secure,” stating, “We’ll have to establish those metric and they are very difficult. Right now there are not enough sufficient metrics in order to make that assessment.

TSA – Pistole Defends Behavior Detection Program. USA Today reports the IG “said in a 41-page report…that the TSA doesn’t effectively assess the program or have a comprehensive training program.” Assistant inspector general for audits Anne Richards wrote, “As a result, TSA cannot ensure that passengers at United States airports are screened objectively, show that the program is cost-effective or reasonably justify the program’s expansion.”

Information Sharing Enterprise — ODNI’s Networking Efforts Cited In Appeal For Agencies To Share More Information. Government Executive reports Leon Fuerth, former national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore, argued Monday at a global policy forum in Washington that … “Networked governance structures can facilitate rapid flow of information and can thus serve as the basis for a smarter and more prescient bureaucracy.” He added that Washington is moving towards this, citing “the Office of Management and Budget’s implementation of cross-agency priority goals and metrics under the 2010 Government Performance and Results Modernization Act…as well as in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” but cautioned that “a like effort by the Obama White House national security team…was derailed by congressional appropriators who felt undermined.

I’m sure you have your own stories.

A sometimes cynical college tells me moneyball in government is simply another way one set of interests will try to take power away from another group. He believes moneyball won’t work.

As much as I would like to see something like moneyball (as metaphor or experiment) crack the performance code, I’m not optimistic.  Unlike baseball, where performance is measured every time a ball is put into play, homeland security is more like the game of Chinese baseball described in a 1975 Public Administration Review article by R. G. H. Siu (the article – Chinese Baseball and Public Administration – is behind a $25 JSTOR paywall): once the ball is in play (I’m paraphrasing), any player can change any of the rules, move any of the bases, alter the field or modify the game in any way that seems sensible at the time.

Keep the game going.

If the history of homeland security budgeting and spending has demonstrated one truism over the past dozen years it is this: threat specters trump performance metrics. The fear of terrorists, cybersecurity villains, mega-disasters, hoards of illegal immigrants, rampant drug smuggling, and information dots not getting connected in time outgun rule-loving, eye-shadded, data-sniffing nerds.

Keep the game going.

I do think Bridgeland and Orsazag’s idea is worth tinkering with.  If moneyball did come to homeland security, what might it look like?  What numbers could tell us more about performance than the current approach of dividing “number of things” into “amount spent?” Maybe there is someone in the homeland security enterprise already doing this, or something like it. If so, where are you? What are you doing?

One more thing. If moneyball does have something to teach homeland security, the teacher probably won’t be very involved with the “doing” of homeland security.

Neither sabermetrics nor moneyball came from baseball players.

————————–
Correction and updates June 25, 2013 11:18 AM :
1. The A’s only took three games in a row from the Yankees in June, not four. I had that confused with the Met’s four game sweep of the Yankees in May.

2. A helpful explanation of Moneyball can be found in Season 22, Episode 3 of the Simpsons, called “Moneybart”. The explanation starts around the 7:45 mark.

3. For reasons buried in gramatical tombs, the apostrophe in “A’s” is apparently correct, as is the absence of one in “Simpsons.”

4. For more on how FEMA assesses preparedness, please see Tim Manning’s June 25, 2013 “Written testimony of FEMA Protection and National Preparedness Deputy Administrator Tim Manning for a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia hearing titled “Are We Prepared? Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11”.  The proposal to “establish a National Preparedness Grant Program” is described toward the end of the testimony.

5. Among the thoughtful comments on today’s post, please see the ones by “JD” and an equally anonymous ”street cop.”

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18 Comments »

Comment by Quin

June 25, 2013 @ 6:58 am

I’ll read the article tonight, but I will hazard two comments without having read more than the post (dangerous I know) First, it’s spot on that “metrics” a word that started popping up a few years ago, are quite absent substantively. What I mean by that is numbers that translate into practical results, not just numbers to fill out plans and papers. I do think people are now at least aware of them. I just don’t know if they’ll like the answers.

Second, I hate Moneyball. When you have Zito, Mulder and Hudson in your rotation and you’re gifted some other no brainer all-stars, you would have to be incompetent in retrospect NOT to win with those guys. The fact is, the A’s were loaded with talent, much of which Beane did not acquire. And while its a great story, and it does stand for a concept, the bottom line is they never won. With all due respect to the Rays and some other smaller market teams (like my Padres) the single most important factor in playing winning baseball is money, as in gross revenues. The disparity in the game still trumps innovation, though innovation coupled with luck can sometimes prevail. But just look at the Yankees and Red Sox this year. The Red Sox imploded, spent more money, and are back in first place with the best record in AL. Who is right behind them? The Yankees, who at one point the salaries of just their players on the DL was larger than something like half the teams in all of MLB entire team salaries. There’s a lesson in there for HLS.

Moneyball, a great story, a promising, interesting concept. But not reality.

Go Padres.

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 25, 2013 @ 7:52 am

Chris! This is a terrific post as is usual from you! Thanks for the work and thinking behind it.

Some thoughts: I really like Michael Lewis stories. But disclosure saw neither the movie nor read the book and not sure why. I guess just to far down my backlog of reading.

But a primer on metrics and statistics. First, OMB controls all statistics gathered, analyzed, and dessiminated by the federal executive branch. Surprise surprise perhaps. They are housed in the Executive Offices of the White House.

Just as there should be an office of an official historian, a Chief Economist, etc etc. each fedreral organizational entity should have an office of a Chief Statistician. Until largely destroyed by the Reagan Administration Offices of Policy Planning and Program Review or some such title were the place where many feeble statistical operations were housed.

Few of the above actually had trained statisticians. I believe statistics is still one of the 10 exams taken to qualify as an actuary.

There should be legislation giving a mandate and authority to each office of the Chief Statistician.

FEMA, the organization from which I retired, had personnel that absolutely abhorded any project that involved numbers, and that of course is why FEMA has never conducted meaningful statistical reviews. Even budgei

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 25, 2013 @ 7:59 am

CONTINUED:

Even budgeting, the lifeblood of an federal organization, was a mysterious wonderland to all but a dozen FEMA officials and employees.

In another comment recently I revealed a conversation with a GAO staffer on the duplication and overlap of federal programs, functions, and activities team and she agreed with me that most agencies have so stovepiped that few understand those duplications and overlaps, even the beu

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 25, 2013 @ 8:08 am

CONTINUED:

even the budget types!

And the relationships to big data are striking. I understand Director Fugate announced to FEMA personnel that he had requested NSA to study all phone calls and e-mails of FEMA personnel. WOW!

In that vein little was discussed on this blog about the growth of the surveillance state but the following might be of some interest:

http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Appropriate gathering of statistics by an informed management is not surveillance but the relationship might well be argued pro or con by some!

The lobbies long ago understood that if the Executive Branch is flatly prohibited from gathering key statistics or not funded to do so they regulation fails.

Comment by Dan O'Connor

June 25, 2013 @ 9:07 am

Beane had a good pitching staff, ok…but he was Alderson’s protégé continuing on a course of action and understood two things were important; runs and wins.
But that’s for another discussion. And the book was much better than the movie.

But getting back to the essence of the conversation. Moneyball was about maximizing conditions for winning at the lowest available price. So if that’s the context of the conversation I think we have to move the conversation past the “metric” and define “winning”.
What is winning in terms of homeland security?

Is it no attacks?

Is it no catastrophe?

Is it speed of response?

It at best is a highly personalized if not nuanced conversation and at worst an undefinable conversation. So how do we put money against nuanced, nebulous, and activities that may not garner the win?

We are no longer able to define winning in the context of warfare so how could we define a state or idea of security?

Baseball games have to have an end, hence there is always a winner. It is a very simply game in that context.

What’s the homeland security game? Is it Congress and the Senate making decisions based on politics instead of need? Chris Beckner was pretty adamant about the immigration bill and border security plan as not being smart.

“This proposal is a terrible idea – one that would be wasteful of taxpayers’ money and is not based on sound operational or technical analysis as to what investments are really needed to improve border security.”

But here we are;

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/24/us-usa-immigration-idUSBRE95N1EB20130624

So if experts and “general managers” and those charged with maximizing utility and efficacy for the lowest price possible are overridden, second guessed, and derided why make the argument?

Let’s compare Moneyball to Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security by John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. Their argument is that cost-benefit analysis needs to be applied to security expenditures. They make the case that for current spending levels to be cost-effective the U.S. government would “have to prevent four Time Square-type attacks every single day.” Is that winning?

There is no binary argument to be made within the security bureaucracy. There is no win and loss record. There is no championship and therefore no legitimate means of accountability with the exception of occasional ripples made within the House and Senate.

This security argument reminds me of the old adage of what is obscenity? I’ll know it when I see it. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart used the phrase to describe his threshold test for obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). So if it’s all open to interpretation then what metric works?

Maybe we could get the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) derivative folks to figure it out.

Oakland under Beane’s leadership has a winning record and some playoff success with a payroll that ranks 27th out of 30 teams. Winning is not losing. And losing is not winning. Until we define winning no amount of spending, rhetoric, analysis, and debate will articulate with clarity how effective our spending is.

Play ball!

Comment by JD

June 25, 2013 @ 9:22 am

If only getting better measures/stats were the key to better policy!

It has long been a grail-like quest to find a few specific measures that could track our homeland security progress. But the stats are only useful to a point, as even the A’s found out in the end.

The desire for metrics, and the use of data can be useful, but also can be quite overdone. Their use in modern U.S. government can trace roots back to Robert McNamara in DOD, to the New Public Management and GPRA reforms under Clinton/Gore, to the performance scorecards used by the Bush 43 administration. A lot of smart folks have tried to nail this down, and continue to fail to capture that grail.

Why?

The stats challenge in the public space is multiple: for example:

(1) measures do not easily capture non-economic measures of social good in the public space;

(2) measures do not easily capture outcomes (how safe is safe?);

(3) the problem set does not remain static, that is the measures need to evolve with the problem over time, unlike the sales measures in a corporate ledger – look at the emergence of cyber, as an example;

(3) there are distinct differences in the agendas of policymakers on many issues, such as whether to open or close the country to immigration, therefore the measures themselves become politicized with meaning;

(4) the public space deals with wicked problems, inherently complicated, that the private space (or baseball) does not;

(5) the government’s role in any endeavor is to balance efficiency of service, effectiveness of service, and equity of service delivery, but these are often in conflict with each other. The effort to tweak programs aimed at solving one problem often leads to problems elsewhere, like squeezing-the-balloon on one end;

(6) for politicians, the measures often make great talking points, and that is where the debate generally stops;

(7), I’ll suggest, actually nailing down the real stats might bring the whole enterprise down (see a lot of John Mueller and Mark Stewart’s work that focuses on cost measures and security).

(8) I’ll also suggest that the asymmetric nature of the threats makes most efforts at stats irrelevant to the security issue for policymakers (despite the best efforts of the risk analysts to make the stats relevant).

In DHS, the matter remains complicated by the numerous and scattered offices, congressional oversight committees, stakeholders, etc., that each have difference reasons for choosing different measures, as well as the role the “enterprise” plays.

If a leader can pick a couple of measures to focus on, it does seem to help the organization focus on that particular measure, but that seems to be the extent of their current utility in our system.

Comment by Christopher Bellavita

June 25, 2013 @ 12:53 pm

From an email comment I just received:

The street cop in me looks at it this way “money ball monetizes something that happens, homeland security is trying to monetize something that doesn’t happen.”

Kind of like monetizing crime prevention. The thief never leaves a note that says I was going to burglarize your home but you have an alarm and dog so I didn’t.

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 25, 2013 @ 2:50 pm

Great comments from the others!

Comment by Wesley Rickey

June 25, 2013 @ 8:23 pm

Of course HLS can learn from money-ball (MB). Those saying otherwise are part of the Greek Chorus. HLS is like baseball in that it is an example of how an unscientific culture responds/fails to respond to the scientific method. HLS may collect as much if not more data than baseball. The problem is too much of this data is meaningless, low hanging fruit. WRC’s recommendations re statisticians is great. So where are the Bill James’, Paul Depodestas’, Sandy Aldersons’, Carl Morris’, Eddie Epsteins’, Dick Cramers’, Pete Palmers’, John Dewans’, Theo Epsteins’ and Voros McCracken’s of HLS? They are out there and probably most of them are not part of the apparatus (this is good). Maybe create a Society for American Security Research, SASR, release the hoards of data and let smart citizens go to town. Perhaps SABR could add a HLS research branch to their already deep research pool.

Comment by Wesley Rickey

June 25, 2013 @ 8:47 pm

(continued)
For defining winning, I would refer readers to the Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent. JD, money ball is about focusing on the process not the outcome. Baseball and HLS share a common psychological deficiency; they judge decisions based on outcomes when there are too many variables to make replication of an outcome possible. Focusing on the process, knowing the probabilities that follow from large sets of data and then acting as the “house” is more efficient than acting on outcomes-based myopia; not understanding why an outcome occurred. Also, complexity and wickedness are not unique to the public space, they are universal. That is why MB can be applied to just about any endeavor. It is also why our statisticians need not come from within HLS any more that Bill James had to come from baseball. Mueller/Stewart have received multiple mentions; actually nailing down the real stats could bring virtually all Govt. programs down.

Comment by Wesley Rickey

June 25, 2013 @ 8:57 pm

(continued)
Perhaps our statisticians could demonstrate for our politicians the inverse relationship between the likelihood of effective programs and the number of oversight organizations. No doubt the data exists. Street cop, great point re alarm systems and dogs. Insurance companies already have this data, I bet the data does show that homes with security systems and/or dogs are burglarized less often. I also bet it would be a cost effective program to nudge (via incentives of some sort) homeowners towards installing security systems. Assuming they deter crime, the systems are an efficient investment compared to bodies, pensions,and suburban assault vehicles.

Yes HLS and Govt. can learn from baseball and MB.

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 26, 2013 @ 12:02 am

Does it make a difference that in Baseball the defense has the ball?

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 26, 2013 @ 12:05 am

How does the USA rank with respect to violence by individuals against individuals? Does firearm possession impact this statistic world wide or domestically?

Comment by William R. Cumming

June 26, 2013 @ 12:07 am

Was 9/11/2001 a so-called Black Swan?

Comment by HGRATTAN

June 26, 2013 @ 4:05 am

Hard to equate a “system that was blinking red” (9/11 Commission [citing CIA Director Tenet]) with a Black Swan.

Experience keeps a dear school, but a fool will learn by no other (Ben Franklin). The history of history tells us that governments are often fools, but history does so retrospectively (Monday morning quarterbacking).

Stats and now stats from BIG DATA might help inform our decisions (decision advantage.). Alternately, the same data might not account for the street cop’s burglar who neglected to leave a note.

The metric for crime prevention and counterterrorism is nothing: nothing happened. We may not know if nothing happened because nothing happened or would nothing have happened if we had not done whatever it is we did.

Counter crime and counter terrorism are not abstractions. Law enforcement and others do things like stop, question, and frisk. (See NYPD Stop, Question, and Frisk debate and DOJ amicus brief also see NSA and PRISM et al).

HLS risk management, however, should (politics notwithstanding) use metrics to assess vulnerabilities and apportion resources.
But, I am a Met’s fan and will try anything at this point.

Comment by Wesley Rickey

June 26, 2013 @ 6:15 am

Nobel prize winning (Economics) and psychologist Dan Kahneman points to Taleb in explaining how a couple of our mental biases impact our decisions. He may as well have been discussing baseball as well as HLS. (1)Our need to have a story to make sense of the world, we construct flawed stories of the past to shape our views and expectations of the future. This leads to (2) illusion of the pundits/SME. Even in the subject matter of their expertise, experts were not significantly better than nonspecialist in predicting the future . . . and they resist admitting that they are wrong. They are “dazzled by their own brilliance”
Even when winning, baseball is dominated by failure 30% success rate will put you in the HoF. In this, HLS and Intel are very similar. They are also very similar in that they are very expensive. Money-Ball is merely about using the scientific method with rigor to be more cost effective in what we do.
HGrattan, the Met’s have some of the best MB minds rebuilding the team, they will return.

Comment by John Bradford

June 26, 2013 @ 9:51 pm

Great post. I have to sleep on a full response, but there is a sabermetrics for HS, and I believe it is risk calculations, or more to the point, risk-based assessments as a way of forecasting resource allocation and strategic focus. In every aspect, this would change the paradigm of how things are currently done (in DHS at the very least), and help add an orienting posture for what makes HS different from national security or homeland defense, two concepts for which it is frequently confused. The whole concept is still too threat-based without considering how the threat evolves with vulnerability and consequence in turn, thus why DHS has never been able to fully define itself properly across the various domains it serves.

One example: think of how much insight could be gained from exploring the patterns we observe at our border ports of entry with watchlisted individuals, drug traffickers, etc. If we viewed this through a risk based lens rather than a reaction posture, we could map the factors that could impact a shift in these activities over time and become more anticipatory–something that speaks to Kahnemann’s thinking as well as others who see predictive models as the next major development in analytic reasoning. The idea of “anticipating changes in the market and developing a logic for filling gaps within resource and other constraints” is at the heart of Moneyball (the subtitle, after all, is “The Art of Winning and Unfair Game”), and is part of the true capability of using risk as a framework for orienting and prioritizing topics faced by multivariate stakeholders.

Comment by Arnold Bogis

June 27, 2013 @ 2:56 pm

First off, I absolutely agree with the previous comments regarding the A’s pitching staff. Not to get into a baseball discussion, but three above average, cost-controlled starters will go a along way to making one’s team look good.

To the “Moneyball” concept – I would like suggest that there is a missing step that hasn’t been explicitly described. While Chris is right that the term has become synonymous for sabermetrics, Moneyball isn’t so much about statistics vs. scouting, or even benchmarks. Instead, it’s using that information to identify and exploit inefficiencies or opportunities in the baseball market. So the statistical analysis at the time suggested that most teams were over valuing home run hitters and guys with “baseball bodies” that didn’t necessarily get on base at a steady clip. So the A’s went after those individuals who excelled at on base percentage (OBP) that were cheaper to sign because they didn’t hit for high average or a lot of power. That damn Yankee dynasty of the nineties had a lineup that “made the pitcher work,” including the great Pedro Martinez. You go back and look and they all mostly had high OBPs.

Other teams picked up on the importance of OBP, and those players began to get expensive and priced themselves out of Oakland’s budget. So they began looking at runs saved, valuing defense especially in positions up the middle. A light hitting centerfielder who takes away hits is valuable just like one that lets the hits drop but is a bit better with the bat. And now these guys were undervalued.

In terms of homeland security, I don’t disagree that applying metrics strenuously across the enterprise could possibly produce good outcomes. But this wouldn’t be a Moneyball approach — good players can be very expensive and so can good programs. Identifying the programs that work and don’t work would also promote efficiency. Identifying those resources that add value but that are not currently adequately funded or engaged would be Moneyball. For example, “bystander care” might be such an asset. It is often pointed out that people help others in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but there is comparatively little investment in making better use of this resource.

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