“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”
PART I: COUNTERTERRORISM
On May 21 the Secretary of Homeland Security affirmed that counterterrorism is the primary mission of the Department. But speaking to a large crowd of mostly state and local officials, Mr. Johnson evidently felt compelled to — or did not have the energy to do more than — review the many activities of the Department and, at least to my ears, focused particular attention on the challenge of illegal immigration (See Part II below). The DHS website does not provide a transcript. I wonder if whoever prepared the read-out was actually there.
On May 28 the President told West Point graduates:
For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism. But a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy… So we have to develop a strategy that matches this diffuse threat — one that expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin, or stir up local resentments. We need partners to fight terrorists alongside us. And empowering partners is a large part of what we have done and what we are currently doing in Afghanistan.
The domestic analog of this strategy also needs to empower its partners. Our homeland security framework should be especially attentive to vulnerabilities and creative regarding strengths. This is certainly important in terms of counterterrorism, but applies across most other hazards as well… if we will take the opportunity to notice.
Neither this White House nor its predecessor has given anything close to the same quality of attention to partnering with the private sector or the states or other crucial domestic players that is given to collaborating with NATO or the G-7 or key individual allies. The diplomatic-military-intelligence triad enjoys an advantage of clout, connections, and intellectual capital that far exceeds what we call homeland security. Counterterrorism and cybersecurity are just about the only aspects of HS that earn any sustained attention by policy elites.
And this is no longer the elite of yore: foxes ala Isaiah Berlin moving from investment banking to the OSS to the Herald-Tribune to an embassy or two and then decamping for a few years at the Ford Foundation. More and more our modern masters are process managers, mathematicians, and other rather wonky hedgehogs “who know one big thing”. And they are inclined to leave other big things — if any might emerge — to someone else. They notice what they know.
Since mid-May I have had two separate conversations with recently retired senior counterterrorism guys. One has been out for about a year. The other just retired last month. They sounded alot alike. Most of what they said you already know. What struck me was what they did not say — seemed unwilling to seriously address — even in an informal setting and with their official duties behind them. (But then again, look what I am doing with the conversations.)
The potentially meaningful silence I observed related to terrorist motivation. Americans currently fighting in Syria were mentioned by both. Domestic terrorist trends were discussed. Recent events in the Sahel were reviewed. In each exchange there were similar references to “behavioral indicators” and “spatial analysis” and “antecedent conduct” and “heuristics” and “covariance” and “probability”. There was considerable reluctance to engage any questions related to ideology, religion, tribal-identity, grievance, or social, economic, and political “co-indicators”. When these questions were asked both experts bridged-back to statistics as quickly as possible.
Speaking of statistics, an N of 2 is seldom significant. But still the similarity was striking. Rather than discussing fleshy and potentially very bloody human beings, my conversation partners might have been describing Brownian physics: The random motion of particles suspended in flux.
PART II: IMMIGRATION
I considered Secretary Johnson’s May 21 remarks misaligned with his audience. He had a crowd with rather specific priorities. He gave a generic speech. Lost opportunity.
The somewhat greater focus I heard him give immigration may have been more the result of narrative punch than proportion or intention. The Secretary mentioned that on Mother’s Day his wife joined him to visit a hosting center in Texas for detained unaccompanied minors (UAMs in trade-talk). I was not taking notes, but his brief description was sufficient to imagine the kind of purgatorial scenes widely reported this week.
Holding area for unaccompanied minors in Nogales, Arizona (USAToday). Please note portable toilets in the far ground. Those are cots in the fore ground.
Mr. Johnson shared being profoundly affected and having since taken several steps to mitigate the troubling situation. This was more than three weeks ago. I have wondered how much the Secretary’s action might be cause of (or only coincident with) this week’s media blitz. I also wonder if our attention to this issue will be any more long-lasting or effectual than that given the kidnapped Nigerian school girls. The crucial difference may be that Secretary Johnson is paying attention and has the authority to ensure others notice and act as well.
In the case of both Nigeria and Nogales a “policy problem” has been personalized. In each case the “others” — even the “its” — who are victims have reclaimed their humanity. Or more accurately many of us have acknowledged what was always the case, but we had neglected to notice.
We are usually as effective depersonalizing victims as we are dehumanizing terrorists.
III. (IN)ATTENTION, INTENTION, AND INFLUENCE
Behavioral indicators and other more objective analytic techniques have emerged, in part, to discourage unthinking, unhelpful, misleading, gross profiling of potential terrorists; such as most Muslims or at least those with beards… or Sikhs who wear beards and turbans (but are not Muslim and at least in the United States have only been the target — not the source — of terrorism).
I am in favor of science, social science and statistics. I very much depend on hedgehogs and have tried to be better at burrowing into a hedge myself.
But this need not — ought not — exclude the knowledgeable, mindful, insightful application of the humanities (e.g. languages, literature. art, philosophy, religion, history). We should especially avoid excluding our humanity.
In dealing with homeland security problems we need to recognize cause and effect. This can often be done with a decidedly disinterested stance. But there are other contexts when subjective human insight can play an important role. There is a place for empathy even in counterterrorism.
At West Point the President also said, “We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield.” We might begin by recognizing that many of our most precious values are disruptive to more traditional societies… as well as some neighbors down the street. Being disruptive is often — even accurately — perceived as threatening. Living our values with integrity while defusing the unintended threat to others is a task requiring both fox and hedgehog, as many as we can get with eyes and ears wide open to the unexpected.
In Philadelphia Secretary Johnson saw a thousand state and local leaders and he didn’t seem to fully recognize their potential. In the particular moment he was unable to differentiate this crowd from other crowds. He only saw what he was prepared to see. But fortunately when Secretary Johnson saw a thousand illegal immigrants crowded into a detention center in McAllen, Texas he recognized: these are children. Not just UAMs. His observations and actions were informed by being a father as well as a cabinet secretary. Solutions will remain elusive, but much more likely when the problem is engaged as a whole.