Homeland Security Watch

Here is a 10 minute CNN interview with Senator Rand Paul, as he discusses his side of what happened at the Nashville airport on Monday.  Senator Paul says he was detained by TSA because he wanted to walk through the body imaging machine a second  time after the machine apparently showed he had something on his leg.  Senator Paul wanted to lift his pant leg and show there was nothing there.  TSA, apparently, insisted on patting down the United States Senator. Senator Paul declined and was not allowed to travel on that particular flight.

Here is a link to the Transportation Security Administration’s blog telling their side of the story.  One part of that post includes this explanation:

When a passenger or bag alarms in screening technology at a TSA checkpoint, the alarm has to be resolved before the passenger can enter the secure area past the checkpoint.  Passengers who refuse to complete the screening process can’t be granted access to the secure area. TSA notifies law enforcement when this happens, and law enforcement officers can escort them out of the checkpoint.  This isn’t done to punish the passenger– it’s done to ensure that every person who gets on a plane is screened appropriately.

The White House press secretary had this to say about Paul’s claim he was detained:

“Let’s just be clear… the passenger was not detained. The passenger triggered an alarm during routine airport screening, but refused to complete the screening process in order to resolve the issue. Passengers, as in this case, who refuse to comply with security procedures are denied access to the secure gate area. In this case, the passenger was escorted out of the screening area by local law enforcement. It’s my understanding he has now rebooked and passed through security without incident, and that has resolved itself.”

Senator Paul said: he certainly felt like he was detained.

“If you’re told you can’t leave, does that count as detention?” Paul asked. “I tried to leave the cubicle to speak to one of the TSA people and I was barked at: ‘Do not leave the cubicle!’ So, that, to me sounds like I’m being asked not to leave the cubicle. It sounds a little bit like I’m being detained.”

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I heard TSA Administrator Pistole a few weeks ago talking about wanting to move TSA away from looking for dangerous objects and toward looking for dangerous intent.

I think that is a worthwhile objective.

To implement that idea,  Pistole (and yes, it is pronounced “pistol”) noted in a speech last month, TSA has :

… begun implementing additional risk-based security measures at numerous airports [to] expedite the screening process for travelers we know and trust the most, and travelers who are willing to voluntarily share information with us before they travel.

This initiative includes easing access for the military:

U.S. service members are entrusted to protect citizens with their lives and as such, TSA is recognizing that these members pose very little risk to security.

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In the decade TSA has been in business, the agency’s employees have:

screened more than five billion passengers and detected thousands of firearms among countless prohibited items discovered and prevented those weapons from entering the cabin of an aircraft.

I have not seen or read evidence or anecdotes to suggest any – repeat – any of the TSA-screened passengers caught with prohibited items planned to commit a terrorist act.  And that includes Sergeant 1st Class Trey Scott Atwater, the man who reportedly brought C4 explosives with him in his carry on baggage last December.  (Earlier this month, Atwater was released on a 50,000 dollar unsecured bond.)

I do not have access to classified information. Maybe TSA has prevented  or displaced terrorist aviation-related attacks.  I want to grant the agency the benefit of the doubt here.  But I am willing to bet, say, $10,000 none of those possible attacks was perpetrated by a United States Senator.

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People can be — and are — stupid, criminal, sneaky and forgetful when it comes to bringing things onto an aircraft.  (I am not without sin here.)  But at what point do we start actually doing risk-informed, risk-based, risk-whatever decision making with passenger screening?

Unless TSA’s continuously evolving risk-based security model seeks to achieve zero risk, why does it take so long to develop discretionary policies “for travelers we know and trust the most,” for people who a reasonable person would consider not to be a risk?

During Monday’s Republican debate in Florida, Newt Gingrich used the phrase “huge institutional barriers against doing the right thing.”  Is that what’s going on here? Is it congress, the administration, TSA, the airline industry who intends to take another decade to get this worked out?  Who is calling the timing shots here? What is the delay?

I do not ask this to be snarky.  I’d really like to know why a nation-wide trusted flyer program cannot be put into place before the summer arrives.

I would be more than happy to make space available on this blog to help clarify why this is taking so long.

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Some flyers may experience a tinge of Schadenfreude at Senator Paul’s experience. But something is deeply wrong when TSA employees are not given — by law, or policy, or doctrine, or procedure, or whatever —  the discretion to treat a United States Senator with some common sense.

Senator Paul did not have “dangerous intent.”  He was not planning to bring the plane down.

If he wanted to destroy America he has access to a much more powerful device.

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I feel somewhat uncomfortable defending the actions of a group that seemingly brings so much discomfort to so many, but a recent Vanity Fair article on airport security not only regurgitates the obvious and well known, but lacks little strategic point of view.  First, the well-known:

Not only has the actual threat from terror been exaggerated, they say, but the great bulk of the post-9/11 measures to contain it are little more than what Schneier mocks as “security theater”: actions that accomplish nothing but are designed to make the government look like it is on the job. In fact, the continuing expenditure on security may actually have made the United States less safe.

From an airplane-hijacking point of view, Schneier said, al-Qaeda had used up its luck. Passengers on the first three 9/11 flights didn’t resist their captors, because in the past the typical consequence of a plane seizure had been “a week in Havana.” When the people on the fourth hijacked plane learned by cell phone that the previous flights had been turned into airborne bombs, they attacked their attackers. The hijackers were forced to crash Flight 93 into a field. “No big plane will ever be taken that way again, because the passengers will fight back,” Schneier said.

Buried within the article is, in my opinion anyway, a very nice articulation of the problem of looking at the issue of terrorism risk simply by crunching the numbers:

Has the nation simply wasted a trillion dollars protecting itself against terror? Mostly, but perhaps not entirely. “Most of the time we assess risk through gut feelings,” says Paul Slovic, a psychology professor at the University of Oregon who is also the president of Decision Research, a nonprofit R&D organization. “We’re not robots just looking at the numbers.” Confronted with a risk, people ask questions: Is this a risk that I benefit from taking, as when I get in a car? Is it forced on me by someone else, as when I am exposed to radiation? Are the potential consequences catastrophic? Is the impact immediate and observable, or will I not know the consequences until much later, as with cancer? Such questions, Slovic says, “reflect values that are sometimes left out of the experts’ calculations.”

Security theater, from this perspective, is an attempt to convey a message: “We are doing everything possible to protect you.” When 9/11 shattered the public’s confidence in flying, Slovic says, the handful of anti-terror measures that actually work—hardening the cockpit door, positive baggage matching, more-effective intelligence—would not have addressed the public’s dread, because the measures can’t really be seen. Relying on them would have been the equivalent of saying, “Have confidence in Uncle Sam,” when the problem was the very loss of confidence. So a certain amount of theater made sense. Over time, though, the value of the message changes. At first the policeman in the train station reassures you. Later, the uniform sends a message: train travel is dangerous. “The show gets less effective, and sometimes it becomes counterproductive.”

Eventually, Bruce Schneier overreaches and follows his generally reasonable assertions with analysis that only serves to buttress his own arguments while ignoring a bit of reality:

Terrorists will try to hit the United States again, Schneier says. One has to assume this. Terrorists can so easily switch from target to target and weapon to weapon that focusing on preventing any one type of attack is foolish. Even if the T.S.A. were somehow to make airports impregnable, this would simply divert terrorists to other, less heavily defended targets—shopping malls, movie theaters, churches, stadiums, museums. The terrorist’s goal isn’t to attack an airplane specifically; it’s to sow terror generally. “You spend billions of dollars on the airports and force the terrorists to spend an extra $30 on gas to drive to a hotel or casino and attack it,” Schneier says. “Congratulations!”

This simplifies the issue in ways that are counterproductive.  Two points:

1. Air travel remains an attractive target due to the cost benefit ratio: it takes very little explosive to bring down a plane and kill hundreds, while at the same time creating a spectacular event that instantaneously affects a large industry in the short and long term. The shoe or underwear bombers would have caused relatively little damage at a shopping mall or casino, but could have easily killed hundreds in an instance and caused enormous economic damage if successful on their original mission.  The liquid bombing plot seemed to be aiming for thousands of deaths and a truly strategic impact, one not attainable by the same number of operatives killing themselves in other public spaces (before it is brought up, I do know of the line of reasoning that a wave of attacks against American malls would have a huge impact…but I guess that I have greater faith in citizen resilience in that we as a nation would not hide at home following such an event).

There is a lot of security theater at airports, but much of it began in response to a rash of hijackings decades ago.  When there was no security it was simple to bring a gun or bomb aboard a flight, take it hostage, and gain attention for one’s political demands.  Steps were taken to make this more difficult.  Reasonable steps should be taken now when instead of simply attention the goals include death on a grand scale.

2. Terrorists do not simply “switch from target to target and weapon to weapon.” Groups consider their goals, determine their resources, and plan for what is then attainable.  The IRA was a sophisticated group capable of inflicting a great number of civilian casualties, yet they were restrained by their political goals.  Al Qaeda has different goals and therefore utilizes different methods.  The same will be true of other current and future groups.  If killing hundreds is a goal but resources are limited to a few poorly trained agents, targeting an airliner would seem more attractive than attempting an operation similar to the assault on Mumbai. Terror is a goal when traditional military victory is out of reach, however it should not be thought that all groups and individuals would generalize this goal into a least common denominator and aim for the easiest target.  That is partly what got us into trouble the last time…(Pre-9/11: What?  Worry about a group of actors with no state backing?!?  Preposterous…now about those Chinese….).

Mr. Schneier has performed an invaluable service over the years bringing to light deficiencies in our homeland security thinking, and Mr. Mann (the author of the article in question) accomplishes the same by exposing it to a wider audience.  Yet I can’t help but think that by not considering the issues a few steps beyond shouts of “security theater,” the conversation we should have about homeland security as a nation will not take place.

“That means anything with an on-off switch has to be turned to the off position,” the flight attendent said in that awkward linguistic style that calls crashing into the ocean a water landing.

“It must be turned off,” the attendent repeated as if the passengers had ignored the first order. “Completely off; not placed in Airplane Mode.”

I can’t remember how many years I’ve heard this refrain. I always assumed it had something to do with electronic devices emiting signals that could interfere with the plane’s navigation system. I think I recall hearing a flight attendent say that several years ago. Ok, maybe 30 years ago.

I know practically nothing about electronics or navigation systems.  I trust the experts.

The last decade has seen the growth of items in the flight attendent announcement of what counts as an electronic device: cell phones, computers, iPads, Kindles, handheld video games, noise cancelling ear phones.

If you’ve flown much you know the drill. You use your cell phone until the door closes. All electronic equipment remains off until you reach 10,000 feet.  You hear a few beeps, followed by an announcement about turning on “approved electronic devices.”

I’ve often wondered how many people actually turn their devices off.  Sometimes I forget to turn mine off.

I saw an article on this topic in Tuesday’s New York Times by Nick Bilton called “Fliers Must Turn Off Devices, but It’s Not Clear Why.”

Some excerpts:

Millions of Americans who got on a plane over the Thanksgiving holiday heard the admonition: “Please power down your electronic devices for takeoff.” And absolutely everyone obeyed. I know they did because no planes fell from the sky. No planes had to make an emergency landing because the avionics went haywire. No planes headed for Miami ended up in Anchorage. We were all made safe because we all turned off all our Kindles, iPads, iPhones, BlackBerrys and laptops, just as the Federal Aviation Administration told us to. ….

OK, that was sarcasm.

According to the F.A.A., 712 million passengers flew within the United States in 2010. Let’s assume that just 1 percent of those passengers — about two people per Boeing 737, a conservative number — left a cellphone, e-reader or laptop turned on during takeoff or landing. That would mean seven million people on 11 million flights endangered the lives of their fellow passengers.

Yet, in 2010, no crashes were attributed to people using technology on a plane. None were in 2009. Or 2008, 2007 and so on. You get the point.

Bilton writes

… rules that are decades old persist without evidence to support the idea that someone reading an e-book or playing a video game during takeoff or landing is jeopardizing safety.

Bilton reports on a 2006 study that found “insufficient evidence to change the policy,” meaning the gadgets are presumed to be potentially dangerous unless they can be proven to be safe.  It’s erring on the side of safety.

…I’m not arguing that passengers should be allowed to make phone calls while the plane zooms up into the sky. But, why can’t I read my Kindle or iPad during takeoff and landing? E-readers and cellphones can be easily put into “Airplane Mode” which disables the device’s radio signals.

One part of the article in particular drew my attention.  Having everyone turn off their devices might actually create a greater hazard.

The government might be causing more unnecessary interference on planes by asking people to shut their devices down for take-off and landing and then giving them permission to restart all at the same time. According to electrical engineers, when the electronic device starts, electric current passes through every part of the gadget, including GPS, Wi-Fi, cellular radio and microprocessor.

It’s the equivalent of waking someone up with a dozen people yelling into bullhorns.

Bilton’s conclusion is

As more and more people transition from paper products to digital ones, maybe it’s time to change these rules.

The article received almost 200 comments. So many comments that Bilton wrote a second article — titled “It’s called ‘Airplane mode’ for a reason” — to respond to the comments. That article is available here: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/its-called-airplane-mode-for-a-reason/

The consensus of the comments, like many issues in homeland security, is polarized. Some people believe the risk is overblown. Other people believe the risk, while small, is potentially serious. One person says he’s flown on Air Force One several times and no one every turned off their phone. Another person, a pilot, said his GPS navigation went blank once because someone in the plane was using a cell phone.

Bilton writes:

Surely if electronic gadgets could bring down an airplane, you can be sure that the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration, which has a consuming fear of 3.5 ounces of hand lotion and gel shoe inserts, wouldn’t allow passengers to board a plane with an iPad or Kindle, for fear that they would be used by terrorists.

Is the NYPD equipped to shoot down airplanes?

That quote comes from yesterday’s “60 Minutes” interview with New York City’s Policy Commissioner Ray Kelly.  Here is a slightly expanded version:

Pelley: Are you satisfied that you’ve dealt with threats from aircraft, even light planes, model planes, that kind of thing?

Kelly: Well, it’s something that’s on our radar screen. I mean in an extreme situation, you would have some means to take down a plane.

Pelley: Do you mean to say that the NYPD has the means to take down an aircraft?

Kelly: Yes, I prefer not to get into the details but obviously this would be in a very extreme situation.

Pelley: You have the equipment and the training.

Kelly: Yes.

Obviously, this script and the actual footage have likely undergone some editing.

In addition, the phrase “take down” does have different meanings in this context.  Kelly could be suggesting that a local police force (albeit the largest in the nation and one leaning so forward in terms of counter-terrorism that if it had a nose it might be touching the ground) has the ability to shoot down an aircraft in flight.

Or he could be suggesting that if terrorists took the passengers of any particular airplane hostage, NYPD now has a dedicated force knowledgeable and practiced at assaulting the airplane while on the ground and rescuing the hostages.

The second option would be impressive, but not surprising.

The first would be shocking and not just a little worrisome.

Update: During a 7-hour drive today, I had a little time to think about this issue.  My first reaction upon reading the AP report was that a statement was taken out of context and used for a short, sensational news piece. I would guess the vast majority of knowledgeable people thought that Kelly was naturally speaking of “take down” in terms of a tactical SWAT operation. However, there may be a little bit more to this than that simple explanation.

Two assumptions: (1) While I did not watch the actual televised interview, I’m assuming both it and the transcript were not edited and this piece of the conversation took place exactly as publicized; and (2) that Ray Kelly is not just a professional but an incredibly smart and savvy  political player–and that is meant as a compliment in terms of a specific skill set.

I interpret the reporter’s question not to mean a threat from a plane sitting on a local tarmac, whether that means hostages or simply a known terrorist situation. Hence the inclusion of light and model planes–threats not usually thought of requiring a response from an armed team on the ground–unless, of course, the plot is discovered in advance. However, I would wager the reporter was speaking of 9/11 and lesser scenarios where the aircraft is in the air, and “take down” means knock it out of the air.

Kelly might have been confused by the question, though I doubt it (see assumption 2). Instead, I’m thinking he either might have understood but had no answer that did not include non-NYPD assistance (not the point of the interview) and resorted to speaking of a situation where a SWAT team could be utilized.  If later pushed for clarification, he could simply explain that he was not talking about shooting aircraft out of the sky but “taking down” in the tactical operational sense.

Or, with a dash more deviousness, he might have understood the reporter’s question to mean shooting down an aircraft in flight and made use of dual definition of “take down” to suggest NYPD had such a capability, knowing that if later pushed for clarification he could explain he meant a particular SWAT ability to storm a plane on a tarmac.  In this instance, however, instead of simply wishing to keep the focus of the interview on the NYPD he understood what the headline would be–”NYPD has the capability to take down aircraft”–and hoped that it would add to the efforts at deterring terrorists from striking New York City.  Regardless of the veracity of the statement, if some wannabe terrorists are thinking of using a light plane filled with explosives to strike a target in the City, perhaps there is a chance they would reconsider if they even thought for a moment that the NYPD had their own anti-aircraft capability.

A bit conspiratorial, but I did have a lot of time on my hands during the drive…

Update 2: Apparently while I was in the car, Noah Shachtman of Wired’s “Danger Room” blog not only addressed the deterrent effect of Kelly’s comments but also filled in the blank concerning NYPD’s capability in this regard: he may have been speaking of actually shooting down a plane (not just using SWAT vernacular regarding a ground assault) and it is by means of a .50 caliber rifle: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/can-the-nypd-shoot-down-a-plane-kinda-sorta-not-exactly/

Andrew Bacevich described (in this video) what happened when the United States lost its nuclear monopoly in 1949, and faced the possibility it would be completely destroyed by the Soviet Union:

“Policymakers reacted in panic….  [This] possibility came to be seen as something that was intolerable.  And from that time down to the present … there has been a theme in US national policy that posits absolute security as the minimum adequate security.”

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The woman in the picture is 95 years old.  She weighs about 100 pounds.  She uses a wheelchair because she has difficulty standing.

According to a story in the Northwest Florida Daily News, written by Lauren Sage Reinlie, the woman was detained, searched, and asked to remove her soiled adult diaper.  The TSA screener had to complete the pat down search before the woman would be permitted “to fly to Michigan to be with family members during the final stages of her battle with leukemia.”

The familiar and predictable outrage the incident generated was balanced by the familiar and predictable response from TSA:

The TSA works with passengers to resolve any security alarms in a respectful and sensitive manner….

During any part of the process, if there is an alarm, then we have to resolve that alarm….

[T]he procedures are the same for everyone to ensure national security.

TSA cannot exempt any group from screening because we know from intelligence that there are terrorists out there that would then exploit that vulnerability….

While every person and item must be screened before entering the secure boarding area, TSA works with passengers to resolve security alarms in a respectful and sensitive manner.

We have reviewed the circumstances involving this screening and determined that our officers acted professionally and according to proper procedure.

The woman’s daughter thought about the official response:

“[If] you’re just following rules and regulations, then the rules and regulations need to be changed….  I’m not one to make waves, but dadgummit, this is wrong. People need to know. Next time it could be you.”

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I think Bacevich’s observation is important.  Absolute security ought not be the minimum level of adequate security.

The woman’s observation is also important, “Dadgummit, this is wrong.”

Congress and TSA know this.

As Kelley Vlahos’ article in the June issue of Homeland Security Today summarizes, the future of airport security screening is supposed to be a shift from “no one is exempt” to an approach driven more by intelligence and risk.

Congressman Mike Rogers agrees with this vision.  But — like some DHS leaders and many fliers — Rogers is impatient:

I don’t think [TSA has] to explain to people that it’s potentially dangerous to fly … with terrorists continuing to target Americans, but we have to be reasonable in our efforts.  When American’s see intrusive practices that don’t seem to be intelligence-driven or smart, it drives them nuts….  I think [TSA] wants to get there, but we need to do it tomorrow and not three years from now.”

Absolute security takes a very long time to achieve.  Adequate security may take even longer.

Today’s blog was researched and written by a “concerned Department of Homeland Security law enforcement officer.”

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How far can consent be stretched?

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can be a lightning rod in the ever-evolving world of homeland security.  This is true for the agency and for the much larger operational concept it embodies.  It is not fair to pile on, but TSA often begs for the attention with their actions and possible mission creep into other venues.

The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) is one of the TSA programs that can generate questions and interesting privacy and authority discussions.  According to TSA in 2007:

VIPR teams work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement existing security resources, provide deterrent presence and detection capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning activities.

Looking to expand the VIPR concept beyond the rail sector to other forms of mass transit, TSA has been reaching out to several high-volume ferry operators to provide additional security, particularly during the summer months when ridership is at its peak.

And…

VIPR teams enhance TSA’s ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly to increase visible security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the country and are a normal component of TSA’s nimble, unpredictable approach to security.

The TSA VIPR operation at the train station in Savannah, Georgia in late February 2011 sparked another debate about the authorities and responsibilities of TSA Transportation Security Officers (screeners) and TSA Federal Air Marshals well away from the aviation environment.

Does the concept of implied consent to search apply if you wish to travel via commercial aviation and now possibly rail?  The TSA employees reportedly searched adults and children at a train station after they departed the train.   These reported searches have generated concerns because the subjects had already disembarked the stated area of concern or threat (i.e., the train) that supposedly created the “justification” or need for the “consent” search in the first place.

TSA’s Blogger Bob proactively addressed the incident and concerns on the TSA blog site to explain their actions and possible error(s):

A video of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) screening passengers at a Savannah, Georgia Amtrak station has been gaining quite a bit of attention and many are wondering why we were screening passengers who had just disembarked from a train.

We were wondering the same thing.

The screening shown in the video was done in conjunction with a VIPR operation. During VIPR operations, any person entering the impacted area has to be screened. In this case, the Amtrak station was the subject of the VIPR operation so people entering the station were being screened for items on the Amtrak prohibited items list as seen in the video.

It should be noted that disembarking passengers did not need to enter the station to claim luggage or get to their car.

Signs such as the one shown here are posted at the entrance to the impacted area.

However, after looking into it further, we learned that this particular VIPR operation should have ended by the time these folks were coming through the station since no more trains were leaving the station. We apologize for any inconvenience we may have caused for those passengers.

So by now, you’re probably wondering what a VIPR is? Is it a type of snake that we misspelled? A really cool car… Nope. It’s a team that’s made up of Federal Air Marshals, Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, Transportation Security Officers, Behavior Detection Officers and Explosive Detection Canine teams. The teams provide a random high-visibility surge into a transit system and work with state and local security, and law enforcement officials to expand the unpredictability of security measures to detect, deter, disrupt or defeat potential criminal and/or terrorist operations.

Ignoring the clear question about their “authority” to conduct searches beyond the implied consent of a passenger at an airport who wishes to fly and not drive to his destination, what is the true benefit or intention of these VIPR operations? Is there value beyond mere presence? Is this an expansion of the agency’s responsibility and authority?    Does the TSA have such abundant resources that they can afford to expand well beyond the aviation environment, if even only for sporadic VIPR operations?

These questions may be unfair after the horrid results of terrorist attacks in the rail environment in Spain and England.  Nevertheless, these VIPR operations may not fully conform to their primary duties in the post 9/11 environment.

Even though the word “transportation” in their agency name encompasses a larger world in the eyes of some people, should TSA employees also be operating at seaports and private marinas where broader authorities and training are required for border searches, inspections and proper interaction with the public.  This is a policy and liability question for discussion by the government and its people.  Where does that discussion happen?  And when?

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How successful has TSA been in the aviation environment, almost ten years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks?   A Washington Post article,  Auditors question TSA’s use of and spending on technology, raises many important concerns and questions about the benefit of the billions of dollars expended by TSA for screening:

Before there were full-body scanners, there were puffers. The Transportation Security Administration spent about $30 million on devices that puffed air on travelers to “sniff” them out for explosives residue. Those machines ended up in warehouses, removed from airports, abandoned as impractical.

But government auditors have faulted the TSA and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, for failing to properly test and evaluate technology before spending money on it.

The GAO has said that the TSA has “not conducted a risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis, or established quantifiable performance measures” on its new technologies. “As a result, TSA does not have assurance that its efforts are focused on the highest priority security needs.”

“They’re adding layers of security and technology, but they need to do a cost-benefit analysis to make sure this is worthwhile,” said Steve Lord of the GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice team, who has reviewed the TSA’s purchases. “They need to look at whether there is other technology to deploy at checkpoints. Are we getting the best technology for the given pot of money? Is there a cheaper way to provide the same level of security through other technology?”

(In addition to TSA related concerns, the DHS Office of the Inspector General recently recommended that the strategic sourcing of detection equipment at DHS could help its agencies save money and standardize its equipment purchases.)

Beyond the established TSA airport screening locations, TSA conducts subsequent passenger baggage searches in the airport concourses after the passengers were already processed by their personnel.  Another recent Washington Post article addressed this issue, describing the experiences of a passenger at the Seattle Seattle-Tacoma International Airport who had reportedly cleared TSA screening and was awaiting her flight.

As she waited for her flight from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport to Medford, Ore., last month, Linda Morrison noticed something unusual in the waiting area.

“A lady in a TSA uniform came over, put on her rubber gloves and went up and down the rows of seats, choosing bags to go through,” remembered Morrison, a retired corporate recruiter who lives in Seattle. “She didn’t identify herself, didn’t give a reason for the search. She seemed to be targeting larger carry-on bags.”

Morrison was stunned. She expected to be screened at the designated checkpoint area, or maybe at the gate, where the TSA sometimes randomly checks passengers as they board. But this was different. “To me, it just felt like an illegal search performed by a police state,” she said.

Ms. Morrison is not alone with her concerns.  Not all air travelers concur with these expanded screening operations, according to the Washington Post article:

James Morrissey, a University of Illinois biochemistry professor and a frequent air traveler, prefers “intrusive security.” “TSA has become a law unto itself, and it routinely tramples the civil rights of the flying public,” he says. “Unfortunately, there will always be some people who will be perfectly okay with having their rights trampled in the name of security. But allowing this to happen is very disturbing to me.”

Jeff Stollman, a security and privacy consultant in Philadelphia, thinks that “annoying” better describes air travel in 2011. He’s irked by what he calls “security theater” that offers no real protection against terrorism. “I suspect that a lot of the current controls don’t really do that much to improve security,” he said.

Matthew Gast, a technology writer who works for a San Francisco-based publishing company, believes that it doesn’t matter what it’s called – it’s wrong. The TSA has gone “too far” in trying to protect us from terrorism. “I have not taken a flight since I was forced to allow a TSA agent to put his hands down my pants,” he said. “It’s the only time I felt unsafe in an airport.”

Other frequent travelers have voiced their concerns.  A number of airline pilots reportedly continue to disagree with the current TSA screening procedures resulting in at least one pending lawsuit against the TSA:

Two U.S. commercial airline pilots complained in a lawsuit on Friday that new screening procedures for flight crews — scaled back after complaints by pilots — were still too invasive and violated privacy rights.

Pilots and flight crews complained the new screening exposed them to excessive radiation because they fly so frequently and that extra scrutiny for them was unnecessary because they already control the planes.

According to the TSA blog, TSA is again reviewing a more focused approach through identity based screening and a known traveler program:

For some time now, there has been much talk about implementing a Trusted Traveler program and switching to more of an identity-based approach. Good news… Administrator Pistole is on board with a known traveler approach. He spoke earlier this month at the American Bar Association and talked about his vision for this concept. You can read his remarks here.

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All these articles (and the thirteen at the end of this post) raise controversial, but important questions for consideration and discussion:

• Is the mission to maintain a sufficient level of confidence in air travel by spending money for homeland security theater, or is it to provide a truly secure aviation environment?   What are the cost limitations, if any, in our current economic world?

• Does it make sense to expend these very valuable and limited resources at the front door when the back doors at many airports are often wide open, given the ability of hundreds of thousands of Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badged employees to introduce and remove all forms of contraband and other interesting items?  If this threat is not fully appreciated, please spend some time with the agencies conducting smuggling and theft investigations at the airports to evaluate the enormous insider threat (the next threat?).

• Does a policy of hiring employees with significant criminal convictions and associations affect the quality of screening and/or faith in the process by the American public?  Does this practice also expand the insider threat in the aviation environment?

Unfortunately, the investment of billions of dollars in technology (useful or not) and personnel at the front door of the airports may be the easier challenge to tackle at this time rather than considering the likely next threat to commercial aviation.

However, the central question I want to raise remains, how far can consent be stretched?  Must we sacrifice liberty for security and to what extent? Are we really using our imagination and connecting the dots in a post 9/11 world?

Maybe we should just be quiet and patriotically remove our shoes to support homeland security theater.

—————————————————–

1. http://www.gadling.com/2010/02/04/tsa-forces-richmond-airport-to-issue-access-badge-to-convicted-f/?icid=main%7Cmain%7Cdl5%7Clink6%7Chttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.gadling.com%2F2010%2F02%2F04%2Ftsa-forces-richmond-airport-to-issue-access-badge-to-convicted-f%2F
2. http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12755515?source=rss
3. http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129658&page=1
4. http://www.wsvn.com/features/articles/carmelcase/MI90493/
5. http://www.allvoices.com/news/8400162-tsa-agent-arrested-for-helping-drug-suspects-sneak-through-security
6. http://online.wsj.com/article/AP0eabbe9f157c43c089bf9be4e4d9cd10.html
7. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-02-16/news/28622234_1_tsa-officers-baggage-drug-dealer
8. http://www.myfoxorlando.com/dpp/news/orange_news/013110_TSA_agent_arrested_for_molestation-
9. http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/TSA-Security-Agent-Arrested-at-LAX-80858482.html
10. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-16/justice/new.york.tsa.arrests_1_tsa-officers-third-degree-grand-larceny-bag?_s=PM:CRIME
11. http://www.smartertravel.com/blogs/today-in-travel/tsa-supervisor-arrested-stole-cash-from-travelers.html?id=6114960
12. http://www.wreg.com/news/wreg-tsa-security-officer-arrested,0,4936320.story
13. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/11/26/tsa-worker-accused-assault-jail-time-stalking-harassment/#

Recently, I served as a member of the US Travel Association’s Blue Ribbon Panel for Aviation Security,  a group brought together to evaluate aviation security.  US Travel, based on recommendations made by the panel, released a report, A Better Way, Building a World Class System for Aviation Security.  The report made recommendations, based on the following goals and recommendations:

• Goal Number One – Improve the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint by increasing efficiency, decreasing passenger wait times and screening passengers based on risk
  • Implement a risk-based Trusted Traveler program
  • Give TSA authority over entire checkpoint area
  • Improve preparation of travelers
  • Encourage fewer carry-on bags

• Goal Number Two – Improve governmental efficiency and cooperation in the execution of its security responsibilities
  • Reinstitute the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
  • Facilitate non-partisan leadership of TSA
  • Develop a comprehensive technology procurement strategy
  • Encourage wider use of secure identification documents
  • Reduce duplicative TSA screening for international arrivals
  • Expand trusted traveler programs to qualified international passengers
  • Eliminate duplication between TSA and CBP
  • Push for international cooperation with U.S. security standards

• Goal Number Three – Restructure our national approach to aviation security by developing and utilizing real risk management methods and tools
  • Implement well-defined risk management processes

If there was an underlying theme throughout the paper and recommendations, it is “let’s ensure that aviation security is risk-based and we have an established risk management process.”  A risk-based Trusted Traveler concept is one for which TSA Administrator Pistole has advocated in front of Congress and various business groups over the last several months.

One recommendation for which security concerns may not be apparent at first blush but is costing millions and will be a huge problem if unaddressed is the number of carry-ons being brought onto planes.  The recent trend of airlines charging travelers for any checked bags is forcing a number of passengers to bring more carry-on bags onto each flight.  The result: increased checkpoint congestion and the government having to dedicate more resources, equipment, and personnel to screen passenger bags. Secretary Napolitano, earlier this month, estimated during a Congressional hearing that the extra carry-on baggage generated by checked baggage fees is costing TSA $260 million.

What will happen as the economy improves and more people begin to fly more? What types of costs, delays, and congestion will result? Is it really a good use of our security resources to force TSA to focus on screening carry-on bags instead of looking for terrorist threats?

The report recommends that the Department of Transportation issue regulations requiring that airlines allow all passengers one checked bag, even if that bag is limited to the size of a carry-on bag.  It also recommends that DOT set standards for the number and size of items that a passenger can bring on a plane. These are common-sense recommendations that will not only make the experience of travelers better but will allow our security officials to focus on security, as opposed to random bags.

from: latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-hawley-tsa-20110129,0,5091218.story

Plugging the airport security gaps

Post-9/11 security has done its job, but we must continue to adapt. To foil endlessly resourceful terrorists, we need to improve in three areas.

————————————————

[note: the three areas are:

1. Multiple layers of security deployed throughout the airport that are changing regularly and seem unpredictable.

2. Ownership of the security result must be jointly shared by TSA, the airports, airlines, law enforcement, vendors and  the traveling public

3. Active assessment and allocation of risk-management resources that balance risk tradeoffs]

By Kip Hawley

January 29, 2011

Copyright © 2011, Los Angeles Times

In a recent speech to the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security,  Transportation Security Administrator John S. Pistole discussed the need for aviation security to be “curbside to cockpit.”

Unfortunately, today’s attack at the Domodedovo Airport on the outskirts of Moscow (the busiest airport in Eastern Europe),  demonstrates the importance of a comprehensive approach to aviation security.  The attack today killed 29 people in a waiting area for arriving passengers, just outside the Customs area. Another 50 were hospitalized, including  35 who were listed in critical condition.  As in most airports, the area struck was outside the security zone.

In response to the attack, TSA stated  “We are monitoring the tragedy at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport. As always, we are working with our international partners to share information regarding the latest terrorist tactics and security best practices.”

This response by TSA is a reasoned one that hopefully will prevail in the coming days over more reactionary ones.  Today’s incident demonstrates how complicated aviation security is, not only in the U.S., but internationally. Threats can be mitigated, but they must be done so through risk management and cooperation globally.   The creation of international standards and strengthened information and intelligence sharing for terrorist attacks are also both critical tools.

As the U.S.  further develops its “curbside to cockpit” vision for aviation security, it should recognize that security must be layered and that  VIPR teams, explosive detection technologies, canines, and behavioral patterns are all important parts of a security program.   Just as important is the recognition that not all travelers are the same and mechanisms for getting low-risk travelers in and out of airports quickly, while focusing government attention on those that are higher risk is critical to our future efforts.

In case you missed it, here is a link to Saturday Night Live’s skit on TSA’s enhanced security procedures.

The skit made light of what has spread quickly over the last week — protests from travelers, the White House, the left, and the right over the increased use of Advanced Imaging Technologies (AIT) and “pat-downs” for those who refuse to go through the full-body scanners or trigger the metal detectors.   The use of these procedures and the ensuing uproar have left TSA and its new Administrator John Pistole in a difficult position.  Yesterday Pistole seemed to back away from assertions he had made earlier in the day on television programs that TSA would not change its policies by issuing a statement that the agency would work to make screenings “as minimally invasive as possible.”

In many ways, TSA could not win in this situation.  On one hand, if it did not change “something” to make security stronger this holiday season and another “underwear bomber” appeared, then the agency would have been made into a political piñata.  On the other hand, its roll out of procedures that can be deemed invasive and burdensome and that make normal Joes and Jills who are flying feel like the bad guys hasn’t gained the agency any fans.

The truth of the matter is that as we get further away from 9/11 without a successful attack happening, TSA’s job becomes harder.  (Indeed, the same can be said of DHS as a whole).  Americans feel more secure and less worried that something is going to happen, especially when they are trying to survive economic hardships that face them day to day.  As a result, TSA must be more transparent on its security efforts and use a common sense litmus to what it employs.  Few, I would venture, would argue that we do not want TSA to protect us and that the agency must be capable of stopping the next terrorist who targets an airplane.  What should the agency do?

First, it should continue its efforts to develop more intelligent screening and security measures.  After a recent flight, it dawned on me that the agency’s efforts often only see what “good” travelers want them to see.  It is incumbent on the traveler, for example, to remove his liquids, his computer, and take off his jackets and shoes before going through security.   Sometimes people forget to remove their liquids and nothing happens.  Most of us know of some travelers who routinely ignore the liquids out mandate and still have not been stopped.  Other times, some of the practices leave us scratching our heads.  For example, I recently traveled with a three month old whose booties had to be removed because they counted as shoes.  As someone who has worked on homeland security issues, I know why many of these practices exist but I still wonder how we can make things better so that the things we are protecting (the traveling public) are not left feeling as if they are the threat or worse, more threatened.  Investment in new technologies that can scan our bags for liquids or allow us to leave our shoes on would go a along way. Of course, the implementation of emerging technologies and measures such as profiling will not likely be without criticism.  The deployment of AIT machines have demonstrated that.

Second, TSA should embrace programs such as  domestic registered traveler programs that have a security component and allow those travelers who are a minimal security risk to pay a fee, submit to a  background check, and go through an enhanced security checkpoint experience.

Third, TSA should heed the recommendations of the Inspector General last week in its report, Transportation Security Administration’s Management of Its Screening Workforce Training Program Can Be Improved, and ensure that screeners receive thorough and consistent training.  A number of the “horror stories” reported about TSA’s screening procedures over the past several days do not stem from the new procedures per se but from mistakes made by TSA officers.  For example, Administrator Pistole told “Good Morning America” this morning that at least one screening went too far when an officer reached insider’s a traveler’s underwear.  Stories of forced removals of prosthetics and breakage of urostomy bags also demonstrate the need for good training.

Fourth, Congress needs to help TSA out by partnering with the agency and not playing out its efforts via the news cycle and blogs.  TSA has nearly an impossible task and it could use some constructive help in coming up with long-term solutions and not being forced into reactionary positions.

Last, the American people can help TSA out by being patient yet diligent.  TSA is tasked with assuring that we mitigate as many risks as possible to ensure that we avoid another 9/11.  Sometimes it might not be able to share threat information with the public because it is protecting its information sharing mechanisms or needs to continue its investigation.  While we should hold a common sense test to the agency, we should give it some leeway to do its job.

Several thousand new readers accessed HLSWatch on Sunday. You are clearly interested in TSA-related information. Following are several recent HLSWatch posts by a range of writers. You can view the entire aviation security archives by selecting the term from among the categories to the immediate right.

If you touch my junk, I’ll have you arrested by Dee Walker

The perfect citizen by S. Francis Thorn

Why did the land of the free and the home of the brave chicken out? by Christopher Bellavita

Binary explosivesby Mark Chubb

The Operation was a failure, but the patient lived by Christopher Bellavita

The week (year?) in aviation by Jessica Herrera-Flanigan

Vulnerability to various viruses and other poisonous ooze by Philip J. Palin

The re-introduction of cholera to Haiti — the US and Dominican Republic — is a huge step backward in a century long effort to corner, contain, and eliminate the highly infective and deadly disease.  The precise cause of the outbreak is not yet known, but experts have said the simple absence of hand soap has considerably accelerated the spread of the bacteria that causes the disease.

This week for the first time in seven years a human case of Avian Influenza was confirmed in Hong Kong.  But already this year there have been 22 confirmed cases and nine deaths in Egypt and seven cases and two deaths in Vietnam.  Most epidemiologists continue to consider the world past-due for a serious pandemic. The Avian H5N1 virus is thought to be the most likely source.

Last year’s Swine Flu or H1N1 pandemic should have been – and in some ways was — a fantastic real-world exercise for pandemic preparedness.  We were lucky the particular virus was fairly low-grade.  Our weaknesses were exposed, but the consequences were modest.  But from what I can see, the less-than-dire consequences of H1N1 may have suppressed personal and institutional preparedness for H5N1 or other potential strains of pandemic influenza.

Wednesday a series of cyber specialists told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that the Stuxnet Wormhas viral capabilities. “What makes Stuxnet unique is that it uses a variety of previously seen individual cyber attack techniques, tactics, and procedures, automates them, and hides its presence so that the operator and the system have no reason to suspect that any malicious activity is occurring,” according to Sean P. McGurk, acting director of the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center.

But while Stuxnet is visciously sophisticated once it infects a system, prevention measures are classic.  According to PC Magazine these include, ”Deploy an anti-malware solution; watch out for vendor security notifications and alerts, and apply patches; ensure that users are updated via security education and awareness programs; and be aware of their assets.”  Attention and discipline are the most important preventive measures.

A Russian biologist, Dmitry Ivanovsky, discovered viruses in the late 19th century.  The word virus has a Latin origin that usually referred to a poisonous ooze.  

Virus is closely related to the Latin virulentus.  The English “virulent” also means poisonous, but today is probably more often used for anything that is extremely infective and rapidly spreading. Especially in this context, it has made sense to use the biological term for malicious computer code and now for anything digital that is rapidly consumed.

The John Tyner — “don’t touch my junk” — video and narrative has certainly gone viral.  I am disgusted by it.  The combination of a puerile wanna-be passenger and a couple of aggressively bureaucratic TSA agents has certainly produced a poisonous ooze of invective going every which way. 

Like soap in Haiti and disciplined attention with our computers, a reasonable dose of recognizing the humanity of one another might have avoided the entire drama. 

In regard to transportation security, there are meaningful issues of privacy and security that deserve serious consideration. In their Tuesday post Chris Bellavita and Dee Walker outlined several.  Most persuasive to me is that TSA is too often  preoccupied with going through the motions.  They need our help, as informed and active citizens, to focus on delivering real security value.

But John Tyner is no Rosa Parks.  Neither are the two slightly obnoxious TSA agents a latter day Sheriff Clark and Governor Wallace. John Tyner missing his plane is no Bloody Sunday.

What I perceive in most — not all — reactions to the John Tyner incident is an epidemic of self-righteous rage.  I saw similar symptoms yesterday on the streets of Baltimore.  I can’t always flip the channel quickly enough to miss it on television.  I hear it on radio talk shows and in the halls of Congress.  I don’t know the epidemic’s source, but the destruction caused is easy enough to see.

I can understand the rage of some Haitians – ten months after the earthquake, two weeks after being flooded out of their tents and shanties, and now told the water on which they depend is deadly — in some moments I share their rage. 

But how do we diagnose — or treat — the rage of  the well-fed and warmly housed?  There seems to be some virus attacking our sense of relationship with one another, of being Americans together, of our shared humanity.

In 1992 the rap metal band Rage Against the Machine wrote what seems to have become the angry anthem of those from the left, right, and plenty in the middle:

I’ve got no patience now
So sick of complacence now
I’ve got no patience now
So sick of complacence now
Sick of sick of sick of sick of you
Time has come to pay…
Know your enemy!

It is an epidemic: virulent, poisonous, and just as deadly as any other infection.

It’s not exactly, “Give me liberty or give me death.” But somehow, “If you touch my junk, I’ll have you arrested” may be a fitting candidate for a 21st century analog to Patrick Henry’s cry.

John Tyner – the man who uttered these words — has become the most recent recruit to the growing “Why is TSA doing these things to us?” army of apparently regular people.

If you have not read about his Saturday morning encounter with TSA at the San Diego International Airport, or watched the now viral youtube video of the episode, you can learn about it here: http://johnnyedge.blogspot.com/2010/11/these-events-took-place-roughly-between.html

Every time there is one of these episodes – and they’ve increased since the implementation of the new “enhanced patdown procedures” [note to marketing: lose the “enhanced” modifier.  The reminder of “enhanced interrogation” is too creepy.]

Restart – Every time there is one of these episodes, it is always interesting to read the comments section of the web article or blog post.  Almost without exception the comments fall into one of two categories:

1.    Dear sir/madam: You are a jerk.  No one is above the law.  Rules are rules.  I want to fly in safety.  The  procedures are for our safety. If you don’t want to follow the rules, don’t fly.

2.    Dear sir/madam: You are a hero.  The rules are stupid.  They violate the 4^th amendment.  They have nothing to do with security. What a waste of money.  TSA has not caught one terrorist.  This is how the Nazis got people to behave.  If people don’t want to put liberty ahead of a false security, they shouldn’t fly.

Osama and his buddies must be in whatever passes for hysterics in his gang over our inability to get out of the trap he set: everyone has to prove they are not a terrorist before they can fly.

Months ago, Dee Walker wrote in this blog about her archetypal difficulties with TSA.  In one of her posts, she noted that the “patdowns” she experienced were cursory at best, and clearly ineffective.

I wondered what she thought about the new enhanced procedures.

Here’s what she wrote.  (She wrote this before the Tyner incident)

———————-

Passengers: targets or threats?

The very same week that the  TSA announces a change in its check point pat-down protocols, a terrorist in Yemen with a known proclivity for making bombs reminds us, yet again, that passengers are more likely targets than threats.

To re-cap, last month, TSA promised an impending “change” in the process screeners use to engage passengers who request a pat-down in lieu of passing through the great privacy compromiser, AKA  full-body imaging devices.  At the time of the announcement, TSA spokesperson declined further comment, a strategic lapse, no doubt, intended to generate buzz and chatter.  The next day, we learned that pat-downs would become more invasive to travelers who request them.

I have previously noted that the pat-downs engaged by TSA screeners are neither thorough, nor are they effective.  Jeffrey Goldberg’s recent experiences at BWI  and Providence airports indicate this is still the case, but he also all but confirms that the TSA seeks to embarrass and intimidate passengers into compliance with the body-scanner process.

Since I have complained repeatedly about the nature and lack of accountability inherent in random selections for additional screening, you would think that I would be happy with a process like full body-imaging, that consistently impacts all travelers.  I am anything but happy.  In fact, I am outraged and it would appear I have much good company.

The touch that humiliates

The new search protocol, according to Goldberg, requires screeners “utilize a sliding motion” to more thoroughly check the crotch area of travelers; not, apparently, for the purpose of finding weapons, but with the main intent of getting travelers  “into the machines.”  In other words, it increase the likelihood of individualized, public humiliation in order to gain mass compliance.

If this news does not disturb you, I am not surprised. If this news disturbs you, then you have only yourself to blame.

We brave Americans are nothing but little sheep when it comes to air travel, me included.  We continue to think that if we cooperate, if we put our heads down while we raise our arms as directed, we will be safe.  Al Qaeda keeps trying to tell us how wrong we are, but we are not listening to them, again.  We are too busy listening to TSA screeners yell at us to remove our shoes and laptops.  Our liquids and gels are seized as we pass en route to our overcrowded seats, positioned both invisibly and mere feet above tons of unscreened and unsafe cargo.

In the most recent event, cargo that was suspected of containing a bomb, had been searched and cleared.  Agents had to be told specifically to look for computer printers before finding what ended up being a bomb that was strong enough to bring down the cargo plane in which it was being transported.   But TSA wants to more thoroughly search our crotches?

I continue to wonder when, as travelers, we will rise in protest of procedures that continue to compromise not just our privacy, but our safety as well.  We  routinely and very passively submit to a seriously flawed screening process, that has one purpose: Efficiency.

On time departures vs. air travel safety

Think about it for just a moment and reflect upon your own experiences.  On the whole, we get really mad when our planes are late, but we are not silent about this unforgivable sin. Far from it.  We complain to our friends and on travel websites about missed meetings.  When we miss connecting flights we demand to be compensated, per federal law.  We loudly demand free hotel rooms when blizzards hit as predicted days in advance.   We want Congress to pass a bill of rights for air passengers that reduce our collective risk of sitting on a tarmac.  Meanwhile, important legislation regarding screening rates for cargo has been largely ignored, and this failure has been met with the most reliable characteristic of US travelers when it comes to safety: silence.

As consumers and travelers, we are solely to blame for the current, porous state of air travel safety.  We have allowed TSA to engage a screening process that focuses its sights on us, and we have quietly acquiesced, all in the hopes that we arrive at our destinations on-time and under-budget.  We, the travelers, have failed to insist upon a more holistic screening process that does not separate passengers from the rest of the plane, its contents, its location, its destination and passenger roster.    In essence, passenger screening is the low-hanging fruit of air travel safety.

Had the al Qaeda bomb attacks launched a few weeks ago been successful, would we now have the courage to ask about the effectiveness of traveler screening?  I suspect not.  In fact, I fear the opposite would be likely.  Passenger screening would be lauded as successful, which, it would be argued, forced al Qaeda to attack asymmetrically using the cargo.

We would then (and very likely will yet), engage in some knee-jerk response designed to heighten perceptions of safety while not unduly compromising the efficiency of moving cargo, because that costs money, and those costs will be passed onto us, the passengers.  More safe cargo means more expensive tickets.  We tend to be pretty vocal about how much we don’t want that.

Revamp the entire air travel system

Sadly, no amount of silence will make us safe.  Remember, the printer cartridge plots were not foiled by screening or by searching.  They were foiled by intelligence.  The computer bombs were interdicted by hard work on the ground in Yemen and quick work facilitated by meaningful communication among agents of cooperating nations.  Can we not reasonably expect some of these characteristics to transfer to more effective passenger screening methodologies?

Passenger screening as currently practiced is a complete waste of time if there are bombs in the cargo hold.  Screening and searching cargo cannot currently be accomplished in a meaningful and cost-effective manner.  A more holistic approach to air travel safety is needed to isolate threats, whether those threats be borne by passengers or cargo.  The more time and resources we waste kidding ourselves that what we are doing is working is more time and money  wasted.   Al Qaeda has demonstrated consistent focus on its goals, and it is only a matter of time before some bloody success is again realized.  That success might be on board a plane that is in the sky today.

Are US travelers, as a group, as capable as al Qaeda?  What if, on one given day, every single traveler passing through US airports refused to enter the body-scanner as a means of protest to the current state of our system?  Would our leaders then understand that we are serious about demanding a revamped air travel safety system?

Are we serious or are we kidding ourselves, still?

How to break the chain of intimidation

Over the course of the past two years, I have been selected for secondary screening roughly forty percent of the time I fly.   I am always polite, but, for many reasons,  I never cooperate with secondary screening requests.   Almost predictably, given my experience, I got “randomly” selected for additional screening, yet again, a few days ago.  This time, I was passing through Tampa International Airport.

After informing the screener that I would not enter the body scanner, she pointedly informed me that TSA had recently implemented new pat-down standards that would include a search of the “crotch area”.  I had to wait five minutes to be searched, and then immediately engaged a second screener regarding these “new” techniques.  I asked this screener how much training each member of TSA received on execution of the new pat-down techniques.  She asked me why I wanted to know and said she was just trying to do a pat-down (as in, please don’t ask me anything, I am just trying to do my job here).  I told her that I was a police officer (I did not indicate I was retired) and was very interested in the level and intensity of training on the new pat-down standards.

She looked a little unsure of herself and told me she had received “a day” of training.  I asked her if TSA would verify for me that each trainer received a full day of training on the new techniques.  She then stated that the amount of training varied by airport and by class size.  I then asked her how many people had been in her class and she told me that if I had questions, I could ask the supervisors after she completed her search.  I looked her dead in the eyes and asked why she would not answer a very simple question, and once I promised it would be my last question, she told me that five people had been in her class.

Generally, the pat-down did not feel any different from the last half dozen pat-downs I have experienced, and it was equally ineffective as a pat-down.  I suspect that the goal was not to interdict weapons or contraband, but to elevate the level of embarrassment felt by those of us who refuse to enter the body scanner. Yet again, that had no effect upon me.  What felt markedly different this trip was how very forcefully informed I was by the first screener, and how utterly intimidated the second screener appeared by my inquiries, coupled with her apparent willingness to offer less than accurate information.

I keep getting back to wondering how we let this happen.  TSA is an agency out of control, and likely the greatest single sources of stress for travelers today. Further, screener hostility toward inquiries like mine further exacerbates my frustration and my concern for our freedom.  I have read the signs that tell me to engage the screeners, but when I do, I am met with suspicion, if not by overt hostility.  We, the people, have instilled great discretion in TSA, and yet there seems to be absolutely no desire by us to achieve accountability for the type of decisions that are made.  Why am I so routinely selected for additional “random” screening?  Why is one screener permitted to completely ignore my inquiries, when other screeners provide answers?  Why are screeners allowed to provide incorrect information?  Why have my inquiries generated an interview from behavioral detection experts, directed there to ascertain what my “problem is”?

Democracy requires information in order to work, and one of the best ways to get information is to ask questions.  Should screeners be allowed to provide inaccurate information?  Should screeners be permitted to refuse to provide me information on processes that are not classified as secret?  Should the mere act of me asking for information be punishable by additional screening?  My experience indicates, sadly yes, across the board.

I do not seek out the attention that TSA showers upon me, but when they are so kind to make me the star of their show, I think I deserve answers to reasonable questions, just as I deserve to be told why a particular question is not reasonable.  The mere act of inquiring should not generate retaliatory actions, like those I experienced in Memphis.

Traveler todo list

I have created a list of to-do’s for travelers who, like me, are fed up with the inconsistency and lack of accountability demonstrated by TSA.  I have attempted to ensure that the guidance I provide is consistent with the guidance that TSA provides.  My suggestions offer you the opportunity to gain some level of accountability:

Engage Your Screener: If you are selected for additional screening, or a level of screening that is clearly different from the majority of travelers around you, immediately ask why you were selected.  TSA Screeners will try to rush or herd you into the body scanner if you are not careful. You must immediately state that you will not enter the scanner.  You will be told about the new and more thorough pat down techniques that are being used and will again be offered the “choice” of going through the body scanner or the pat down,  Again, affirmatively state that you will not enter the body scanner.  Then prepare for all eyes to be upon you as the screener states loudly into their radio “We have a refusal”.  Do not be worried and do not allow yourself to be cajoled.  This is just another link in the chain of intimidation.

After you are told yours was a ‘random’ selection, try to note who is “randomly” selected immediately after you. If it is a person of the same race or gender as you are, ask the screener whether those characteristics were relevant to your selection.  Also note the name of the person who is providing information to you.  I strongly encourage you to be polite, and to address the person by their name, as in “Okay,  Ms. Jones, I am waiting right here until you tell me where to go.”  Or, Yes, Mr. Smith, I will remove everything from my pockets”.  Being rude just makes a bad situation worse, and frankly it is not the screeners fault that they are asked to do stupid things. Being rude will also reduce the likelihood that your questions will be answered.  Sometimes, just asking the questions can generate additional attention, and may get you an interview with a behavioral detection officer (BDO).

As you are shuttled to the side or down the middle, you may be asked whether you want to be screened in private.  I was not given that option in Tampa, which is fine because I strongly urge you to decline private screening. The more eyes on what is happening to you, the better for you.  I believe most screeners are highly uncomfortable with the new pat-down procedures and likely resent people like me, who refuse to enter the scanner.  They are far less likely to try to retaliate against you with other people watching.

Do not be afraid to ask to speak to a supervisor.  If reasonable questions are not answered, you should seek answers from the people in the booth.  Take down names, especially when employees of TSA refuse to answer your questions.  Try to also remember to ask why your questions are not being answered.  Be prepared for a general lack of cooperation and remember that TSA wants to get you into and out of the security experience quickly.   The quality of your interaction is far less important.

Finally, follow up.  Make friends, family and acquaintances aware of your experiences and contact TSA.  In his book, Satisfied Customers Tell Three Friends, Angry Customers Tell 3,000 Pete Blackshaw reminds us that in today’s world, the customer is king and queen.

It is time for each of us to remind TSA of that very same thing.

Today’s guest blogger is S. Francis Thorn.  Thorn teaches homeland security at a university in the United States.  He has a military and intelligence background.   This is his first post for Homeland Security Watch.

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First off, the “picture” is fake. It is digitally manufactured.

This “art” is taken from a Wired.com article regarding promotional marketing for a medical imaging company.  With technology being so pervasive, dare I say promiscuous, it may be more common to see medical imaging technology -or technology in general – being cross-pollinated with other disciplines for different uses. After all, if GPS is good for munitions finding their target, it is also good for helping people find the nearest hospital.

That said, the recent concerns surrounding TSA screening techniques is an indication further discussion is necessary, especially as it relates to the pervasive use of technology and its impact on privacy. When a commercial airline pilot is willing to risk his job – during one of the worst economic periods in American history – over TSA screening techniques, this pilot may be saying ‘I’m no longer willing to ride in the back of the bus.’ And should we blame him? TSA itself has abused the technology.

Additionally, how much confidence does DHS/TSA leadership inspire when a ‘do as I say, not as I do’ security model is projected?

At a recent event at JKF International airport, where Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano was showcasing the new Advanced Imaging Technology (ATI), she apparently did not participate in demonstrating the efficacy of the technology, but instead used “volunteers.”

But let’s not skirt the main issue – which is protecting the American flyer from terrorism. Let there be no doubt, the threat is real.

In the context of threats to U.S. Airlines, there may be some common denominators – like citizenship (…or the citizenship of packages). Poor Juan Williams…

Flight 175:

Marwan al-Shehhi (United Arab Emirates)

Fayez Ahmad (United Arab Emirates)

Mohald al-Shehri (Saudi Arabia)

Hamza al-Ghamdi (Saudi Arabia)

Ahmed al-Ghamdi (Saudi Arabia)

Flight 11:

Mohamed Atta (Egypt)

Walid al-Shehri (Saudi Arabia)

Wail al-Shehri (Saudi Arabia)

Abd al-Aziz al-Umari (Saudi Arabia)

Satam al-Suqami (Saudi Arabia)

Flight 77:

Hani Hanjur (Saudi Arabia)

Khalid al-Mihdhar (Saudi Arabia)

Majid Muqid (Saudi Arabia)

Nawaf al-Hamzi (Saudi Arabia)

Salem al-Hamzi (Saudi Arabia)

Flight 93:

Ziad Jarrahi (Lebanon)

Ahmad al-haznawi (Saudi Arabia)

Ahmad al-nami (Saudi Arabia)

Saeed Alghamdi (Saudi Arabia)

Flight 63:

Richard Reid (Great Britain)

Flight 253:

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Nigeria)

True, American’s can be radicalized domestically and access various transportation systems – but they can also join the U.S. Army (here and here) or get invited to speak at Pentagon luncheons….

One challenge with aviation security — as last week’s air cargo incident illustrated — is that there is a significant international aspect. The U.S. has integrated itself into the international system (i.e. globalization) to such an extent that external security threats are having an impact on internal freedoms. In the context of aviation security and its affect on privacy, the conversation regarding America’s relationship with the international community has been anemic.

For example, if individuals are traveling from overseas to kill Americans, is it appropriate to revisit programs like our visa wavier program before placing tighter security restrictions on the internal movements of American Citizens? Internationalism, in many ways, is antithetical to the American ethos.

For those curious about how America might interact with the global community, President George Washington’s Farewell Address is a necessary primer. As a suggestion, pay particular attention to Washington’s council “to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” Essentially, with certain caveats, Washington’s prescription for preserving American freedom is for the United States to interact with the global community in the most detached manner possible.

In the context of America’s approach to aviation security or National/Homeland Security writ large (i.e. international security partnerships/alliances/collaboration), it seems a question we need to answer as a nation is – whether Washington’s council is relevant or obsolete?

For those who consider Washington’s council is obsolete – strike a pose.

There are plenty of breaking news reports on the  packages found late Thursday, October 29.  Following are a few of the more detailed and helpful I have seen.  Many of these reports will be updated in the hours ahead.  (This post originated at 5:30 Eastern on Friday, October 30.)

TUESDAY UPDATE:

September “dry run” confirmed (BBC)

Yemen launches manhunt for bomber (Reuters)

British special forces part of Yemen manhunt (Telegraph UK)  Chief of British Defence Staff says military intervention in Yemen “might be” necessary (Telegraph UK)

Yemen indicts al-Awlaki (AFP)

MONDAY UPDATE:

The BBC is claiming  official confirmation that the source of information on the Yemeni package plot is a a former Guantanamo detainee.

On October 15 AFP reported the man had reached out to Saudi authorities.

SUNDAY UPDATE (At the request of Bill Cumming I am continuing the thread, although at a reduced pace.)

Suspect arrested in Yemen (Telegraph UK) (Student is thought to have be source of packages)

Likely bombmaker identified (Telegraph UK) (Same technician suspected in Christmas Day and other attempted bombings)

Awlaki identified as likely “mastermind” (Guardian UK)  (Includes reporting on likely escalation of US operations originating in Yemen.)

Bomb points to Al Qaeda according to Dubai police (Khaleej Times Dubai)

SATURDAY UPDATE:

PETN confirmed as explosive (BBC)

Detailed description of IED found at Dubai (Telegraph UK)

Yemen packages expose gaps in air cargo screening (National Journal)

Secretary Napolitano affirms apparent AQ connection (ABC News, Good Morning America)

In June the GAO updated its report on Air Cargo Screening. 

In June the Council on Foreign Relations provided a helpful update on the situation in Yemen: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9369/islamist_radicalism_in_yemen.html

ORIGINAL FRIDAY POST:

Cargo plane bomb alert: explosive devices ‘designed to harm US synagogues’  (Telegraph UK)

Terror alert: how the hunt for the packages unfolded (Guardian UK)  (Nice overview of the timetable)

 Obama Says Explosives Were U.S. Bound (New York Times)

Gibbs and Brennan Brief on Terrorism Threat (Politico)

Video of the President’s statement on the Yemeni packages (Washington Post) (after an advertisement) and the complete Post story.  And now there’s a transcript of the President’s statement from the Post.

Packages bound for Chicago synagogues (Chicago Tribune) (One of the synagogues is across the street from the Obama’s southside home.)

Yemen Terror Alert (BBC) (Helpful side-bar pieces on the broader context in Yemen)

Statement from UPS on investigation (UPS)

Statement from Fedex on investigation (Fedex)

Reuters seems to have the best contacts on site in Dubai, where one of the suspicious devices was found.  So far not much is being reported but you might check the link for updates: Package found in Dubai at lab for tests.  The packages originated in Yemen where Reuters also seems to be the most likely candidate to tell us something, if something worth telling is found: Yemen investigating suspicious packages.

In 2008, Fred Gevalt and his daughter Emelie flew around the country trying to find out why Americans tolerate the growing security state.

“We wanted to know why did the land of the free and the brave chicken out,” he told me.

The Gevalts focused especially on what happens at airports under the name of security.   They shared what they learned in a 94 minute film titled “Please Remove Your Shoes.”

You can see excerpts and get more information about the film and the people who made it by going to www.pleaseremoveyourshoesmovie.com.  Salon has a review here;  SecurityInfoWatch has a very thorough review here; the Wall Street Journal review is here, and the Washington Post review is here.

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On the surface, the film appears to be about the security ineptitude of the FAA from the late 1980s through 2001 and the continuing problems of its genetically related TSA offspring.  The story is told through the eyes of whistleblowers, a few members of congress, newspaper and television reporters, and several other people in and around aviation security.

The film includes a review of several post 9/11 incidents that raise questions about the effectiveness of TSA and the safety of air travel.  It has an extended excerpt of Steven Bierfeldt’s chilling (and recorded) interaction in March 2009 with TSA and law enforcement officials at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport: was this reasonable suspicion or abuse of authority?

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The film is not a political movie in a hatchet job way.  It is a political movie in the sense that it asks how much we are willing to put up with in the name of security; how we balance threat against consequences.

One of the people in the movie puts it this way:

“By sewing fear, Jihadist wield power out of all proportion to their numbers.  They threaten not just lives, but a way of life; fostering a paranoid mindset in which innocent travelers accept being bullied, harassed, and stripped of their constitutional rights. ….  [We]  still don’t have a system that is rational, effective and proportionate to the threat.  We continue to sacrifice our resources and freedoms for nothing more than an elaborate facade of security.”

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In my view, the film’s TSA focus is as much macguffin as minotaur.  A central current of the film is how security has become a national shibboleth, something too sacred to question.

“Security has become too hot to touch,” Gevalt said during an interview.

“Congress is afraid to touch it. They just have to support it ad infinitum.  This is what frightens me.  The prospective budget for [security] is infinite.  It’s unbelievable.  And TSA is right in there.  The economy stinks. And we’ve got a bunch of guys [TSA] who, understandably, want to keep their jobs, hire more people, get bigger, get more important, get recognized.”

Gevalt says he and the others responsible for the movie have more to say than maybe what the film actually portrays.

“I’m not apologizing for it.  I think it’s a damn good movie.  But I think it’s necessary first to demonstrate that in many, many respects the system does not work. …. There’s a kind of naive expectation by the public that there is a statistical increase in [aviation security] because of TSA and homeland security.  And I just don’t think that’s true.

“I don’t think that’s necessarily the fault of TSA entirely.  I think it’s partly a function of the nature of the beast.  When you stop and think that we as a country lose 40,000 people a year to car accidents, 120,000 people a year to alcohol, and half a million to cigarette smoke — we haven’t forfeited all our personal liberties and we haven’t put ourselves into national bankruptcy over those three topics.  Yet look what we’re [spending] on security.

“The average is something like 104 people per annum from 1973 through 2001, including 9/11, that have died [from] terrorism [in the US].  That’s an extraordinary number, and I’m not going to suggest to the families of the 9/11 victims that [it’s not important].  But from a position of leadership, why are we doing this?  This is self flagellation.

“I think the bigger question is why are we throwing all this [security] money against the wall, with all the attendant employees, and gadgets, and policies and everything that comes with it.  It’s nuts.  It’s absolutely nuts.

That’s part of why I spent a good hunk of my nest egg [Gevalt financed the film himself] because I think we at least owe it to ourselves to think about it and talk about it.”

How does Gevalt think we can get out of the war on terror trap?

“Well, I think we start by looking at the statistical probabilities of death, doom and destruction right in the eye and try to make a cold blooded decision.”

In the world of homeland security, this is called risk management.

“But you can’t expect people in the business like TSA to think this way because it fundamentally undercuts what they are doing.”

I started to ask him if he thought TSA had improved over the years.  The movie closes with a dozen recommendations for improving aviation security.  Many have been implemented already.  The people in DHS I spoke with say the film mostly reports old news.

But whether TSA has improved or not is irrelevant to the larger point Gevalt is making.

“They probably have improved, but it’s kind of like saying ‘We need to fix this car over here, so we got a basketball team to help do it.  Don’t you think their drop shot is better than it used to be?’”

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Why did Gevalt make this movie?  What does he hope it accomplishes?

“My hope is that someone in Washington knows what the point of all this is.  What are we doing here, at the strategic level?  What are we looking for?  What are we supposed to do?  What are we not supposed to do?  It would strike me that the biggest single problem that faces this agency [TSA] is whether or not they are operating as a deterrent or … to interdict.  Are they there to stop [a terrorist] or are they just there to shoe them away and have them go bomb the subway or something?”

The people at TSA I know are as serious about making sure flying is safe as are the whistleblowers and other critics in the movie.

Gevalt acknowledges that, but…

“How much are you willing to spend, how much should the government spend, how much does it make sense to spend in terms of time, employees, money, everything that costs you to build this kind of scarecrow?

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“I gather you liked the movie?” Gevalt asked me at the end of the interview
“It’s not a movie you like or you don’t like,” I said.  “It’s a movie that you have to think about.”
“I’m glad it had that effect,” Gevalt said.  “That’s what we’re trying to do.”