Homeland Security Watch

Despite the end of flu season in the Northern Hemisphere, the incidence of H1N1 continues to increase.  Over 1 million Americans are now estimated to have the virus. Several jurisdictions, including Washington D.C. and Wisconsin, are seeing an unusual number of cases of summer flu linked to H1N1.

In the Southern Hemisphere, the H1N1 virus is displacing the former seasonal strain.  Late yesterday the Buenos Aires region joined four other Argentine provinces in declaring a health emergency.  Schools  have been closed and other social distancing tactics are being implemented. Argentina’s response to the virus has been delayed and complicated by a national political campaign that concluded with an election on Sunday.  (More from the Buenos Aires Herald)

The Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy has released a helpful round-up of good practice guidance for pandemic preparedness.  The Pennsylvania Department of Health is offering workshops to help businesses prepare for pandemic.

Every Friday the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention update US laboratory confirmed cases of H1N1 at its FluView website.

UPDATE: Good late Wednesday overview of the situation in the Southern Cone from the Associated Press.

A sharper version of this H1N1 distribution map is available at the WHO website.

The World Health Organization — as long expected — has declared a Phase 6 pandemic. It is a breaking story with plenty of coverage, including from the BBC, New York Times, and the WHO itself (a bit delayed).

UPDATE:  At about 1:00 eastern Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of WHO, offered a public explanation of  the Phase 6 Declaration. “This particular H1N1 strain has not circulated previously in humans. The virus is entirely new. The virus is contagious, spreading easily from one person to another, and from one country to another. As of today, nearly 30,000 confirmed cases have been reported in 74 countries. This is only part of the picture. With few exceptions, countries with large numbers of cases are those with good surveillance and testing procedures in place. Spread in several countries can no longer be traced to clearly-defined chains of human-to-human transmission. Further spread is considered inevitable.”

Within 60 minutes of Dr. Chan’s news conference, DHS and HHS released a joint statement from Secretaries Napolitano and Sebelius.  “Today’s decision by the WHO was expected and doesn’t change what we have been doing here in the United States to prepare for and respond to this public health challenge. Once we saw how fast this virus was spreading, we activated our pandemic plans and started doing all the things we needed to do to keep the public as safe and secure as possible,” said Secretary Sebelius. “What this declaration does do is remind the world that flu viruses like H1N1 need to be taken seriously. Although we have not seen large numbers of severe cases in this country so far, things could possibly be very different in the fall, especially if things change in the Southern Hemisphere, and we need to start preparing now in order to be ready for a possible H1N1 immunization campaign starting in late September.”

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that, “full pandemic flu vaccine production will start in two weeks.”

Several media organizations clearly had stories pre-loaded for the long-delayed and long-expected announcement.  As a result, most of the  early reports are measured in tone.  The most serious concern is focused on how the H1N1 virus might mutate during the Southern Hemisphere’s flu season that is just beginning.  Early reports from Chile indicate that H1N1 is crowding out older versions of the seasonal flu.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention there are 276 laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 in the state of New York.  Most of these have been concentrated in New York City.

This morning the New York Daily News - that pillar of probity - offers the following headlines for your breakfasting and commuting pleasure:

Swine flu panic hits NYC

Swine flu panic in NYC heads into higher gear

As swine flu keeps causing panic, when will Mayor Bloomberg close the schools?

City education officials fumble creation of clear swine flu school-closing rules

These are the headlines even after H1N1 was cleared as the cause of  a widely reported infant death. 

Compare and contrast the reality construed by the headlines above to the reality presented by this statement from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene: “Seasonal and H1N1 influenza are both present in New York City, but neither is currently causing an unusual rate of severe illness.”

Three more NYC schools are to be closed today.  According to the city health department, “Over the last five days, the city closed 15 schools in Queens (I.S. 238, P.S. 16, Q255, I.S. 5, JHS 74, P.S. 107, M.S. 158, Our Lady of Lourdes, I.S. 25, World Journalism Preparatory, Q233, P.S. 209, P9, P.S. 19 and P.S. 32) and one in Brooklyn (I.S. 318) after documenting confirmed cases of H1N1 at I.S. 238Q, and unusually high levels of flu-like symptoms in the other schools.  The Health Department continues to work with the Department of Education to assess the situation daily and make decisions regarding school closures on a case by case basis.”

There are 1499 public schools in New York City serving more than 1.1 million students.  The New York Daily News also offers this headline: Working parents scramble to find child care as swine flu outbreak closes schools.

Imagine the risk to children, the economy, and more involved in shutting down the entire school system in response to “flu-like symptoms.”

Despite what appear to be community-level outbreaks of H1N1 in Japan, the WHO has not confirmed a  full Phase 6 pandemic.  

According to an Associated Press report at roughly 11:15 eastern, “WHO chief Dr. Margaret Chan says the swine flu epidemic is in ‘a grace period’ with the WHO alert remaining at phase 5 out of a possible six for the last month. She told the WHO annual assembly on Monday that no one can say how long this period will last. Chan says the danger now is that the swine flu virus could mix with other flu strains and become more dangerous.”

Phase 6 differs from Phase 5 in terms of  how the disease is spreading and its geographic reach.  The WHO pandemic alert system does not attempt to communicate the virulence of the contagion. There is, however, a push for a new approach that would begin to reflect comparative impact. Some speculate that reluctance to declare Phase 6 may reflect official concern for how the public could interpret such a move.

According to Bloomberg, the number of laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 in Japan is growing rapidly.  Most of the new cases in Japan involve teenagers.  As has been reported in other nations, the vast majority of individual cases in Japan are presenting with mild symptoms.  The May 18 update WHO H1N1 update is available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_18/en/index.html

There is a growing body of evidence that young people are most susceptible to the new influenza strain. The New York Times reports, “This year’s swine flu is concentrated in those ages 5 to 24… and school outbreaks like those under way in New York and Houston are the norm.”  Sunday’s Washington Post headlined, “Age of flu victims has big implications.”

While the New York Times report (above) suggests there is probably wide-spread under-reporting in the US figures, the CDC has confirmed over 4700 cases and five deaths in 47 states.  A sixth death,  a New York teacher, was reported on Sunday.  But some are suggesting H1N1 may have played an indirect role in this death.

 Today the WHO begins it annual meeting in Geneva.  The AFP reports that, “The WHO is still considering whether to halt seasonal flu output in order to free up production capacity for large scale pandemic vaccine production.”

The online American Medical Association Journal, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness has published open access to a collection of H1N1 related articles.

A thirty-three year old Texas school teacher has been confirmed as the second US fatality of the H1N1 virus, even as public health mitigation efforts are being eased in Mexico City, Washington D.C.,  San Francisco, and elsewhere.

Late Tuesday, Secretary Napolitano explained, “the CDC [Centers for Disease Control] today modified its interim guidance regarding the closure of schools and child care facilities. As CDC announced earlier today, this particular strain is currently causing a disease similar in nature to seasonal influenza, and with the new information they’ve been able to collect, no longer recommend communities immediately close schools. Instead, teachers and students with influenza-like illness should stay home, which is consistent with what would be recommended during a typical flu season. ”

As of noon eastern on Wednesday the WHO pandemic alert remains at phase 5.  But as the number of confirmed European diagnoses increases a move to phase 6 is considered likely.  WHO standards  call for declaring phase 6 when a community-level outbreak is confirmed in two WHO regions.  Such an outbreak in Europe — in Spain or the United Kingdom – now seems likely. 

The official WHO count of laboratory confirmed cases of H1N1 infection now stands at 1516 scattered across twenty-two countries.  But the disease is in most cases presenting itself with a severity similar to seasonal flu.

Public health officials caution that the new influenza strain could still strengthen through ongoing mutation.

 A report this morning from National Public Radio underlines the unpredictability of the flu virus.  According to NPR, a possible  mutation of the H3N2 strain of seasonal flu may have emerged.  According to Canadian scientists, “In British Columbia, the H3N2 virus causes more severe cases of flu than H1N1 does,” Brunham says. “So we wonder if some of the severe cases in Mexico may have been caused by the variant H3N2 virus.”

Scientists are also concerned that H1N1 could return during the fall flu season with greater strength.  According to the Baltimore Sun,  “the worst is likely still to come. In pandemics of the past, flu that arrived in the spring hit harder come fall, when influenza season returned.”

SECOND UPDATE: Shortly after 5:00 pm (eastern) the New York Times headlined a Reuters story, “8 Students in Queens Likely Had Swine Flu, Officials Say.  Third paragraph reads, “In every single case, illness was mild. Many of the children are feeling better,” Frieden said.”  A Times companion story offers, “Health Agencies Warily Monitor Swine Flu Strain.” 

The New York City Department of Health has released the following statement, “The Health Department is investigating a cluster of respiratory illness in a non-public school in New York City and has determined that at least 8 students have probable human swine influenza. More than 100 of the school’s students were absent several days this week due to fever, sore throats and other flu-like symptoms.”  The full NYC Health Department  statement (choose the link above) is calm, complete, and inspires confidence.

——————————————-

At 11:45 am (eastern) on Saturday the BBC headline reads: Mexico Flu has “Pandemic Potential”

Swine Flu could Cause Pandemic: WHO Says is the Washington Post’s lead.

The most complete and updated story at this hour is probably from Bloomberg: Swine Flu May Be Named Event of International Concern.

While WHO and CDC experts are talking, their public information sites have not — yet — changed from yesterday (still no change at 2:45 eastern on Saturday. ) At 4:00 pm updates are showing on the CDC website.  Some elements have time-stamps as early as noon Saturday.  The updates are, however, in my judgment, less than sufficient to in anyway shape this rapidly developing story.

http://www.who.int/csr/don/en/

http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/investigation.htm

There is a slightly breathless quality to the reporting today (perhaps a poor choice of words given the respiratory illness). Based on what I know, the media stories are accurate.  The urgent tone is — potentially — getting ahead of the facts.  But, if so, this is not the media’s fault.  A  potentially significant threat has suddenly — even mysteriously – emerged.  It deserves serious attention.  The media is doing what it is supposed to do.  The tone reflects the current paucity of authoritative information and comments by authorities who are available to the media.

Consider how the “Gray Lady” started its  Friday story on page A-13 and contrast this  to the start on Saturday’s front page:

STORY A: “An unusual strain of swine flu is circulating among people in the Southwest but is not known to have caused any deaths, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said…” The agency, which has found only seven cases, expects to find more now that it has begun looking intensively for them.

STORY B: “Alarmed Mexican officials, scrambling to control a swine flu outbreak that has killed as many as 68 people and infected possibly 1,000 more in recent weeks, canceled more public events… in and around the capital and said they were considering keeping schools for millions of students here closed into next week

I don’t really need to tell you which — A or B — ran Friday and which ran Saturday.  Given the non-information emerging from the WHO session (UPDATE above), the shift in tone from under-control to crisis-mode is almost sure to increase.

In the early stages of a potential crisis, such as this, there is a substantive need for a proactive public affairs operation that will seek out new information for the media — and public —  be sure the information is accurate, framed as responsibly as possible, and distribute that information as quickly and effectively as possible. (A reader comments that this should be specialist public affairs unit.)

Given the non-information forthcoming from official sources, it is not surprising to see a proliferation of unofficial sources emerge — such as this blog.   The In Case of Emergency blog has brought together a helpful collection of official, non-traditional, and entirely unofficial sources that are tracking the swine flu story. 

In 2004 a former Director-General of WHO said, “We have had great success… controlling outbreaks, but we have only recently come to understand that communications are as critical to outbreak control as laboratory analyses or epidemiology.” Paradoxically, perhaps, one of the best resources on effective risk communications is the CDC’s PandemicFlu site.

EDITORIAL NOTE:  For readers of this blog (let’s admit we often share some rather arcane interests ) there is one small sliver of a silver lining in this story.  Here’s a tantalizing tidbit from the Friday New York Time’s story, “The unusual strain this year was noticed, Dr. Schuchat said, only because the agency was trying out a new diagnostic test at a Navy laboratory and doing more testing than usual through a new Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project along the Mexican border.”

More information on  BIDS is available from the  program’s CDC website.  Is this what the Secretary was talking about in referring to borders as ”living, breathing organisms?”

ScienceInsider reports that the Navy Lab the did the good work was the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego.

SECOND UPDATE (1:01 pm eastern): “Mexican officials, scrambling to control a swine flu outbreak that has killed at least 16 people and possibly dozens more in recent weeks, shuttered schools from kindergarten to university for millions of young people in and around the capital on Friday and urged people with flu symptoms to stay home from work,” according to the New York Times.

UPDATE (9:30 am eastern): “The World Health Organisation (WHO) voiced concern on Friday at a confirmed outbreak of swine flu in the United States and what it called more than 800 human “influenza-like” cases in Mexico, including about 60 deaths,” according to Reuters.

The diagnosis of at least seven cases of swine flu in the United States (reported here yesterday) has public health authorities moving quickly to assess and contain the surprising emergence of the disease.

Concern increased overnight as the possibility emerged of an hither-to unexplained Mexican pattern of respiratory failure that has killed thirteen.   According to Bloomberg, “Disease trackers are trying to determine whether a previously unseen strain of influenza in the U.S. is related to more than 130 cases of severe respiratory illness in Mexico and may spark a pandemic. A new variant of H1N1 swine influenza has sickened at least seven patients in California and Texas, the Centers for Disease Control and Preventionin Atlanta said yesterday. Mexico’s Health Minister Jose Cordova canceled classes in the capital today and recommended citizens avoid public places after 20 fatalities from an illness possibly caused by an H1N1 flu virus.”

The Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota  asked Peter Sandman, PhD, a risk communication consultant based in Princeton, N.J., to listen in on Thursday’s CDC teleconference.   Lisa Schnirring writes, “While he credited the CDC with getting a clear, calm, and concise scientific message out about the swine flu cases, he said they missed a teachable moment to promote pandemic preparedness. ‘Everyone needs to learn how to say ‘This could be bad, and it’s a good reason the take precautions and prepare’ and ‘This could fizzle out,’” Sandman said. ‘They need to simultaneously say both statements.” He added that “good risk communicators need to know how to be both scary and tentative.’”

Reuters has developed a short overview of influenza virus and swine flu in particular.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has developed a more detailed overview of swine flu.

The CDC has established a website where it will post updates to its findings: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/investigation.htm

For several years pandemic defenses– or at least media reports on the defense — have focused mostly of the H5N1 virus of avian flu.  Two more human cases of avian flu were reported this week in Egypt.  Too early to tell if we are dealing with a quarterback fake or a whole different game.

EDITORIAL NOTE: For a prescient strategic take on this urgently unfolding issue, please read and listen — again — to the  Tuesday post and comment by Chris Bellavita, Craig Baldwin, William Cumming, and (indirectly) Nathan Wolfe: http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/04/21/a-way-to-prevent-a-pandemic-decades-before-it-starts/#comments

Reports of drought, flood, wildfire, hurricane, tornado, tsunami, and various plagues are easy to find.  Happy Earth Day. 

To some the risk of these and other natural threats are atypically — perhaps unnaturally – increasing.  Last year the National Intelligence Council offered,

We judge global climate change will have wide-ranging implications for US national security interests over the next 20 years. Although the United States will be less affected and is better equipped than most nations to deal with climate change, and may even see a benefit owing to increases in agriculture productivity, infrastructure repair and replacement will be costly. We judge that the most significant impact for the United States will be indirect and result from climate-driven effects on many other countries and their potential to seriously affect US national security interests. We assess that climate change alone is unlikely to trigger state failure in any state out to 2030, but the impacts will worsen existing problems—such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions. Climate change could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially contributing to intra- or, less likely, interstate conflict, particularly over access to increasingly scarce water resources. We judge that economic migrants will perceive additional reasons to migrate because of harsh climates, both within nations and from disadvantaged to richer countries.

Is climate change a homeland security issue?  Is it a Homeland Security issue?

Recently in this blog there was a quick exchange on whether or not Columbine - or school shootings in general - are properly understood as an issue of homeland security.   Maybe you have noticed, my posts have not given any attention to Somali piracy.  In recent days I have been especially tempted to give attention to the interrogation techniques used by military and intelligence officials on suspected terrorists. But I have not. Meanwhile some readers find my reports on the Hindu Kush excessive.

What fits?  What does not?  Why or why not?  The editorial issue is trivial.  But the policy/strategy issue is potentially crucial.

Last June, co-contributor Chris Bellavita wrote in Homeland Security Affairs Journal, “There are at least seven defensible definitions of homeland security, based on claims about what homeland security emphasizes or ought to emphasize. The definitions focus on (1) terrorism, (2) all hazards, (3) terrorism and catastrophe, (4) jurisdictional hazards, (5) meta hazards, (6) national security, and (7) government efforts to curtail civil liberties. In a metaphorical sense, each definition represents a set of interests that seeks a niche in the homeland security ecosystem. As in a biological system, these semantic entities struggle for resources that give advantage for organizational or political survival and growth.”  (See the complete essay at www.hsaj.org.) 

Two anecdotes:  Last year I made a listening tour of putative Homeland Security leaders.  It was not until the fifth such meeting that I finally discerned my conversation partners were using  ”all-hazards” as the term-of-art for hazards other than terrorism.  How “all” came to exclude terrorism is a long story and this is not the place to tell it. Second story: several months ago I had a series of very productive sessions with a smart, experienced, and sophisticated D.C. insider focused on an important issue of HS policy/strategy.  Our co-conspiracy was successful and certain operational steps were implemented.  As the sun set over the Rosslyn high rises and we disconnected from a final teleconference, she turned to me with a smile and asked, “Now Phil, what is homeland security?”

This is a practical question with important implications, depending on how it is answered.  We are currently incapable of meaningful consensus regarding an answer and that is hardly surprising. But I am concerned that we are not doing more – even fussing a bit — to find a more widely accepted definition.  We define in order to better understand and better communicate our understanding.  The definition — even if it is wrong (especially if it is proven wrong) – can assist this process.

While it no doubt sounds pedantic, I will point to Aristotle for a practical start.  He set out ten categories to better apprehend the subject or predicate of a proposition. One of Aristotle’s categories attends to the relation of one thing (homeland security) to others (e.g. law enforcement, emergency management, public health, counter-terrorism, environmental protection, economic security, intelligence, national security, et cetera).

What differentiates HS from those “things” to which HS is related?  What does HS add to the relationship?  How do the others differ from their prior condition because of their relationship to HS?  In modern parlance, what is Homeland Security’s value-add?

A few days ago, Phil Palin noted the continuing spread of the H5N1 virus in Egypt: “According to the World Health Organization of the 64 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 23 have been fatal.”

If H5N1 doesn’t ring a bell, it was all the rage in homeland security a few years ago. (I am aiming for  issue-attention-cycle irony, here.  I was unable to find an emoticon to express that.)

A related story yesterday (here) suggested additional H5N1 concerns:

“An unusual pattern of avian flu cases in Egypt — almost all are in toddlers, all of whom have survived — has led some flu-tracking Web sites to speculate that dozens of silent cases are circulating there.”

Other people disagree (with hope): “Right now, it’s all hot air,” said Dr. Robert G. Webster, a flu expert at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital in Memphis. “I hope to hell it’s not happening, because it would mean the virus is adapting to humans. But there’s not a shred of data.”

“Adapting to humans” is code for “1918 can happen again, but really bad this time.”

If we keep dodging the H5N1 bullet (or its various mutations), odds are its a matter of time before something else biological threatens the security of the homeland, including the planetary part of the homeland.

In the video below (click on the image), Nathan Wolfe describes his idea for getting a decades head start on future biological threats — “preventing epidemics before they happen, sidelining them via early-warning systems and alleviating the poverty from which easy transmission emerges.”

The video is 12 minutes, but I thought the first 3 minutes and the last 3 minutes capture the core of what he and his colleagues are trying to do.

(The video comes from ted.com.  If the internet did not exist, TED would be a reason to invent it.)

This week two women — one age 33 and the other 25 — were confirmed to have contracted the H5N1 virus.  According to AFP, both women are critically ill.  According to the World Health Organization of the 64 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 23 have been fatal.

A new GAO report strains to sound positive in assessing US readiness for a pandemic. Continuing problems are identified in threat surveillance; federal interagency collaboration; Federal-State-Local intergovernmental collaboration; and public-private communication, coordination, and collaboration. The report has not yet been officially released by GAO, but is available here from the House Homeland Security Committee.

Administrative Note: Technical difficulties on the part of the host for HLSwatch have delayed and continue to complicate today’s posts.

Last week the FBI outlined its new “theory of the case” regarding the 2001 anthrax attack. So far, almost all of the focus has remained on the whodunit, a scientist named Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, who committed suicide late last month as the FBI was closing in on him. Far less attention has been given to whatdunit, the United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases or USAMRIID, and whether sufficient institutional security measures have been developed within government laboratories and government-sponsored research programs to ensure that we can detect the next bio-bomber.

Lingering questions from the Ivins case, particularly the reaction of his co-workers at Fort Detrick, suggest that we have a lot of work to do to build an effective security system to monitor the potential misuse of the world’s most deadly substances. And it is possible that our actions since 2001 have expanded the danger.

Based on new scientific tools used in the investigation, the FBI is certain that the agent used in the attack came from a specific flask used in research at the Army lab. That flask was “effectively the murder weapon” according to U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor. So, whether or not Dr. Ivins did it, the FBI is convinced that someone at USAMRIID did. At least one government scientist weaponized an agent, removed it from the facility and used it to kill five people without being detected. The combination of background checks, peer observation and physical security at Fort Detrick in place in 2001 was inadequate.

Even now, many of Dr. Ivins’ co-workers are not convinced he did it because they believe they would have seen him do it. These doubts should sound an alarm about the state of bio-security today. Seven years after the incident, no one associated with Fort Detrick has yet explained what has been done to make a repeat incident less likely.

Let’s compare aviation and bio-security. Aviation security is far from perfect, but we have responded aggressively and systematically to the 9/11 failure. We know a lot more about passengers before they arrive at the airport. We inspect them and their baggage thoroughly before they are allowed to board an airplane. Once on board, a potential hijacker faces a locked cockpit door, an air marshal, a better trained crew and a plane-full of inquisitive eyes. There remains a residual threat to aviation, most likely from air cargo, but at least we have done as much as we can to prevent another suicide hijacking.

Unfortunately, it is possible our response to the other 2001 terror attack has been backwards. We have spent many billions of dollars developing vaccines and deploying detection equipment based on the belief that the threat was external – a terrorist organization would develop and deploy a biological weapon against the United States.

That danger certainly exists, but we now know that this was an insider job. Someone working for a secretive agency and in control of the most dangerous technologies that exist used them against the society they were charged to protect. And, because the scope of research on bio-defenses has expanded exponentially since 2001, the insider threat now could be even greater.

In the coming days, it will be imperative for the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Health and Human Services to come forward and tell us what has been done at government labs across the country and within government-sponsored research programs in light of the USAMRIID case to strengthen bio-security. What new research protocols have been established? What kind of peer review system is now in place? What kind of detection equipment has been installed as workers exit labs? How have background checks been strengthened? If Dr. Ivins was suffering from declining mental health, to what extent are labs monitoring scientists and looking for danger signs?

We now know that in 2001 we were attacked not just by al Qaeda but also by a government agency. Significant questions linger as to whether the government’s biological security is keeping pace with biological research. The government cannot retreat behind a veil of secrecy. The American people deserve to know that government bio-defense programs now have more effective security measures in place so that we are sufficiently protected from both internal and external threats.

The case should be far from closed.

P.J. Crowley is a Senior Fellow and Director of Homeland Security at the Center for American Progress in Washington, D.C. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and then as Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, serving as Senior Director of Public Affairs for the National Security Council.

The LA Times is reporting the suicide death of the bioweapons scientist employed at Ft. Detrick who was considered by the FBI to be the suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five people and severely sickened 17 others. Steven Hatfill? Nope.

The LA Times report said the Feds ruled out Hatfill and settled on Bruce E. Ivins, a different bioweapons expert at Ft. Detrick, as the culprit. Hatfill had been under investigation for years and publicly proclaimed “a person of interest” by then Attorney General John Ashcroft.

In June, the Justice Department reached a settlement valued at $5.85 million with Steven Hatfill, who sued them for trashing his name in the media.

The Washington Post tells that FBI Director Robert Mueller changed leadership of the anthrax investigation in 2006, instructing the new investigators to re-examine leads and reconsider potential suspects. Turns out that Ivins had an impressive record for his research on behalf of the Defense Department in the area of anthrax decontamination. Ivins also is reported to have conducted extra-curricular research that tipped the investigation in his direction. What is odd is that the following information was public for years:

Ivins was one of the nation’s leading biodefense researchers, according to the Times report, and co-author of numerous anthrax studies, including one on a treatment for inhalation anthrax published in the July 7 issue of the journal Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy.

In the six months following the anthrax mailings, Ivins conducted unauthorized testing for anthrax spores outside containment areas at USAMRIID and found some, according to an internal report by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, which oversees the lab.

In December 2001, after conducting tests triggered by a technician’s fears that she had been exposed, Ivins found evidence of anthrax and decontaminated the woman’s desk, computer, keypad and monitor, but didn’t notify his superiors, the Times reported. The report says Ivins performed more unauthorized sampling on April 15, 2002.

This information was reported by USAToday in 2004.

“I swabbed approximately 20 areas of (her) desk, including the telephone computer and desktop,” Ivins told Army investigators. Half of the samples, he found, “were suspicious for anthrax.”

Rather than report the contamination, Ivins said, he disinfected the desk. “I had no desire to cry wolf.”

Ivins also helped the FBI analyze one of the anthrax-tainted envelopes sent to Senator Daschle’s Washington office.

It is unclear if anything Ivins did before the attacks in September and October 2001 was suspicious. We’ll never know whether Bruce Ivins was indeed the perpetrator among the 20-30 scientists at Ft. Detrick under investigation. Ivins had been told about the impending prosecution and apparently committed suicide by overdosing on Tylenol with Codeine.

Barack Obama today delivered remarks at Purdue University in which he laid out a set of national security priorities. He specifically identified “nuclear, biological, and cyber threats – three 21st century threats that have been neglected for the last eight years.”

He explains in the speech — in so many words — that by “neglected” he means underinvested in and deserving of greater priority. It can be said that when everything’s a priority, nothing is. But if you read the whole speech Senator Obama makes the case that its wiser to focus on the ways in which we are vulnerable as opposed to focusing on the specific enemies. Sounds weird, but it makes sense to suggest that, while national security is broadly defined, we must focus on the threats that can be presented, regardless of the adversary.

For example, while it may be al Qaeda that seeks to use bio-terrorism, we need to focus on defeating that threat if it is employed by any enemy. Same goes for nucs and cyber. And since I’m still here at Maxwell AFB for the Air Force Cybersecurity Symposium, following are Obama’s proposals on addressing cyber threats:

Every American depends – directly or indirectly – on our system of information networks. They are increasingly the backbone of our economy and our infrastructure; our national security and our personal well-being. But it’s no secret that terrorists could use our computer networks to deal us a crippling blow. We know that cyber-espionage and common crime is already on the rise. And yet while countries like China have been quick to recognize this change, for the last eight years we have been dragging our feet.

As President, I’ll make cyber security the top priority that it should be in the 21st century. I’ll declare our cyber-infrastructure a strategic asset, and appoint a National Cyber Advisor who will report directly to me. We’ll coordinate efforts across the federal government, implement a truly national cyber-security policy, and tighten standards to secure information – from the networks that power the federal government, to the networks that you use in your personal lives.

To protect our national security, I’ll bring together government, industry, and academia to determine the best ways to guard the infrastructure that supports our power. Fortunately, right here at Purdue we have one of the country’s leading cyber programs. We need to prevent terrorists or spies from hacking into our national security networks. We need to build the capacity to identify, isolate, and respond to any cyber-attack. And we need to develop new standards for the cyber security that protects our most important infrastructure – from electrical grids to sewage systems; from air traffic control to our markets.

For a brief speech, this was about as much detail as we can expect from a candidate. However, the next president is going to have to delve into such challenges as how effectively to draw the line between monitoring, detecting, dissuading, deterring, and defeating cyber threats. And should we actually endure an attack, we’ve yet to carve out our conops for response, recovery, and retaliation. What does it mean to retaliate for a cyber attack that steals secrets? Or one that shuts down an electrical grid, leading to actual casualties? Or one that isolates our armed services from its chain of command?

Cyber security ought to be a presidential priority and it is positive to see Senator Obama call it out as a strategic concern. We’ll see if John McCain is focused on cyber should his campaign offer a counter-speech.

A National Bio and Agro-defense Facility, or NBAF, is proposed in HR 1717, which is scheduled for a mark up this afternoon by the Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee. 

As the Department of Homeland Security continues to grow organizationally, it would seem that a good portion of its mission also continues to be shared among other agencies previously in charge of addressing certain threats.  The NBAF will be led by a director appointed by the Homeland Security Secretary, but it also will serve both the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture “in defending against the threat of potential acts of agroterrorism and natural-occurring incidents related to agriculture with the potential to adversely impact public health, animal health, and the economy, or may otherwise impact homeland security” according to the bill.  HR 1717 may reflect an emerging trend in DHS reorganization of the S&T missions. 

The proposed National Bio and Agro-defense Facility represents something not unlike the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.  Both the NBAF and DNDO are responsible for “directing basic, applied, and advanced research, development, testing, and evaluation.”  In fact the authorizing language for the DNDO and NBAF look very similar in scope and structure. 

Could this be the beginning of an over all trend to reshape DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate into threat-oriented Offices or Facilities?  Will there next be an organization focused solely on bio-terrorism (there almost was)?  And another on just chemical threats?  Or MANPADS?

This story sounds like something out of an ancient Incan ritual:

If terrorists ever unleashed a biological weapon, unusual molecules normally found in the blood of llamas could quickly help warn of the attack, scientists now report.

Researchers at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington and their colleagues experimented with antibodies, which act as the red flags and magic bullets of the body’s personal defense arsenal.

….The researchers generated more than a billion kinds of antibody binding regions in the laboratory based on genes taken from small blood samples from llamas. After testing their antibodies against various biological threats, the researchers found they could within days successfully identify antibodies targeting cholera toxin, a smallpox virus surrogate and ricin, among other known menaces.

The article should be appearing here in the next day or so.

The Trust for America’s Health released an annual report yesterday on the nation’s public health preparedness, giving each of the 50 states grades on their level of preparedness. Oklahoma and Kansas come away with the highest grade, and the four states tied for the lowest ranking are California, Iowa, Maryland, and New Jersey. The complete report is available here.

Federal Times had a story yesterday that surveyed the one piece of homeland security-related legislation to emerge from the lame duck session of Congress this past month: the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (S. 3678). From the article:

In its final days, the 109th Congress passed a bill creating a new $1 billion agency to fight bioterror threats.

Called the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), it will fund research into cures for infectious diseases and other biological threats, a field that has drawn limited research from pharmaceutical companies due to its low profit potential. The new agency, to be located in the Health and Human Services Department, is intended to centralize federal efforts against bioterrorism.

The legislation updates the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (S.15), with the objective of making it easier to fund mid-stage research that bridges the gap between existing biodefense capabilities and long-term biodefense R&D.

The final bill also makes HHS the lead federal agency for medical response in emergencies, taking the National Disaster Medical System out of FEMA and bringing it over to HHS.

This story in Government Health IT provides additional info on the legislation, and the industry association BIO comments on the passage of the legislation in this press release.

GovExec reports today on remarks by DHS WMD adviser Maureen McCarthy at a conference last Friday on the possibility that foot-and-mouth disease could be used by terrorists:

The Homeland Security Department’s senior adviser for weapons of mass destruction said late last week that the introduction of foot-and-mouth disease on American soil would have a tremendous effect on the U.S. economy, whether the outbreak is intentional or accidental.

Maureen McCarthy, the weapons adviser, on Friday told attendees of the Association for Intelligence Officers’ annual convention that such an outbreak would cost the American agriculture economy “hundreds of billions” of dollars and could shutter some trade borders for “years” if officials deem it necessary.

“It will happen instantly,” she said of the financial and trade impact, “even if there are no deaths.”

During a discussion that in part focused on how biological agents might be used against the United States, McCarthy said foot-and-mouth disease could be used by terrorists. However, she told Government Executive after the discussion that there is no existing intelligence indicating such a plot.

This statement comports with the theory of a recent unclassified/FOUO DHS “Red Cell Report” entitled “Weaponizing Avian Influenza” dated February 2006, which I stumbled across on a Google search a few days ago. (Screen shot of the search result available here.) The document wasn’t still online when I came across the search result, but it clearly suggests that DHS is looking at the possibility that terrorists could leverage a pandemic influenza outbreak to enhance or multiply its effects.

Are these types of scenarios realistic? I’d argue they’re within the realm of possibility, but not among the most likely terrorist plots. But this possibility provides a slightly greater rationale to pay attention to these naturally-occurring threats. And it suggests that strategies focused foot-and-mouth and pandemic influenza need to consider the possibility of manmade outbreaks.

The AP reports today on positive news in the race to develop a vaccine for H5N1 viruses:

Human trials indicate an H5N1 bird flu vaccine developed using a virus isolated in Vietnam can neutralize antibodies from H5N1 viruses found in other countries, the vaccine’s manufacturer said Wednesday.

The preliminary trial results raised hopes that vaccines based on older H5N1 bird flu strains might prove effective against future variants of the virus in the event of a pandemic.

In Sanofi Pasteur’s trial, 300 volunteers were vaccinated with a strain of the virus isolated in Vietnam in 2004. Antibodies were then examined from their blood, and tests were done using H5N1 viruses from Turkey and Indonesia. The results indicated that the volunteers’ antibodies were able to neutralize the other H5N1 viruses, proving that some measure of cross-protection is possible.

“This is a milestone for vaccine development,” said Dr. Klaus Stohr, the World Health Organization’s top official on pandemic influenza vaccines.

This could turn out to be very good news, and deliver a solution to an ominous challenge. We aren’t out of the woods yet, but the world’s leaders and scientists deserve a lot of credit for their effective and timely response to this challenge over the last twelve months.

CQ breaks a story today (available by subscription only) that I haven’t seen reported elsewhere yet (it’s not on the wires or reported by the St. Louis media):

An air monitoring system in St. Louis picked up particles of a biological agent on Monday that can be deadly in large doses.

Tularemia — also known as rabbit fever — is naturally found in the St. Louis region. But officials have been working since last night to determine whether the detection is a threat after a BioWatch sensor near Busch Stadium picked up the bacteria, according to a source familiar with the investigation.

Local officials have the lead on the investigation, but the Department of Homeland Security is closely monitoring the progress. Testing is on-going.

This is reminiscent of a similar incident on the National Mall in DC last year. Game five of the NLCS is scheduled to take place at Busch Stadium in St. Louis tonight.

Update (10/17): The AP now has the story.

From today’s New York Times, a story surveying the problems in which Project BioShield is currently mired:

The last of the anthrax-laced letters was still making its way through the mail in late 2001 when top Bush administration officials reached an obvious conclusion: the nation desperately needed to expand its medical stockpile to prepare for another biological attack.

The result was Project BioShield, a $5.6 billion effort to exploit the country’s top medical and scientific brains and fill an emergency medical cabinet with new drugs and vaccines for a host of threats. “We will rally the great promise of American science and innovation to confront the greatest danger of our time,” President Bush said in starting the program.

But the project, critics say, has largely failed to deliver.

So far, only a small fraction of the anticipated remedies are available. Drug companies have waited months, if not years, for government agencies to decide which treatments they want and in what quantities. Unable to attract large pharmaceutical corporations to join the endeavor, the government is instead relying on small start-up companies that often have no proven track record.

The article builds off the excellent piece in Time Magazine back in January on BioShield and goes into great detail on the nasty fight between VaxGen and Emergent BioSolutions (formerly BioPort) over anthrax vaccine contracts.

The September issue of the Emerging Infectious Diseases includes a policy review that assesses variability in state plans to contain pandemic influenza. The report reviewed 49 of 50 states’ pandemic influenza plans (Lousiana was the only state without one on the web), and focused on three key areas: vaccination, surveillance & detection, and containment measures. Although the report describes variability in the first two areas, containment strategies–such as legal and practical plans for quarantine–showed the most marked heterogeneity:

…confusion and lack of specificity exist in these posted state plans in proposing practical containment measures in the community.

The authors, all from the Research Triangle Institute International (RTII), make helpful recommendations to fill this gap:

Several practical nonpharmaceutical containment steps need to be considered. For example, only approximately one third of the state plans are explicitly considering recommending self-isolation of adults with influenzalike symptoms and keeping children with such symptoms home from school and daycare. Even in this increasingly computer-based economy, in which a considerable percentage of persons can work from home most of the time, this simple stratagem is not addressed in most state plans. Other simple recommendations for use in the community, such as avoiding mass gatherings; shopping on off hours; and household and workplace strategies such as frequent hand washing, avoiding handshaking, and keeping towels separate, are often neglected in state plans.

We should remember that health officials who fought against the spread of SARS in 2003 used extensive exposure control measures, including restrictions on mass gatherings and voluntary home quarantines. Many officials credited such measures as important to slowing disease spread, including CDC director Julie Gerberding. And a Harvard survey of Toronto citizens impacted by SARS demonstrates that the public is not as allergic to the idea as many think. Creative solutions, such as Singapore attention to workforce issues and Hong Kong’s guidance for business and special needs groups, should be thoughtfully considered.

The RTII researchers suggest lack of federal guidance and gaps in epidemiological knowledge as primary reasons for variable state plans, and recommend a revision of the national pandemic influenza plan. Such a revised plan should pay close attention to exposure controls like isolation, quarantine, community restrictions, and other practical containment measures.

The Washington Post published two long, excellent pieces on bioterrorism yesterday and today, the first story focused on the controversial creation of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), and today’s story focused on the disturbing threats could arise out of the development of synthetic biology. Together, the two stories provide a solid precis of the key issues in bioterrorism today, and raise important questions:

• The work of the NBACC is intended to defeat new bioterror threats, but could it also help create them?
• Will there be enough accountability and oversight at the NBACC, given the shroud of secrecy in which it is covered? (See this link for some of the scraps of info on it.)
• Does the creation of the NBACC help create a de facto bioterror arms race in the world?
• Will synthetic biology become a terrorist tool, or a tool used by rogue nations?
• What’s the best way to counter these threats?
• Does the Select Agent rule need to be expanded to account for synthetic biology-related risks?

Overall, two very interesting stories, worth reading in full.

Update (8/1): David Stephenson weighs in on the stories.

Update (8/2): A good post from Jason Sigger at Armchair Generalist on the two stories.

Some good news on the pandemic flu front:

A British company reported Wednesday it had achieved the best results ever seen on an experimental human vaccine for bird flu and said mass production might be possible by 2007.

A global health official called GlaxoSmithKline’s early results “an exciting piece of science.” If future tests are as promising, it would be a major step in the frustrating campaign to protect people from a possible deadly flu pandemic.

The U.S. government’s chief infectious disease scientist also was very optimistic.

“The data are really very impressive,” said Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. “It changes the whole complexion of the issue that we have to face of getting enough vaccine for people who might need it in a pandemic.”

There are still risks that the virus could mutate into forms that the vaccine would not contain, but this is certainly a positive development for the scientific community’s effort to combat this potential global threat.

This press release from CBP today makes me nostalgic for my childhood, and hours spent in the morning, while waiting for the school bus, pouring a salt shaker over the hapless creatures:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agriculture specialists here recently intercepted a slug in a shipment of fresh mushrooms from Bulgaria. The slug, identified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) as Lehmannia nyctelia, is established throughout Europe, north and south Africa, Australia and New Zealand and could potentially pose a tremendous threat to agriculture in the United States.

The shipment of mushrooms arrived at Sea-Tac Airport from Bulgaria via London on Monday, July 10th, and was examined by CBP agriculture specialists. As the numerous (62) cartons of mushrooms were being unloaded from the air cargo container, an agriculture specialist crawled into the container to check for pests. The slug was found on the floor of the container, apparently after crawling out of the mushroom shipment. The shipment was bound for an importer in California.

The live slug was captured and sent to the USDA National Identification Services located in Philadelphia. If a sample is “actionable,” that is, not known to exist in the United States, or is an exotic invasive species detrimental to American agriculture, the shipment is ordered for fumigation, destruction, or reexport. On July 12th, scientists there dissected and identified the slug and verified that it was the first positive identification of this species intercepted at any U.S. port of entry. The shipment of mushrooms was destroyed.

The Lehmannia nyctelia species of slug is a voracious feeder on a variety of trees, shrubs, crop and greenhouse plants. It can also transmit the tobacco mosaic virus to some plants, which unchecked can have devastating effects on several crops including tomatoes, peppers, other vegetables, flowers and weeds.

What I can say? It’s been a slow news week.

The National Governors Association released a report this week intended to serve as a guide for governors and state officials to prepare for the pandemic flu. The press release is here, and notes four key principles to guide state-level activity that are stressed in the report:

• The effects of a pandemic flu will be broad, deep and simultaneous, and states must focus resources to ensure continuation of essential services.
• Medical response capability in a pandemic will be limited, strained and potentially depleted during a pandemic.
• Government must work closely with the private sector to ensure critical operations and services are maintained.
• A pandemic will force many key decisions to be made in a dynamic environment of shifting events, and partnerships must be built now and tested to ensure appropriate and rapid action.

It’s a solid report, the latest in a gathering wave of pandemic flu preparedness guides. A worthwhile read for state officials.

DHS yesterday broke ground on the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick, MD, as noted in a press release from the Department. The Frederick (MD) News Post reported on the ground-breaking, and the Baltimore Sun ran a story that considered some of the security-related and ethical issues surrounding the work of the NBACC.