Homeland Security Watch

On February 7, 1812 President Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson:

“The re-iterations of the Earthquakes continue to be reported from various quarters. They have slightly reached the State of N. Y. and been severely felt W. & S. Westwardly. There was one here [Washington, D. C.] this morning at 5 or 6 minutes after 4 OC. It was rather stronger than any preceding one, & lasted several minutes, with sensible tho very slight repetitions throughout the succeeding hour.”

According to a good piece recently published in the Washington Post,

The New Madrid quakes started nine days before Christmas in 1811 and culminated in a massive shock on Feb. 7, 1812, which some experts believe was one of the largest quakes ever to strike the center of a continent.

In the then thinly populated mid-Mississippi Valley it seemed the end-of-the-world had arrived.  The ground split open, geysers of sand covered forests, the Mississippi river reversed course.  After-shocks continued for months.

A few years ago a friend was named head of strategic planning for a major healthcare system with most of its hospitals in St. Louis and nearby.  After he had been there awhile I asked about the status of their earthquake plans.  He was not from the region and had never heard about the New Madrid fault.  After my question, he asked about pre-existing plans.  There were none.

On this day in 1904 a great fire engulfed Baltimore, then the sixth largest American city.  It started at mid-morning on a Sunday. The cause has never been confirmed, but is assumed to have been accidental.  Over the next thirty hours the fire consumed over 1500 buildings and most of the central business district. There are several online resources, I especially recommend: The Great Baltimore Fire of 1904.

Three of many lessons learned:

Interoperability – Since at least the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 many had encouraged standardization of fire equipment, and especially hose couplings.  Despite the recognized vulnerability very little progress had been made.  As a result, when firefighters and their equipment arrived in Baltimore from Washington, Philadelphia, Wilmington, New York and elsewhere their effectiveness was seriously undermined.  For more see: Major U.S. Cities Using National Standard Fire Hydrants, One Century After the Great Baltimore Fire (National Institute of Standards and Technology)

Mutual Aid –  Twenty-one cities and over 1000 firefighters provided mutual aid as Baltimore burned, most arriving Sunday afternoon.   The speed of this response was made possible by the B&O railway providing special trains at no cost.  The first reinforcements arrived from Washington D.C. only 38 minutes after the request was made (!). The U.S. Navy, Maryland State Militia, and police from several cities, especially Philadelphia and New York, also responded.   But the mutual aid — both private and public — so generously and quickly extended was often under-utilized through lack of technical and strategic preparedness.

Recovery –  A few years after the fire a survivor wrote, “The boldness with which Baltimore in the very moment of its devastation, planned and put into execution a great scheme of public improvements, seemed to act as a charm to dissolve the spell of ultra-conservatism, and to inspire the people with confidence in themselves and in the future of the city.”  Throughout the late 19th Century there had been many efforts to re-conceive the old port as a modern metropolis.  The fire opened the space that provided the opportunity to implement those plans. (An early example of Advance Recovery Planning.) Within two years Baltimore newspapers were claiming the city had been reborn much better than before.

The Facebook motto — “Done is better than perfect” — may be a fair summary of how Baltimore was rebuilt so quickly.   From this distance it’s tough to say what may have been lost along the way, but for the first time a sewer system was laid, parks were created, streets were substantially widened, and electrical and telephone lines were put underground.  Personally, I’m infatuated with much of the post-fire architecture that still graces Baltimore.

The survivor quoted above, longtime insurance executive C.C. Hall, also wrote, “A splendid audacity, resting upon a basis of intelligent comprehension, replaced the old-time hesitancy with which large projects had been received. To create rather than be created became the dominant impulse of the community.”

On February 7, 1995 Pakistani and U.S. authorities captured Ramzi Yousef. He was later found guilty for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  During his U.S. trial Yousef told the court, “Yes, I am a terrorist, and proud of it as long as it is against the U.S. government and against Israel, because you are more than terrorists; you are the one who invented terrorism and using it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”  When arrested in Islamabad Youself was in possession of Delta and United airline tickets and was in the process of converting children’s toys into bombs.  He is currently serving a 240 year term in a federal penitentiary.

“What’s past is prologue,” is from Act 2, Scene 1 of The Tempest.  Shakespeare continues, “what to come, in yours and my discharge.”

The Boston Globe recently ran a very interesting, if short, editorial on the benefits of disaster tourism:

The residents of Joplin, Missouri suffered unspeakable tragedy when the May, 2011, tornado left the small city in ruins and 161 people dead. Today, Joplin is in the midst of a new crisis as city leaders, under fire, backed down from proposals to market the devastation and recovery as “tornado tourism.’’ While every effort should be made to respect the solemn nature of Joplin’s history, the city should reconsider: Disaster tourism is a natural part of any tragedy that engages, and sometimes enrages, a nation.

An interesting perspective I hadn’t thought of before.  Usually, such activities are easily cast as predatory or manipulative.  However, the editors of the Globe make the good point that disasters are learning experiences, not just for those directly impacted but for society in general.  For every person who goes and tours a former disaster site, a few might go home and perhaps not only prepare for the unthinkable themselves, but share that message with others.

Although we can say with near certainty that new outbreaks of disease and catastrophic natural disasters will occur during the next several years, we cannot predict their timing, locations, causes, or severity.  We assess the international community needs to improve surveillance, early warning, and response capabilities for these events, and, by doing so, will enhance its ability to respond to manmade disasters.

The intelligence chief’s comments regarding the Iranian threat were considerably more circumspect, “We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so.  We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

Yet Senators, the media, and perhaps General Clapper himself gave much more attention to the possible Iranian threat than the probable threat of natural catastrophe and pandemic.  The front page headline in the Washington Post was “U.S. spy agencies see new Iran risk.”

The same day the DNI was testifying on Capitol Hill, Mike Dunaway was making a presentation to a FEMA-hosted audience in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.   In late 2008 and early 2009 a reasonable sample of  respondents answered a series of questions regarding their perceptions of relative threats to continuity of private sector operations, profitability or survival.

A couple of the survey findings stood out for me: Among 19 threats identified, the lowest perceived threat was “geologic disaster (earthquake, mudslide, volcanic action)”.  The survey was conducted prior to the earthquake-and-tsunami in Japan and none of the respondents were in California.   Perceptions will vary by time and place.

Also low on the list of threats was “interruption in supply or delivery chain.”   Several firms reeling from the loss of Japanese and Thai suppliers might answer differently.  But I don’t doubt the survey findings reflect general attitudes.  (Dr. Dunaway’s dissertation is chock-full of interesting findings.)

As addressed in two posts last Thursday and Friday, the President has signed-out a National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security.  I appreciate Alan Wolfe and Bill Cumming commenting here on the posts.  Most friends, colleagues, and perhaps an adversary or two, decided to communicate more privately.  Below are a sample of the comments received.

“Just words on paper, very unlikely to really influence supply chain policy.”

“Despite a bow to resilience, this is a security strategy.”

“Lots of cargo and logistics talk, not much recognition of how the supply chain is really something new and different.”

“Though better than the earlier draft, it still seems to be mostly focused on security and less on resilience. However, I know from direct experience it is not easy to write about resiliency, and perhaps being secure is one of the first parts of being resilient.”

“Stalking horse for new (costly) regulations.”

“While it is a national strategy, it feels quite federal/global to me. I’m not sure if many state and/or local folks could conceive how they could contribute to helping realize the goals outlined. It is my belief that a resilient supply chain, like many things, starts and ends in localities around the world.

“C-suites will ignore and deploy their minions to be sure “efficiency” always trumps “resilience,” no matter how inefficient it may be to have a catastrophic collapse of supply chains.”

“The private sector is paramount. It seems to me that much, though certainly not all, of the role of government will be to encourage, support, oversee and in some instances force the private sector to do things. Left to themselves, I think other forces will drive the private sector to not do some of what has to be done to reduce risk and enhance resiliency.”

“To give this the status of a presidential strategy is sort of amazing. It’s made me stop to think. But I feel a bit like a Catholic must feel when it’s announced the Pope has convened a major meeting on an aspect of doctrine I had really never thought of before.”

“What am I supposed to do? I don’t know enough about supply chains to even start a conversation with private sector peers. Besides which private sector peers? These are not the security and EM guys I usually work with.”

“(The strategy is) better than I would have bet. But while behind closed-doors the operators agree it is a real issue, how do you convince CEOs, CFOs, and Boards of Directors? Japan didn’t persuade. Thailand didn’t persuade. White House stationary is easy to ignore. The only things these masters-of-the-universe understand is a swift kick in you know where… and by then it will be too late.”

Perceptions will vary by time and place.  But there is a strong tendency to give more attention to external threats than internal vulnerabilities.  There is more concern regarding possible evil intent elsewhere than accident, neglect, and denial close at hand. We see the splinter in the eye of the other much more quickly than we recognize the log in our own eye.

Wednesday the White House released a new National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security.   This is an issue easy to underestimate.  Like the plumbing in your house, it tends not to be at the forefront until something goes wrong: leaking, freezing, breaking, bursting, or when the well goes dry. Below is a quick take on context and potential implications.

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On June 26, 1974 at a Marsh supermarket in Ohio, a pack of Wrigley’s Juicy Fruit chewing gum became the first retail product sold using a scanner and Universal Product Code symbol.  Our lives would never be the same.

The use of the UPC and other “bar codes” allows the supply chain to be digitally monitored, mapped, and managed as never before. Logistics became one aspect of a supply and demand chain.

Working through a private international standards-setting process a variety of bar codes provide a framework that pulls many products, services, and information about them across the network.

In effect, this information moves the supply chain itself.

Increasingly these standards – and the rich information and management resources they make possible – ensure effective, timely, and comparatively friction-free transactions between companies and nations. The ability to share this digital information in very close to real-time has transformed the modern supply chain from supply-push to demand-pull.

Farmers, miners, and fishermen still matter. Processors, truckers, wholesalers, and retailers still play a crucial part. Ports, railways, and highways are still required. Physical stuff of all sorts still has to move from point A to B (and usually on to points C, D, and Z). But at least in the United States, Europe, Pacific Rim and increasingly around the world, the digital signals that are sent along largely determine when and where product arrives.

When this strategic capacity for generating demand-pull information persists, the supply chain is very resilient. Demand-pull is an attractor around which the system self-organizes.

But if the digital stream dries up the supply chain goes blind, deaf, and immobile. This has important – and largely unprecedented – implications for catastrophe preparedness.

Given this strategic context we are clearly beyond the typical approach to Mass Care (ESF-6) or Logistics (ESF-7). The Emergency Support Functions are just as dependent on supply chain resilience as any other aspect of modern life.

Supply chain resilience is a matter of systemic strategic capacity. If the capacity is resilient, local capability will be restored sooner rather than later. If the capacity is lost, it may be very late indeed until local capability is restored. Moreover, as the supply chain has evolved into a scale-free network – a network where relatively few hubs concentrate the preponderance of connections – the supply chain has incorporated the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of such a network.

With particular attention to the weaknesses, Ted Lewis explains:

A scale-free network containing a highly linked hub and many sparsely linked nodes is more organized than a random network… When a highly organized system reaches its critical point, insignificant incidents become significant because they can collapse the entire system… As self-organization increases, typically in the form of larger hubs or nodes with high betweeness properties, the complex system also becomes more vulnerable to targeted attacks and normal accidents. The extreme case of self-organization is SOC (self-organized criticality) – a state in which small changes are likely to create large effects… As a system nears its critical point, consequences grow exponentially in size. As SOC grows, so does the multiplier effect on the overall system. (Lewis, Ted G., Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World, Agile (2011), Page 340)

For the last twenty years the modern supply chain has generated extraordinary benefits. Efficiencies have multiplied across the global network. But the same networked behaviors that multiply good outcomes can – especially in an unexpected context – multiply bad outcomes.

Surprisingly, optimizations and improved efficiencies have been shown to increase self-organized criticality, making optimized networks less resilient. There are a number of reasons for this non-intuitive result, but one obvious reason is that efficiencies often mean less redundancy and less (expensive) surge capacity.

Most owners and operators of supply chains will find this claim incredible. They will point to several years of data and experience demonstrating increasing stability, effectiveness and predictability. They are right, and it is the system’s predictability that is of particular concern.

The modern supply chain – at its best – is good at predicting market patterns. It recognizes early shifts in consumer behavior, signals these subtle changes across the network, and stimulates appropriate responses in terms of production, transportation, distribution and other functions. Nearly everyone operates on tight deadlines and scramble to meet shareholder profit expectations, but the overall volume is sufficient to keep cash, credit, and goods flowing just ahead of demand. A miniscule profit margin multiplied over millions of consumers is good business.

A big part of the magic is deferring to the expertise of others. Costs – and therefore the consumers’ price – are driven down by abandoning any function where there is not a clear comparative advantage. Increasingly dense network hubs are the result. Searching for comparative advantage has created “cylinders of excellence.”

The producer is very expert in producing, and depends on another expert to transport, and another expert to process, and another expert to package and so on across the network.

No one owns the supply chain. Very few even try to visualize more than their piece of the supply chain, the piece where they have comparative advantage. The level of risk-informed engagement with each piece ranges widely. Risk-informed engagement with other hubs in the network is uncommon.

V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman explain,

Most companies don’t worry about the behavior of their partners while building supply chains to deliver goods and services to consumers. Engineers – not psychologists – build supply networks. Every firm behaves in ways that maximize its own interests, but companies assume, wrongly, that when they do so, they also maximize the supply chain’s interests… That finding isn’t shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each of which has its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction to ensure that supply chains deliver goods and services quickly and cost-effectively. Executives tackle intraorganizational problems but overlook cross-company problems because the latter are difficult to detect. They also find it tedious and time-consuming to define roles, responsibilities, and accountability for a string of businesses they don’t manage directly. Besides, coordinating action across firms is tough because organizations have different cultures and companies can’t count on shared beliefs or loyalty to motivate their partners. (Narayanan, V.G. and Raman, Ananth, Aligning Incentives in Supply Chains, Harvard Business Review on Supply Chain Management (2006), Pages 174-175))

The local grocer does not own his or her source of supply. Even the large grocery company does not usually own the trucking firm that delivers product to its loading docks. The distribution center does not own the means of producing what it distributes. The food supply chain is – and most supply chains are – a disaggregated set of functional specialties in tight relationship and mutually dependent, but much more a team of rivals than a true partnership.

The ubiquitous use of outsourcing in search of comparative advantage is widely thought to transfer risk down or across the network. The assumption is suspect.

Outsourcing more likely obscures the actual level of risk. For the reasons outlined by Narayanan and Arnanth the risk is not known, but it almost certainly exists. Wall Street rewards this behavior because it keeps inventory costs low across the supply chain and creates the impression of risk distribution.

Risk distribution can be illusory, especially in scale-free networks. Rather, risk is almost certainly being concentrated in those low-end operators most vulnerable to any major shift in the risk environment.Given the nature of the modern supply chain, this supposedly transferred risk is actually accumulating and will, probably (my judgment), be unleashed across the supply chain by some future event with catastrophic consequences.

The greatest value of the new Strategy is to create a window-of-opportunity before such an event when creative and collaborative attention can be focused on these issues, especially to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities and enhance the resilience of strategic capacity.

Yesterday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland Secretary Napolitano unveiled the new National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security (1.5 megabyte PDF).  The President signed-out the document on Monday.

The strategy offers two goals:

Goal 1: Promote the Efficient and Secure Movement of Goods – The first goal of the Strategy is topromote the timely, efficient flow of legitimate commerce while protecting and securing the supply chain from exploitation, and reducing its vulnerability to disruption. To achieve this goal we will enhance the integrity of goods as they move through the global supply chain. We will also understand and resolve threats early in the process, and strengthen the security of physical infrastructures, conveyances and information assets, while seeking to maximize trade through modernizing supply chain infrastructures and processes.

Goal 2: Foster a Resilient Supply Chain – The second goal of the Strategy is to foster a global supply chain system that is prepared for, and can withstand, evolving threats and hazards and can recover rapidly from disruptions. To achieve this we will prioritize efforts to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities and refine plans to reconstitute the flow of commerce after disruptions.

In my judgment we are much closer to achieving “efficient and secure movement” than we are to a “resilient supply chain”.  The new strategy could help with each, but the tougher task will be the effort “to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities.”

On January 11 the Wall Street Journal reported,

After a decade of streamlining their supply chains to make them less costly, the natural disasters and political upheavals that marked 2011 showed many multinational companies just how vulnerable those links have become.

A senior supply chain executive recently told me (clearly depending on me to protect his name and the name of his firm), “We have several known choke-points. I’m sure there are many more we don’t know about.  It won’t take a major disaster to disrupt supply, just a couple of unusual, probably simultaneous accidents.  I think — hope — there would be a similar impact on our competitors.  But that doesn’t help our consumers.”

“There are ways to mitigate our risk, but they’re all expensive,” another executive explains.  ”And for the last decade and the foreseeable future the lower cost of US supply chain management has been our principal economic advantage.  We’re much better than the Europeans, tons more efficient than the Chinese.  Increase supply chain costs and we lose just about the only advantage the US has left on most commodity trading and even a broad range of high-end specialty goods.”

Again from the Wall Street Journal:

Justifying redundancies is one of the toughest aspects of managing a supply chain, because backstopping doesn’t pay off unless there is a disaster. When CFOs ask about the return on such investments, the answer is, “If we’re lucky, absolutely zero return,” says Sean Cumbie, vice president in charge of global supply-chain management at genetics-testing company Qiagen NV, based in Germany.

The new strategy makes a glancing reference to “appropriate redundancy” which, for most supply chain executives, is like discussing the practical difference between manslaughter and murder.   Whatever you call it, the outcome ain’t pretty.

The senior supply chain guys (and a few gals) are the pioneers of the field.  In the last twenty years they have transformed the known world.  Not just the supply chain world, but the everyday world of billions of consumers.  Today the supply chain is faster, cheaper,  delivers much higher quality with much more assurance and transparency than a quarter century ago.

On most days the supply chain is also stronger, more flexible, and better at handling a range of emergencies and disasters.

But what we saw in Northeast Japan and Thailand has exposed a parallel reality.  Like all networked systems, risk tends to pool in unexpected ways and often unexpected places.  What if the earthquake-and-tsunami had hit the economic heartland of Tokyo and Osaka, instead of the Tohoku periphery?  What’s would the outcome be if  instead of Thai flooding it was an earthquake in San Francisco and down the east side of Santa Clara County?  What happens if the Port of Long Beach is seriously disrupted for an extended period?  What if cyber-vandals — or economic or national or terrorist adversaries –seriously target the digital systems on which the modern supply chain absolutely depends?

In a report — “New Models Addressing Supply Chain and Transport Risk” (7 megabyte PDF) —  released Tuesday, the World Economic Forum found:

Supply chain and transport networks have continuously evolved to deliver capacity, speed, efficiency and customer service through organizational trends such as globalization, specialization, volume consolidation and information availability. The focus on cost optimization has highlighted the tension between cost elimination and network robustness – with the removal of traditional buffers such as safety stock and excess capacity. These developments have shifted risk distributions…(while) their effects have often included sharing risk more broadly around the world, reducing high-frequency risks and focusing risk within sectors, common technologies or nodes. Another common feature has been to disassociate risk from responsibility, misaligning incentives and creating moral hazards – the notion that a party that is insulated from risk will behave differently from how it would behave if it had full exposure to risk.

Most supply chain managers I know tend to discount low frequency, high consequence risks (see related post).  They discount this kind of risk because over the last twenty years they have become true masters of risk management.   They also discount high impact risks because their CEO’s, Boards of Directors, and shareholders reward them for squeezing every possible penny out of supply chain costs.  They discount catastrophic risk because their creation — the modern supply chain — has never experienced a fundamental systemic failure.

Yet.

Many supply chain executives have become what economists sometimes call “risk preferers”, they have learned to maximize their return by skating with great style, grace, and confidence along the edge of chaos.   Each day they become more adept at mastering the chaos.   Is the experienced supply chain executive a sorcerer or  sorcerer’s apprentice?

The new National Strategy is the starting point for a collaborative process of discussion, analysis, and policy development.  It seeks to “develop a culture of mutual interest and shared responsibility” across government and the private sector.  It’s the right goal.  It’s the right way to pursue the goal.

It is a very ambitious goal.

The chart is taken from a December edition of Fortune Magazine.  These estimated costs — almost certainly underestimated — reflect a record-setting $380 billion in global economic losses; nearly two-thirds higher than in 2005, the previous record year. (See more from Munich RE.)

This week’s leader in The Economist is entitled, “The Rising Cost of Catastrophes” (see below and for a link to a more detailed article).  In the run-up to the 2012 Davos Summit the World Economic Forum has identified key global risks and gives special attention to the implications of the earthquake-tsunami-nuclear emergency in Japan.  They warn about “seeds of dystopia” being planted worldwide.  Fortune, The Economist, and WEF… in the business world this is a thoughtleader trifecta.

The unprecedented scale and recurrence of these losses may — but I emphasize, may — have begun to influence strategic decisions by some major players.  A once-upon-a-time client lost nearly $1 billion as a result of the floods in Thailand. They are certainly learning from hard-knocks what a decade-ago I tried to communicate as a competitive opportunity as well as competitive risk.

So attention must be paid, either now through thoughtful mitigation or at some future point through even higher declared losses.

And yet, last week I was with three serious, practical business leaders who seemed unaware of the triple-header in Japan or the epic flooding in Thailand or the eventual shift in the San Andreas and New Madrid faults.   They have not personally experienced anything analogous.  Accordingly such high impact risks are only “theoretical”, which being serious, practical men they cannot allow to distract from what they know and know how to manage.

To ponder the experience of a peer from Sendai or Bangkok would require a kind of empathy, imagination and vulnerability that does not typically earn seven-figure bonuses.  Will the criteria for bonus payments shift to reflect a shifting context?  Hiring criteria?

The potentially catastrophic risks that I use as examples currently tend to be dismissed as either “ancient history” or “fanciful futures.”   It is helpful when Fortune and The Economist and the World Economic Forum begin to sing a similar tune.

Over the last year, Klaus Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum, has argued, “In the past the decisive factor in success was productivity, the efficiency with which you used resources.  Today the most important success factor is to recognize risks and mitigate those risks.”  If the pace of global economic growth continues to slow, risk-mitigation will become even more critical to bottom-line success… even survival.

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The following was published in The Economist on January 14

COMMERCE has long been at the mercy of the elements. The British East India Company was almost strangled at birth when it lost several of its ships in a storm. But the toll is rising. The world has been so preoccupied with the man-made catastrophes of subprime mortgages and sovereign debt that it may not have noticed how much economic mayhem nature has wreaked. With earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand, floods in Thailand and Australia and tornadoes in America, last year was the costliest on record for natural disasters.

This trend is not, as is often thought, a result of climate change. There is little evidence that big hurricanes come ashore any more often than, say, a century ago. But disasters now extract a far higher price, for the simple reason that the world’s population and output are becoming concentrated in vulnerable cities near earthquake faults, on river deltas or along tropical coasts (see article). Those risks will rise as the wealth of Shanghai and Kolkata comes to rival that of London and New York. Meanwhile, interconnected supply chains guarantee that when one region is knocked out by an earthquake or flood, the reverberations are global.

This may sound grim, but the truth is more encouraging. When poor people leave the countryside for shantytowns on hillsides or river banks they are exposed to mudslides and floods, but also have access to better-paying, more productive work. Richer societies may lose more property to disaster but they are also better able to protect their people. Indeed, although the economic toll from disasters has risen, the death toll has not, despite the world’s growing population.

Preparing for the worst

The right role for government, then, is not to resist urbanisation but to minimise the consequences when disaster strikes. This means, first, getting priorities right. At present, too large a slice of disaster budgets goes on rescue and repair after a tragedy, and not enough on beefing up defences beforehand. Cyclone shelters are useless if they fall into disrepair. A World Bank study recommends using schools and other bits of normal public infrastructure in disaster-protection plans, so that the kit and buildings are properly maintained.

Second, government should be fiercer when private individuals and firms, left to pursue their own self-interest, put all of society at risk. For example, in their quest for growth, developers and local governments have eradicated sand dunes, mangrove swamps, reefs and flood plains that formed natural buffers between people and nature. Preserving or restoring more of this natural capital would make cities more resilient, much as increased financial capital does for the banking system. In the Netherlands dykes have been pushed out and flood plains restored to give rivers more room to flood.

Third, governments must eliminate the perverse incentives their own policies produce. Politicians are often under pressure to limit the premiums insurance companies can charge. The result is to underprice the risk of living in dangerous areas—which is one reason that so many expensive homes await the next hurricane on Florida’s coast. When governments rebuild homes repeatedly struck by floods and wildfires, they are subsidising people to live in hazardous places.

For their part companies need to operate on the assumption that a disaster will strike at some point. This means preparing contingency plans, reinforcing supply chains and even, costly though this might be, having reserve suppliers lined up: there is no point in having a perfectly efficient supply chain if it can be snapped whenever nature takes a turn for the worst. Disasters are inevitable; their consequences need not be.

FROM TODAY’S WALL STREET JOURNAL:

California is gearing up for what officials say could be a catastrophic wildfire season following what so far has been one of the driest winters on record.

Hundreds of wildfires have broken out in what is typically a season with few fires, forcing fire officials to add staff. An unexpectedly busy wildfire season starting in the spring could worsen California’s budget woes, with its deficit for the next fiscal year projected at $9.2 billion.  MORE

Last Wednesday, January 4 marked the five year anniversary of the landmark Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons:”

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

The bi-partisan authors of these words, referred to in arms control circles as “The Four Horsemen,” are not traditional peace activists or long-time nuclear abolitionists.  Instead, their identity as realists, hawks, and Cold War warriors is what lent such weight to the argument for nuclear zero:

Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The desire to rid the world of nuclear bombs is nearly as old as the weapons themselves. What was new about this particular call was not simply the sketch of concrete steps that could be taken at the beginning of such a journey, but the gravitas of the messengers.  In the abstract it seems almost silly to think that such ideas cannot inhabit a respected space in the relevant conversation without a blessing from above, but at the same time these “wise men” provided the rhetorical room for such a conversation to expand from a minority view to a wide-ranging debate across the foreign policy, international security, and defense worlds.

What does this have to do with homeland security?  There is the obvious impact that comes with a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons that includes a reduced risk of nuclear terrorism, accidental launch, and war with all it’s worldwide implications.  However, reference to this particular anniversary in other venues made me both appreciate the potential coercive power of such an opinion piece and made me wonder if there had been anythings similar in the homeland security sphere. If not, as I suspect, what could have a comparable effect?

Stephen Flynn and the idea of “resilience” is the only candidate that springs to mind.  Yet it introduced a new concept, one which in my opinion has been twisted into various shapes to fit various needs and definitions.  The Four Horsemen did not conjure a “world without nuclear weapons” out of nothingness, but instead by lending their voices to a relatively marginalized idea shifted the terms of conversation and analysis on which nuclear policy is grounded. Perhaps a true paradigm shift.

Are there possible candidates, authors and topics, in what is considered “homeland security” that could result in such a radical shift?

Earlier today the President signed out and the Secretary of Defense released new strategic guidance for the Department of Defense. Following are my quick-takes on those aspects of the document  most closely related to homeland security.

Page 1:

The demise of Osama bin Laden and the capturing or killing of many other senior al-Qa?’ida  leaders have rendered the group far less capable. However, al-Qa?’ida and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. More broadly,violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland.The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats thatcould directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the UnitedStates will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring theactivities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establishcontrol over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.

Page 2:

In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure toreform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that,over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and aremore stable and reliable partners of the United States.Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists anddestabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states.

Page 3:

To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the globalcommons ?– those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms orother anti-access approaches. Both state and non-state actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland. Growth in the number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.

Page 4:

Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qa?’ida and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa?’ida and preventing Afghanistan from everbeing a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributedand will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

Page 5:

Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space….

U.S. forces willcontinue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. We willalso come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong,steady?–state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad.

Page 6:

The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries. U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad. DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

You may see more.   The document includes considerable attention to WMD and cyber threats not excerpted above.

Monday the independent panel appointed to investigate the Fukushima nuclear accident released a 507 page interim report.  Most of the document focuses on specific operational decisions and tactical choices.

Several specific failures are highlighted: insufficient planning, poor regulation and oversight, inadequate training and exercising, a breakdown in communications within the government and between the government and the operator of the nuclear power plant.

The previous paragraph could be quickly edited to apply to nearly every serious industrial accident: Bhopal, TMI, Deepwater Horizon, various large-scale blackouts and others.   The same failures are referenced in most after-actions for events large and small.

Also typical has been most of the media coverage focusing on personal failures by political, regulatory and corporate leaders.

But toward the end of the report — and the 22 page English-language executive summary — are several atypical bits of analysis worth much more attention than given so far.

It is not easy to admit an absolute safety never exists and to learn to live with risks.  But it is necessary to make effort toward realizing a society where risk information is shared and people are allowed to make reasonable choices.

A quarter century ago I made some extra Yen editing Japanese-to-English translations.  This time I will mostly leave the first draft as it is. There is a kind of clarity in the slightly awkward but more literal rendering.

Even for an accident of low probabilities so long as extremely large scale damages are anticipated once it occurs… due consideration should be given to the risks involved and precautionary measures should be taken.

It was a major shortcoming for the safety of both nuclear power plants and surrounding communities that a nuclear accident had not been assumed to occur as a complex disaster.  Disaster prevention programs should be formulated by assuming complex disasters, which will be the major point in reviewing nuclear power plant safety for the future.

It cannot be denied that the viewpoint of looking at a whole picture of an accident was not adequately reflected in nuclear disaster prevention programs in the past.

The nuclear disaster prevention program had serious shortfalls. It cannot be excused that nuclear accidents could not be managed because of an extraordinary situation that… exceeded the assumption.

The Investigation Committee is convinced of the need of paradigm shift in the basic principles of disaster prevention programs for such a huge system, which may result in serious damage once it has an accident.

Whatever to plan, design and execute, nothing can be done without setting assumptions. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that things beyond assumptions may take place. The accidents this time present us crucial lessons on how we should be prepared for such incidents beyond assumptions.

Low probability, high consequence events deserve our sustained attention.

Reasonable assumptions will be exceeded.

The chairman of the investigation panel, Yotaro Hatamura, has been especially critical of the tendency to blame the crisis on soteigai. This is often translated as “unforseeable events,” but is probably closer to “unimaginable events.”  (Echoes of a “failure of imagination” in the 911 Commission report.)

Hatamura is an engineer.  His best known work is probably Learning from Design Failures in which he examines more than 100 cases to “uncover the root cause, reveal the scenario that led to the unwanted event, describe what happened so readers can clearly repeat the steps in their mind, and propose ways to avoid those mistakes in the future.”   It is a very detailed, case-by-case, engineering oriented approach to disciplined thinking.  He is a solution-oriented guy.

But Hatamura  has also become an advocate for clearly distinguishing between complexity and non-complexity and what can — and, even more important, cannot — be done to manage complexity.  With a little effort we can foresee complex events.  We have a much more difficult time imagining how our strategy for the complex must differ from our strategy for the merely complicated or novel or known.

The Japanese for complexity (see above) includes kanji a classically minded literalist might read as “a surprising recurrence of miscellaneous elephants.”  If you can imagine how you would manage that, you are on your way to being able to manage the cascade of a complex event.

The final report is expected in June.

…well, you probably know the rest.

This colorful turn of phrase was uttered within my earshot at a Boston bar following the Patriot’s loss to the Buffalo Bills.  Until this game the Bills had not beat the Pats for 15 straight games, a streak that began in 2003.  The Bills are not a bad team this year, in fact they had the same undefeated record as New England entering the game.  Instead, it was the expectation that the result this past Sunday would be the same as so many games before that added to the befuddlement of viewers across the region (in addition to Tom Brady throwing the same number of interceptions in one game–four–that he had thrown all last season). The same colorful, and upset, individual remarked that his “nephew had never known the Bills to beat the Patriots.”

What it says about my life that this episode inspired thoughts about homeland security I will consider in greater depth another time. Regardless, this animated man unintentionally uttered insightful homeland security ideas.

“My nephew has never known…” As a greater time elapses between events, the expectation that those events are possible generally decreases and the urgency to prepare dissipates.  Perhaps because the original attack on the World Trade Center did not achieve a catastrophic result, the nation was strategically unprepared for 9/11.  The same group not only carried out an attack in the U.S. mainland again (after several against various U.S. targets overseas), but they struck the same target. By strategically, I am not referring to the question of whether our intelligence services were properly aware of the threat or if our leaders were aggressive enough in their chosen courses of action.  Instead, as a nation we were seemingly shocked by the attacks as if the threat had never manifested before that terrible day.  Would the reaction to the attacks have been different if they occurred in 1994 or 1995 instead?

The “sun shining”: Sometimes your star player has a bad day and throws four interceptions.  Sometimes as a fan, you underestimate your opponent because they weren’t so hot the year before but you haven’t bothered to analyze whether they improved over the off season.  Sometimes, a plot will develop in a place intelligence services are not looking and by a group that has not appeared on anyone’s radar screen.  Sometimes a less-then-catastrophic storm will cause the failure of levees generally believed to have been built to stricter guidelines. Sometimes a system designed to prevent blow-outs fails.

My point: the unexpected will occur and we can’t count on preventing, deterring, or mitigating all the worst case scenarios.  Somehow in a time of fiscal and political constraint, room for catastrophic planning should be carved out of a system that rests on preparing for the expected. Following the next “unexpected” catastrophe, there will not be a chance for quick redemption on the following Sunday.

Rikuzentakata on March 13, 2011 (photo by Reuters/Toru Hanai)

Rikuzentakata on September 9, 2011 (photo by Reuters/Toru Hanai)

The tenth anniversary of 9/11 happened to coincide with the six-month mark for the 3/11 earthquake-and-tsunami in Japan.

The Wall Street Journal dedicated a special weekend section to Japanese recovery.  Brookings hosted a seminar.  The Japan Society sponsored a panel discussion organized around the theme Re-imagining Japan: The Quest for a Future that Works.

The Japan Society seminar was, in part, prompted by a new book based on a series of essays mostly completed before March 11.  The book was conceived as a call-to-action for the world’s third largest economy, still stalled two decades after the explosion of a  huge property bubble.

Otherwise I did not notice much attention in the United States. This is despite a continuing drag on the US economy caused by disruption of the global supply chain after one of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded.

No doubt 9/11 crowded out attention to 3/11. Too bad.

What might we learn from a formidable economic power that has evidently lost its ability to grow? What might we learn from a democratic political process that has lost the confidence of its citizens through unending factionalism?  What might the United States learn from a catastrophe that killed more than 22,000, displaced more than 300,000, left behind more than 24 million tons of debris, and spawned a long-lasting nuclear emergency?

The instrumental lessons-learned abound.  On this count, the best single source I have so far seen is an August special report by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.  A whole range of studies are being completed or are already under peer review.  By March 11, 2012 much of what we think we know about catastrophe preparedness may be revolutionized by an enhanced understanding of the Japanese experience.  If we choose to pay attention. (Recovery Diva gives close attention and should be regularly read.)

Regarding less instrumental but potentially important outcomes, it may be several more years before we can reach conclusions.

I will point to one phenomenon that is worth particular attention.  There is a Japanese term, shimin shakai, that is usually translated as “civil society” and often used to describe a range of semi-official Japanese voluntary organizations.  There is a deeper meaning.

What is the role of a “citizen” (shimin) in “society” (shakai)?  What do these terms mean in a post-modern culture that still draws heavily on pre-modern sensibilities?

In the early 1960s the notion of shimin became closely associated with a largely grass-roots movement opposing  the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.  While no doubt mythologized over the decades, many remember the popular struggle against the treaty as giving birth to nothing less than a new kind of Japanese: spontaneous, autonomous, free-thinking, even while in meaningful relationship with others and collaborating on issues of common concern.

Simon Andrew Avenell has explained, “As an idea, shimin proposed a new relationship between individual and state; it made possible a progressive reimagination of the nation; it legitimized the defense of private interest against corporate and political interference; and, most important of all, it infused individual and social action with significance far beyond the specific issues at stake, linking them to an ideal — if protean — vision of a new civil society for a new Japan.”

The events and aftermath of March 11 have retrieved and reinvigorated this concept of shimin.  Depending on how the emerging sense-of-citizenship develops, this could be the most profound outcome of the crisis.

–+–

I found the pictures at the top in a collection put together by Alan Taylor at The Atlantic.  Please visit: Japan Earthquake: Six Months Later.

The pictures are of Rikuzentakata.  The Wall Street Journal has given sustained attention to this community, including some well-produced multimedia.

This graphic comes from a site called Visual News (thanks WRC).  You can click on the picture for a larger, full screen, easier-to-read-the-details image.

If we were to look up into the branches of our ancient family tree, many of us would see limbs from our past that ended prematurely in the huge pandemics which have swept the world. In my tree for example, two relatives on oposite American coasts died of Spanish Flu in the same year. Created in a collaboration between GOOD and Column Five, this graphic details the ten deadliest pandemics both past and present, with a key explaining normal symptoms, estimated death tolls and the years they ravaged the world. If that sounds bleak, just make sure you notice how many of these global crisis’ have been cured in just the last century. What cures will the future hold?

Sunday morning Meet the Press — and most broadcast media — gave ongoing attention to Hurricane Irene… even as New York was mostly spared and Philadelphia and (later) Vermont were more than a bit surprised.

The panel, gathered around a studio table in Washington DC, discussed “the political aspect of this storm.”  You can see this element of the show in it’s entirety here (after a 14 second ad).  I want to highlight two issues raised during the rather brief discussion.

First from David Brooks:

Obviously, since Katrina, the, the message for politicians is go all out, maximize the warning.  And I suppose that’s fair. In some parts of the country, that’s fair.  But in places like Washington where it really wasn’t that big a storm, what’s going to happen over time, if they do this every time there’s a storm, is people are going to begin tuning them out.  Obviously, there’s an incentive to play it safe, but there are the kind of things you have to balance out.  And if you go hyper every time, people are going to tune it out.

It’s hard to disagree. But what I also heard weather forecasters and politicians and emergency managers saying clearly and often is:  If we wait until we are sure, it will be too late to evacuate out of harms way.  When a hurricane aims for the most densely populated region of the nation you have to take some risks to mitigate a greater risk.   I heard plenty of (wo)man-in-the-street interviews saying the same thing.

Emphasizing that some risks are beyond precise prediction or effective control is a good message to send and explain and re-send and re-explain.  Informed and educated people will make choices that best fit their situation.

Next from Katty Kay in conversation with the host David Gregory:

MS. KAY: …the watchword is overpreparedness and not underpreparedness.  But it’s very different, when you’ve had three days warning to something like what happened in Japan, for example.

MR. GREGORY:  Yeah.

MS. KAY:  Imagine that.  How is the country prepared for that?  If you have a seismic earthquake off probably the West Coast followed by a tsunami, you don’t have that time to prepare.

MR. GREGORY:  Well…

MS. KAY:  Is any country really up to handling something like that?

MR. GREGORY:  And before–I want to get to that point, but before we leave the activism and the preparation, we talked to Cory Booker, the mayor of Newark.  This was a tweet that he sent out last night, yes, on Saturday. “Heading on a pizza run.  I’m going to deliver 10 pizzas to those standing in our shelter at JFK…”

The panel never got back to “that point” and I’m concerned our national answer is just about as substantive as was Mr. Gregory’s.  Like it says in the song, in terms of catastrophe preparedness I wish we would, “Quit your ramblin quit your gamblin.”

By the way, if you love the old Leadbelly Ledbetter ballad you can listen to it here. Someday, but evidently not this day, I will learn how to embed video.

Early this morning Irene came ashore near Cape Lookout, North Carolina.  She is still tracking to parallel the Atlantic coast all the way into the Canadian Maritimes.   Roughly two million evacuees are on the move to make room for Irene… especially her storm surge.

At this point Irene is forecast to pass over the New York metropolitan area on Sunday as a Category 1 hurricane.  Right now the eye seems likely to move over Long Island which could reduce wind-impact on the more densely populated urban core.

The New York City Office of Emergency Management is reporting:

Due to the approach of Hurricane Irene, the City has issued a mandatory evacuation order for New Yorkers who live in the low-lying Zone “A” coastal areas across all five boroughs and the Rockaways. These areas include: Coney Island, Manhattan Beach, Far Rockaway, Beach Channel, South Beach, Midland Beach, and Battery Park City. People should be out of these areas by 5 pm on Saturday.

Residents who live in Zone A are strongly encouraged to stay with friends or family outside an evacuation zone. Evacuation Centers are open for residents who have no alternative shelter.

MTA service including subways, buses, and railroads will begin to shut down at noon tomorrow, so please prepare to evacuate immediately.

The New York Times has a very helpful interactive map of the NYC evacuation zones.

As noted in previous posts, NYC has a great emergency management community.  While there are intense rivalries between certain agencies.  There is also effective — and regularly exercised — incident command.  There is a professionalism, competence, and commitment to mission that very few jurisdictions can equal.

My only critique of NYC emergency services has been a tendency to depend too much on command-and-control structures and systems.  Its very depth of expertise could, in a truly catastrophic context, undermine its effectiveness.  Experts can sometimes get in the way of creative response to the unexpected.

While I think Sunday and the aftermath could be tough, right now — cross my fingers, knock on wood, et cetera — I do not anticipate a catastrophic impact on New York.  If so, the expertise and command-and-control bias will provide significant benefit.  I will be interested in what our New York City readers have to say on Sunday and Monday… assuming they can let us know.

For a different angle on the catastrophe or non-catastrophe issue, please read an excellent post by Nate Silver at the New York Times blog packed with meaningful data.  He calls it: A New York Hurricane could be a Multibillion Dollar Catastrophe.

A  firefighter, a  cop, and an emergency manager walk into a bar.  This is not a joke.  I was with the three of them.

One had red wine, another had a beer, the third ordered scotch.   I was drinking Dry Sack on the rocks with a twist.

Can you guess which one had which drink?  Can you guess which offered what to the conversation:

“The problem is everyone is in denial about the worst risks.”

“New Orleans after Katrina was simple compared to Sendai after the tsunami.  How about Memphis after New Madrid or LA after the big one?” You can know the real pros by whether or not they pronounce it Maaadrid, as in really crazy.

“How about DC, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham after New Madrid?  How about pipelines, rail bridges, interstates, and the Eastern Interconnect after New Madrid?”  Hows about every little town downstream from a dam?

“How about the whole economy for the next ten years after Long Beach is taken out? I don’t care if it’s tsunami, pandemic, or an IND.”

“How about the whole economy if some cyber-anarchists decide to really screw with credit cards and ATMs?”

“As long as they vaporize my mortgage too.”

The bar talk was not as grim as this suggests.  Extended conversations with this crew are like a public reading of Dante’s Inferno (no Paradiso) with a running commentary by the comedian Lewis Black.  You roar with laughter over a comment that ought not be documented here.   A slightly sick sense of humor is essential to survival in these professions.

“We’re the real problem,” one guy said wrapping his arms around the shoulders of those on either side.  ”We’re too good.  Why worry when the A team’s got your back?”

“Just call 911 and the cavalry always comes.”

“Even under fire… hell, with radioactive brimstone falling from the sky.”

“Thing is, we’re really good at the everyday stuff and lots of the tough stuff.”

“Did you hear about the 911 call because the citizen thought her remote had been stolen.  Cops found it in a drawer.  They responded!”

“That’s the problem, we are so #$!@ responsive we’ve trained the citizens to depend on us.  When the big #$!@ happens they just wait around.”

“Not everyone.”

“Practically EVERYONE!”

“There’s two big pile-ups:  real increasing dependence. Who grows their own food anymore?  Who even eats at home? And where does our food come from? Not anywhere close.  Second pile-up: The #$!@ complicated system works really, really well until it doesn’t work at all.  So there’s no obvious reason to pay much attention, until it’s too late.”

“So… what we’re really good at is hiding the problems?”

“Sure.  There’s a fire.  You put it out.  You get ‘em temporary housing or they go to the in-laws.  I keep gawkers away.  Everything’s fine. No worries. But in Joplin or Tuscaloosa? Even those huge twisters were tiny compared to what we’ll get when the wrong fault shifts under 5 million or a wildfire overwhelms San Diego.  Hows about a CAT 5 and flood surge pounding Miami-Dade?”

“When they call 911 no one will answer, they won’t even get a #$!@ dial-tone!”

“It doesn’t take such a big hit.  Maybe catastrophe comes on little cat feet?  You read Ted Lewis’ new book?  The complex systems we depend on are so intricate  just one little complication and the consequences cascade.”

“Sort of like the 2003 blackout caused by tree branches in Ohio?”

“But the cause wasn’t tree branches, it’s the way WE build and manage systems. Tree branches are a preexisting condition.  Our choices create the vulnerabilities.”

“You know when I was a little kid,” (the guy to his right mimicked the Staten Island accent) we had a farm right down the road.  It’s a landfill now.  The big farms in Jersey, they’re all McMansions.  Mom and pop get their broccoli and peas from California just like all of us.”

“You know what though? The beers alot better than back then.  Hey waitress, another round here.”