Seasonal flooding is expected in Venice.  But this autumn —  for the fourth time since 2000 — the  high water has substantially exceeded historic norms.

The Venetian experience and response offers analogies for decisions unfolding from Sandy:  In particular should our strategy lean toward absorbing or resisting?

Over the centuries Venice has made choices across this continuum.  Some islands have been largely abandoned.  Architectural, infrastructural, and economic adaptations have anticipated flooding.  Large-scale engineering projects are underway to protect the city from flooding.

Much will depend, I expect, on the experience of the next two-to-five years.   If Sandy is framed as an anomaly, choices will default to status-quo-ante.  The 1821 flooding of the Battery is barely remembered.  The Long Island Express of 1938 was an even worse storm and did not seriously dent post-war development.  But if last year’s experience with Irene and this year’s with Sandy is followed in short order by a third perceived calamity: policy, strategy, and behavior will shift.

It is worth remembering that until the Portuguese, Dutch, and English began sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, Venice was the great European trading center and a significant Mediterranean power.  The decline of Venice was mostly a matter of shifting trade patterns, but  a series of powerful storms and floods  in the year 1600 and afterwards accelerated the decline.

…Thus did Venice rise,
Thus flourish, till the unwelcome tidings came,
That in the Tagus had arrived a fleet
From India, from the region of the Sun,
Fragrant with spices — that a way was found,
A channel opened, and the golden stream
Turned to enrich another. Then she felt
Her strength departing, yet awhile maintained
Her state, her splendour; till a tempest shook
All things most held in honour among men…

Samuel Rogers

The fuel situation has improved markedly in New Jersey… as I expected, predicted in prior posts, and just about when I projected.  The fuel situation has not improved — and probably gotten worse — in New York City and Long Island.  Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa.

Below is an excerpt from today’s New York Times.  It blames the difference between NJ and NY mostly on a delay in gas rationing.   This is part of the story.  I don’t think it is the main part.  Rather, I perceive — I am no longer in the region and not able to check-in-person — the key problem is a set of broken connections between the big Linden terminals with smaller terminals beyond the East River.

If this is confirmed as the problem I will have committed the same error that Karl Rove demonstrated in election projections: Mistaking a prior paradigm for current reality.   I mistook my (modest) familiarity with the fuel distribution network in the Washington DC region as functionally analogous to the NYC metro market.  I was looking for one or two really big nodes to restore.  Given the layered density and geographic challenges of the NYC metro fuel market it absolutely makes sense there would be much more inter-mediation in the marketspace.   Not looking for it was a serious mistake.

Please read the final paragraph in the excerpt.  This is why preparedness and mitigation is so very important.  What can be worked out in advance is much more difficult in the midst of a crisis.

The center of the problem was Linden, N.J., oil industry executives said, the heart of the metropolitan supply chain and a place where New York officials have no jurisdiction. It is where the Colonial pipeline ends, bringing petroleum products up from the Gulf of Mexico, and where the Buckeye pipeline begins taking petroleum products to Long Island and other areas.

Six- to eight-foot waves surged through the area, crashing into a Phillips 66 refinery and into a cluster of terminals on or close to the Arthur Kill waterway that receives refined products from the Colonial pipeline and local refineries for shipment throughout the region.

In addition, while the main pipelines have recovered power, 20 or so terminals in and around Linden will take more time to build to normal operations. Eight to 14 are in various stages of repair and limited operations, while 6 are still out of commission. Docks were flooded and damaged, along with equipment that lifts refined product to the barges from pipelines and tanks. The surge blew out control-room windows and lifted and damaged marine docks and lifting equipment essential for putting the products on the barges.

“Hurricane Sandy gave us a major shot to our distribution network,” said James Benton, the director of the New Jersey Petroleum Council, a trade organization. He said the northeaster was a blow, as well, since “it delayed damage assessments for the larger facilities and recoveries for some of the smaller facilities.”

The extent of the damage to the gas-distribution network was not fully understood by state and city officials, said Ralph Bombardiere, executive director of the New York State Association of Service Stations and Repair Shops.

A New York State energy office created amid gas shortages in the 1970s was dissolved in the 1990s. And, Mr. Bombardier said, there was little if any coordination or monitoring of the entire distribution network before the hurricane. “There’s more damage than anybody knew,” he said. “There was no plan or diagram of how this industry worked or who you can call to find out what’s happening. ”

The full NYT story is available at “Behind New York Gas Shortage, Missed Opportunities and Miscalculations“.   I contributed my share.

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15 UPDATE:

Good overview in today’s NYT: Gas Crisis Abates

While not exactly scintillating, a very timely read might be the National Disaster Recovery Framework (September 2011).

From the document’s Executive Summary:

Experience with recent disaster recovery efforts highlights the need for additional guidance, structure and support to improve how we as a Nation address recovery challenges. This experience prompts us to better understand the obstacles to disaster recovery and the challenges faced by communities that seek disaster assistance.The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)is a guide to promote effective recovery, particularly for those incidents that are large scale or catastrophic.The NDRF provides guidance that enables effective recovery support to disaster-impacted States, Tribes and local jurisdictions. It provides a flexible structure that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and collaborative manner. It also focuses on how best to restore, redevelop and revitalize the health,social, economic, natural and environmental fabric of the community and build a more resilient Nation. The NDRF defines:

• Core recovery principles

• Roles and responsibilities of recoverycoordinators and other stakeholders

• A coordinating structure that facilitates communication and collaboration among all stakeholders

• Guidance for pre- and post-disaster recovery planning

• The overall process by which communities can capitalize on opportunities to rebuild stronger, smarter and safer

These elements improve recovery support and expedite recovery of disaster-impacted individuals, families, businesses and communities. While the NDRF speaks to all who are impacted or otherwise involved in disaster recovery, it concentrates on support to individuals and communities.

In the twelve days since Sandy rolled up the Jersey shore and her winds tore across New York harbor people have died, families have lost their homes, and whole neighborhoods have been destroyed.  The vulnerabilities of systems on which modern life depends — especially power, communications, and fuel — have been dramatically exposed.

Mistakes have been made in responding to the crisis.  There has been delay, confusion, and bad judgment.  I have seen some of these problems up close and personal.  I have made my own contributions.  I have read of many more errors.  Several examples have been sent to me by readers.

I have also seen — and heard reports of  – kindness, courage, and generosity.   I have seen planning assumptions and preparedness exercises confirmed.  I have seen professionals giving fully of their energy and intelligence to serve those in need.   One night in New Jersey a huge caravan of  enormous utility trucks passed me heading north.    It occurred to me that the Interstate and Defense Highway System has never been needed to move tanks against an enemy, but it’s sure helpful to move mutual aid… and food, pharma, and much more.

At the very end of the caravan was a Red Cross ambulance with Texas plates.  As traffic slowed, I read a sign on its side explaining it was a gift from the people of Kuwait to a community in Texas (Killeen maybe, I don’t remember).  That’s really long-distance mutual aid.

Thursday afternoon Governors Christie (NJ) and Cuomo  (NY) each gave separate media briefings.   One of my mistakes was yesterday’s post worrying that the true cost of Sandy was not yet being recognized.  Cuomo’s remarks suggest there is a full realization of what the winds have wrought and the implications for recovery.

Governor Christie mostly provided an update on various public services and thanked those who have been involved in the response.   Chris Christie is certainly not shy to call someone an idiot or worse when he thinks it is deserved.  Especially in that context, I was struck yesterday by his defense of those who were doing their best to respond.  Even while 400,000 New Jersey residents remain without power (150,000 new or repeat outages from the nor’easter), the Governor commended the utility companies and especially their crews, who “worked right through the snowstorm. They are doing a good job.”

When a reporter asked a question inviting the Governor to pound-the-utilities, he responded instead,  “The villain in this case is Sandy.” (Governor Cuomo did not need to be invited to pound away.)

The storm is exposing systemic vulnerabilities and bad judgment that could reasonably be blamed on two or three generations of private and public officials and many survivors and victims of the storm.    I suggest it is helpful to look for lessons-learned and unhelpful to seek who to blame.

On a really great day about 80 percent of my plans make some progress.  On most days, without much interference, I only hit sixty-to-seventy percent of my targets.  Under stress, complication, and confusion the percentage further declines.   A quarter-century ago I had some venture capital experience; about two-thirds of investments were expected to fail.

Failure is not a villain.  Failure can be a really good friend.  Friendship is much more likely when — instead of punishing failure — we embrace it, ask it questions, and listen to it teach us.

Yesterday FEMA said that at least 95,000 residents of New York and New Jersey are eligible for some form of emergency housing assistance.  This is an increase from an earlier estimate of 34,000.  Some details on the Disaster Assistance Housing Program from the Department of Housing and Urban Development:

In response to those needs, and at the request of New York and New Jersey, FEMA has activated its Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which allows eligible survivors who are in shelters and cannot return to their homes due to storm-related damages to stay in participating hotels or motels until more suitable housing accommodations are available. FEMA’s contracted vendor, Corporate Lodging Consultants, is maintaining a list of participating hotels and motels, and working to bring on more hotels to ensure that the needs of all survivors are being met. Hotel and motel owners who wish to become a participating hotel can sign up at https://ela.corplodging.com/

HUD is coordinating with FEMA, and affected States, to identify housing providers who may have available housing units, including public housing agencies and multi-family owners.  HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME programs give State and communities the flexibility to redirect millions of dollars to address critical needs, including housing and services for disaster survivors. HUD’s Section 203(k) loan program enables those who have lost their homes to finance the purchase or refinance of a house along with its repair through a single mortgage. It also allows homeowners who have damaged houses to finance the rehabilitation of their existing single-family home.

There has been discussion of using FEMA trailers in Staten Island, Breezy Point, Seaside Heights and other less dense neighborhoods.  But last week FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate said trailers were unlikely to be used.

“Given the rental market and the availability of hotels and motels,” FEMA expects to be able to put all displaced residents of the storm-hit East Coast in existing housing, Fugate said in a conference call with reporters. Some 9,000 people are currently in temporary housing, he added. “That number is fluctuating, but in some areas it’s going up as people go home and discover their homes are flooded and they can’t stay there,” Fugate said. “So we’re working directly to provide people with assistance to get into hotels and motels, and then assess who’s going to need longer-term assistance.”

In New York by Executive Order of the Mayor (November 5)  ”Owners, residents, employees of businesses, and other members of the public (other than authorized government personnel and essential emergency personnel) may re-occupy buildings in Zone A only upon determination by the Department of Buildings that the occupation is permitted.”  Zone A is the most flood-prone area of New York and was designated for mandatory evacuation as Sandy approached.  Roughly 375,000 people reside in Zone A.

Many displaced survivors and evacuees are currently staying with family or friends, but when it becomes clear that original housing will not be available in a timely way, many more will avail themselves of Transitional Sheltering Assistance.   FEMA pays participating hotels and motels the “government rate” established for the city. Hotel stays for Hurricane Katrina survivors reached a peak of roughly 85,000 participants about eight weeks after landfall.  This would be around Christmas for Sandy.

Both quality-of-life and financial incentives exist to move as many as possible as quickly as possible from hotels and motels into rental housing.   As was the case after Katrina, this could be difficult post-Sandy.  ”We don’t have a lot of empty housing in the city, so it’s hard to find it when we need it,” Mayor Bloomberg has said.

For example, the exact number of long-term displaced on Staten Island has not yet been established.  But it is estimated to be a few thousand and potentially many more.  Checking the FEMA  Housing Portal on Wednesday there were 112 rental units available on Staten Island.  The housing portal almost certainly does not encompass the entire market, but it is unlikely that most of those who have been displaced can be relocated proximate to their previous neighborhoods. This has implications for employment, educational continuity, healthcare, family support and much more.

Replacement housing is going to be expensive, messy, and the problem is going to persist well into the New Year.

From: Wave of Death Hit New York Enclave, Wall Street Journal, November 5

This may just be blogger-bluster and I don’t want to suggest it is more than that, but it seems more and more likely we are — I am, many in New York, Trenton, and Washington DC  are  –  not yet acknowledging the huge long-term financial implications of Sandy.  This is especially dangerous if we inappropriately frame the problem during its genesis.  This is the moment when our judgments, whatever they may be, will have the greatest influence.

1836 deaths are blamed on Katrina. No matter how many more victims are found Sandy’s death toll will remain at less than ten percent that number.  Despite several serious problems, the evacuation for and response to Sandy was handled with much more competence and effectiveness than for Katrina.

But the “good news” of preparedness and response — and an election — has obscured profound issues of recovery that are just unfolding. The pre-Katrina population of New Orleans was 484,674.  The population of Staten Island a bit more than 468,000. The population of coastal New Jersey, the Rockaways, and other areas affected by Sandy is much higher than that directly impacted by Katrina.  Building inspectors are just beginning to access areas that have been without electricity.   Certainly the scale of damage at Breezy Point or Midland Beach or Seaside Heights, New Jersey is analogous to the Lower Ninth Ward or Lakeview or Long Beach, Mississippi.

In my experience media often over-play disaster coverage.   In this case, I wonder if even the hyper-competitive NYC media are missing a major story muffled (temporarily) by a combination of competence, complexity, and presidential politics. (The Thursday NYT has reduced front-page coverage to a lower-right corner photo of snow falling on ruins.)  I am not suggesting shouts and hand-wringing or more TV interviews with survivors about their feelings, but  reports on electricity, fuel, other supply chains, port restoration, housing, and analysis of implications would be helpful.  I expect — hope — some future Sunday Times will have a major analytical feature.  But the sudden reduction in regular reporting in the hometown paper seems way strange.  The Post and Daily News may be giving marginally more attention to the Nor’easter, but otherwise not much different.  Weirdly the New York Observer is, at least proportionally, focusing more on Sandy’s implications than her big brash brothers.  (See a collection of the NYO’s “recovery” focus.)

There are social, economic, and geographic differences that may make recovery from Sandy less fraught than that from Katrina.   Nearly 300,000 homes were destroyed by Katrina and the levee failures.  The final accounting for Sandy will not get anywhere close. But there are also issues of population density, infrastructure vulnerability, economic priority, and political power that could make Sandy a disaster that keeps on giving… and expecting to receive.

As I write this another Nor’easter is descending on the the Tri-State.   Record snowfall of between 4 and more than 7 inches with strong winds is reported. Winter officially begins on December 21.  Snow and ice was not a problem in post-Katrina recovery.

THURSDAY EVENING UPDATE

Several developments on replacement housing just today.  The following details are from an Associated Press report filed at 6:40PM ET.

• The federal government is moving manufactured housing into areas in New York and New Jersey that were hit hardest by Superstorm Sandy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency said Thursday.
• In New York and New Jersey, FEMA has determined that more than 101,000 people are eligible for temporary housing at hotels or motels in the region but it’s unclear exactly how many people are taking advantage of that option.
• More than 56,000 people have also been ruled eligible for FEMA’s individual and households program, which provides money for renting a new place or housing repairs.

WATER: Twelve Jersey shore communities have boil/bleach orders.  New York public health officials have released Do-Not-Drink orders for three water systems (including Breezy Point) and boil/bleach instructions for another 23 systems.  Despite the wide-spread and persistent power failures, most municipal water systems have been able to maintain their operational integrity.  There have been water problems in lower Manhattan because it has often not been possible to pump water into high-rise residential buildings.  But… water systems survived Sandy in pretty good shape.

FOOD: The Staten Island Borough President criticized the Red Cross for a slow response when emergency food distribution did not begin until late in the 72 hours immediate response window.  Meanwhile the Newark Star-Ledger reports that “FEMA agents blanket NJ” and added “Working with the American Red Cross, the agency has distributed millions of gallons of water and millions of meals. It has also provided generators and water pumps.” There have also been several reports of neighborhoods responding spontaneously and generously to food shortages.   Pick-up sites for emergency food and water have been established.

Despite wide-spread power outages, communications failures, and transportation hurdles the grocery supply chain is recovering quickly.  Following is a detailed report by Alaric DeArment with Drug Store News:

• Ahold USA, which operates 772 supermarkets under the Giant Food Stores, Martin’s Food Markets, Giant Food and Stop & Shop banners throughout the Northeast and Virginia, closed four stores, all in Stop & Shop’s New York-metro division, division spokeswoman Arlene Putterman told Drug Store News. One of the stores was in Long Island, N.Y., another was in Brooklyn and two were in New Jersey; the division has 184 stores total. Putterman said the stores would open periodically, starting the week of Nov. 5. Suzi Robinson, spokeswoman for Stop & Shop’s New England division, said the company had “deep experience” handing natural disasters and that all of the division’s 219 stores stayed open.

• Supervalu closed all of the 117 Acme stores in the path of the storm on Monday, the day the storm made landfall, but had reopened all but four of them. “We want to make sure that anything we do really helps the communities that we serve,” Supervalu spokesman Mike Siemienas told DSN. “Our top priority right now is making sure that all of our stores that we can get up and running for the community are. And then we’ll work to see what community needs we may be able to assist with.”

• Sears Holdings, which operates the Sears and Kmart chains, had 187 stores closed at the height of the storm, but as of Nov. 1, that number was down to 40, while 20 were operating on generators or had generators en route, a representative of the company told DSN. The company announced that it would give out $350 million in rewards to Shop Your Way cardholders living in affected areas, amounting to $20 per cardholder. The company was also shipping extra supplies like flashlights, batteries, generators and sump pumps to stores.

• ShopRite had 27 stores that remained closed at press time, but all its warehouses and distribution centers were fully operational and delivering products to stores “as quickly as possible to ensure our customers’ needs are met during this difficult time,” according to the company.

• Target had reopened all of the stores affected by press time and also announced a donation of $500,000 in money and goods for storm-relief efforts, including $425,000 to the American Red Cross, $50,000 to the Salvation Army and $25,000 in gift cards.

• Walmart had four stores that remained closed as of Nov. 2, but had pledged $1.5 million in relief efforts. The company said it was “working closely” with the American Red Cross, Salvation Army and Feeding America and also donating truckloads of water, food and other basic items and providing charging stations at Sam’s Club stores for members of the public without electricity to charge cell phones and other devices.

PHARMACEUTICALS: Grocery stores have become major distribution points for pharma and in many markets drug stores are among the top five sources for groceries, so the reports above and below involve both pharma and food.

• CVS/pharmacy closed “up to 800” stores ahead of the storm due to mandatory evacuation orders, and 60 remained closed at press time due to evacuations or power outages, spokesman Mike DeAngelis told DSN, and 90 were operating on generators. At the same time, 100 were operating without power, meaning they were operating in an “off-line mode” without generators. About 15 stores in New York and New Jersey experienced either a total inventory loss due to water damage or couldn’t be reached for a damage assessment, but the company has donated more than $100,000 to the American Red Cross National Disaster Relief Fund to provide support to affected communities and is distributing $50,000 worth of snacks and bottled water in New Jersey.

• Rite Aid closed 790 stores at the height of the storm, and 188 remained closed or were operating without power as of Oct. 31. In addition, eight stores sustained “substantial damage,” and the company expected that number to increase as field leaders gained access to more locations, but the company was re-opening stores “as quickly as possible.” The Rite Aid Foundation, the company’s philanthropic arm, donated $100,000 to the American Red Cross for relief efforts.

• Walgreens closed 750 stores ahead of the hurricane, and as of Nov. 2, about 130 remained closed in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania. The company began stocking extra items like nonperishable foods, water, batteries and flashlights, as well as arranging special transportation and lodging for employees who depend on public transit and preparing 160 portable generators for rapid deployment to stores as needed and dry ice for medicines requiring refrigeration. The company also donated $250,000 to the American Red Cross for storm-relief efforts and three semitrailers full of bottled water to a Red Cross center in New Jersey.

Elsewhere I have argued that the difference between a catastrophic and a non-catastrophic event is often a matter of supply chain resilience.   There are places where delivery of emergency supplies by Red Cross or others is absolutely necessary.  But no emergency supply system can effectively provide for a multi-million person metro area.  The persistence and adaptability of key supply chains, especially water, food, and pharmaceuticals, are foundational to effective response and recovery.

PLEASE SEE FRIDAY MORNING POST  BELOW(THREE MUSKETEERS) FOR UPDATES ON THE REGIONAL FUEL SITUATION

Some quick aggregation and analysis on three critical nodes.  For this summary I have focused on the current situation in the Greater New York City area.  This is not a region in which I specialize, I would welcome reader corrections.

By “current” I mean Thursday evening, November 1.  This is the oft-referenced 72 hour mark since Sandy came ashore.

Power: 43 percent of New Jersey electric customers (1.7 million),  over 1.5 million New Yorkers and close to 350,000 citizens of Connecticut are still in the dark.  Several utilities report they expect to reach the 90 percent restoration point within the next ten days (November 9-12).  See more details from the US Department of Energy. I have not found any reports of Sandy causing long-term impact on power generation.   (There was a Sandy-related safety alert at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Station, but this operation had already shut down for scheduled maintenance before the superstorm hit.)  According to the regional grid coordinator,  even at the height of the storm there was “enough generation available in the region to cover the loss of those generating stations that are out of service because of the storm. “Transmission capacity, especially in New Jersey, was affected. There were 22 230-kilovolt transmission lines out of service because of flooding in substations in northern New Jersey.   The storm compromised 41 transmission facilities in the multi state region most directly impacted by Sandy. But the storm’s biggest impact, as usual, was on the distribution system.  In Westchester County alone over 600 roads remain closed because of downed power lines.  Flooding has seriously impacted buried lines and substations in New York City and other coastal communities. According to reports in the Philadelphia Inquirer, “We had massive damage to our infrastructure,” said Chris Eck, a spokesman for Jersey Central Power & Light Co… The New Jersey utilities lost numerous substations to floods, in addition to losing power lines and pole-top transformers. The substations, which serve large areas of customers, must be drained, dried and cleaned before they can be reenergized. Ralph A. LaRossa, PSE&G’s president, said Thursday that cleanup crews were engaged in “hand-to-hand combat” with filth in substations, using toothbrushes and rags to remove dirt.”

Communications: The Federal Communications Commission reports that one in four cell phone towers were out of service at the height of the storm.  Verizon declared a “service emergency.” Thursday’s Wall Street Journal reported:

Eleven years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Verizon Communications Inc. is once again scrambling to repair severe damage to a key switching facility inside its historic headquarters building in lower Manhattan. The massive facility for interconnecting key communications lines sustained heavy damage after planes struck the Twin Towers more than a decade ago. This time the enemy was water shoved ashore by Hurricane Sandy. The building is one of the worst hit of a number of facilities that carriers were rushing to fix Wednesday… Verizon employees said Monday night’s storm surge was so powerful that it breached the protective plugs that surround cables coming into the building. As a result, water flooded the critical basement “cable vault” that takes in communications cables and directs them to switching gear upstairs, which wasn’t damaged.

AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and smaller wireless carriers were also reporting tower outages and system instability across Metro New York and northern New Jersey.   Wireless providers are not required to report on system status, but most expert observers seemed to agree roughly twenty-percent of the network is still non-operational across the most affected areas.  The power outage is complicating and delaying restoration efforts.

Above: Flooded lobby of Verizon data center at 140 West Street

Fuel: Roughly 25-30 percent of regional fuel refining is offline.  The Colonial Pipeline is expected to resume deliveries to the New York metro market on November 2. This major source of Gulf Coast petroleum product has been shut-down since October 29.  Late November 1 the Ports of New York and New Jersey were reopened to maritime fuel deliveries.  But availability of supply is not — yet — the fundamental problem. Several  gasoline terminals are not able to receive or transfer product because of damage caused by the storm surge.  Roughly 75 percent of the New York metro’s gasoline supply is distributed from terminals in the Linden, New Jersey area. One company executive estimated the terminals at his site could take four to six weeks to repair.  In any case, many gasoline terminals do not have  electricity to pump product.  Utilities anticipate this issue may be resolved over the weekend.  Because of power outages many gasoline service stations cannot pump what they have in their storage tanks.  Mike O’Leary, vice president of Raceway Petroleum Inc., based in Piscataway N.J., said only three of its 50 stations “were able to open with power restored” to run gas pumps cash registers and credit-card transaction devices.  In Paterson, N.J., the state’s third-largest city, the Police Department was trying to negotiate emergency contracts for gas, and short of that, said it would beginning siphoning it from other city vehicles to keep police cruisers running. The EPA has issued emergency waivers through November 20 related to Reformulated Gasoline Requirements in order to maximize gasoline availability in the states impacted by Sandy.

Supply is not the problem. Identifying demand is not the problem.  The network for delivering supply to demand has mostly — though not entirely — survived.

In all three cases the distribution system has been disrupted.  In particular, transfer capability is a serious challenge for each sector. For example, fuel needs to be transferred from refineries, pipelines and barges and eventually into trucks.   The Linden terminals play this function.  The Verizon “cable vault” is analogous to the fuel terminals, as are electrical substations.

Our three heroes share a similar weakness.  Is there a D’Artagnan to rescue them?

LATE FRIDAY UPDATE:

I’ve been offline, but (mostly) good news today in terms of gasoline distribution in the NYC metro area:

According to Dow Jones:

NuStar Energy  said the truck-rack facility at its petroleum-products terminal in Linden, N.J., will be back in service by the end of day Friday.  NuStar crews were able to bring a generator from one of its Gulf Coast facilities and procured another regionally to power up the truck-rack bays in Linden. The rest of NuStar’s 4.5-million-barrel capacity storage-and-distribution terminal in Linden remains shuttered until commercial power can be restored and damage assessments completed.

According to Reuters:

In an effort to reduce the impact of crippled fuel flows in the Northeast, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a temporary blanket waiver of the Jones Act on Friday. The move allows foreign oil tankers from the Gulf of Mexico to enter Northeastern ports to provide additional fuel resources, a service usually restricted to domestic vessels. About half of the region’s gasoline and diesel comes from the Gulf Coast via the Colonial Pipeline or via tanker from overseas.

Despite some continued disruptions to supply, other critical terminals and refineries continued to reopen on Friday.

Colonial Pipeline, the 825,000 bpd conduit that ships fuel from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast, said it had restarted a large section of Line 3, its Northeast mainline that runs from Greensboro, North Carolina, to Linden, New Jersey, on Thursday. It also resumed deliveries at its key Linden junction to a connected Buckeye terminal.

“While Colonial’s pipelines and facilities were spared significant damage, many of the terminals in the Linden area will require days if not weeks to fully recover,” it said.

Kinder Morgan said on Thursday it would resume shipping from its New York and New Jersey terminals in the next day or two, after the company brought in generators to power pumps and other equipment. The terminals in Carteret and Perth Amboy in New Jersey and in Staten Island, New York, will begin to receive and move refined fuels in the next 24 to 48 hours.

Royal Dutch Shell said Thursday that all its New York borough terminals were still down. Its Shell-branded network was 84 percent open in Connecticut, 47 percent open in New Jersey, 62 percent open in New York and 83 percent open in Pennsylvania.

Motiva Enterprises said on Wednesday it reopened more of the fuel terminals it shut because of Hurricane Sandy, but four terminals in Sewaren and Newark, New Jersey, and Brooklyn and Long Island, New York, have no restart date.

Magellan Midstream Partners, one of the largest U.S. pipeline and storage terminal companies, said it now has limited operational capacity to receive inbound vessels and barges at its New Haven terminal.

Buckeye Partners said its main New York Harbor area terminal in Linden, New Jersey, was reconnected to its power supply and fully operational by noon on Friday. The company expects its two other New York area terminals in Inwood and Long Island City to return to service by November 2 midnight. The company is supplying jet fuel to the three airports in the New York City area.

EARLY SATURDAY UPDATE

According to the Energy Information Administration:

Based on today’s (November 2) emergency survey of gasoline availability, EIA estimates that two-thirds of gasoline stations in the New York metropolitan area do not have gasoline available for sale. This number includes stations that reported no gasoline available and those EIA could not reach after numerous attempts, and consequently assume that the station was closed. Of the stations sampled, one-third had gasoline available for sale, 3% were not selling gasoline because they had no power, 10% had power but no gasoline supplies, and 53% percent did not respond to attempts to contact them.

According to the Associated Press:

Another definition for resilience:

Resilience is an innate tendency, usually consisting of several inter-related parts, that allows a system to flex under stress and bounce-back to something similar to its preexisting condition once the stress is lessened or removed.

Three inter-related parts that seem to recur in many systems:

Resilience is more likely to emerge if the system is characterized by diversity, decentralization (self-organization), and adaptation (including the improvisational and opportunistic sorts).

The more diverse roles and functions embedded in a system (nation, region, community, company, neighborhood, firm, family or many other examples) the more likely one or more of the roles and functions will effectively adapt to stress.

The more self-organizing a system —  the  more capable participants are to choose and act in accordance with Strange Attractors of Meaning — the more likely some participant will find an effective way of adapting to stress.

Resilience can mitigate the negative consequences of change through adaptation. Resilience expects change and spawns structural and behavioral characteristics that accept considerable change as a way of avoiding catastrophic change. Diversity does not ensure effective adaptation.  A decentralized and/or self-organizing system produces many mal-adaptive features.  But the more diverse and self-organizing the system the more likely the system will generate – nurture and facilitate – effective adaptation.

–+–

These notions began to knock about last Wednesday afternoon.  I had lunch with a FEMA colleague and we talked about how efficiency often conflicts with resilience.  After lunch, before driving to Dulles to catch a plane, I walked over to the Hirshhorn Museum to see the new Ai Weiwei exhibit.

Ai Weiwei is a leading Chinese artist.  If you pay any attention to such things you know he has been in trouble with the authorities:  arrested, jailed, beaten, fined, and not allowed to leave China.  But until visiting the exhibit I had forgotten what started his troubles. As recently as the 2008 Olympics Ai Weiwei was officially celebrated.

Entering the exhibit the visitor is confronted by a huge wall covered in Chinese characters, clearly a listing or inventory of something (see below).   A small English-language label explains these are the names and basic details of 5385 school children who died at their desks in the May 12, 2008 Sichuan Earthquake.  Ai Weiwei and other artists began to collect and publish the names when the government failed to do so.  The artists’ investigation also suggested official corruption in school construction had contributed to many of the deaths.

The entire list of dead school children is available here.

An audio recording announces each name.  Several other pieces in the exhibit are related to the destruction and death — and official deceit — related to the earthquake.

Another small English-language label quotes the artist:

A name is the first and final marker of individual rights, one fixed part of the ever-changing human world.  A name is the most basic characteristic of our human rights: no matter how poor or how rich, all living people have a name, and it is endowed with good wishes, the expectant blessings of kindness and virtue.

In acting on this Strange Attractor of Meaning, Ai Weiwei has earned official censure, unofficial violence, and a sustained effort to suppress his inclination to diversity and self-organization.

–+–

The world is ever-changing.  We face this flux with a small set of (near) certainties:  my name, your name, the nature of our relationship.  In some relationships — such as this blog — even the names are uncertain.

But in this digital space and its most proximate socio-political space, diversity proliferates and self-organization permeates.  Problems are presented and debated, proposed solutions even more so.  Expectations of kindness and virtue are often disappointed.  You dismiss me as a  Pollyanna (effeminate fictional character).  I decide you are a selfish cynic (dog-like).  But despite ourselves: we listen a tad, we learn a bit, we adapt grudgingly to one another.

I do not seek to deny or diminish our difficulties.  I wish for more kindness and virtue.  But especially in the face of cruelty and cravenness I am glad to be part of a system that does not suppress diversity of opinion and self-organization of solutions.

I predict plenty of troubles ahead — whoever is elected, whatever becomes of the Euro, regardless of why the earth is warming, no matter what Israel does (or does not do) to Iran or vice-versa, however Assad falls — there will be dark days. Want to debate that?

It is clear to me that whatever troubles descend we will be better off if we nurture diversity and facilitate self-organization.   From the relationship of these two characteristics emerges adaptability and in an ever-changing world adaptability is the best friend we’ve got.

From Wednesday’s Times-Picayune:

Dwight Robinson spent Wednesday afternoon looking for his mother’s casket along the levee in eastern Plaquemines Parish. He had just driven past his aunt’s crypt, now tucked in the slant of the east bank levee that skirts the Mississippi River. Robinson, 59, was walking through the world in utter shock. He was overwhelmed and in disbelief that Hurricane Isaac had moved the crypt about a quarter mile from its cemetery…

“I tried to go back to see if my mom’s tomb was there,” he told a Times-Picayune reporter while waiting along the levee in mud-soaked sneakers. “I just fear it might have floated away.” He looked up at the levee as though he might see her…

He then drove about 100 yards before noticing a beautiful pink casket with ornate metal fixtures resting parallel to the river.

He swerved off the road, stranding his car in some mud along the highway. Later, the Mercury had to be pulled out by a nearby truck.

He climbed the levee and studied the pink casket, attempting to find markings.

“I wonder what you could do to know … to identify these things?” he pondered.

When asked whether he thought it belonged to his mother, he said he wasn’t sure but that it looked familiar.

“I started to think what color her casket was, and pink is what came to mind,” he said. “I hope it’s not hers. Well, in a sense, I’m hoping it is.”

Robinson said his biggest fear is that it might have floated down into the Gulf.

He noticed the casket was upside down. He quickly flipped it, water pouring out as it turned. No identifying markings were present on its top.

Despite it all, he says he’s going to rebuild in Bertrandville.

“This is our little piece of the swamp,” Robinson said. “It’s a swamp but it’s our little piece. Our little piece of America.”

“It’s a mess, but, you know, this too shall pass.”

–+–

Plaquemines Parish is a narrow straw of land bisected by the Mississippi River extending southeast from New Orleans into the Gulf of Mexico.

The 2010 census found 23,000 people up from 12,500 since 1910.   There is about 850 square miles of (sometimes) dry land down from about twice that in 1950.

Once dependent on hunting, trapping, sugar, citrus, and piloting ships from the Gulf to New Orleans, Plaquemines is now an operational center for oil and gas drilling for much of the northern Gulf.

Like most of southern Louisiana, Plaquemines  is made up of sediment deposited by the Mississippi.  About 1200 years ago the river’s course shifted east and the erosion of the Northern Plains began forming this new spur of delta.

Over the last half-century not nearly as much sediment has arrived and most that does flows right by.  The engineering of the Mississippi has reduced sediment flows by 50-to-70 percent.   Where the delta once meandered and moved and thereby replenished itself, we now maintain persistent navigation channels.   And because the mouth of the Mississippi has reached the edge of the continental shelf,  our navigation channels are very efficient at delivering the silt into a thousand-foot-deep maw.

In January the State of Louisiana and others announced a plan to reverse land loss in the Mississippi delta.  The core concept is to open up diversions on the Mississippi and Atchafalaya rivers to allow silt and freshwater into marshlands, build new ridges, pump sediment into eroded marshes, build new shorelines, and pour sand onto barrier islands.  Basically it is an engineered approach to what happened naturally before our engineering got in the way.

Experts are divided on the plan’s prospects for success.  But in May the Coastal Master Plan was adopted unanimously by the Louisiana state legislature.  From my layman’s perspective, the plan is more likely to be effective in restoring the wetlands west of Plaquemines.  With one mile of land on one side of the river and, maybe,  a mile-and-a-half on the other, sitting on the edge of an underwater cliff, Plaquemines is an inherently vulnerable place.

Dwight Robinson says, “This too will pass.”  Well… yes it will, but not necessarily to a better place.

The last few weeks we have been using this blog to explore resilience: For several thousand, Plaquemines is home.  This is where their mother is buried.  This is where they were married and raised their children.  The economy of Plaquemines is stronger than many other places.  The seafood is among the best in the world.  On a bright March morning with the sun rising over the Gulf, it is one of the most beautiful places in the world.

This week Plaquemines looks like the Reuters picture at the top and a mother’s casket has gone missing.  Today a remnant of Isaac makes a return visit.   Next week or next year another hurricane will hit.

Resilience is, I have argued, mostly a matter of human relationships.  The stronger, more numerous, and more diverse our relationships the more resilient an individual or community or organization or nation.  These relationships are quite often tightly tied to a shared place.   We cling to those we love and the places where we have loved them.

Even to our detriment.  Sometimes even to our death.

–+–

Following are the lyrics for Between the Devil and Deep Blue Sea. Surprisingly, I couldn’t find a YouTube of Ella Fitzgerald’s version.  Her voice communicates this sometimes exquisite, sometimes perverse sort of resilience better than any words alone.

I don’t want you
But I hate to lose you
You’ve got me in between
The devil and the deep blue sea

I forgive you’
Cause I can’t forget you
You’ve got me in between
The devil and the deep blue sea

I oughta cross you off my list
But when you come knocking at my door
Fate seems to give my heart a twist
And I come running back for more

I should hate you
But I guess I love you’
You’ve got me in between
The devil and the deep blue sea

She’s no Ella, but here’s a 1957 recording of Lee Wiley that begins to suggest the power and pathos of profound attraction to… almost anything.

–+–

Related Links:

Plaquemines Resiliency Index

Atlas of Shoreline Changes in Louisiana from 1853 to 1989

Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act website

From Wednesday’s  New Orleans Times-Picayune editorial page:

Not that anybody here in August 2005 could forget, but Isaac’s approach near the seventh anniversary of Hurricane Katrina was a sobering reminder of our city and region’s near destruction and of the deaths and displacement of so many of our friends and loved ones.

Katrina was not New Orleans’ introduction to trouble. The city has known perils its entire existence.

But there may have been no more perilous time than that of Katrina and its watery aftermath. At what other point was the continuing existence of the city in such doubt?

We don’t hurt today like we did during Katrina’s first anniversary, and certainly not like we hurt during the crisis itself. But the pain is still real, and it’s likely to be with us even after ongoing recovery is completed.

It’s important to note that this community still has its joie de vivre.

Not even the billions of gallons of water that flowed over and through our levees could extinguish that. In fact, for some of us the near-death experience of Katrina may have intensified that trademark joy of life. We take nothing for granted now, least of all the company of friends and family. So many died. So many are gone for good.

Consequently, our interactions with those who are here have with them an added measure of appreciation.

Even so, our world-renowned joyful spirit remains tempered with a sadness for the things that were lost and an anxiety that another disaster could upend our lives once again…

New Orleans, to quote Louisiana poet Yusef Komunyakaa, is a “testament to how men dreamt land out of water.” The engineering failures made plain by Hurricane Katrina made it appear that the water had reclaimed that land and that our dream existence had morphed into a nightmare.

But seven years later, we remain attached to the place and to the people who make the hard times worth it, displaying a spirit that’s not just joyous but might also be called indomitable.

So… just for the purposes of this blog, let’s decide that in this text the T-P editors have ascended to that perfect crystallization of Truth to which every editorial writer (and blogger) aspires:  Resilience is a function of prior experience with peril (multiplied by occurrence) + prior experience with recovery (multiplied or divided by a defined quality metric) the total of which is multiplied by the number of near-death experiences = joy of life (also known as resilience).

Any questions?

From another page in the Times-Picayune:

If New Orleans must suffer a hurricane, it won’t do so on an empty stomach. Around town, the menus for Hurricane Isaac were taking shape this morning: apple cinnamon pancakes for breakfast in Lakeview, pulled pork sandwiches for lunch on Oak Street, deep-dish pizza on Freret Street, and plenty of cold beer and chilled wine to wash away the worry.

More than a handful of New Orleans restaurants are feeding patrons hungry for something a little more exciting than their storm-kit’s potted meat…

Maybe resilience is not a matter of algorithms but a recipe, a sort of spicy gumbo adaptable to what is in season, each fixing a little different but always recognizable as mama’s or nana’s and “just like I remember”, even when it ain’t necessarily so.

Here’s the full poem by Yusef Komunyakaa, quoted above in the Times-Picayune:

REQUIEM

So,
when the strong unholy high winds
whiplashed over the sold-off marshlands
eaten back to a sigh of saltwater,
the Crescent City was already shook down to her pilings,
her floating ribs, her spleen & backbone,
left trembling in her Old World facades
& postmodern lethargy, lost to waterlogged
memories & quitclaim deeds,
exposed for all eyes, damnable
gaze & lamentation—plumb line
& heartthrob, ballast & watertable—
already the last ghost song
of the Choctaw & the Chickasaw
was long gone, no more than a drunken curse
among the oak & sweet gum leaves, a tally
of broken treaties & absences echoing
cries of birds over the barrier islands
inherited by the remittance man, scalawag,
& King Cotton, & already the sky was falling in on itself,
calling like a cloud of seagulls
gone ravenous as the Gulf
reclaiming its ebb & flowchart
while the wind banged on shutters
& unhinged doors from their frames
& unshingled the low-ridged roofs
while the believers hummed
“Precious Lord” & “Deep River”
as the horse-hair plaster walls
galloped along with the surge,
already folklore began to rise up
from the buried lallygag & sluice
pulsing beneath the Big Easy
rolling between & through itself,
caught in some downward tug
& turn, like a world of love affairs
backed up in a stalled inlet,
a knelt-down army of cypress,
a testament to how men dreamt land
out of water, where bedrock
was only the heart’s bump
& grind, its deep, dark churn
& acceleration, blowzy down
to those unmoored timbers,
already nothing but water
mumbling as the great turbulent eye
lingered on a primordial question,
then turned—the gauzy genitalia of Bacchus
& Zulu left dangling from magnolias & raintrees,
already…

published in Callaloo 31.2 (2008)

Remember when you were instructed in Algebra class to “show your work”?  I have been working on a hypothesis that diversity is more important to resilience than redundancy.   I’m not ready (able) to offer the full algorithm, but here are some elements of the equation.

Resilience: “The ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.” (Presidential Policy Directive 8 and other federal documents).

“Resilience is defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks…” (Diversity and Resilience of Social-Ecological Systems)

Recover: 1. to get back or regain (something lost or taken away): to recover a stolen watch; 2. to make up for or make good (loss, damage, etc., to oneself); 3. to regain the strength, composure, balance, or the like, of (oneself). (From Dictionary.com)

“The term “recovery” refers to those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate interim and long-term housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic development; and restoring natural and cultural resources. (PPD-8 and other federal documents)

Restore: “1. to bring back into existence, use, or the like; reestablish: to restore order. 2. to bring back to a former, original, or normal condition, as a building, statue, or painting. 3. to bring back to a state of health, soundness, or vigor. 4. to put back to a former place, or to a former position, rank, etc.: to restore the king to his throne. 5. to give back; make return or restitution of (anything taken away or lost).” (See Dictionary.com)

(In contemporary usage there is little distinction between recover and restore. We may tend to recover things that have been lost and restore things that have been damaged. Sudden losses are usually recovered, while slow deterioration is typically restored. We are inclined to recover what is personally owned and restore what is shared in common. But exceptions abound. Etymologically there is a slight suggestion that recovery obscures what has been lost (covers it over), while restoration is often celebrated precisely because of what had been lost or nearly lost.)

Redundant: 1. characterized by verbosity or unnecessary repetition in expressing ideas; prolix: a redundant style. 2. being in excess; exceeding what is usual or natural: a redundant part. 3.having some unusual or extra part or feature. 4. characterized by superabundance or superfluity: lush, redundant vegetation. 5. Engineering .a. (of a structural member) not necessary for resisting statically determined stresses. b. (of a structure) having members designed to resist other than statically determined stresses; hyperstatic. c. noting a complete truss having additional members for resisting eccentric loads. Compare complete ( def. 8 ) , incomplete ( def. 3 ) . d. (of a device, circuit, computer system, etc.) having excess or duplicate parts that can continue to perform in the event of malfunction of some of the parts. (See Dictionary.com)

“Since the notions of redundancy and diversity are often confused, we will here define our usage: assume we have a group of units and that each unit is characterized by ten attributes. If all units have the same values for each attribute, we have “true” redundancy. If there are differences in values in one or another attribute we have diversity.” (From Diversity and Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems) This is a chapter in Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future.  Elsewhere the text suggests that “too much” information sharing suppresses diversity and undermines resilience.  That’s worth a blog post or two.

(The Latin origin of redundant – redundare – means to overflow or flow back (undare referring to a wave, think undulate).  In a purely redundant system strength is derived from exact duplication.   Like the Borg, a redundant system can overflow non-systemic threats.  But any vulnerability built into the system (known or unknown) will also  propagate a wave-like system-wide threat.  Redundant systems are often strong but inflexible.  Redundant systems are highly resistant-to-change and therefore innately non-adaptive.)

Renew: 1. to begin or take up again, as an acquaintance, a conversation, etc.; resume. 2. to make effective for an additional period: to renew a lease. 3. to restore or replenish: to renew a stock of goods. 4. to make, say, or do again. 5. to revive; reestablish. (See Dictionary.com)

(I’m surprised by the retrospective character of renew. I expected it to mean new-again and imply starting over. But that pesky “re” insists on honoring the past.  In English renew and innovate are treated as synonyms, but the Latin for innovate is much better at escaping the past.)

RE-: “a prefix, occurring originally in loanwords from Latin, used with the meaning “again” or “again and again” to indicate repetition, or with the meaning “back” or “backward” to indicate withdrawal or backward motion: regenerate; refurbish; retype; retrace; revert.” (From Dictionary.com)

Recently a couple of colleagues have argued that resilience — despite the “re” — can empower innovation.  Trying to be collaborative:  The Latin origin of resilience means to jump or leap again.  I suppose the direction of the leap — backwards, sideways, or forward — is not prescribed.   Still… if innovation, adaptation, and moving in a truly new direction is the goal, resilience will probably restrain more than enable.

“The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names.” Confucius

(Or at least recognize the confusion of wrong names.)

A giant tulip poplar fell in our yard.   It’s girth was nearly twice my reach.  A storm uprooted and deposited it precisely parallel to our house about eight feet from the west wall.  If it had fallen east at almost any other angle it would have caused significant damage.

This happened two years ago. There are several smaller trees as close to our house.  There is one even larger oak towering over the northwest corner. I have done nothing to mitigate the risk.

There is a program at Wharton that specializes in near-misses.  In 2008  the Wharton researchers added two new layers to the bottom of a pre-existing Safety Pyramid and renamed it the “Risk Pyramid.”  The two new layers are:

1. Foreshadowing Events and Observations.
2. Positive Illusions, Unsafe Conditions and Unobserved Problems – Unawareness, Ignorance, Complacency

(From  Assessment of Catastrophic Risk  and Potential Losses in Industry (2012) Kleindorfer, Oktum, Pariyani, and  Seider)

I am not unaware or ignorant of the risk.  I have observed the risk.  I don’t hold positive illusions regarding the risk.   I have observed near-misses and I recognize them as foreshadowing events.  But I am complacent.

Why am I complacent?

According to Alan Berger et al there are  ”Five Neglects” common in risk management:

1. Probability neglect – people sometimes don’t consider the probability of the occurrence of an outcome, but focus on the consequences only.

2. Consequence neglect – just like probability neglect, sometimes individuals neglect the magnitude of outcomes.

3. Statistical neglect – instead of subjectively assessing small probabilities and continuously updating them, people choose to use rules-of-thumb (if any heuristics), which can introduce systematic biases in their decisions.

4. Solution neglect – choosing an optimal solution is not possible when one fails to consider all of the solutions.

5. External risk neglect – in making decisions, individuals or groups often consider the cost/benefits of decisions only for themselves, without including externalities, sometimes leading to significant negative outcomes for others.

Some of these factors influence my complacency — especially consequence neglect — but my inaction is mostly a matter of avoiding near-term costs.   It will certainly cost me money, time, and several beautiful trees (all current sources of enjoyment) in order to mitigate the uncertain, if very likely, future loss of (more) money, time and one or more fallen trees.

To overcome these neglects and short-term thinking, scholars at the Wharton School of Business have identified an eight step process:

Step 1 Identification and recognition of a near-miss

Step 2 Disclosure (reporting) of the identifiedinformation/incident

Step 3 Prioritization and classification of information for future actions

Step 4 Distribution of the information to proper channels

Step 5 Analyzing causes of the problem

Step 6 Identifying solutions (remedial actions)

Step 7 Dissemination of actions to the implementers and general information to a broader group for their knowledge

Step 8 Resolution of all open actions and review of system checks and balances

I have done everything except Steps 3, 7 and  8.  In other words, I have done everything except make an explicit decision regarding priority and implementation.  I am kicking the can.  I am procrastinating.  I am not actively choosing, I am passively choosing to accept the consequences of inaction.

This is not just a personal problem.  This is at the core of many organizational, even national problems; even in the best organizations, even in the best nations.

Embedded in the links above are entirely reasonable recommendations regarding management processes to overcome this recurring problem.   Mostly it comes down to variations on creative nagging.  We use data to nag, processes to nag, required reporting to nag. We schedule meetings mostly as an elaborate way to nag. Laws and regulations nag… and throw in some threats for good measure.  By writing this blog I’m nagging myself to take action.

As a colleague says, “Humans typically talk and talk and talk, and if they keep talking about something long enough they will actually do something about it.”

Resilience is enhanced by taking personal responsibility for recognizing and mitigating risks.   Resilience is reduced by inattention, denial, lack of communication, and inaction.   Ignoring near-misses increases the likelihood — and often the scope — of future loss.

What about other near-misses:  floods, wildfires, earthquakes, power outages, communications failures, supply chain complications, and more?  When are these stress events one-offs and when are they pieces of a pattern?   When does an infrequent risk deserve sustained attention and action?

How about this:  When a key asset (such as your home) is catastrophically vulnerable to a demonstrably recurring event (such as high winds)  and this vulnerability is amplified by a specific threat (such as a giant tree), action should be taken to reduce potential consequences (take down the tree).

Excuse me, I’ve got some calls to make.  How about you?

In the movie Apollo 13 — recounting the nearly deadly 1970 moon mission —  the heroic NASA mission director says, “Failure is not an option.”

The real hero — Gene Kranz — never said this.   It’s a scriptwriter’s creation.   After the movie’s success, Mr. Kranz did use the phrase as the title of his memoir.

Failure is always an option.  We recently received several reminders of this reality:

The final report on Air France Flight 447 found that “the crew was in a state of near-total loss of control” because of inconsistent data reports.

A  Japanese parliamentary commission found the Fukushima nuclear emergency was a “profoundly man-made disaster.” (See a good summary from the BBC.)

Last week from Columbus, Ohio to Charleston, West Virginia to Washington DC the best laid plans of intelligent people and competent organizations unraveled before an unexpected strong storm.

There was failure.   There was passivity, fear, denial, selfishness and greed.

At Fukushima and in response to the derecho there was also creativity, courage, patience,  generosity, self-sacrifice and resilience.  We don’t know enough about what happened over the South Atlantic to be sure, but I expect even in those horrific 3 minutes, 30 seconds the full range of humanity could be found.

Across all these situations there was uncertainty.   Some uncertainty is innate to nearly every context.  But we are increasingly adept at self-creating even more.

Responding to the Air France Final Report, William Voss, President of the Flight Safety Foundation, told The Guardian, “Pilots a generation ago would have… understood what was going on, but [the AF447 pilots] were so conditioned to rely on the automation that they were unable to do this,” he said. “This is a problem not just limited to Air France or Airbus, it’s a problem we’re seeing around the world because pilots are being conditioned to treat automated processed data as truth, and not compare it with the raw information that lies underneath.”

It’s a problem well-beyond commercial aviation.  We organize much of our lives around the assumption that automated processes will persist and critical information will be available.  We expect to be warned of a threat, about the location and condition of our family and friends,  and about when a crisis will be over.  We expect to be able to access our credit and cash accounts. We expect to be able to travel from here to there to purchase what we need and reunite with those we love.   If necessary, we expect to be able to call 911 and quickly get professional help.  Over the last two or three generations everyday life has — increasingly — demonstrated these are reasonable expectations.

We are habituated to success.

But like the Air France pilots, when our information habit is not being fed our response can be self-destructive.   In the absence of information we tend to continue as usual or focus on restoring access to information. Both behaviors can significantly increase our risk by ignoring rapidly changing conditions and/or delaying thoughtful engagement with changed conditions.

The Apollo 13 Review Board found the accident, “…resulted from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving design.”

The deficient and unforgiving design that many of us — private citizens as well as public safety agencies — have adopted is dependence on just-in-time information.

My twenty-something children  seldom pre-plan in any significant way. They expect cell phones, text messaging, Facebook, and email to allow them to seize the best opportunities that unfold.   It works and I envy them.  Except when it does not work.  Except when these digital networks fail.

Much of our consumer culture is built around the same approach. We have become an economy, a society optimized for just-in-time. It can be a beautiful dance of  wonderful possibilities emerging in a moment and rapidly synchronized across time and space.  Until the music stops.

In the three examples above (not all catastrophic) there is a shared over-confidence in the fail-safe capabilities of protective design and effective communications.   In each of these cases the design bias increased risk exposure, communications was confusing or worse,  and both the design and the communications protocols complicated effective human response once risk was experienced.

There are several contending definitions of resilience.  Something that all the definitions I have encountered share is an expectation of failure.  Resilience is in many cases the learned-response to failure.  If it doesn’t kill you, you can learn from it.   The good news — and the bad news — is that catastrophes are sufficiently rare that we don’t get many opportunities to learn about catastrophic resilience.  What is a “forgiving design” for encountering catastrophe?

In April 2010 Jim Lovell, the commander of Apollo 13, called the mission a “successful failure.” Lovell explained that while Apollo 13 never reached the moon, there was  ”a great success in the ability of people to take an almost certain catastrophe and turn it into a successful recovery.”

Envision a complete blackout of telecommunications (voice and data) across a region, say, extending from the mouth of the Susquehanna River south to the Potomac River and from about the Bull Run Mountains in the West to the Chesapeake Bay in the East.  This encompasses roughly 5 million residents.

Such a blackout for any sustained period  is an “an almost certain catastrophe”.   Can we envision how to “turn it into a successful recovery?”  What could be done?  What should be done?  What does the mental exercise (more?) tell us about our dependencies, our operational options, mitigation opportunities, and creativity?

I know, I know… such an event is wildly unlikely… nearly unimaginable.  Just about as silly as a bad thermostat undoing a mission to the moon.

–+–

This is part of a series examining potential relationships between catastrophe, resilience, and civil liberties.  We have spent the last several Friday’s looking mostly at catastrophe.  With this post we are pivoting toward resilience.   There have been a couple of great conversations.   Please contribute to the conversation by selecting the comment function immediately below.

One week after the derecho’s destruction, roughly one-third of West Virginians do not have electric power.  Yesterday afternoon (Thursday) a strong storm hit the Charleston area with wind gusts recorded up to 59 miles per hour.  Another 20,000 electric customers were knocked off the grid (again?).

The lack of power has complicated communications (including credit/debit card verification), pumping of fuel, access to cash (ATMs out of service), availability of ice, safe storage of food and pharma, and a host of other daily needs.  Given the extraordinary heat the lack of air conditioning has in several cases been life-threatening.

Above is the three day weather forecast for the state capital.

Last evening a West Virginia friend wrote, “As they usually do, people are showing amazing resiliency.  However, the longer this goes it is clear there is considerable strain.  The financial impact of replacing lost food and the money spent on fuel for generators is creating a significant group of people who were financially stable but now have moved into a situation where they need help.”

The uncommon, no-notice, hard-hitting June 29 derecho was — despite widespread use of the term — not a catastrophic event.   No fundamental, irreversible shift in economic, political, or cultural behavior would unfold from this single experience of risks exposed.

But if a sequence of non-catastrophic events are experienced in a particular place over a compressed period of time, when does the sum of non-catastrophic outcomes become a catastrophe?

MONDAY UPDATE

Strong storms did move through West Virginia on Sunday.  Roughly 20,000 customers who had power, lost power.   This brought the total number of homes and apartments off-the-grid to over 60,000.  The number of people directly affected is estimated at about 120,000.

This was the second strong storm to hit West Virginia since the June 29 derecho.

In response to the struggles of the last week, there is some talk of West Virginia following Florida and Louisiana in requiring a portion of gasoline stations to have emergency generators to support pumping when the grid goes down.

Probably a final comment on the derecho:  Tracking media coverage by the Washington Post, Columbus (OH) Dispatch, and the Charleston (WV) Daily Mail, the differences have been stunning.  The Post has torn into the alleged incompetence (or worse) of the electric and telecommunications companies.  Meanwhile the Daily Mail has highlighted how so many of the repair crews traveled great distances and are working long hours to restore service.   The Dispatch has leaned toward Post-like criticism, but not quite as far. (About 47,000 Ohio customers are still without power.)

The Daily Mail  – and West Virginia political leaders — have mostly focused on heroic stories of neighbors serving neighbors, the kindness of strangers, and individual resilience.  The Post — and mid-Atlantic political leaders — have focused much more on situating blame.  All have reported similar facts and statistics.  But the context for the facts has reflected two very different worldviews.

Today’s Charleston Daily Mail has a front-page story that begins, “Kanawha County’s director of emergency management hopes the recent storm will persuade people they need to be better prepared when disaster strikes. ”People need to be prepared to take care of themselves for at least 72 hours,” said Dale Petry, director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management agency.”

I do not want to minimize issues of systemic vulnerability for which large providers should be held accountable.  But I am struck by the role of media and political leadership in determining whether a population responds as victims or survivors.   A victim can blame others.  A survivor is focused on more productive tasks.

Derecho forming in Midwest and barreling to the Mid-Atlantic

The implications of last week’s derecho are a matter of some debate. Please contribute to the debate through the comment function at the close of this post.

TIME: Friday. June 29, 2012.  Minimal notice.  Emerged in Southern Great Lakes during  mid-afternoon, hit National Capital Region between 10:30PM to 11:30PM.  (By statute the National Capital Region consists of the District of Columbia, 2 Maryland counties, 4 Virginia counties, and the City of Alexandria.)

SPACE: 650 miles deep (Northern Indiana to Atlantic seaboard), 270 miles wide (roughly Norfolk VA to Philadelphia PA).

CHARACTERISTICS: Fast-moving, averaging 60 miles per hour.  Hard hitting with sustained winds ranging between 60 to 90 miles-per-hour, very strong downbursts (and even stronger microbursts, producing tornado-like outcomes), widespread lightning strikes, and hail.  Wind-gusts of over 80 miles per hour were reported along an arc extending from Baltimore (MD) in the north to Richmond (VA) in the south.

Derecho’s are difficult to predict.  Most meteorologists are surprised the June 29 squall line survived its transit of the Appalachians.   Descending toward the coastal plain the derecho was quickly strengthened by the hot, humid atmospheric instability spawned by a record-breaking hot day.  The June 29 temperature in Washington DC had reached 104 degrees.

Again and again the June 29 derecho has been described as a “no-notice hurricane.”

FREQUENCY: Uncommon.  Usually less than one per year anywhere in North America.  Typically no more than one every four years in the mid-Atlantic.

CONSEQUENCES: Twenty-six deaths,  over 5 million without electricity for up to one week, widespread telecommunications outages (including 911 system failures), water quality concerns in West Virginia, suburban Maryland and other locations, transportation system stress due to reduced fuel pumping capabilities, traffic signal failures, and increased traffic, as a result of both the storm and Independence Day holiday.  Economic impact — from both physical destruction and loss-of-trade — not yet calculable.

ANALYSIS: Following is a Washington Post editorial that was written about 72 hours after the event.  It is, I suppose, a kind of consensus analysis.  I am concerned this consensus gives insufficient attention to several strategic realities.  The Post editorial board’s original analysis is in italics.  My counter-argument is indented non-italic.

Powerful storm exposes lack of disaster preparedness

The aftermath of the Derecho storm that exploded across the upper midwest to mid-Atlantic on Friday has exposed a series of cascading dependencies.  None of these dependencies are surprising.  But the scope and scale of the event offers a very public case-study for what is usually obscured in the rapid response to smaller events.

I will focus mostly on the National Capital Region, because that’s where I experienced the event.

Friday’s record-breaking heat in the Washington DC area reached 104 degrees. An unexpected late afternoon meeting kept me in the capital until rush-hour.  The air-conditioning in my car failed.  I bailed off I-395 and got a hotel room.  I was given a room on the top — eleventh — floor.  The room’s AC was struggling.  No doubt the roof-top temperature was much higher than 104.

At about 10:45 I was awakened by a high pitched squeal.   My room faced West-Southwest.  Straightline winds — estimated at 60 to 90 miles-per-hour — were pushing against the window and whistling through its frame.

A tall wall of lighting filled the far Western horizon.  It rolled toward me, swamping the glittering urban landscape.  As the strobe dance of lightening  approached, it was as if a black wave covered the ground.   A mile away a blazing bright tower suddenly disappeared.  I was next.  No lights. No air air conditioning.  No way to open the windows.

Roughly 1.3 million people in the National Capital Region lost power on Friday night.  On Sunday morning the Washington Post’s lead story reports, “As the region suffered through a second day of 100-degree-plus heat, power companies said it could take up to a week before everyone has electricity again.”

Because of the loss of power, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, serving much of the Maryland suburbs, was unable to refill its water system over-night.  With another record-breaking hot day on Saturday, there was the threat of the system being sufficiently drained to lose system integrity.  Mandatory water restrictions were put in place.  (Once a water system experiences negative-pressure it can take weeks to clean and recover system integrity.)  Other water utilities were also calling for reduced usage and issuing boil orders.

Because of the loss of power, many service stations were unable to pump gas.  My wife was unable to fill up in Charlottesville (VA), found an open station in the Shenandoah Valley, needed gas again in Charleston (WV) and after passing closed station after closed station, sat in a line for nearly an hour with her gauge on E.  The station was only taking cash because their credit-card verification connection was offline.

When my wife called me  she was about to leave the gas line, frustrated and angry with all the “cheaters.”  I was able to tell her the utility map showed severe outages extending West to Huntington and into Kentucky.  Later she called to confirm she would have been stranded if she had not gotten gas when she did.  She also reported periodic traffic congestion much greater (and weirder) than the typical start of the Independence Day weekend.  Her speculation was that a lot of people were out looking for functioning grocery stores, gas stations, and such.

I returned to our Blue Ridge mountain-top very early Saturday morning and while I am, obviously, online and was able to use my smartphone at the height of the storm, there are increasing reports of communications problems.  According to the Washington Post:

Cellular and Internet services were down after Friday night’s storm (http://wapo.st/KSPWn8 ), as reports of slow or intermittent service came in from Virginia, Maryland and the District. A Verizon representative confirmed that there had been “voice outage and no signal” in parts of Virginia, including Herndon, Manassas and Woodbridge. In a statement, Verizon said that as commercial power was being restored, some services would come back and that they were working to fix service.

AT&T is also reporting outages, including to some land-line phones. Several 911 centers  were blacked out or had functional problems as a result of electrical failures.  Even redundant systems, with emergency power back-ups, in some cases failed.  There has not yet been time to determine the full cause.

This was a high-impact event doing direct damage to a variety of infrastructures.  The scale of destruction and disruption was considerable.  The geographic scope of the event was much greater than typical.  This scope-and-scale is straining recovery capabilities.   Electric utilities are, for example, needing to call on mutual aid from much farther away than usual.

We all know, but do not always acknowledge, our dependence on the grid, on the water system, on the fuel distribution network, on the credit-and-debit card verification system, et cetera, et cetera.  Events like this force us to recognize our reality. Will this event encourage more attention to systemic mitigation?  Probably not in a sustainable or systematic way.

Even with the death, destruction, and discomfort this is far from a catastrophe.

But… on Sunday morning the Weather.com forecast is headlined: Hot, Humid and Hellish.  Clearly public safety agencies and the population have been proactive in minimizing day-after effects.  How about three days after… five days after?   What if the response-and-recovery period is punctuated by another hard hit?

Speaking Saturday to news media at the Virginia Emergency Operations Center, Governor Bob McDonnell said, “This is a very dangerous situation… It will take several days to restore all power, so Virginians should plan accordingly. This is not a one-day situation; it is a multiday challenge.”  The same could be said for a wide region extending back to the Great Lakes.

A potential catastrophe unfolds over time and space, cascading across an ever-expanding landscape, exposing and uncoupling dependencies as it goes.  The potential for catastrophe increases as the cascades recur in the same space with increasing frequency.   So far this is just another tough time that we will, probably, treat as a rare event rather than a leading indicator.

MONDAY MORNING UPDATE:

More than 600,000 electric utility customers in the National Capital Region continue without power.  Some of the utilities in the mid-Atlantic do not expect to achieve the 90 percent restoration benchmark before Friday.

The same storm that hit the DC metro area pummeled Ohio with even more force.  Initially 1 million Ohioans were without power, as of Monday morning 200,000 remain in the dark.  In West Virginia 500,000 remain power-less and the Governor ordered non-essential state workers to stay home today.

Public transit in the National Capital Region is mostly operating at full capacity.

The Federal government and most private employers will open for business-as-usual in Washington.

The weather forecast for the Washington DC area is for a high of 95 degrees.  Similar highs are predicted for the remainder of the week.

The following is excerpted from the Sunday Charleston (WV) Gazette-Mail:

The storm, which swept from the Great Lakes to the Chesapeake Bay, devastated parts of Ohio, Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia and the District of Columbia. But West Virginia took the biggest hit, according to FirstEnergy.

“It affected it fairly catastrophically,” company spokesman Todd Meyers said Sunday.

“Parkersburg took the brunt of the storm, with 90-plus mile-per-hour winds.”

Forecasters on Friday predicted a number of storm cells, but no one expected a continuous line stretching from the Northern Panhandle to south of Huntington, Meyers said. “It blew across the entire state.

“In Ellenboro, a 500-kilovolt transmission line — it crunched three towers. That’s part of the interstate transmission grid, and it’s out.” Repair crews were at the scene Sunday, he said.

“They’ll build temporary structures and get that line back up by midweek, hopefully. Then in the fall, when you have less load, that’s when you’ll go back in and do permanent repairs.

“Our problem, why so many customers are out, this one damaged over 50 large transmission lines and 70 substations.”

Other details on this region-wide no-notice (little notice) event from The Baltimore Sun and the Richmond Times-Dispatch.