Homeland Security Watch

Last Wednesday, January 4 marked the five year anniversary of the landmark Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons:”

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

The bi-partisan authors of these words, referred to in arms control circles as “The Four Horsemen,” are not traditional peace activists or long-time nuclear abolitionists.  Instead, their identity as realists, hawks, and Cold War warriors is what lent such weight to the argument for nuclear zero:

Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The desire to rid the world of nuclear bombs is nearly as old as the weapons themselves. What was new about this particular call was not simply the sketch of concrete steps that could be taken at the beginning of such a journey, but the gravitas of the messengers.  In the abstract it seems almost silly to think that such ideas cannot inhabit a respected space in the relevant conversation without a blessing from above, but at the same time these “wise men” provided the rhetorical room for such a conversation to expand from a minority view to a wide-ranging debate across the foreign policy, international security, and defense worlds.

What does this have to do with homeland security?  There is the obvious impact that comes with a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons that includes a reduced risk of nuclear terrorism, accidental launch, and war with all it’s worldwide implications.  However, reference to this particular anniversary in other venues made me both appreciate the potential coercive power of such an opinion piece and made me wonder if there had been anythings similar in the homeland security sphere. If not, as I suspect, what could have a comparable effect?

Stephen Flynn and the idea of “resilience” is the only candidate that springs to mind.  Yet it introduced a new concept, one which in my opinion has been twisted into various shapes to fit various needs and definitions.  The Four Horsemen did not conjure a “world without nuclear weapons” out of nothingness, but instead by lending their voices to a relatively marginalized idea shifted the terms of conversation and analysis on which nuclear policy is grounded. Perhaps a true paradigm shift.

Are there possible candidates, authors and topics, in what is considered “homeland security” that could result in such a radical shift?

Earlier today the President signed out and the Secretary of Defense released new strategic guidance for the Department of Defense. Following are my quick-takes on those aspects of the document  most closely related to homeland security.

Page 1:

The demise of Osama bin Laden and the capturing or killing of many other senior al-Qa?’ida  leaders have rendered the group far less capable. However, al-Qa?’ida and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. More broadly,violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland.The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats thatcould directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the UnitedStates will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring theactivities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establishcontrol over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.

Page 2:

In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure toreform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that,over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and aremore stable and reliable partners of the United States.Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists anddestabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states.

Page 3:

To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the globalcommons ?– those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms orother anti-access approaches. Both state and non-state actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland. Growth in the number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.

Page 4:

Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qa?’ida and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa?’ida and preventing Afghanistan from everbeing a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributedand will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

Page 5:

Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space….

U.S. forces willcontinue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. We willalso come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong,steady?–state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad.

Page 6:

The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries. U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad. DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

You may see more.   The document includes considerable attention to WMD and cyber threats not excerpted above.

Monday the independent panel appointed to investigate the Fukushima nuclear accident released a 507 page interim report.  Most of the document focuses on specific operational decisions and tactical choices.

Several specific failures are highlighted: insufficient planning, poor regulation and oversight, inadequate training and exercising, a breakdown in communications within the government and between the government and the operator of the nuclear power plant.

The previous paragraph could be quickly edited to apply to nearly every serious industrial accident: Bhopal, TMI, Deepwater Horizon, various large-scale blackouts and others.   The same failures are referenced in most after-actions for events large and small.

Also typical has been most of the media coverage focusing on personal failures by political, regulatory and corporate leaders.

But toward the end of the report — and the 22 page English-language executive summary — are several atypical bits of analysis worth much more attention than given so far.

It is not easy to admit an absolute safety never exists and to learn to live with risks.  But it is necessary to make effort toward realizing a society where risk information is shared and people are allowed to make reasonable choices.

A quarter century ago I made some extra Yen editing Japanese-to-English translations.  This time I will mostly leave the first draft as it is. There is a kind of clarity in the slightly awkward but more literal rendering.

Even for an accident of low probabilities so long as extremely large scale damages are anticipated once it occurs… due consideration should be given to the risks involved and precautionary measures should be taken.

It was a major shortcoming for the safety of both nuclear power plants and surrounding communities that a nuclear accident had not been assumed to occur as a complex disaster.  Disaster prevention programs should be formulated by assuming complex disasters, which will be the major point in reviewing nuclear power plant safety for the future.

It cannot be denied that the viewpoint of looking at a whole picture of an accident was not adequately reflected in nuclear disaster prevention programs in the past.

The nuclear disaster prevention program had serious shortfalls. It cannot be excused that nuclear accidents could not be managed because of an extraordinary situation that… exceeded the assumption.

The Investigation Committee is convinced of the need of paradigm shift in the basic principles of disaster prevention programs for such a huge system, which may result in serious damage once it has an accident.

Whatever to plan, design and execute, nothing can be done without setting assumptions. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that things beyond assumptions may take place. The accidents this time present us crucial lessons on how we should be prepared for such incidents beyond assumptions.

Low probability, high consequence events deserve our sustained attention.

Reasonable assumptions will be exceeded.

The chairman of the investigation panel, Yotaro Hatamura, has been especially critical of the tendency to blame the crisis on soteigai. This is often translated as “unforseeable events,” but is probably closer to “unimaginable events.”  (Echoes of a “failure of imagination” in the 911 Commission report.)

Hatamura is an engineer.  His best known work is probably Learning from Design Failures in which he examines more than 100 cases to “uncover the root cause, reveal the scenario that led to the unwanted event, describe what happened so readers can clearly repeat the steps in their mind, and propose ways to avoid those mistakes in the future.”   It is a very detailed, case-by-case, engineering oriented approach to disciplined thinking.  He is a solution-oriented guy.

But Hatamura  has also become an advocate for clearly distinguishing between complexity and non-complexity and what can — and, even more important, cannot — be done to manage complexity.  With a little effort we can foresee complex events.  We have a much more difficult time imagining how our strategy for the complex must differ from our strategy for the merely complicated or novel or known.

The Japanese for complexity (see above) includes kanji a classically minded literalist might read as “a surprising recurrence of miscellaneous elephants.”  If you can imagine how you would manage that, you are on your way to being able to manage the cascade of a complex event.

The final report is expected in June.

…well, you probably know the rest.

This colorful turn of phrase was uttered within my earshot at a Boston bar following the Patriot’s loss to the Buffalo Bills.  Until this game the Bills had not beat the Pats for 15 straight games, a streak that began in 2003.  The Bills are not a bad team this year, in fact they had the same undefeated record as New England entering the game.  Instead, it was the expectation that the result this past Sunday would be the same as so many games before that added to the befuddlement of viewers across the region (in addition to Tom Brady throwing the same number of interceptions in one game–four–that he had thrown all last season). The same colorful, and upset, individual remarked that his “nephew had never known the Bills to beat the Patriots.”

What it says about my life that this episode inspired thoughts about homeland security I will consider in greater depth another time. Regardless, this animated man unintentionally uttered insightful homeland security ideas.

“My nephew has never known…” As a greater time elapses between events, the expectation that those events are possible generally decreases and the urgency to prepare dissipates.  Perhaps because the original attack on the World Trade Center did not achieve a catastrophic result, the nation was strategically unprepared for 9/11.  The same group not only carried out an attack in the U.S. mainland again (after several against various U.S. targets overseas), but they struck the same target. By strategically, I am not referring to the question of whether our intelligence services were properly aware of the threat or if our leaders were aggressive enough in their chosen courses of action.  Instead, as a nation we were seemingly shocked by the attacks as if the threat had never manifested before that terrible day.  Would the reaction to the attacks have been different if they occurred in 1994 or 1995 instead?

The “sun shining”: Sometimes your star player has a bad day and throws four interceptions.  Sometimes as a fan, you underestimate your opponent because they weren’t so hot the year before but you haven’t bothered to analyze whether they improved over the off season.  Sometimes, a plot will develop in a place intelligence services are not looking and by a group that has not appeared on anyone’s radar screen.  Sometimes a less-then-catastrophic storm will cause the failure of levees generally believed to have been built to stricter guidelines. Sometimes a system designed to prevent blow-outs fails.

My point: the unexpected will occur and we can’t count on preventing, deterring, or mitigating all the worst case scenarios.  Somehow in a time of fiscal and political constraint, room for catastrophic planning should be carved out of a system that rests on preparing for the expected. Following the next “unexpected” catastrophe, there will not be a chance for quick redemption on the following Sunday.

Rikuzentakata on March 13, 2011 (photo by Reuters/Toru Hanai)

Rikuzentakata on September 9, 2011 (photo by Reuters/Toru Hanai)

The tenth anniversary of 9/11 happened to coincide with the six-month mark for the 3/11 earthquake-and-tsunami in Japan.

The Wall Street Journal dedicated a special weekend section to Japanese recovery.  Brookings hosted a seminar.  The Japan Society sponsored a panel discussion organized around the theme Re-imagining Japan: The Quest for a Future that Works.

The Japan Society seminar was, in part, prompted by a new book based on a series of essays mostly completed before March 11.  The book was conceived as a call-to-action for the world’s third largest economy, still stalled two decades after the explosion of a  huge property bubble.

Otherwise I did not notice much attention in the United States. This is despite a continuing drag on the US economy caused by disruption of the global supply chain after one of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded.

No doubt 9/11 crowded out attention to 3/11. Too bad.

What might we learn from a formidable economic power that has evidently lost its ability to grow? What might we learn from a democratic political process that has lost the confidence of its citizens through unending factionalism?  What might the United States learn from a catastrophe that killed more than 22,000, displaced more than 300,000, left behind more than 24 million tons of debris, and spawned a long-lasting nuclear emergency?

The instrumental lessons-learned abound.  On this count, the best single source I have so far seen is an August special report by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.  A whole range of studies are being completed or are already under peer review.  By March 11, 2012 much of what we think we know about catastrophe preparedness may be revolutionized by an enhanced understanding of the Japanese experience.  If we choose to pay attention. (Recovery Diva gives close attention and should be regularly read.)

Regarding less instrumental but potentially important outcomes, it may be several more years before we can reach conclusions.

I will point to one phenomenon that is worth particular attention.  There is a Japanese term, shimin shakai, that is usually translated as “civil society” and often used to describe a range of semi-official Japanese voluntary organizations.  There is a deeper meaning.

What is the role of a “citizen” (shimin) in “society” (shakai)?  What do these terms mean in a post-modern culture that still draws heavily on pre-modern sensibilities?

In the early 1960s the notion of shimin became closely associated with a largely grass-roots movement opposing  the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.  While no doubt mythologized over the decades, many remember the popular struggle against the treaty as giving birth to nothing less than a new kind of Japanese: spontaneous, autonomous, free-thinking, even while in meaningful relationship with others and collaborating on issues of common concern.

Simon Andrew Avenell has explained, “As an idea, shimin proposed a new relationship between individual and state; it made possible a progressive reimagination of the nation; it legitimized the defense of private interest against corporate and political interference; and, most important of all, it infused individual and social action with significance far beyond the specific issues at stake, linking them to an ideal — if protean — vision of a new civil society for a new Japan.”

The events and aftermath of March 11 have retrieved and reinvigorated this concept of shimin.  Depending on how the emerging sense-of-citizenship develops, this could be the most profound outcome of the crisis.

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I found the pictures at the top in a collection put together by Alan Taylor at The Atlantic.  Please visit: Japan Earthquake: Six Months Later.

The pictures are of Rikuzentakata.  The Wall Street Journal has given sustained attention to this community, including some well-produced multimedia.

This graphic comes from a site called Visual News (thanks WRC).  You can click on the picture for a larger, full screen, easier-to-read-the-details image.

If we were to look up into the branches of our ancient family tree, many of us would see limbs from our past that ended prematurely in the huge pandemics which have swept the world. In my tree for example, two relatives on oposite American coasts died of Spanish Flu in the same year. Created in a collaboration between GOOD and Column Five, this graphic details the ten deadliest pandemics both past and present, with a key explaining normal symptoms, estimated death tolls and the years they ravaged the world. If that sounds bleak, just make sure you notice how many of these global crisis’ have been cured in just the last century. What cures will the future hold?

Sunday morning Meet the Press — and most broadcast media — gave ongoing attention to Hurricane Irene… even as New York was mostly spared and Philadelphia and (later) Vermont were more than a bit surprised.

The panel, gathered around a studio table in Washington DC, discussed “the political aspect of this storm.”  You can see this element of the show in it’s entirety here (after a 14 second ad).  I want to highlight two issues raised during the rather brief discussion.

First from David Brooks:

Obviously, since Katrina, the, the message for politicians is go all out, maximize the warning.  And I suppose that’s fair. In some parts of the country, that’s fair.  But in places like Washington where it really wasn’t that big a storm, what’s going to happen over time, if they do this every time there’s a storm, is people are going to begin tuning them out.  Obviously, there’s an incentive to play it safe, but there are the kind of things you have to balance out.  And if you go hyper every time, people are going to tune it out.

It’s hard to disagree. But what I also heard weather forecasters and politicians and emergency managers saying clearly and often is:  If we wait until we are sure, it will be too late to evacuate out of harms way.  When a hurricane aims for the most densely populated region of the nation you have to take some risks to mitigate a greater risk.   I heard plenty of (wo)man-in-the-street interviews saying the same thing.

Emphasizing that some risks are beyond precise prediction or effective control is a good message to send and explain and re-send and re-explain.  Informed and educated people will make choices that best fit their situation.

Next from Katty Kay in conversation with the host David Gregory:

MS. KAY: …the watchword is overpreparedness and not underpreparedness.  But it’s very different, when you’ve had three days warning to something like what happened in Japan, for example.

MR. GREGORY:  Yeah.

MS. KAY:  Imagine that.  How is the country prepared for that?  If you have a seismic earthquake off probably the West Coast followed by a tsunami, you don’t have that time to prepare.

MR. GREGORY:  Well…

MS. KAY:  Is any country really up to handling something like that?

MR. GREGORY:  And before–I want to get to that point, but before we leave the activism and the preparation, we talked to Cory Booker, the mayor of Newark.  This was a tweet that he sent out last night, yes, on Saturday. “Heading on a pizza run.  I’m going to deliver 10 pizzas to those standing in our shelter at JFK…”

The panel never got back to “that point” and I’m concerned our national answer is just about as substantive as was Mr. Gregory’s.  Like it says in the song, in terms of catastrophe preparedness I wish we would, “Quit your ramblin quit your gamblin.”

By the way, if you love the old Leadbelly Ledbetter ballad you can listen to it here. Someday, but evidently not this day, I will learn how to embed video.

Early this morning Irene came ashore near Cape Lookout, North Carolina.  She is still tracking to parallel the Atlantic coast all the way into the Canadian Maritimes.   Roughly two million evacuees are on the move to make room for Irene… especially her storm surge.

At this point Irene is forecast to pass over the New York metropolitan area on Sunday as a Category 1 hurricane.  Right now the eye seems likely to move over Long Island which could reduce wind-impact on the more densely populated urban core.

The New York City Office of Emergency Management is reporting:

Due to the approach of Hurricane Irene, the City has issued a mandatory evacuation order for New Yorkers who live in the low-lying Zone “A” coastal areas across all five boroughs and the Rockaways. These areas include: Coney Island, Manhattan Beach, Far Rockaway, Beach Channel, South Beach, Midland Beach, and Battery Park City. People should be out of these areas by 5 pm on Saturday.

Residents who live in Zone A are strongly encouraged to stay with friends or family outside an evacuation zone. Evacuation Centers are open for residents who have no alternative shelter.

MTA service including subways, buses, and railroads will begin to shut down at noon tomorrow, so please prepare to evacuate immediately.

The New York Times has a very helpful interactive map of the NYC evacuation zones.

As noted in previous posts, NYC has a great emergency management community.  While there are intense rivalries between certain agencies.  There is also effective — and regularly exercised — incident command.  There is a professionalism, competence, and commitment to mission that very few jurisdictions can equal.

My only critique of NYC emergency services has been a tendency to depend too much on command-and-control structures and systems.  Its very depth of expertise could, in a truly catastrophic context, undermine its effectiveness.  Experts can sometimes get in the way of creative response to the unexpected.

While I think Sunday and the aftermath could be tough, right now — cross my fingers, knock on wood, et cetera — I do not anticipate a catastrophic impact on New York.  If so, the expertise and command-and-control bias will provide significant benefit.  I will be interested in what our New York City readers have to say on Sunday and Monday… assuming they can let us know.

For a different angle on the catastrophe or non-catastrophe issue, please read an excellent post by Nate Silver at the New York Times blog packed with meaningful data.  He calls it: A New York Hurricane could be a Multibillion Dollar Catastrophe.

A  firefighter, a  cop, and an emergency manager walk into a bar.  This is not a joke.  I was with the three of them.

One had red wine, another had a beer, the third ordered scotch.   I was drinking Dry Sack on the rocks with a twist.

Can you guess which one had which drink?  Can you guess which offered what to the conversation:

“The problem is everyone is in denial about the worst risks.”

“New Orleans after Katrina was simple compared to Sendai after the tsunami.  How about Memphis after New Madrid or LA after the big one?” You can know the real pros by whether or not they pronounce it Maaadrid, as in really crazy.

“How about DC, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham after New Madrid?  How about pipelines, rail bridges, interstates, and the Eastern Interconnect after New Madrid?”  Hows about every little town downstream from a dam?

“How about the whole economy for the next ten years after Long Beach is taken out? I don’t care if it’s tsunami, pandemic, or an IND.”

“How about the whole economy if some cyber-anarchists decide to really screw with credit cards and ATMs?”

“As long as they vaporize my mortgage too.”

The bar talk was not as grim as this suggests.  Extended conversations with this crew are like a public reading of Dante’s Inferno (no Paradiso) with a running commentary by the comedian Lewis Black.  You roar with laughter over a comment that ought not be documented here.   A slightly sick sense of humor is essential to survival in these professions.

“We’re the real problem,” one guy said wrapping his arms around the shoulders of those on either side.  ”We’re too good.  Why worry when the A team’s got your back?”

“Just call 911 and the cavalry always comes.”

“Even under fire… hell, with radioactive brimstone falling from the sky.”

“Thing is, we’re really good at the everyday stuff and lots of the tough stuff.”

“Did you hear about the 911 call because the citizen thought her remote had been stolen.  Cops found it in a drawer.  They responded!”

“That’s the problem, we are so #$!@ responsive we’ve trained the citizens to depend on us.  When the big #$!@ happens they just wait around.”

“Not everyone.”

“Practically EVERYONE!”

“There’s two big pile-ups:  real increasing dependence. Who grows their own food anymore?  Who even eats at home? And where does our food come from? Not anywhere close.  Second pile-up: The #$!@ complicated system works really, really well until it doesn’t work at all.  So there’s no obvious reason to pay much attention, until it’s too late.”

“So… what we’re really good at is hiding the problems?”

“Sure.  There’s a fire.  You put it out.  You get ‘em temporary housing or they go to the in-laws.  I keep gawkers away.  Everything’s fine. No worries. But in Joplin or Tuscaloosa? Even those huge twisters were tiny compared to what we’ll get when the wrong fault shifts under 5 million or a wildfire overwhelms San Diego.  Hows about a CAT 5 and flood surge pounding Miami-Dade?”

“When they call 911 no one will answer, they won’t even get a #$!@ dial-tone!”

“It doesn’t take such a big hit.  Maybe catastrophe comes on little cat feet?  You read Ted Lewis’ new book?  The complex systems we depend on are so intricate  just one little complication and the consequences cascade.”

“Sort of like the 2003 blackout caused by tree branches in Ohio?”

“But the cause wasn’t tree branches, it’s the way WE build and manage systems. Tree branches are a preexisting condition.  Our choices create the vulnerabilities.”

“You know when I was a little kid,” (the guy to his right mimicked the Staten Island accent) we had a farm right down the road.  It’s a landfill now.  The big farms in Jersey, they’re all McMansions.  Mom and pop get their broccoli and peas from California just like all of us.”

“You know what though? The beers alot better than back then.  Hey waitress, another round here.”

The Congressional Research Service (specifically the stalwart Bruce R. Lindsay and redoubtable Francis X. McCarthy) has produced a new study entitled: Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis. It was released to Congress on June 21 and has subsequently been made available to the public by the Federation of American Scientists.

As with most CRS products the report is comprehensive, credible, and cautious. The analysis provides a helpful overview of the current policy landscape. The CRS is not tasked to advise or innovate. The CRS is tasked with even-handed research and reporting to inform members and their staff of options and major issues, usually bounded by the traditional policy frameworks recognizable to their principal audiences.

Some key outputs from the report:

If amended, the Stafford Act might provide a declaration for what might be classified as a “megadisaster” or “catastrophic disaster.” It is unclear, however, what differentiates a disaster from a catastrophe. (Page 4)

A catastrophic declaration may be used to trigger certain mechanisms before, during, and after a catastrophe. Policymakers might also elect to apply a catastrophic declaration to one or more phases of the incident. (Page 5)

Given the number of large-scale disasters occurring in the last 30 years, one might conclude that large-scale disasters are occurring more frequently—which might support an argument for a catastrophic declaration. A counterargument, on the other hand, is that in terms of damage costs, only Hurricane Katrina truly qualifies as a catastrophic event when compared to other, recent incidents. It might be further argued that while many of the most expensive disasters have occurred in recent years, the increased costs associated with such incidents are a function of variables that are not necessarily related to the magnitude of the incidents (such as increased federal expenditures for assistance and recovery projects, the replacement of expensive infrastructure, and the development of previously uninhabited areas). (Page 12)

Upon reviewing the results of the comparative analysis of destructive incidents, it could be argued that highly destructive events occur too rarely to warrant a catastrophic declaration. Using the 90th percentile as a benchmark, only one event in the last 140 years would be catastrophic and only four would qualify if the 80th percentile is used as a benchmark. Similar conclusions might be drawn on the comparative analysis of combined VSL and damage estimate costs—specifically, that high-impact events are too infrequent to merit the addition of a new declaration category—only one incident in the last 100 years meets the 90th percentile threshold. Additionally, the threshold would have to be adjusted to the 20th percentile to include more than one incident. Critics of the additional declaration might further argue that VSL is a poor determinant for a catastrophic declaration because federal assistance is predominately tied to recovery projects rather than victim or survivor compensation. (Page 15)

Depending on its design, certain benefits may be derived from using a catastrophic declaration for large-scale disasters, including:
• accelerated and more robust federal assistance to states prior to an incident,
• the use of specialized response plans and guidelines for the federal response,
• the elimination or reduction of procedures and protocols that might impede response and recovery activities and efforts,
• the elimination or reduction of procedures and protocols that might delay the disbursal of federal assistance, and
• increasing the amount of federal assistance through various mechanisms to help states recovery more quickly and avoid economic hardship.

The potential drawbacks of a catastrophic declaration may include:
• unclear authority and responsibility designations could confuse those responsible for executing the response and recovery,
• increased federal costs for disaster assistance due to increased declaration activity,
• increased federal costs for disaster assistance due to the increased federal costshare provisions included with the declaration, and
• increased federal involvement and responsibility for incident response. (Page 17)

Please do not mistake the summary above as equal in value to the full CRS narrative.

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Now for something completely different, as my fourth-cousin Michael has been known to say, you might review the pdf linked below. Where Lindsay and McCarthy are quantitative, the authors of this working draft (including yours truly) are more qualitative. Where CRS is reporting what is known and avoids advocacy, this other document explores admitted unknowns and advocates innovation in catastrophe preparedness far beyond the typical writ of Congress. The CRS report says little about private sector catastrophe preparedness; the other document is full of private sector implications and calls-to-action.  One report is authoritative, the other wants to be provocative.  The CRS report is official.  There is nothing official in the working draft offered below.

The document accessed through the link is nearly 25 megabytes, so don’t give up too soon. If you have concerns or suggestions, this is a working draft and changes and additions will continue to be made through the middle of August.

Catastrophe: Definitions, Characteristics, and Proposed Principles of Good Practice (Working Draft)

Their sense of humor intact, Cantabrians have learned to make the best of a bad situation. (Photo by Bronwyn Hayward)

This week the New Zealand Government announced that it will buy out more than 5,000 Christchurch homeowners affected by the February 22 earthquake that devastated the Southern Hemisphere city of 400,000 people. Many more are still awaiting assessments of geotechnical conditions that threaten to undermine any investment in rebuilding their shattered lives where the rubble of their homes now rests.

Since the original earthquake last September, Christchurch has experienced more than 7,300 aftershocks. Two of them had moment magnitudes greater than 6.0 and several more exceeded magnitude 5.0.

With their central business district and most iconic landmarks still in ruins people are wondering when they will get the chance to start rebuilding. The logistics alone suggest the task ahead will be Herculean — although for many it seems, at least for now, rather more Sisyphean. Some estimates indicate that it will take about five years to raze all of the damaged buildings and clear the debris left behind.

With each significant aftershock the community has come together to meet immediate needs, but some wonder how long this can continue. No firm estimates seem readily available to indicate how many people have packed up and left for awhile if not for good. But the impact of their departures are beginning to show signs of straining the social fabric even as the physical fabric of the community remains tattered and torn. This begs the question how people will organize themselves to meet the ongoing challenges of living in the devastated city.

From what I can tell from monitoring Facebook posts and talking to friends, the people coping best with the situation are those who have managed to keep a small but strong social circle intact. A sense of humor has helped immensely with this. As has the willingness to share other forms of human capital.

The most valuable commodities being exchanged in Christchurch these days are not dollars or dozers but instead quick smiles, soft shoulders, firm handshakes, hearty laughs and quiet strolls together along the dark and dusty streets. The duties of those undaunted by disaster are few but strict: In Christchurch they are summed up by a song written and recorded by New Zealand arist Dave Dobbyn entitled Loyal. The second verse summarizes much of what drives those still living in Christchurch these days:

Out in the battle, flung far and used.
Where does allegiance lie?
Sometimes when all of your hopes, and all of your dreams,
Are too much to value in one moment.
And all of us anxious, but why hurry love?
History’s here and now.
Oh and why are you waiting – waiting for what?
The history of some love?

Those daring enough to remain in Christchurch these days seem to share something in common much more powerful than their love of the place or the economic interests they have in homes or jobs. It’s the relationships that have nurtured and sustained them through this serial tragedy that now bind them tightly together. They have history together; a history bound up in love and hope.

The dharma of disaster requires little more of us than a willingness to share our vulnerability by being present in the suffering of others. No burden is too terrible or too great when enough people are willing to bear it.

Those awaiting answers, like those who now know the Government will step in to buy up their properties, have important decisions to make. Here’s hoping they find comfort and direction in the help offered by their friends and families.

Among his many other skills, Phil is obviously also a gifted mentalist.  In his previous post he raises exactly the set of questions that occurred to me (perhaps not expressed in my own mind so succinctly or eruditely…) when I read about another issue that could possibly define “low probability, high consequence” events, solar storms:

While a video of the eruption captured by NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory showed an enormous plume spraying from the sun, this solar tantrum would not be the big one — it would not be the 1859 event all over again.

Sept. 1 of that year saw the largest solar flare on record, witnessed by British astronomer Richard Carrington. While tracing features of the sun’s surface, which Carrington had projected via telescope onto paper, he saw a sudden flash emerge from a dark spot. Although such sunspots had sparked curiosity for centuries — Galileo famously drew them, too, in the early 1600s — Carrington had no idea what the flash could mean.

Within hours, telegraph operators found out. Their long strands of wire acted as antennas for this huge wave of solar energy. As this tsunami sped by, transmitters heated up, and several burst into flames. Observers in Miami and Havana gaped skyward at eerie green and yellow displays, the northern lights pushed far south.

What could possibly happen during such an event?  The Washington Post article I noted gives a taste:

Such a “Carrington event” will happen again someday, but our wired civilization will suffer losses far greater than a few telegraph shacks.

Communications satellites will be knocked offline. Financial transactions, timed and transmitted via those satellite, will fail, causing millions or billions in losses. The GPS system will go wonky. Astronauts on the space station will huddle in a shielded module, as they have done three times in the past decade due to “space weather,” the scientific term for all of the sun’s freaky activity. Flights between North America and Asia, over the North Pole, will have to be rerouted, as they were in April during a weak solar storm at a cost to the airlines of $100,000 a flight. And oil pipelines, particularly in Alaska and Canada, will suffer corrosion as they, like power lines, conduct electricity from the solar storm.

So there is a potential storm heading our way at some point, but if it wasn’t so bad in the past, could it possibly have a greater impact now?

A seemingly great technological step forward in disaster communication with the public is thrown under the political bus:

President Obama could soon have the ability to personally text message every single cell-phone-toting American — whether  they like it or not — with “critical emergency alerts” under a new federal program that civil libertarians and political opponents say is a Big Brother-like intrusion posing a high risk of political abuse.

Federal officials in New York yesterday unveiled the three-tiered emergency alert system that would blast messages about Amber Alerts, impending weather disasters and terror threats to mobile devices.

Cell-phone users could opt out of most alerts if they want to, but not the texter-in-chief’s presidential pages.

“It’s like the state rep sending out mailings about how wonderful they are,” said Tad Kasperowicz of the Quincy Tea Party. “President Obama says,’Here come the high winds and the thunderstorms’ and it’s not really an emergency, but, hey, he gets his name out to every cell phone in the area. I can see that. Absolutely. There’s potential for abuse there.”

Sure, there is potential for abuse…if you believe the party affiliation of the people currently in office will always hold that office.  In other words, where is the political advantage for Obama to start such a system if it can be politically exploited when a Republican will at some point come into control of it?

Perhaps this is just the natural, and extremely positive, evolution of a public advisory system that had been lagging behind technological developments. However, I may just be naive…

How do appropriate authorities, today and going forward, deal with this attitude?

Guidroz said that the Southern Louisiana community “is protected better than we were 70 years ago” but that most residents did not build their homes above flood levels. Building on pilings 10 feet aboveground is expensive. And residents “just don’t think it’s going to happen to them in their lifetime,” Guidroz said. “They’re willing to take the chance.”

Speaking of Juliette Kayyem, she will be appearing this evening on a panel at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government on “OIL SPILLS, EARTHQUAKES, TSUNAMIS & MELTDOWNS: Acting In Time Against the Next Disaster.”

In addition to Juliette there is an impressive list of participants:

Juliette Kayyem
Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs,
Department of Homeland Security (2009-11)

General Craig R. McKinley
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Admiral Robert Papp
Commandant, US Coast Guard

The Hon. Bart Stupak
Member, US House of Representatives (1993-2011)
Chair, House Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations

Admiral James Winnefeld
Commander, US Northern Command &
North American Aerospace Defense Command

David T. Ellwood (Moderator)
Dean, Harvard Kennedy School

The event will be streamed over the internet live and can be viewed here beginning at 6pm:

http://www.iop.harvard.edu/Multimedia-Center/All-Videos/The-Forum-LIVE

A day or two following the event, a recorded video will be made available on the Kennedy School website.  I will update this post with the relevant information when it is made available.

Update:

Here is the link to the video of the event:

http://www.iop.harvard.edu/Multimedia-Center/All-Videos/Earthquakes,-Tsunamis,-Oil-Spills-Meltdowns-Acting-In-Time-Against-the-Next-Disaster

And here is a summary of the remarks:

http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2011/04/planning-for-disasters/

Much of the analysis of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, both the tick-tock of events at the plant itself and the re-evaluation of nuclear reactor safety and response plans here in the U.S., has treated the subject as if it was an isolated incident. This ignores the triggering event, a 9.0 earthquake and resulting monster tsunami, along with the true utter death and destruction that resulted as opposed to the ongoing radiological situation that has yet to kill one person (the brave people working to get the situation under control have likely been exposed to high enough doses of radiation to increase their chances of developing cancer, but at this point outside the plant it likely will be difficult to identify any increased cancer rates).

This is not generally the best of ideas, either for understanding decisions made by the utility that owns and operates the Fukushima plant and Japanese authorities or in analyzing our own safety efforts and crisis response plans (never mind the fact I’ve seen significantly more concern raised about nuclear safety than questions about our own ability to deal with an event that kills tens of thousands and displaces hundreds of thousands of people).  That said…I’m about to commit the same mistake, because like in physics it is sometimes easier to treat a real physical object like a car as if it were a pure geometrical shape (such as a sphere) just because it makes the math easier. In other words, sometimes important insights can still be gained by simplifying a situation.

In this case, I’m thinking about the similarities between the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and spill and the ongoing troubles at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.  Both are technical disasters that impact people and the environment with possible long-term effects to which there has been a confused response.  In a recent Boston Globe op-ed, former DHS assistant secretary Juliette Kayyem reflects on her experiences in the Gulf:

In hindsight, it’s clear to me that there were two different responses to the spill — one political, one operational. Despite some fits and starts, the operational response largely worked. But it was the political response that garnered so much attention, and seemed so disconnected from what was going on day-to-day operationally.

The operational response, led by Thad Allen, occurred in the field. Countless Coast Guard officials, environmental cleanup crews, BP engineers, and state and local first responders focused on closing the well; used 1.8 million gallons of dispersants on the surface and sea bottom; burned oil when it surfaced; protected marshlands with protective boom; skimmed oil if it was near shore; and cleaned up tar balls when oil hit the shore.

Yet, the whole time, we were playing by a rulebook that no one could admit we were playing by. This was true not just for the White House, but for the governors and local leaders as well.

Even putting aside BP’s public-relations fiascos — former CEO Tony Hayward wasn’t the only one who wanted his life back — the notion that the US government would stand hand in hand singing “Kumbaya” with BP as we worked together to fight the oncoming oil was absurd. Thus, Thad Allen would become the voice and leader of the response, BP would be kicked off the podium (literally: their daily press briefings with the Coast Guard were canceled)

Not one of the Gulf governors — all of them Republican, at least two potentially running against President Obama in 2012 — would accept that his own experts had signed off on plans that, essentially, they no longer liked in the harsh light of day.

In a democracy, any disaster is inherently political. This isn’t a criticism. The administration did, in my view, what any compassionate and concerned administration ought to do; the governors would similarly defend themselves. And maybe first responders are too quick to criticize elected officials for involving themselves in major disasters; leadership is what we elect them for. They can assign blame, demand resources, and channel popular outrage in a way a by-the-book field response cannot.

On the other side of the Pacific, the story sounds eerily similar.  The Wall Street Journal has been carrying out some of the best reporting on the management of the Fukushima crisis:

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which oversees the country’s top nuclear regulator, said Friday said it will run Tepco’s main daily plant-status briefing, held each evening, though the company will conduct some others on its own.

Tepco came under another indirect attack Friday, as the governor of Fukushima prefecture, or state, vowed he would oppose any efforts to reopen parts of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, as well as a neighboring Tepco-run plant, until he was assured of their safety. While he has limited ability to block any reopening, his comments underscore the rising local opposition to nuclear power in Japan.

Tokyo’s intervention in Tepco’s public-relations arm came after several briefings that sowed confusion, with Tepco issuing statements on radiation levels that it later rescinded or revised, or that appeared to catch Tokyo by surprise at briefings often held at around the same time of day.

The move deepens the government’s involvement in Tepco. After the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that led to dangerous reactor overheating at the plant, Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered advisers to set up a command center in Tepco’s offices. The government has since moved to quash speculation, amid questions over Tepco’s ability to shoulder potential liabilities over the disaster, that it would nationalize the company.

“Under the current configuration, it is not clear who is calling the shots and who is taking responsibility,”

To bring it all together, Ben Heineman, former General Counsel of GE (among his many professional accomplishments), highlighted the similarities between the two incidents in a Harvard Business Review piece:

A potentially catastrophic technological problem, an incomplete crisis response plan, misleading early information, divided private and public authority, ineffective initial actions.

This could describe the current situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and its six reactors. But, it also describes what happened after the April 20, 2010 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.

These two unprecedented events are stark reminders that effective crisis management involving complex science and technology is wholly dependent on well-thought-out — and actively practiced — crisis response plans. Of course, such plans will have to adapt to actual events, but without a robust plan, “seat of the pants” crisis management won’t work.

Although the Japanese nuclear event is not yet a week old and information is impressionistic and fragmentary, it bears a striking resemblance in a number of dimensions to the Gulf spill

Response Plan. Neither the Gulf spill nor the problems at the Japan nuclear plants were unthinkable.

Public or Private Responsibility? The U.S. government initially left many dimensions of crisis management and response to BP. But, the Gulf spill was a national issue, which required governmental direction, responsibility and accountability.

In Japan, although the government has taken the lead on many aspects of the post-earthquake/tsunami crisis, there has been confusion about who is in charge at the nuclear plants. Where is the central government? Where is the nuclear regulator?

Confusing Information. A host of factual questions were raised by Gulf Spill: How much oil was flowing? How could the flow be stopped? Where was the oil going (surface/sub-surface)? How could it be contained or removed? How could damage to environment/people/property be eliminated or mitigated? But for a significant period of time, responses from the company and the government were confusing. The U.S. government needed a central authority which used expert working groups, and which made clear to the public what was known, what was unknown, what process was in place for improving knowledge, and when there would be regular updates on those issues. A similar set of problems bedevils Japan.

Decision-Making Processes. As noted, there was substantial confusion for weeks after the Gulf spill about whether the company or different parts of government were making decisions.

A similar concern appears to apply in Japan, where opaqueness prevails about who is making decisions about what options, with what parties at the table, and with which other parties advising (from around the world).

Implementation and Resources. In the Gulf, there were also serious issues about which private and public sector actors would implement which decisions — and about what resources were necessary.

In Japan, it is very hard to tell at the moment who is responsible for carrying out which decisions at the nuclear plants.

It is still too early to draw any definitive lessons from what is happening in Japan.  Yet the basic similarities so far identified between these two events  should give pause to all regulators and emergency planners.