Homeland Security Watch

Congress last month received the pre-release draft of a new report focused on managing DHS through the coming presidential transition. The final public report is now available by its authors, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), which had undertaken the study at the request of Congress to prepare the Department for the management challenges – as well as security vulnerabilities – it will face between November and January 20, 2009.

Given that we’ve seen spikes in terrorist attacks at times of political transition, such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the presidential transition carries with it an added challenge for DHS. It must manage the institutional flux that occurs with any change in the presidency while also maintaining, if not bolstering, the ability to defeat, deter, defend against, or respond to a terrorist attack seeking to exploit such a symbolic window of time.

The policy community has embarked on a number of ongoing transition studies that aim to inform the next team’s policy slate as it takes over DHS. I participate in two of them, and there are at least two others I’m aware of. For the most part, these efforts do not address the management challenge of keeping DHS running during this key timeframe. This is where the NAPA study comes in.

The report suggests that, while the ratio of political appointees to career leaders is typical at DHS given the rest of the Executive branch, DHS should shift more executives to field operations and convert deputy slots to career positions. This process is well underway, but we are seeing cases where political appointees are getting the deputy jobs as career positions.

In all, NAPA offers a transition plan in 22 steps. Among them are the following:

June through the Democratic and Republican conventions:
• Appoint a full-time transition director.
• Develop a comprehensive transition plan.
• Enhance current transition initiatives and a transition training plan.
• Fill vacant senior executive service positions quickly.

Between the conventions and the election, DHS should:
• Ask the presidential candidates to name a potential Homeland Security transition team.
• Expedite security clearances for all transition team officials.

Between election day and inauguration the president-elect should designate, and Congress should vet, a new DHS secretary to be sworn in on Inauguration Day

After the election:
• Other key political appointees should be approved no later than December.
• DHS should offer training for likely presidential appointees.
• DHS should continue joint training exercises with career and non-career executives.

As with nearly all such reports, the NAPA panel calls for Congress to consolidate its oversight of DHS. However, the focus it gives to the less exciting, but equally vital, management imperatives makes this study unique. I have no doubt the current DHS leadership is committed to carrying out the NAPA report’s recommendations. But let’s hope that all the concern over security vulnerabilities during the transition proves to be unnecessary.

Yesterday IBM and GW’s Homeland Security Policy Institute convened a panel event and discussion entitled “Technology in Homeland Security: A Double-Edged Sword.”

Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for S&T at DHS kicked it off with a presentation on how his directorate views the technology landscape, with a focus on not falling victim to the “failure of imagination” the 9/11 Commission blamed as one of the reasons the 9/1 attacks were not disrupted. This notion caused a number of us to ask about the practical limits on such an approach to technology. Specifically, how to insure against spending money on an “anything’s possible” mentality that invests in countermeasures against any threat imaginable? Buswell explained that White House guidance, Department level plans, and input from the customer community (the component agencies at DHS) helps bound the imagination.

Jan Lane stepped in for Frank Cilluffo to moderate Busewell’s presentation and Q&A and I joined the panel as moderator and occasional referee. Frank was able to join toward the latter half and weigh in on the issues.

Our panelists provided a diverse treatment of this challenging topic. Parney Albright, former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, and now Managing Director & Vice Chairman at Civitas, weighed in on the challenges confronting the innovators on the business side of the equation who seek to take pre-prototype solutions to market and how that shapes the spectrum of technology solutions deployed at the state level.

Christian Beckner, Professional Staff Member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, explained some of the rough patches still preventing a more accelerated trend in technology as a homeland security advantage, as well as indications of areas of interest from an oversight perspective. (Note that Christian spoke not on behalf of the Committee.)

Greg Nojeim, Director of the Project on Freedom, Security, and Technology at the Center for Democracy and Technology offered insightful warnings about the unintended consequences of technology when it is not developed or deployed with privacy protections at the initial stages. He cited such things as the PATRIOT Act and government wire-tapping outside of FISA.

Langdon Greenhalgh, CEO of Global Emergency Group, provided the needed perspective of the international emergency response community, which depends to an ever increasing degree on technology as an enabler.

I’m working with Jan and Frank to generate an after action report that condenses the highlights of the discussion. Look for it to be available here and possibly on the HSPI website.

Over 70 participants attended representing the following, among other, organizations:

• DHS, NPPD, IP, HITRAC
• DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council
• Homeland Security Institute (DHS S&T)
• DHS S&T
• U.S. Secret Service
• Department of State
• Department of Energy
• The White House
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
• Government Accountability Office
• European Union
• IBM
• Bingham Consulting Group
• Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Lockheed Martin
• Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
• Trade Security Institute
• Dutko Worldwide
• The Washington Times
• USA Today
• Swedish Institute of International Affairs
• Embassy of El Salvador
• Embassy of Switzerland
• International Association of Fire Chiefs
• Embassy of Australia
• International Development Bank
• Latin America Working Group
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Partnership for Public Service
• Center for Democracy and Technology
• MSCL, LLC International Maritime Consultancy
• Oxford Analytica, Inc.
• American Red Cross
• Institute for Regulatory Science

The Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee convenes its resilience hearing this Wednesday, the 14th. I’ll testify with DHS Assistant Secretary Bob Stephan, Bill Raisch of the International Center for Enterprise Preparedness at NYU, and the Director of the New Orleans Health Department.

The 14th is part of a month of hearings the Homeland Security Committee is dedicating to resilience. Wednesday’s hearing is intended to educate the members on what resiliency really means, what the private sector is doing to achieve resilience, and how DHS can work with the private sector within a framework to promote resilience.

The hearing begins at 2PM in the Homeland Security Committee’s room (311 Cannon House Office Building). Consider attending if you are in WDC. It’ll also stream at the Subcommittee website after the hearing concludes.

Among other things, I intend to describe ways in which the Global Movement Management framework applies to the goal of resiliency and will upload the oral statement later on Wednesday. In the meantime, please feel free to send in your thoughts on the issues in which the Subcommittee is interested for this hearing.

Full Committee hearing on:
“The Resilient Homeland - Broadening the Homeland Security Strategy.”

Tuesday, May 6, 2008 @ 10am
311 Cannon House Office Building

Witnesses (partial):
• Hon. Stewart A. Baker, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security;
• Susan R. Bailey, Ph.D., AT&T Operations, Inc., Vice President Global Network Operations Planning;
• Professor Yossi Sheffi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
• Mr. Erroll G. Southers, Assistant Chief, Los Angeles Airport Police, Homeland Security & Intelligence Division, Adjunct Professor of Terrorism and Public Policy, Associate Director for Educational Programs, Homeland Security Center for Risk & Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), University of Southern California

Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism
“Assessing the Resiliency of the Nation’s Supply Chain.”

Wednesday, May 7, 2008 @ 2pm
311 Cannon House Office Building

Witnesses (invited/partial):
• Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security;
• Commissioner W. Ralph Basham, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security;
• Mr. Robert W. Kelly, Senior Advisor for Homeland and National Security, Reform Institute;
• Mr. Paul Zimmermann, Director of Operations, Port of New Orleans

Today Congresswoman Jane Harman, chair of the Homeland Security Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, published an op-ed in a California paper about how urgent homeland security is – or should be – as a national priority, suggesting that the next President must address the lack of an “effective strategy against major threats.”

She describes a horrific scenario that could take place at LAX: a dirty bomb attack on a highly populated civilian area. Try not to get spun up on the suggestions that terrorists might obtain enough americium from smoke detectors to make a bomb. (Estimates of the necessary amount of detectors range from 1500 to 7500.)

The real value in Harman’s article is the brief treatment she gives of the priorities the next President must embrace to secure the homeland. Readers will recognize some as similar to those included in the previous post entitled 2008 Wish List: Part I. Congressman Harman identifies enhanced intelligence, better stewardship of hazardous materials, stronger partnerships with international partners, and deeper involvement with the state and local authorities.  These are her words:

• Take the offensive against potential threats. Part of this equation is better intelligence - understanding the motivations and capabilities of our enemies, and using that information to anticipate and prevent attacks. For all its tough talk on terrorism, the Bush administration has done a particularly poor job on this front.

• Secure dangerous materials. The ingredients for a dirty bomb can be found in thousands of facilities across the United States - from hospitals to laboratories to water treatment plants - which often have extremely lax security.

Cesium and americium bind chemically to concrete and asphalt and become lodged in cracks on the surface of sidewalks, streets and buildings. Clean-up is nearly impossible. In some cases, demolition is the only practical solution.

• Enhance international relationships and cultivate new ones. Our allies are an extended defensive barrier, and there is much we can learn. Our solid relationship with the British enabled us to disrupt a terror plot to smuggle liquid explosives onto airplanes bound for the United States in 2006.

• Make state and local law enforcement a truly integral part of a homeland security strategy. Federal communication with these partners must improve. Law enforcement stands on America’s front lines and can offer valuable perspectives that inform the national intelligence cycle. They know their communities best. Programs established through the recently enacted 9/11 act will help facilitate information-sharing and avert needless panic caused by ambiguous “gut feelings.” DHS’s continued unwillingness to include local first responders meaningfully in preparing intelligence products borders on the irresponsible.

These explanations are pretty short on detail, but it is an op-ed. Hopefully, this is a sign of productive oversight from her Subcommittee on these important priorities. A hearing on the priority and potential role of the Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Homeland Security Review would be an ideal setting in which to address these questions.

No you didn’t. The Homeland Security appropriations bill started out four years ago as a pork free piece of legislation (no special projects for legislators using federal funds).  By last year’s passage of the FY2007 bill, pork had taken hold, albeit modestly compared to other bills. This time, the FY08 appropriations bill that went to the Senate yesterday from the House includes significantly more pork than there has ever been in the bill. (See last year’s in-depth analysis by Christian Beckner.)

The FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant program, which has never been earmarked before, is bogged down with 96 earmarks totaling $51.3 million. Earmarks are found in everything from Coast Alteration of Bridges ($19 million) to research projects totaling $150 million, which includes a $27 million research institute courtesy Reps Alexander, Corchran, and Corker. There is also $20 million for interoperable communications for Mississippi, even though the total of unearmarked grants for interoperable communications in the bill is only $50 million.

No time to write more now, but see the full list “projects” is on pages 102-110 of the joint explanatory statement. Earmarks are rarely defensible, but always expected. The Homeland Security bill had been a haven from this kind of selfish spending. Some, like the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, may be worth it. Let’s hope the Senate gives this bill the scrutiny that forces these projects to be defended.

Congress included $13million for the Global Trade Exchange within the spending bill sent to the Senate last night. GTX is the third phase of an effort to bring better security and system visibility to the global maritime shipping supply chains. The bill reads as follows:

$13,000,000 shall be used to procure commercially available technology in order to expand and improve the risk-based approach of the Department of Homeland Security to target and inspect cargo containers under the Secure Freight Initiative and the Global Trade Exchange.

The Department issued an RFQ (thumbnail below) for this effort last week. Criticism of the effort usually revolves around the opaque nature in which it has evolved. Private sector operators whose information would theoretically populate a central data exchange express concern over the potential imposition on their supply chains that would come without sufficient benefit to their operations.

GTX has the potential to become a game-changing new dynamic between the public and private sector. However, much remains to be revealed in terms of the anticipated concept of operations that would create the appropriate mix of incentives to support private sector involvement. It is conceivable that if such a ConOps is crafted – including data privacy assurances, a durable governance framework, and shared risk, among other things – the kind of transparency that could be brought to the global maritime trade domain may generate a great advantage for our Homeland Security efforts to identify threats and for our maritime economic operators to identify and mitigate disruptions to their supply chains.

NOTE:
Singapore is now the seventh international port to join an effort to test scanning capabilities geared toward preventing radioactive material from being smuggled via U.S.-bound shipping containers. Integrated scanning for these purposes includes radiation detection and X-ray imaging of 100 percent of maritime cargo headed to the U.S.

This effort, part of the Secure Freight Initiative run jointly by DHS, Energy, and State, is in response to a Congressional mandate included in the SAFE Port Act. Other recently announced ports that signed up include Port Qasim (Pakistan), Puerto Cortés (Honduras), and the Port of Southampton (UK).

A seven-year extension of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, or TRIA is closer to passage in the Congress this week. This will be the result of a compromise between Dems and Repubs, and between the House and the Senate. In general, Dems favor the legislation to enable private insurers to write policies that cover acts of terrorism, which they believe insurers otherwise would not provide out of concern that such a policy would be too risky. Repubs are, in general, unsupportive of extensions for the bill in favor of private sector market solutions that they believe would be less expensive.

The insurance industry paid more than $30 billion in claims as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Afterward, commercial terrorism insurance for businesses became expensive and even impossible to obtain. Congress responded by passing TRIA to provide a financial backstop for the insurance industry so that it would continue to underwrite policies. TRIA is set to expire on December 31.

House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank is leading the House charge to bolster TRIA. The Senate is seeking ways to continue TRIA in more modest ways. The White House supports the Senate’s more conservative version of the TRIA bill.

CQ wrote today that Chairman Frank will accept the Senate’s seven-year extension of TRIA, which is shorter than the 15-year extension he sought. The seven-year TRIA extension would increase the deficit by $3 billion over the next five years and $5.1 billion over the next decade, according to CBO estimates. Chairman Frank said he also would step back from requiring an expansion of the program to cover nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological attacks. On the other hand, Frank is committed to reducing the $100 million threshold that would trigger government coverage to $50 million.

The last thing we should want to do is to leave America’s economy hanging without viable insurance coverage that can protect it against losses like those we saw in lower Manhattan on 9/11. However, there comes a time when industry will have to step up to identify the market – or create one – for providing the coverage necessary for confidence in today’s risk-laden environment. TRIA was created as a temporary fix to bridge the tenuous time between 9/11 and a more stable economic landscape that would allow the market to operate effectively in this new terrain. However, the question remains: What if the market sets a price so high for this coverage that demand never takes hold? We run the risk of creating an additional vulnerability in the form of a brittle economy that would likely suffer unnecessary cascading effects from a terrorist attack if the insurance coverage is not in place to buffer the financial impact.

Washington-based think tank CSIS is joined by Rep. Jim Langevin (D-R.I.), chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security and Science and Technology; and Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the ranking Republican on the subcommittee to launch a cybersecurity commission of top experts in the field charged with putting forth recommendations for the next U.S. president.

The 32-member commission plans to finish its work by the end of 2008. Co-chairmen of the commission are retired Admiral Bobby Inman, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency; Scott Charney, corporate vice president for trustworthy computing at Microsoft Corp.; Rep. Langevin and Rep. McCaul.

UPDATE:

IBM Plans Major Security Initiative
Thursday November 1, 6:29 am ET
By Brian Bergstein, AP Technology Writer

IBM Says It Will Spend $1.5 Billion on Computer Security-Related Products in 2008

BOSTON (AP) — IBM Corp. plans to announce Thursday that it will boost what it spends developing computer security products to $1.5 billion in 2008, reflecting an intensifying focus for the company.

IBM executives would not say how much they used to spend. But analyst Charles King of Pund-IT Research said he believes $1.5 billion would be twice what IBM traditionally spends on security research and product development each year.

The figure is separate from IBM’s spending on acquisitions that bring in new technology. In the past year IBM has bought several security companies, including Internet Security Systems Inc. for $1.3 billion and Watchfire Corp. for at least $100 million.

Now IBM says it is integrating technologies from its acquisitions with security software and services developed in house. It expects to offer broader security packages so customers can reduce the number of providers they hire to protect their data.

“We believe there’s a crisis in the marketplace right now,” said Val Rahmani, who heads IBM’s infrastructure management services.

Even with this sharper focus, IBM will encounter tough competition from security specialists and other information-technology vendors such as Hewlett-Packard Co. and EMC Corp., which have also been spending heavily to bolster their offerings.

In a letter to the outgoing Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Jackson, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson chose to focus on the low lights of Jackson’s tenure. Thompson’s letter is a response to Jackson’s October 19 letter highlighting the efforts to fill vacancies at DHS.

The response takes issue with Jackson’s positive spin on filling vacancies (“filled, selected, or formally advertised” to be exact).  Thompson takes the opportunity to list a number of programs failing to meet expectations that may indicate a pretty clear agenda for the Dems to start critiquing the Repub’s homeland security record.

The programs identified in Chairman Thompson’s letter include:

• The Transportation Worker Identification Card program

• Secure Border Initiative and Project 28

• US-VISIT (biometric exit capability)

• National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the corresponding Sector-Specific Plans

• DHS Office of Health Affairs

• Surface Transportation Security (mass transit)

• FEMA (brain drain)

• Office of Emergency Communications

Of course, the Thompson letter could have highlighted some positive accomplishments by the Department.  But the Chairman closes his missive with a reference to a recent hearing that the DepSec did not to attend. Thompson suggests that the hearing, “Holding the Department of Homeland Security Accountable for Security Gaps,” was a missed opportunity for Jackson to defend the Department’s record. With a hearing title like that, I suppose its no surprise the DepSec had somewhere else to be.

Readers will recall the post we had here on September 25 introducing the presentation slides being used by White House officials to brief Congressional, State, and Local stakeholders about changes to be made to the nation’s homeland security strategy. It revealed a broadened focus that emphasized both natural disasters as a risk and offensive measures as a resource in protecting the homeland. The White House issued a statement today that describes those changes as:

Acknowledging that while we must continue to focus on the persistent and evolving terrorist threat, we also must recognize that certain non-terrorist events that reach catastrophic levels can have significant implications for homeland security.

Emphasizing that as we secure the Homeland we cannot simply rely on defensive approaches and well-planned response and recovery measures. We recognize that our efforts also must involve offense at home and abroad.

A full third of this fact sheet lists accomplishments by the Administration since 9/11 and suggests what Congress should do on secret surveillance laws, Committee jurisdictions, and grant allocations.  The entire strategy is available for download here. 

Leaving aside for the moment the question of “Why now,” the “national information management system” cited in the Strategy peaks my interest. Since there’s little on it in the document, perhaps this refers to something already underway. It may be the Interagency Incident Management Group. Readers of this blog usually have all the answers so please comment.

Other highlights include the following:

Situational Awareness & Information management
Maintaining situational awareness requires “prioritiz[ing] information and develop[ing] a common operating picture, both of which require a well-developed national information management system and effective multi-agency coordination centers to support decision-making during incidents.” The concept of situational awareness is identified as the fifth core principle of incident management and defined as

“continuous sharing, monitoring, verification, and synthesis of information to support informed decisions on how to best manage threats, potential threats, disasters, or events of concern.”

The Strategy acknowledges that while timely information is valuable, it also can be overwhelming. Situational awareness and decision-making, therefore, demands that incident information be effectively prioritized. The Strategy refers again to a “national information management system.” That system’s role is to “integrate key information and define national information requirements.” Not a bad job to have. This type of role would amount to the czar of all czars.

Cyber Security: A Special Consideration
The Strategy asserts that in order to secure the nation’s cyber infrastructure against man-made and natural threats, Federal, State, and local governments, along with the private sector, must work together to prevent damage to, and the unauthorized use and exploitation of, cyber systems.

The Secure Freight Initiative is called out specifically as a “comprehensive model for securing the global supply chain that seeks to enhance security while keeping legitimate trade flowing.” The Secure Initiative, it explains, “leverages shipper information, host country government partnerships, and trade partnerships to scan cargo containers bound for the United States.” Nothing further about the Global Trade Exchange or other phases of this Initiative can be found in the Strategy.

Interoperable and Resilient Communications
The Strategy identifies two distinct communications challenges: interoperability and survivability. Interoperability, according to the Strategy requires “compatible equipment, standard operating procedures, planning, mature governance structures, and a collaborative culture that enables all necessary parties to work together seamlessly.” Survivable communications infrastructure requires that the nation’s “communications systems [are] resilient – either able to withstand destructive forces regardless of cause or sufficiently redundant to suffer damage and remain reliable.”

GAO released a statement this week on the SAFE Port Act. The Act covered a range of policies focused on maritime security, but may be best known for its mandate to scan 100% of all incoming maritime cargo. DHS is principally responsible for executing on the Act, but relevant component agencies include the U.S Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the Transportation Security Agency.

GAO delved into this one. They “visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors.” GAO’s recommendations focus on the need to develop strategic plans, better plan the use of DHS human capital, and establish performance measures. The programs addressed in this document can be organized as follows:

Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee (Chairman Jane Harman, D-CA) of House Homeland Security Committee will hold a hearing titled “The Way Forward With Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for Change.”

Date: Thursday, September 27, 1000
Place: 311 Cannon Building
Witnesses:
• Charles Allen - Chief intelligence officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
• Michael Mines - Deputy assistant director, Directorate of Intelligence, FBI
• Eileen Larence - Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
• Todd Masse - Specialist, Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
• John Rollins - Specialist, Terrorism and International Crime, CRS
• Norman Beasley - Coordinator for counter terrorism, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

Fusion Centers started back in 2003 with a good amount of support from DHS, state and local law enforcement, the FBI, and even Congress. Soon after, CQ’s Jeff Stein ran a story on April 25, 2006 about how popular the new Centers are proving to be, called “Local Intelligence ‘Fusion Centers’ Emerge as Major Force”.

At that time about 40 states had established their own “fusion centers,” where local agencies can share and act on criminal and terrorism information with representatives from the FBI and DHS. In August 2005, DHS and the Department of Justice issued guidelines to bring the fusion centers in line with federal practices.

DHS Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charlie Allen would follow these developments with plans to send DHS analysts and officers to one Fusion Center a month over the next two years. Two months later, DHS announced plans to embed their analysts at fusion centers in New York City, Los Angeles, Reistertown, MD, and Baton Rouge.

Today, about 43 Fusion Centers exist. Since 2003, DHS has provided more than $300 million to states and regions to establish these Centers and have assigned only about 15 of its own intel analysts to the Centers. (35 more analysts are to be deployed by year’s end.) A list of state and regional intelligence fusion centers dated March 8 was first published by Secrecy News, and by the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center of the Justice Department in Tallahassee.

According to CQ’s Stein, the popularity of fusion centers reflects state and local disappointment with DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (too many points of contact) and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (too opaque).

But how well are they doing?

The Congressional Research Service issued a withering June 6 report suggesting that little counterterrorism was actually being accomplished by the Fusion Centers. They seemed to be drifting back to their comfort zones: “Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach.” That might be code for “everything and anything.” Its true that connecting dots requires better understanding of the dots and the relationships between them, but do more eyes on the dots necessarily mean better connectivity?

There are those who believe these Centers actually do a little too much work.

At a recent meeting of the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee (a DHS entity populated by private citizens and senior DHS officials), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sent a representative to submit a prepared complaining about FC oversight and management with special focus on the concern that with the added fusion comes an erosion of privacy. The EPIC statement recommends:

• Disclosing the location, jurisdiction, and funding provided for each center.
• Suspending of funds to the centers until a full privacy impact analysis is concluded.
• An inspector general’s investigation to confirm compliance with federal laws about due process, privacy, civil liberties and civil rights.
• Requiring each Fusion Center to publicly name all its federal, state, local and private partners.
• Annual reports from each Fusion Center listing the number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions by category of offense.
• Having any information collected, analyzed or shared with a center comply with the Federal Privacy Act.

Whoa. We’re not already doing this? Chairwoman Harman’s hearing will likely get into these issues, but will more likely focus on performance measures. With both CRS and GAO speaking at the hearing we’ll get some critical details.  But that a local user, Norman Beasley, Coordinator for counter terrorism at the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, will speak means we might here the other side of the story. 

“Homeland Security Achievements and Priorities”
House Committee on Homeland Security
Date: Wednesday, Sept. 5, 10:00 a.m.
Place: 311 Cannon House Office Building
Witnesses:

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff

“The National Applications Office”
House Committee on Homeland Security
Date: Thursday, Sept. 6, 10:00 a.m.
Place: 311 Cannon House Office Building
Witnesses:

Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charlie Allen

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer Daniel Sutherland

Privacy Office Chief Hugo Teufel, III

“A DHS Status Report: Assessing Challenges and Measuring Progress”
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Contact: Michael Alexander - Democratic Staff Director at 202-224-2627
Date: Thursday, Sept. 6, 1:30 p.m. (Originally scheduled for July 31)
Place: 342 Dirksen Bldg.
Witnesses:

David M. Walker - Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office

Paul A. Schneider - Undersecretary of Homeland Security for management

“Immigration Security”
House Judiciary — Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law
Contact: Ur Jaddou - Democratic Counsel at 202-225-3926
Date: Thursday, Sept. 6, 1 p.m.
Place: 2141 Rayburn Bldg.
Agenda: STRIVE Act

The final conference agreement on the 9/11 Bill is now available.  As noted in earlier posts, the 9/11 Bill represents the effort to implement a number of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  This was among the commitments Democratic candidates made while running to take the majority in the Congress last November. 

I’ll continue the series of posts here that analyze selected portions of the Bill, and update those already posted if the final Bill changed those sections.

General Eisenhower is often quoted for having said that, “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”  In a way, that’s the underlying motto to the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, which was mandated by Congress in the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996.  The new 9/11 Bill establishes a similar process for DHS called the “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.” 

The QDR is a “comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the Unites States,” according to the 1996 Act.  That boils down to a four-year strategic assessment of the current threats facing the U.S. and its interests, a top-level strategy for how the Defense Department will address those threats, and a preliminary justification for near- and long-term investments.  DOD has a way of connecting that document with other planning mechanisms, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Unified Command Plan, Strategic Planning Guidance, Transformation Planning Guidance, and Joint Operational Concepts, to name a few.  Imagine if the Department of Homeland Security generated or linked strategies like this.  It might lead to what the Defense Department would call an overarching framework, something that is difficult to pin down in the HLS domain. 

Section 1606 of HR1 establishes the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.  The main purpose according to the legislation is to conduct:

“a comprehensive examination of interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal response assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the homeland security program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the homeland security strategy of the United States and establishing a homeland security program for the 20 years following that examination.” 

That reads a lot like the Military Force Structure Review Act.  It also reflects the insightful analysis offered by a veteran of four QDR’s, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michéle Flournoy.  In her testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee in March, she calls specifically for this.  Her statements is actually entitled “The Quadrennial Defense Review: A Model for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.” 

Now the President and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, Michéle Flournoy suggests a list of commonalities between DHS and DOD that might allow the former to benefit greatly from a so-called QHSR.  She says that both Departments are:

• charged with missions that are vital to the health and welfare of the nation – protecting the American people and our way of life is a mission in which we cannot fail;

• facing persistent and resourceful enemies;

• large, complex bureaucracies comprised of a number of diverse and (in some cases, previously independent) organizations with their own cultures, traditions, and ways of doing business;

• responsible for spending billions of taxpayer dollars as efficiently and effectively as possible;

• perennially in the position of having more programs to pay for than budget; and

• trying to balance near-term demands against long-term investments. 

Hard to argue with that.  The authors of the QHSR will be challenged by a constant pressure to seek reform through reorganization.  This is misplaced energy in large part.  The focus for a QHSR should certainly seek to address the bullets above, but also the important questions of how we clearly define the threat posed by terrorism, as well as natural disasters in the context of securing the homeland; how do we define the capabilities necessary in such a way that we can craft an actionable investment strategy; how do we plan to spread this responsibility more effectively across the Executive Branch agencies; and what is the strategy for engaging allies in the process of defining the threat and our shared interests in defeating it?

The language in the Bill ends by stating that “the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall provide to Congress and make publicly available on the Internet a detailed resource plan specifying the estimated budget and number of staff members that will be required for preparation of the initial quadrennial homeland security review.”  According to the Bill, the first QHSR would commence in 2008, just when the next QDR process begins.

Update 7/25: Turns out the people who worked up the International Supply Chain Security Strategy considered how that plan relates to other existing ones in a way similar to how DOD does so with the QDR as I mentioned above.  This is from the new supply chain strategy document:

To go with the second installation in this series of posts looking into sections of the conference version of HR1, note the provision establishing a second Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.  A posting here in February detailed a then-newly released report of the Homeland Security Advisory Council on the culture at DHS.  Readers will recall that it included a recommendation for creating another Deputy Secretary, but one for “operations.” 

That report made more hay with its comments about a lack of unity among the ranks coinciding with the release of the Federal Human Capital Survey, which placed DHS at the bottom of the list measuring its performance culture.  However, its recommendation for a Deputy Secretary for Operations (DSO) gained enough support in the Congress to find a version of it proposed into law.  Section 1601 of the bill “to provide for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” (read: the 9/11 Bill) creates a second Deputy Secretary for DHS.  This one is charged with a Management portfolio, whereas the HSAC believed a new DepSec was needed to focus on Operations. 

There is a significant difference between these two portfolios.  Title VII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the U/S for Management, described it as being responsible for: 

the management and administration of the Department, including the following:

(1) The budget, appropriations, expenditures of funds, accounting, and finance.

(2) Procurement.

(3) Human resources and personnel.

(4) Information technology and communications systems.

(5) Facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources.

(6) Security for personnel, information technology and communications systems, facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources.

(7) Identification and tracking of performance measures relating to the responsibilities of the Department.

(8) Grants and other assistance management programs.

(9) The transition and reorganization process, to ensure an efficient and orderly transfer of functions and personnel to the Department, including the development of a transition plan.

(10) The conduct of internal audits and management analyses of the programs and activities of the Department.

(11) Any other management duties that the Secretary may designate.

That has to rank among the world’s most difficult jobs.  The language in the 9/11 Bill elevates the current DHS Under Secretary for Management (now Paul Schneider) to a Deputy level that is implicitly junior to the existing Deputy Secretary (now Michael Jackson).  But managing the finances, IT, and facilities just doesn’t seem like the role that needs elevating at DHS.  The HSAC proposed a new DSO for specific reasons having little to do with human resource management.  Their report states: 

The DSO would be responsible for creating and/or championing strategic initiatives that reinforce the assumption that all efforts should be about “the Security of the Homeland” – not about the Department of Homeland Security….

Originally, the report made no mention of the U/S for Management.  I was asked to read a draft of the report and made a few very minor suggestions.  One was to cite the role of Management Under Secretariat in order to clarify its relative role, which would be unchanged and junior to the DSO.  The text: 

This [Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Operations] would also be in a position of continuity to help drive organizational maturation and to reinforce the culture required for the long-term success of DHS and its components. The DSO would be selected from candidates with a strong National Security operations background similar to a Chief Operations Officer…. The DSO would also maintain close coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, whose ultimate role would be reinforced by the DSO’s seniority and Department-wide jurisdiction.…

So what will happen to Section 1601?  There is some saving language that might compensate for actually moving the U/S Management into second in line of succession behind the regular DepSec (Sec. 1601(g)(2)).  HR1 actually changes Sec. 701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to alter the responsibilities of the U/S Management as follows: 

The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management shall serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary on matters related to the management of the Department, including management integration and transformation in support of homeland security operations and programs.

That’s closer to the HSAC’s original intent.  However, the HSAC report also stipulated that this new position should be filled by a careerist, as opposed to a political appointee, in order to instill some continuity and overcome some of the politicized nature of the Department’s image.  The HSAC report went a step further by offering this candid assessment of the workforce challenge facing DHS (in 2006): 

Historically and for reasons of urgency it would appear that much of the decision making within the Department’s headquarters has been made by a core group of trusted appointees. … we recommend immediate efforts be undertaken to … identify, select, formally train and empower Government Service personnel throughout the Headquarters to assume positions for a leadership transition period that should be in effect for at least six months on either side of the November 2008 presidential election.

HR1 offers a second nod to the intent of the HSAC recommendations by imposing (albeit with caveats) a five-year term on the position of Deputy Secretary for Management.  That’s a valuable detail to gain the continuity value, but the responsibilities of this new DepSec could be made more concrete and relevant to the challenge by adding some of the more strategic roles envisioned by the HSAC.  Perhaps something will change in conference.

CQ reported that Senate Republicans agreed to assign conferees to consider HR1, the House bill that implements several of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.  (They were holding out until Democratic leadership dropped their provisions granting certain labor rights to the workforce of airport screeners.  The President also threatened to veto the entire bill if it included these rights for airport screeners.) This post is the first in an occasional series to highlight important sections of HR1 as it undergoes conference proceedings.

Section 1301 of Title XIII is provision recommended earlier this year (see this post) to create an institutional mechanism at DHS charged with promoting HLS capabilities and cooperation overseas.  Creating the Science and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office is an important investment, but one that needs to be revisited in terms of its limited scope and organizational placement.

The bill’s provision offers a half-dozen findings, beginning with these two: 

This is another question for the record Chairman Wu submitted after the March 8 hearing on the DNDO and DHS S&T budgets (previous post here).  His question gets to the heart of how technology and strategy should be required to work together.  He rightly points out that too much emphasis on technology (detectors) at the expense of smart tactics (deployment strategy) results in a waste of money and time, not to mention the introduction of unnecessary vulnerabilities.  In some ways, this issue is central to rationalizing what DHS calls a global nuclear detection architecture.

From the FY 2008 budget request and information I’ve received from DNDO, It seems that deployment of detection technologies is limited to highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of entry with relatively little attention given to intercepting smuggled materials in foreign countries or detecting materials smuggled across more remote borders. Is this an appropriate way to deploy detection technologies? If not, what factors should DNDO consider when determining where to deploy their detectors?

The deployment strategy of detectors and other countermeasures in combating smuggling nuclear weapons may be one of the most important considerations in assessing the DNDO strategy.  However, that the strategy and budget seem to indicate a focus on domestic choke points (i.e. highly trafficked points of entry) is appropriate at this stage for two reasons.  First, efforts to detect or otherwise counter the threat of smuggled nuclear material overseas are mainly conducted by other agencies, although there is an important role for the DNDO.  Second, the DNDO was wise to begin their deployment strategy at major points of entry first given the priority of closing obvious gaps soonest, but they must move forward with a plan to deploy along less populated, and therefore less guarded, sections of the
U.S. border, among other improvements.

The effort to combat smuggled nuclear material is a global one.  Indeed the DNDO was originally named the National Nuclear Defense Office to reflect a broader mission than the one it is perceived to have today.  After working its way through the interagency process, this title lost the word “national,” which was replaced with Domestic, and the word “defense” became detection, in an apparent effort to winnow the mission of this new office.  In practice, this makes some sense since both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense also play a role in this area.  The DHS office was given the detection mission only, but that has since evolved, and for good reason.  Today, the DNDO works very closely with other agencies to develop not only new capabilities, but also the global deployment strategy that reflects and informs the use of detection efforts by all federal agencies including DOE, DOD, and others.

When the DNDO was created in April 2005, the White House placed significant emphasis on deploying detection capabilities quickly and in the most needed places.  This had both positive and negative effects.  The priority on deploying detectors quickly naturally sacrificed quality in the short run.  The “pagers” and first-generation portal monitors (RPMs) suffered from poor selectivity that forced them to signal an alarm when encountering non-threatening materials that naturally contain radiation.  This led to news reports and internal assessments that showed RPMs signaling a “hit” when only ceramic tile or other commercial material was found in an a container or truck hold.  The other major trade-off that resulted from an accelerated deployment schedule was the low sensitivity of the earlier detectors (many of which are still in use).  Low sensitivity leads many detectors to be unable to sense the presence of source material because, ironically, HEU and other elements actually give off very low levels of radiation prior to detonation.  Current research and development underway at DNDO already shows major progress in both selectivity and sensitivity in a variety of settings.

The priority of placing detection capabilities at highly trafficked points of entry reflects a judgment call the DNDO and DHS leadership had to make at the time DNDO stood up and began using its first budget in FY 2005.  Given limited resources, the constraints of a new organization, and an evolving threat, the choice was made to start with the most likely choke points based on traffic patterns (both licit and illicit) and the risk these areas posed to surrounding infrastructure and populations.  Over time, the DNDO plan reflects an intention to contribute to anti-terrorism programs overseas by supporting the DHS-DOE-State Department Secure Freight Initiative and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor.  This is a positive development that also indicates the aggressive progress DNDO is making in the field of nuclear detection.  Future development in DNDO’s deployment strategy certainly includes efforts like Securing the Cities, but also networked detection capabilities in less traveled sections of the border to close those serious gaps you cited.  An important improvement in strategy would include the use of decoys, hidden detectors, and mobile sensors to offset the adversary and increase the deterrent value of our anti-terrorism capabilities.

Three interesting questions for the record followed the March hearing before the House Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation.  They may reflect wider sentiment among those providing oversight of federal efforts to reduce the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons.  I believe they are public now, so here’s the first one from Chairman Wu:

1.   In your opinion, what are the benefits of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Securing the Cities Initiative? Is this type of project likely to be successful in preventing the unlawful transport and detonation of nuclear or radiological devices in the US? Do you believe that the requested funding level of $30 million for FY 2008 is appropriate?

The DNDO’s Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) reflects an investment in an important part of a layered defense.  While efforts to secure sources of nuclear material in troubled areas like the former Soviet states remain critical, in addition to interdiction operations like the Proliferation Security Initiative, efforts like STC help close an important gap in today’s detection mission. 

Because even the most effective global effort to stop illicit movement of dangerous nuclear material will be less than 100% successful, it is wise to consider domestic detection efforts in major cities.  A perpetrator may be able to obtain nuclear material and evade detection overseas, en route, and across the U.S. border, which is known to be porous in parts.  If this occurs, it is likely that intelligence communities will have some warning and be able to provide law enforcement and other authorities with valuable information to aid an apprehension.  An STC effort would greatly help augment intelligence and law enforcement officials by providing added warning and more accurate information about the location of nuclear material.

The scenario of nuclear material smuggled across U.S. borders, while dangerously possible, is perhaps as likely as nuclear material obtained from within the United States for use against a major U.S. city.  Dangerous source material for a dirty bomb can be found in unsecured commercial locations or universities where nuclear material is located for legitimate uses.  If a perpetrator steals this material, STC capabilities provide a better ability to locate and isolate the material.

Whether or not STC will be successful is difficult to say at this stage, but some precedence already exists that indicates such an effort could indeed be effective.  The Department of Defense (DOD) already deploys their own version of STC focused exclusively on protecting bases within the U.S.  Detectors are in place surrounding the bases to detect a potential nuclear threat in vicinity of the base.  Ongoing R&D for these programs is focused on increasing the ability to detect source material moving at greater speeds along public roads that lead to these bases.  The potential for cooperation between DNDO and DOD should be pursued for mutual benefit.

Lastly, DNDO’s budget request for STC deserves attention.  The nation’s investment in STC should reflect a commitment to thinking creatively and responsibly about the threat of nuclear terrorism in America’s cities.  The nearly $11 billion to be spent on missile defense this next year places the STC budget in perspective.  With an overall DNDO budget of approximately $550 million, dedicating $30 million to Securing the Cities seems appropriate.  At this early stage, a healthier investment like this would help identify more promising routes to success while weeding out potential dead-ends.  STC is equal parts R&D and strategy.  These early months will require a dedication of brain power that must be hired as well.

Whatever the fate of this war supplemental, it is hard to accept the argument that all of the domestic spending included is out-of-scope.  The House-Senate agreement (HR 1591) provides about $2.25 billion in funds directed at homeland security needs.  The original request included zero homeland dollars. Below is a comparison chart provided by CQ Homeland Security that the Congress released showing the breakdown of funds.

Congressional comparison chart of Emergency Supp

Among the highlights:

• $978 million for aviation security
• $458.5 million for border and container security
• $652.5 million for security grants to ports, transit systems and states.
• $115 million for the Secure Freight Initiative and SAFE Ports Act. 
• $325 million for rail and transit security
• $223.5 million the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to acquire and deploy a fleet of next generation Radiation Portal Monitors.

I’m in Berlin for the next few days courtesy Aspen Institute.  In the meantime, please offer your thoughts on the war supplemental. 

Congressman David Wu, chairman of the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, convened a hearing today on funding for homeland security R&D.  Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Vayl Oxford testified, along with Admiral Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology at DHS.  I testified on the role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the applicability of risk assessments, and other items.  Jerry Epstein, Senior Fellow at CSIS, testified on the Department’s biosecurity investments.  And, from a first responder-as-user perspective, Marilyn Ward of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council testified.

Fortunately, the hearing avoided the non-starter subject of whether DNDO should be consolidated into the S&T Directorate.  The whole reason it is separate is due the special nature of nuclear terrorism and nuc detection R&D.  The hearing focused instead on the importance of strategic level judgments about how to balance near-term needs to deploy technology solutions to the challenges of securing the homeland with long-term commitments to R&D that can lead to major leaps in capability down the road.

My statement focused on the nuclear challenge from a non-physicist perspective by introducing a different view of success factors for the DNDO, and the public sector in general.  There’s a certain amount of attention given to the use of a broader framework for gauging value in R&D investments in there, too, that makes use of an IBM model — Global Movement Management – developed originally by Scott Gould and Christian Beckner.  Full disclosure: I’m now on that project to generate the 2.0 iteration.  I’d welcome any reactions to my testimony, and you can view the statements offered by the other expert witnesses by clicking below.

Vayl Oxford testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Admiral Cohen testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Dr. Epstein testimont for 3-8-07 hearing

Ms. Ward’s testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Czerwinski testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Update 3/11/07: GovExec’s Winter Casey covered the hearing in this story.

This month the Congressional Research Service issued a new report on the concept of “risk” in Homeland Security.  The importance of assessing, mitigating, and otherwise calculating risk in the effort to protect the homeland is easy to appreciate.  But claw back the terminology and talking points, and it becomes less clear just how risk can be assessed – much less calculated – when it comes to the evolving threats of terrorism.  Terrorism offers neither the trend lines nor the depth of historical data (thank goodness) needed to design a reliable methodology that risk assessment demands in other cases, such as hurricanes or car accidents.   

Does that mean it’s a useless tool?  Secretary Chertoff brought a welcomed new rationale to homeland security investments when he was nominated by suggesting that politics needn’t drive the way we protect vulnerable components of the country.  He argued that HLS leadership should “base its work on priorities driven by risk.”  Eventually adopting a phrase coined by the HSAC WME Task Force, he began suggesting that DHS efforts should “buy down the risk:”  Investments, in other words, should be targeted in ways that bring about the greatest possible return by gauging the likelihood and potential severity of terrorist threats to the homeland.  According to CRS, that’s easier said than done.  While this may have occurred to many of us during the years since Secretary Chertoff first committed the Department to this rationale, few have been able to bring this kind of clarity to the real challenges of applying risk to protecting against (or actively combating) terrorism.

While this new study draws attention to the important issue of how to apply the nearly $12 billion spent under the federal Homeland Security Grant Program, its worth considering how risk assessments may be used (or eventually required) for determining other HLS investments.  For example, look for renewed attention by Congress on WMD-related initiatives.  Long-lead items such as research and development for better defenses against bio- or nuclear terrorism involve significant uncertainty because scientific research may lead to dead-ends before arriving at a new solution.  It will be important for Congress to consider how risk assessments could determine if WMD attacks are deemed sufficiently likely to warrant the level of commitment called for in some of these areas (see post from 2/6/07).  I’ll dedicate another post soon to this important question.  In the meantime, the CRS study is entitled “The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress,” and can be found here. 

Consider this a placeholder post today.   I’ll take on a piece at a time of the newly released DHS budget in an effort to highlight selected sections and provide background details.  Some of the budget lines will face very little scrutiny in the Congress and the press.  Areas likely to get a lot of attention include the S&T budgets and technology acquisitions, monies directed toward mass transit security, and funds for some newly created offices or initiatives, among other things, that we can discuss here soon. 

Naturally, the budget calls for steep increases for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, reflecting a sense of urgency, demonstrated progress, and distance to the goal line.  The following is a selection of highlights from this fact sheet about the FY08 DHS budget focused on combating the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons: 

FINAL NOTE: I’m slated to testify before a subcommittee of the House Science Committee in March on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.  More details to come about that and other related Congressional oversight efforts.  I’ll be sure to post the testimony here.

When Christian Beckner unplugged from Homeland Security Watch, which he created and led, he called on some of us to maintain the blog. His are big shoes to fill. My name is Jonah Czerwinski and I will be one of the many required to pick up where Christian left off. More about my background will follow shortly. In the meantime, on with the Watch:

House Homeland Chairman Outlines Committee Priorities

During a luncheon discussion today Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, offered a glimpse of what will populate his Committee’s agenda for the 110^th. Jointly hosted by the Homeland Security Policy Institute and The Aspen Institute , the luncheon was an opportunity for Chairman Thompson to introduce what he calls a “Real Deal for Homeland Security.” His prepared remarks can now be found on the Committee website, but there are some points he highlighted – and even added – during his delivery before a few dozen HLS wonks:

Mass transit. Chairman Thompson said to look for legislation next month aimed at strengthening mass transit security. In his remarks, he listed a few demands that legislation will likely include: vulnerability assessments, information sharing measures, and security training programs, among others.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represent a failure that should never be repeated, he said, but they also revealed equities that need better Congressional support. He called out the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard for special attention and suggested the two need better federal support. The USCG Deepwater Project must be fully funded. That was not in the prepared remarks.

FEMA reorganization is unfinished. Chairman Thompson characterized efforts to reorient FEMA as insufficient. The audience was given the impression that current plans fall short of a solution to prevent the kind of under-performance witnessed in the Gulf Coast.

Other aspects of the Department are due for “aggressive oversight.” The Chairman identified both the DHS Management and S&T Directorates as needing scrutiny in three areas: leadership, mission, and accounting. Both the House Homeland Security and House Science Committees are preparing for a hearing on S&T after the President’s budget is released next month.

The Chairman called out Biowatch by name. This is the program that deploys detectors to provide early warning of an intentionally introduced pathogen. According to today’s remarks, Biowatch can expect renewed scrutiny.

While it was not in his prepared remarks, Chairman Thomson pointed out during his comments the lack of screening for air cargo and suggested that his Committee would seek measures aimed providing some kind of visibility into the contents of cargo placed on passenger planes. He also noted that sea-borne cargo (“anything entering our ports”) must be subject to better screening. It was unclear if his call for transparency was intended to support 100% radiography screening of shipping container bound for the U.S. His prepared speech made no mention of ports or screening.

DHS contracting accountability made the list. The Chairman named both the Secure Border Initiative (SBI Net) and US-VISIT as likely targets of oversight. He directly questioned the use of a “border fence” to manage immigration and security needs.

“Secure Borders, Open Doors” Makes Progress, Sets Goals, Requests Input

That leads into another message today that Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, circulated through an email to outline measures intended to improve visa processing under the joint State Department-DHS “Secure Borders, Open Doors” policy. Her message as I received it today (bold emphasis added, immaterial language snipped):

January 29, 2007

SUBJECT: A Message from Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, regarding Improvements to U.S. Visa Processing

The United States is one of the most open and engaged societies on Earth, maintaining vibrant family, commercial and educational links