• 1995: Sarin gas is released by members of Aum Shinrkyo on several lines of the Tokyo Metro that were passing through key areas of the Japanese government, killing 13 people and injuring countless others.

• 1995: Over a period of four months, several gas bottles exploded on the RER and the Metro in Paris, killing  8 and wounding more than 100 people. The attacks were attributed to the Armed Islamic Group.

• 2004: In February, a suicide bomber killed 41 people and injured more than 120 in an explosion on the Moscow metro system.   Individuals linked to the militant Nikolai Kipkeyev were found guilty.  In August, Kipkeyev died when a female suicide bomber he was escorting into a Moscow subway panicked upon seeing a police officer and detonated her bomb, killing 8 people and wounding 50 others.

• 2004: A series of coordinated bombings take place on Madrid’s Cercanias commuter train, killing 191 people and wounding 1800 others.  A direct connection to Al Qaeda is not found, though Spanish authorities determine that the attacks were done by by an Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell.

• 2005: A series of coordinated suicide attacks occur on London’s mass transit system, carried out by four British Muslim men, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700.

• 2006:  Seven bombs explode on the Suburban Railway in Mumbai, killing 209 and injuring more than 700.  The bombings were believed to be carried out by Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Students Islamic Movement of India.

• 2009: Najibullah Zazi is arrested in Denver for planning suicide bombings on the New York City subway system.  On February 22, 2010 he pled guilty and admitted that he was recruited by Al-Qaeda in Pakistan to blow up the New York City subway.

So who is responsible for coordinating the U.S. rail and subway security systems here in the U.S.?  The Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  Not only must TSA focus on aviation security (without an Administrator in place), it must also focus on mass transit and passenger rail security.  According to the TSA’s website, it does so by seeking to:

advance mass transit and passenger rail security through a comprehensive strategic approach that enhances capabilities to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist attacks and respond to and recover from attacks and security incidents, should they occur. TSA’s strategic priorities for mass transit and passenger rail security are:

* Focus efforts to mitigate high consequence risk to transit assets and systems, particularly underwater and underground infrastructure;

* Expand employment of random, unpredictable deterrence; and

* Build security force multipliers with training, drills and exercises, and public awareness

According to the FY 2011 DHS Budget Request, TSA is undertaking the following activities to secure mass transit, passenger rail, and bus:

• shareholder collaboration with key stakeholders through its Regional Transit Security Working Group, which identifies regional priorities and resolves security needs.  Much of TSA’s regional work is focused on Tier 1 Transit Security Grant Program cities, including New York City, Boston, D.C., Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
• working with the American Public Transportation Association to develop consensus-based security standards for mass transit.
• engaging in its “layered security operational test bed” to test operational and technological solutions for mass transit and passenger rail facilities.

In FY 2011, TSA requested $97.6 million to support its Surface Transportation Inspection Program and explosive detection canine program, a $29.4 million increase from FY 2010.

In terms of funding support for local mass transit areas, the Transportation Security Grant Program has requested $300 million for FY 2011. This money is allocated on a risk-based approach to eligible mass transit and bus systems, as well as to Amtrak, to enhance security measures on critical transit infrastructure.  Guidelines for the distribution of these funds are given in the DHS Appropriations bills, as well as in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

So how well is TSA doing on its efforts to better secure rail and and subway systems?  In a report entitled Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs released last June, the Government Accountability Office commended TSA for taking key steps to strengthen the systems.  At the same time, it noted that TSA faced a number of challenges hindering its success. Specifically, GAO found that TSA had not fully combined its assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence to conduct its risk assessments.  The GAO also noted that TSA faced a number of coordination challenges- both with industry and other agencies at the state, local, and federal levels.  Information sharing of security information remained a challenge, as did concerns regarding “potential costs and the feasibility of implementing pending employee security training requirements.”

The need to strengthen the federal relationships with transit agency officials across the country is one that also appeared in another June 2009 GAO report entitled, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened. In the report, the GAO noted that management and resource issues have resulted in delays in approving projects and distributing funds. According to the report, as of February 2009, transit agencies having spent only $21 million of the $755 million that had been awarded between 2006 and 2008.  To correct the shortcomings, GAO recommended that DHS strengthen its methodology for determining risk by developing a “cost-effective method for incorporating vulnerability information into future iterations of the” Transportation Security Grant Program.

It is safe to say that like much of TSA’s efforts on aviation security, its mass transit and passenger rail efforts remain a work in progress – showing some movement forward and continually evolving but in need of improvement.  Unfortunately, like our efforts in aviation security, many efforts remain reactionary in nature.  After the bombing in Moscow, a number of transit agencies across the nation beefed up their security, assigning more police, increasing K-9 teams, and conducting random station sweeps.  During those efforts, vulnerabilities were uncovered. For example, in New York City, the Associated Press reported that more than 4,000 security cameras in its subways were not working and that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority had cut the number of police patrols throughout its systems.

While the U.S. has been fortunate to not have seen a successful attack carried out on a domestic mass transit and passenger rail system, its efforts to secure such systems should be prioritized and expanded.  In particular, an increased focus on risk-based grants, information sharing of key intelligence with relevant stakeholders, and identifying and deploying preventive technologies are key to strengthening our mass transit and passenger rail systems.

This morning we have much more information.  There have been seven, and probably more,  fatalities and scores of  injuries. It is entirely too early to identify a cause, but signal system failure or operator error are the top suspects.  The operator of the colliding train is among the dead.

The dramatic scene of crumpled cars will keep the story near the top of this morning’s television news.  DC commuters have a tough day ahead. 

Consider how different the tone and scope of reporting — and our response – might be, if the text message had read something like, “Metro reports an explosion on a red line train.  Metro reports massive injuries at this time. The green line and the red line are affected. Further information to follow.”

Even if the fatalities and injuries had been fewer and the visual images no more dramatic,  for most of us the emotional reaction would be  much more agitated if the cause had been a terrorist attack.

Is the difference in response appropriate?   Is the difference unavoidable?  Are our very different responses helpful?

From an ethical or moral perspective the outrage we feel in response to a terrorist attack is appropriate.   The dehumanization that empowers such an attack is worthy of anger and more.

Some neuroscientists argue that the difference we feel depending on the natural, accidental, or intentional origin of an event is innate.  The brain’s amygdala reacts with fear and/or outrage, long before the prefrontal cortex begins to “think” about the event.

But when we do begin thinking, how we respond to accident or intention continues to be very different.

Today most of us — especially regular Metro riders — will discount the risk of recurrence.  We will, without much emotion, read the news reports and be interested in the eventual NTSB findings.  Unless there is credible evidence of gross negligence or a cover-up (which would stimulate outrage) our more analytic tendencies will define our response.  We will wait for evidence to inform how technology, hiring, training, and other systems might be improved. 

In response to an accident we value deliberation.  We approach the situation with a largely detached sense of our innate limitations, but with hope and faith in learning what we can to reduce the likelihood of a similar accident in the future.  We recognize that human judgment is involved in and responsible for the system.  But unless there is evidence of evil intention or gross negligence, we focus on the system more than the individuals.  This is even true when operator error is the principal culprit.  We seek to design and build systems that discourage operator error.

In case of an accident rather than blaming and punishing, we usually — most of us — focus on learning and improving.  Accidents will happen.  We look to systematically minimize accident potential and build a resilient system.

In the aftermath of a terrorist event the emphasis is flipped.  We tend to focus mostly on blaming and punishing.  Learning and improving the system can easily get lost in the outrage.

Human evil — banal or purposeful — is outrageous.  There is no value in suppressing the sharp alarm that responds to evil intention.  But outrage is insufficient and not well-suited for long-term strategic action.

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Within these programs, Tier 2, 3, or 4 transit systems and ports will have to compete for their allocations from smaller fixed pools of funds. This could lead to cities that were likely on the borderline between Tier 1 and Tier 2 having lower levels of grant funding in 2007, e.g. Seattle’s transit system and the Ports of Baltimore and Charleston.

DHS deserves strong kudos for releasing this document in January, relatively early in fiscal year 2007. By comparison, in FY 2006 this document was not released until the very last week of the fiscal year, a delay that was detrimental to the ability of these transportation systems to manage security activities. Hopefully this is a sign of an better-managed grants process at DHS.

I’ll add a link to the transcript of the press conference announcing these grants when it becomes available.

Update (1/10): The transcript of the press conference is available here. And detailed guidance documents on the port security and transit security grant programs are available here.

The proposed rule is part of a package of new security measures that will require freight rail carriers to ensure 100 percent positive hand-off of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials, establish security protocols for custody transfers of TIH rail cars in the high threat urban areas, and appoint a rail security coordinator to share information with the federal government, as well as formalizing the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) freight and passenger rail inspection authority.

This AP story and this NYT piece discuss the draft regs and offer some initial reactions to them from Capitol Hill.

At first glance, the portions of the NPRM that deal with hazardous materials on freight rail look solid; this is a high-risk segment of the broader rail environment, and safeguards on the security and chain of custody of hazmat rail cars is needed, going beyond what has generally been a relatively solid effort to date by the freight rail industry. But the NPRM essentially punts the ball on the topic of passenger rail, beyond establishing some vague reporting requirements. While it’s true that passenger rail security is inherently difficult in comparison with aviation security, given the open nature of rail and transit systems, I would have expected more of a discussion of these passenger issues in the regs.

This executive order comes only weeks before the start of the 110th Congress, during which the new Democratic leadership plans to prioritize rail and transit security legislation. This executive order seems like an attempt to pre-empt these efforts, and incoming House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson described this executive order in a press release as a “smokescreen.”

I have a similar reaction reading the executive order, which essentially admits that this issue has been ignored over the past five years. Why didn’t DHS develop a strategic plan for rail, transit, and trucking security two, or three, or four years ago? Why does it take this political sea-change to serve as a forcing action? While there are certainly limits to what can be done effectively to secure these modes of transport, there is definitely more that needs to be done, and hopefully we’ll see progress in these modes in the coming year.

You can read all of my posts on ground transport security issues over the past year in this topic thread.

• Ports with extensive petrochemical assets, primarily along the Gulf Coast, made out very well in the allocations. The eight ports in Texas and Louisiana received funding totaling $57.7 million – approx. 1/3rd of the total allocation.
• New York’s funding increased sharply, from $6.6 million in FY 2005 to $25.7 million in FY 2006 – not surprising given the fallout from the general grant allocations in June.
• Ports in California made out poorly in the allocations. LA/Long Beach’s funding was halved from $24 million to $12 million, and other major ports – Oakland, San Diego – received little or no funding (a fact not lost on the Contra Costa Times).
• Chicago, somewhat surprisingly, received a large allocation of $11.5 million, after have received less than $2 million in all previous rounds of port security grants combined.

A likely general explanation for these decisions, I would expect, is that certain ports (e.g. LA / Long Beach) have already made extensive investments in security, and DHS is spreading funds to a second tier of ports who have not received funding in previous rounds and are insufficiently protected by comparison and have higher “need” scores.

Two suitcases containing bombs and found on trains in Germany were likely to have formed part of a terrorist plot, German investigators said Friday.

The bombs were found in the German cities of Dortmund and Koblenz on July 31 with German Criminal Police Office (BKA) chief Jörg Ziercke saying that were arranged to explode simultaneously at 2:30 p.m. Neither of the bombs was detonated.

“It’s more likely than unlikely that there was a terrorist background,” Ziercke told a news conference in Wiesbaden. If the around 25-kilo (55-lb.) suitcase bombs had exploded they would have lead to “a fireball” in the train carriages and an “indeterminate number of injured and possible deaths,” he said.

Speaking in Berlin Friday, German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble also warned that Germany should brace itself for similar attempts. “Unfortunately, we must assume that the danger of a repeat of these attempted attacks.”

The recent plot that this most resembles is the Madrid bombings, which were also targeted at regional commuter trains, and detonated with near-simultaneity. German authorities released pictures of men that they believe were connected to the plot, taken from video surveillance of train stations – another proof point for the value of this technology. Coverage of the story in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (in German) notes that a menu from a restaurant in Lebanon was found near one of the bombs, a potential hint (or deliberate false lead?) about the origin of the plot.

Update (8/19): One of the suspects has been arrested.

The train arrived at the next station, and the two of them got off and he waved the radiation detection over him again out on the platform. The passenger got back on the train, and the officer left the car – there was some kind of medical emergency elsewhere on the train – and that was it. End of incident.

As far as I could tell, the officer never resolved why the radiation detector was going off near the guy. And he did not ever ask the man his name, or take down any other personal information.

Is this the right way to deal for Metro officials to deal with incidents such as this? Wouldn’t a better response have been to stay with the guy until this was resolved, and take down his personal information – and if necessary, send an FBI agent out to his primary residence to see if there were any abnormal readings of radiation?

There’s at least a 99% chance that this was unconnected to any malicious threat. But in spite of those odds, I don’t think it was right to simply let this pass without taking further action (at the very least getting his name). And not only for terror-related reasons, but also for public safety purposes – perhaps the guy was being exposed at home or elsewhere, without his knowledge, to some dangerous source of radiation.

So what’s the story? How often do these ‘detections’ occur on the Metro? (I’ve traveled on the metro at least a thousand times in the last few years, and have never witnessed an incident like this before). What’s the policy to deal with them? Was this response within that policy?

For more information, check out the Counterterrorism Blog, this local Mumbai blog, and updated coverage on the websites of The Hindu and The Times of India.