Homeland Security Watch

DHS concluded Ardent Sentry – Northern Edge, a full scale exercise testing DOD, state/local, and interagency responses to a range of scenarios to stress test capacity and knowledge of NIMS, the NRP, etc.  Even the Canadians are involved. 

AS/NE introduced an interesting new role that reflects progress from the post-Katrina position to consider turning to the Pentagon as lead federal agency too quickly.  The “Defense Coordinating Officer” (DCO) debuted to coordinate information and requests between FEMA and the Department of Defense.  Apparently it worked so well that DCOs will be assigned to each of FEMA’s 10 regions.  It probably helps that even before Katrina the Homeland Defense team at DOD was steadily writing up “prescripted requests for assistance” to anticipate the kinds of state and local needs that might arise in any of the 15 national planning scenarios. 

But I digress.  The Ardent Sentry-Northern Edge war game kicked off a five-year schedule of national level exercises.  It began with FEMA Regions I and II dealing with hurricanes from New York to Maine.  Region X’s (Alaska) scenario even involved terrorist threats to energy infrastructure.  FEMA Region V got the real deal with managing response mechanisms and practices following the fictitious detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear device in Indianapolis.

I’m traveling until Memorial Day.

A few months ago, the White House quietly issued a classified joint Homeland Security Presidential Directive / National Security Presidential Directive - HSPD-16/NSPD-47 - and has not released its contents. The San Francisco Chronicle ran a story about the directive in mid-August, noting that it contained the following contents:

The order, confirmed to The Chronicle by officials with knowledge of its contents, focuses on threats to aircraft from passenger baggage and air cargo — including detection of conventional, nuclear, radiological, and chemical devices — securing the airspace over the continental United States, and developing technologies to detect and prevent missile attacks on aircraft.

The directive, known as both National Security Presidential Directive 47 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16, also orders the agencies to implement a plan to check airline passenger lists against the government’s watch lists and to assume the costs of conducting the database searches. The cost of checking passenger lists currently falls to the airlines.

Recently a notice appeared in the Federal Register that is the first government confirmation of HSPD-16/NSPD-47 that I’ve seen. The notice describes a new Plan for the Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic, which cleary defines DOD, DOT, and DHS roles in the event of an emergency airspace incident, and establishes a “ESCAT Air Traffic Priority List (EATPL)” which serves as an order of priority for use and entry into U.S. airspace in the event of the activation of this plan.

This EATPL seems a bit out of balance to me, putting state and local law enforcement and first response activities near the end of the air traffic priority list, after a long list of military air assets. In a scenario where an attack has taking place and out-of-region emergency services are needed, it seems as if this priority list create a risk that state and local response assets would be stuck at the back of the queue, behind military assets who may be necessary to secure airspace and facilitate continuity of government, but who aren’t going to save any civilian lives. Hopefully this is an issue that is being discussed between DHS and DOD; otherwise this could lead to of the same command-and-control response breakdowns that we saw in the response to Hurricane Katrina.

The New York Times reported over the weekend on the National Guard deployments to the U.S.-Mexico border, leaving an open question as to whether they are making an impact at the border:

The border may have a reputation for drama, intrigue and danger, but Specialist James Dwiggins of the Wisconsin National Guard has not seen much of that in the reception booth of the Border Patrol station here, where he works answering phones and sliding a clipboard for visitors to sign in.

From a camera room at the station, Specialist Kirsten Schultz of the Wisconsin Guard has seen a lot of people crossing the border. Out in the field, Specialist David Murray of the Virginia National Guard stares out at the loping hills lining the border, waiting and watching.

“I don’t see that we are having an impact,” said Specialist Murray, camped on a rainy afternoon at an observation point covered in camouflage netting with three other soldiers. “But every time the Border Patrol comes up, they tell us movement of people has almost completely stopped through here.”

For the National Guard troops sent here, many of the tasks in the border mission may seem humdrum, but the Border Patrol, eager for any help it can get, has claimed some early success as the operation moves into full swing.

The article later notes that only 3,000 of 6,600 people are “forward-deployed”, with the rest performing administrative tasks or being trained. And it answers my earlier question about where these folks would be housed:

…unlike normal deployments, the soldiers, at least for now, are largely camped in motels and hotels, ranging from the highly rated Loews Ventana Canyon resort near Tucson to the more modest Americana hotel in this city’s gritty downtown.

This is good news for hoteliers in Tucson, Yuma, Laredo, etc., but a bad deal for everyone else. Say an average hotel room costs $75/night for the people deployed. For 6,600 people @ 365 days/year, we’re talking about $180.7 million/year for hotel costs alone. Is this really the best way to spend money on border security…to say nothing of broader homeland security funding needs? (cf. the $93 million cut in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s budget request.) The National Guard members who have been deployed to our border are doing a fine job at the task that they’ve been given, but with the exception of the construction teams, I still question the security value of this deployment.

Vanity Fair has a new story online today that provide a detailed chronology of the morning of 9/11 from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), the East Coast regional HQ for NORAD. The author of the story received 30 hours of audio files from the operations floor at NEADS, which serve as the basis for the piece. The tapes tell a story of mass confusion on the day of 9/11, with multiple contradictory pieces of evidence about hijackings lasting all day. And while F-15 fighters were finally in place over DC after AA 77 hit the Pentagon, they were not authorized to shoot down UA 93 until after it had already crashed in Shanksville, PA, in large part because the FAA did not notify NORAD about UA 93 for 35 minutes. This belies the commonly-accepted wisdom about this decision:

In his bunker under the White House, Vice President Cheney was not notified about United 93 until 10:02—only one minute before the airliner impacted the ground. Yet it was with dark bravado that the vice president and others in the Bush administration would later recount sober deliberations about the prospect of shooting down United 93. “Very, very tough decision, and the president understood the magnitude of that decision,” Bush’s then chief of staff, Andrew Card, told ABC News.

Cheney echoed, “The significance of saying to a pilot that you are authorized to shoot down a plane full of Americans is, a, you know, it’s an order that had never been given before.” And it wasn’t on 9/11, either.

President Bush would finally grant commanders the authority to give that order at 10:18, which—though no one knew it at the time—was 15 minutes after the attack was over.

The story also focuses on an initial false presentation of this narrative by military commanders before an early hearing of the 9/11 Commission, which led the commission to bring back top commanders for a second hearing to try to get the story straight. The Commission eventually decided to refer this matter to the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, and as noted in a story in the Washington Post today, these investigations have been completed and should be publicized soon. The Post story indicates lasting vexation among Commission members and staff at the initial timeline provided by officials:

“We to this day don’t know why NORAD [the North American Aerospace Command] told us what they told us,” said Thomas H. Kean, the former New Jersey Republican governor who led the commission. “It was just so far from the truth. . . . It’s one of those loose ends that never got tied.”

Hopefully these IG reports will finally clear this matter up, and if there was any deliberate effort to mislead or conceal information, then those people should be punished severely. Anything that gives new ammunition to delusional 9/11 conspiracy theorists weakens the essential base of public support that the United States needs if it is going to successfully wage the war on terror. For that reason, it’s essential that there be zero tolerance in the government for actions that shade or distort the truth about 9/11.

CSIS released a report last week entitled “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves”. Chapter 5 of the report focuses on the Guard’s homeland defense and civil support roles. It provides a very useful summary of the debate over the past five years on the role of the National Guard for homeland defense and civil support, noting a recurring reluctance to fully embrace these missions:

Despite the fact that DoD is the only federal department that has substantial capabilities to respond to catastrophic or multiple, simultaneous events, the military has not organized, trained, or equipped its active or reserve forces to reflect civil support as a priority mission. Instead, much of the time since 9/11 has been spent debating how many simultaneous events DoD should plan for. Clearly a single event is unrealistic, given that al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to plan and execute multiple, simultaneous attacks, but those in DoD who fear civil support could become a force structure driver in a tight fiscal environment opposed basing planning on anything more than a modest number of events.

…and discussing the Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina:

Hurricane Katrina highlighted the practical implications of DoD’s limited approach to civil support missions. Although “the Department of Defense response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest deployment of military forces for a civil support mission in our nation’s history,” and both active and reserve military forces saved thousands of lives and essentially salvaged a desperate situation, the experience showed just how far the U.S. government and military have to go in terms of being prepared to provide civil support. During the Katrina response, it was clear that many involved at the federal, state, and local level were working with the military in a civil support context for the first time. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DoD used a 21-step process to place and approve requests for assistance. The two agencies did not even agree on the terms for such interactions – FEMA called them “mission assignments” and DoD called them “requests for assistance,” reflecting DoD’s reluctance to take assignments from another federal agency.

….The Katrina response highlighted that, as currently organized, DoD and the interagency more broadly, lack a substantial capability to assess support requirements, assign forces effectively to meet those requirements, track which forces are performing what tasks in which areas, or provide a structured and orderly process to flow military capabilities rapidly to the areas that need them most. The response to Hurricane Katrina was essentially a “pick-up game,” albeit it one that highlighted the ability of the U.S. military to respond reasonably effectively from a standing start.

Given this response, the authors of the report worry about how well DOD would respond in an event that exceeded Katrina, i.e. certain types of CBRN attacks.

The second half of the chapter offers a set of recommendations:

• The Department of Defense should recognize civil support, particularly in response to a catastrophic event, as a central mission for which it must plan, program and budget;
• At a minimum, the Department of Defense should resource and organize the National Guard to serve as the backbone for ten regional Civil Support Forces that would be responsible for regional planning, training, and exercising and would be able to deploy initial response forces rapidly to the scene of an event.
• The Department of Defense should nominate a National Guard general officer to serve as Deputy Commander at NORTHCOM.
• Designate the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters concerning the role of the National Guard in homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support missions.
• Revise the charter for the NGB to recognize its role as the joint force manager for the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support.

That’s just the homeland defense & civil support chapter; the rest of the report provides an important and insightful look at the state of the National Guard. The report deserves more media attention than it’s received to date.

Reuters reports today on comments by Donald Rumsfeld regarding the possibility of deploying U.S. troops in support of the border security mission on the U.S.-Mexico border:

The Pentagon has begun exploring options for the potential use of troops and equipment to help secure the U.S. border with Mexico, where hundreds of thousands of migrants enter the country illegally each year, a defense official said on Friday.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld discussed border issues at the Pentagon with his Mexican counterpart, Defense Minister Gen. Gerardo Clemente Ricardo Vega. Mexico and the United States share a 2,000-mile border….

A defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue, said the Defense Department is exploring options for possible use of troops or military assets to help with border security.

I’m skeptical of this idea at first impression, primarily because I think it would be expensive and have a low return-on-investment compared with other funding options for border security. What we don’t need is more people “stuffing the line” - the incremental value of more manpower, all by itself, is a linear function, and is likely to only make a modest dent in the flow. Instead, what we need for border security are force multipliers, in the form of technology investments and/or a border fence (depending on geography, terrain, and migration patterns).

Sec. Chertoff and Sec. Rumsfeld sent a joint memorandum to President Bush two weeks ago, one which puts forth a common set of principles that the define conditions under which either DOD or DHS should lead the response to a catastrophic event. The memorandum defines the six “key facts and circumstances for consideration in making an assessment,” as listed below:

• The status of the State and local response. How effective is the initial State and local response, including the use of the affected State’s or States’ National Guard? Have first responders been overwhelmed by the incident? What is the availability of National Guard assistance from other states?
• Intergovernmental relations. What is the nature of the relationship, skill, and trust among the leadership of the Federal, State (or States), and local governments in the affected jurisdictions?
• Implementation of the National Response Plan. Has the Governor of the affected State requested Federal assistance or, in the absence of a request, have you invoked applicable Federal authorities to initiate a Federal response?
• The status of the Federal civilian response. Do available Federal civilian responders, with their contracted support, have the necessary capabilities to deal effectively with the incident? Are they, in fact, dealing effectively with the incident? What are the recommendations of the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense?
• The involvement of active duty U.S. military forces. Have U.S. military forces – Active, National Guard, and Reserve – been requested by the Governor of the affected State? Is the magnitude of the incident so great that the logistical, transportation, search and rescue, communications, or CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) capabilities of DoD are deemed to be essential to an effective response?
• Military-to-military and military-to-civilian relations. What is the nature of the relationships among the U.S. military – Active, National Guard, and Reserve – and the Adjutant General and the Governor of the affected State?

These all seem appropriate, but they still leave a lot of room for subjectivity in this decision-making process. I’d like to know more about which specific types of scenarios would require DOD to take the lead role in response.

The journal Homeland Security Affairs has a new issue now online, which contains several interesting articles, including one on the subject of teaching homeland security that I’ll write about later in the week.

One article that I found very valuable in the new issue was “‘Who’s in Charge?’ New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security,” by Lt. Col. Thomas Goss. Goss surveys efforts by DOD, DHS, and DOJ to clarify the distinction between “homeland defense” and “homeland security” and developing a means to address issues that fall at the “seam” between the two areas:

In the middle is a “seam” of ambiguity, where threats are neither clearly national security threats (requiring a military [DOD] response capability) nor clearly law enforcement threats (requiring a non-military response capability from the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], the Department of Justice [DOJ], or other agency). Along this “seam” are threats such as transnational terrorist groups who challenge the delineation of responsibility between DOD and DHS, DOJ, or other agencies, because it is difficult to label them as either a national security threat or a law enforcement threat. Determining whether a particular adversary is one or the other will depend on the circumstances at the time and who is most capable to lead the nation’s efforts. Because of the nature of this spectrum, a coordinated, integrated, and coherent national effort is essential in securing the U.S. against all threats.

Goss offers up maritime security as a prototypical “seam” issue, one where the boundary between state-centric threats and criminal threats is ambiguous and unclear. He discusses the organizational, legal, and contextual variables that determine whether DOD or DHS would be a lead agency in a given scenario, and he concludes by surveying DOD’s responsibilities within homeland defense. Overall, an interesting piece that helps to clarifythe often-fuzzy distinction between homeland security and homeland defense.

Jim Carafano at the Heritage Foundation has published a memorandum this week entitled “America Needs a Security Strategy for Safer Skies” which makes the case that the United States needs an “air security strategy,” similar to the same way that HSPD-13 led to the development of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. This concept of “air security” includes but is broader than aviation security; it also encompasses airspace protection and control, and missile defense.

Carafano argues that the strategy should address five key priorities:

• Passenger screening
• Shoulder-fired missile (MANPAD) threats
• Domestic air security investment
• Theater cruise and missile defense
• A reasonable role for the private sector

I agree strongly that it makes sense for the federal government to develop a “national strategy for air security.” And I concur with many of the points in the memorandum, in particular the need for better intelligence-sharing with the private sector in this domain, and the idea that airspace security should become the primary responsibility of the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, instead of DOD (although I think there’s still a role for the Air Force and Navy in the actual interception of hostile aircraft.)

I also think it’s reasonable to develop a strategy for the domestic deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems, but I don’t think that DHS needs its own TMD capability: DOD’s TMD assets should be leveraged for the homeland defense mission. One area where I disagree is on counter-MANPAD systems. It was appropriate to develop prototype systems (as DHS has done) but I don’t think that the deployment of these systems is the best use of homeland security resources right now.

And on the topic of passenger screening, I’m not sure what Carafano means when he writes:

If 10 years from now the United States is still physically screening airline passengers, something will have gone terribly wrong. The United States should commit to becoming a global leader in developing an alternative security screening program that does not require 100 percent physical screening.

If there’s some silver bullet solution to aviation screening on the horizon, I haven’t heard about it yet. I think we need new layers of security in the system (e.g. stronger intelligence, behavior detection, more advanced detection tools) but having new layers doesn’t automatically mean that it’s safe to move away from 100% screening. I think it’s a laudable goal to find ways to move away from total screening and reduce costs, but I’m pessimistic about finding ways to do that, unless we perhaps go with Tom Friedman’s immodest proposal.

Overall though, an interesting memo that puts forward some good ideas that should be debated and considered.

The publication Inside Defense reports on the new National Security Presidential Directive-46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-15, issued on a classified basis this month:

President Bush has issued a new, classified directive to better coordinate the efforts of all federal agencies that play a role in fighting militant Islamic terrorist activities around the world, according to a senior government official.

Bush recently signed the document, National Security Presidential Directive-46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-15, said the official. Also referred to as the “War on Terror” directive, it reflects a desire by the White House to better orchestrate activities across a wide range of bureaucratic jurisdictions — including diplomatic, legal, financial and military — that are collectively assigned to counter extremist groups and terrorist networks.

“This new directive will synchronize the efforts of all the government agencies that have a role to play in the global war on terror,” said the official, who asked to not be identified.

Fred Jones, a spokesman for the National Security Council, declined to comment on the new decree, citing a White House policy of not discussing classified directives.

The new directive, the senior official said, reflects many themes spelled out in the Defense Department’s National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror.

Here’s the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror. Hopefully the government will release an unclassified version of the NSPD/HSPD so that people can better understand the intention of this directive.

The new Canadian defence minister, Gordon O’Connor, discussed the Harper government’s intention to renew the NORAD treaty with the United States before it expires in May, and expand NORAD’s role in the area of maritime surveillance:

O’Connor, in his first public statement since Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper came to power last month, downplayed the significance of the updated treaty, dismissing the suggestion it could lead to U.S. warships patrolling Canadian waters.

The agreement will mean “merely a transfer of information,” he told reporters in the hangar deck of the Canadian frigate HMCS Halifax, after touring the navy dockyard.

“It doesn’t change our responsibility as a country,” he said. “We have to look after our own sovereignty. We have to deal with any threats coming from the sea.”

Once ratified, the new treaty would allow intelligence on shipping data and threats to the sea lanes to be sent directly into NORAD headquarters, which is staffed by Canadian and U.S. military at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo.

This is a sensible change for NORAD and the US-Canada security relationship, given the closely linked maritime domains of the two countries and the increased prominence of maritime security in the broader counterterrorism and homeland defense context. For more on what NORAD and NORTHCOM are doing on maritime security, see this recent Denver Post story.

The Denver Post concluded an excellent three-part series today on NORTHCOM that delves deeper into its roles and missions than any other news story I’ve seen in recent memory. The first story focuses on NORTHCOM’s role in maritime and cargo security; the second story looks at the future of NORAD; and the third story looks at NORTHCOM’s potential role in a pandemic flu response. Some highlights from each story:

The piece on maritime and cargo security describes a recent incident where officials intercepted inbound cargo that had triggered sensors:

A federal agent working with port authorities in South Asia sounded the warning: A cargo container had tripped sensors that detect possible chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The container was gliding west through the Mediterranean Sea on a ship bound for New York.

Here, at the military’s homeland defense headquarters in Colorado Springs, surveillance crews melded that tip with radar and satellite data. Surrounded by wall-sized screens, the high-tech trackers located the ship and followed it across the Atlantic Ocean.

About 200 miles off the East Coast, Coast Guard forces intercepted and boarded the freighter and searched the cargo containers until they knew all of them were safe.

Military officials wouldn’t say more about this classified incident that occurred in November, but the way it was handled begins to reveal how secretive military forces in Colorado - the center for airspace surveillance through the Cold War - increasingly target the high seas to reduce what commanders see as a major vulnerability.

And it notes NORTHCOM’s recently-expanded authority to act in this domain:

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently granted new authority to Navy Adm. Timothy Keating - commander of both Northcom and the U.S.- Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD - to call up aircraft carriers, submarines and other sea craft for maritime operations to deter and disrupt enemies and collect intelligence.

I’m glad to see NORTHCOM working together with civilian authorities and taking a more forceful role in combating these maritime threats.

The second article takes a look at the role of NORAD and future of the Cheyenne Mountain facility. It wonders whether NORAD is now obselete given the increasing importance of the NORTHCOM command post at Peterson AFB. And it looks at the information-sharing challenges within NORAD between US and Canadian officials:

Thousands of feet under granite in a command post built to withstand Soviet nuclear blasts, Canadian Maj. Pat Audet quietly supervised one of the U.S.-Canadian surveillance crews that for nearly 50 years have scanned North American skies guarding against enemy intruders.

But on this recent morning, Audet faced cardboard “top secret” signs taped over two of his surveillance screens. For “U.S. eyes only,” he said.

Such barriers to sharing information hint at changes reshaping this Cold War-era defense complex just southwest of Colorado Springs as well as the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, the U.S.-Canadian partnership that runs it….

Today, for the 170 or so Canadians posted at Northcom, just handling e-mail grows increasingly difficult. Canada’s Capt. Richard Bergeron, co-director of the joint planning group, pointed at separate U.S. and Canadian computer systems on his desk.

The reason for this lack of information-sharing perhaps stems in part from Canada’s abstension from US ballistic missile defense activities. The article also notes the decision in Canada to create a separate Canada Command to mirror NORTHCOM. It would be a shame if the ties built over the past decades by NORAD were to dissipate and the two countries’ security infrastructures were to become less integrated. I’d like to see this long-run outcome:

“I can see Northern Command, Canada Command and NORAD all becoming one,” said Canadian Lt. Gen. Eric Findley, deputy commander of NORAD.

The third story looks at NORTHCOM’s preparations for the avian flu, and suggests that the military would potentially take on the following roles and responsibilities in an outbreak:

Yet, spurred by President Bush during his recent visit here, Northcom officials are preparing to:

• Share early-warning data on outbreaks with civilian health authorities.
• Inspect passengers at airports and seaports for signs of flu.
• Slow travel and help police communities, short of attempting full-blown quarantines.
• Move medicines to hard-hit areas and victims to clinics for treatment.
• Back up civilian doctors by working shifts at overloaded hospitals.
• Possibly share vaccines, beds and ventilators.

…Civilian response leaders here - representing diplomatic, environmental protection, emergency management and transportation agencies - welcomed the prospect of military support.

Military forces “have assets we don’t have. They move tons of equipment every day. They’re also the best at planning,” said Capt. Lynn Slepski of the U.S. Public Health Service, now serving as a senior health adviser in the Department of Homeland Security.

The military’s preparedness to assume these responsibilities will be a critical success factor in potential efforts to combat an outbreak. It’s good to see NORTHCOM stepping forward to work with civilian authorities to plan for these contingencies.

Overall, a great set of stories by the Denver Post, and worth taking the time to read in full.

For the last several years, the OMB has published a “Homeland Security Funding Analysis” as part of the budget request, assessing homeland security on a government-wide basis. The analysis this year is found in Chapter 3 of the Analytical Perspectives report and in this related appendix.

The analysis notes that the FY 2007 budget request proposes $58.3 billion for spending on homeland security on a government-wide basis - an increase of 6.3% from FY 2006.

Perhaps the most notable change in the report this year is the method of accounting for homeland security spending at the Department of Defense. The report notes:

The revisions to the Department of Defense (DOD) homeland security funding estimates also better reflect actual spending by the Department. Previously, the DOD homeland security funding estimates were derived from an annual report issued by the DOD Comptroller’s office that identified funding spent on combating terrorism activities. Now, DOD has been able to identify discrete, homeland security-related projects, programs and activities within the budget accounts of the various service branches. As a result, the funding estimates are more precise and integrated with the DOD budget.

The impact of this definitional change? A doubling of what’s considered to be homeland security spending within the Department of Defense. In the FY 2006 Analytical Perspectives report, DOD homeland security spending for FY 2005 was pegged at $8.57 billion. In the FY 2007 report, it’s now $17.2 billion (incl. supplemental funding) for the same year!

This is a drastic change, and is worth a closer look in terms of understanding DOD’s role in homeland security. (It’s also important to point out this change in methodology, because otherwise the $58.3 billion figure could be cited incorrectly in the media and elsewhere as a 17% increase from last year’s pre-revised figure of $49.9 billion.)

DOD’s homeland security spending primarily falls within two of the six mission categories defined in the National Strategy: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Defending against Catastrophic Threats. (Emergency Preparedness and Response is a distant third).

67.7% of DOD’s $16.7 billion for FY 2007 falls under the category of protecting critical infrastructure. As the FY 2007 Analytical Perspectives report notes:

DOD reports the largest share of funding in this category for 2007 ($11.3 billion), and includes programs focusing on physical security and improving the military’s ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of attacks against departmental personnel and facilities.

This total represents an upward revision of about 20% from the previous baseline methodology.

It’s worth pointing out that this amount for DOD is 62% of total critical infrastructure protection spending, and about 4x what the Department of Homeland Security receives each year to spend on critical infrastructure protection. To be sure, military base security and force protection are necessary and important tasks. But isn’t the protection of publicly-owned civilian infrastructure equally critical? This discrepancy raises questions in my mind about the extent to which the protection of critical civilian assets is underfunded today.

The category of “Defending against Catastrophic Threats” accounts for 29.9% of DOD’s projected homeland security spending for FY 2007. The report notes:

DOD defends the nation against catastrophic threats by undertaking long-term research on chemical and biological threats and by developing strategies to counter the risk of such attacks. DOD’s efforts in maritime defense and interdiction provide early detection and response to possible CBRN threats. DOD also conducts anti-terrorism planning to defend against a potential CBRN or other terrorist attack against a military base or installment. Finally, the U.S. Northern Command, the military command responsible for homeland defense, is included in this category.

The revision to OMB’s methodology created a huge jump in the estimate of DOD homeland spending in this mission area. The FY 2006 analytical perspectives report estimated a total of only $158.9 million for FY 2006. The FY 2007 report estimates a total of 5.00 billion for the same year - a thirty-fold increase.

These activities, as described above, do all seem like they should be appropriately counted as “homeland security.” But again, I wonder about the equity of the allocation. The mission budget in this category for DOD is now larger than DHS and HHS combined. If this is dual-purpose counter-WMD activity and research (focused on both foreign battlefields and homeland defense), then that’s completely appropriate, although perhaps it shouldn’t all be counted here. But if it’s research primarily for homeland defense, then I’m struck by the extent to which the key civilian agencies - DHS and HHS in this case - lag in funding.

Overall, these budget documents provide a useful first layer of analysis about homeland security funding across the federal government. They provoke questions about the appropriate allocation among the key agencies, and highlight the relative penury of civilian agencies for the critical infrastructure and counter-WMD missions. Hopefully members of Congress will look strategically at these issues in the coming budget and appropriations hearings.

GovExec reports today on a Senate HSGAC hearing held on Thursday, where DOD Asst. Secretary for Homeland Defense Paul McHale questioned whether a single official should be in charge of National Guard and active-duty forces during future domestic crises:

Paul McHale, the Pentagon’s assistant secretary for homeland defense, told senators during a hearing that he has changed his mind concerning whether one person should have been placed in charge of all military forces involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina….

McHale told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that he has now come to realize that the concept, which is commonly referred to as dual-hatting, will not work during a domestic catastrophe.

“A dual-hatting command falls apart if you have a difference of opinion between two executives,” he said. “In a crisis environment, I think it’s almost inevitable that the president and a governor will have differences of opinion. To put an officer in a crossfire between the two of them, I think is untenable.”

The article goes on to discuss suggestions by Senators during the hearing that the military was slow to respond to Katrina - an area of inquiry that the HSGAC has indicated that it plans to pursue since the late fall. I think we can expect some interesting recommendations on the DOD’s role in emergency response in the Katrina investigation reports, which the statements today by McHale likely try to anticipate.

I’ve now read the key sections of the Quadrennial Defense Review that focus on homeland defense and homeland security. There’s really not that much new in comparison with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support released in June 2005. To the extent that there are changes in focus, they are driven by response to Katrina and the resulting desire among some to enhance DOD’s role in emergency response.

There’s also a disconnect on the subject of homeland defense in the report between the well-defined “strategy” section and the Force Planning Construct, which lays out the operational consequences of the strategy. In fact, homeland defense barely gets mentioned in the Force Planning Construct section, as I’ll detail in the outline that follows:

The QDR notes that “defending the homeland in depth” was one of four priority areas for examination. And in the chapter “Operationalizing the Strategy” it goes into great depth on the changed nature of the threat:

Globalization enables many positive developments such as the free movement of capital, goods and services, information, people and technology, but it is also accelerating the transmission of disease, the transfer of advanced weapons, the spread of extremist ideologies, the movement of terrorists and the vulnerability of major economic segments. Th e U.S. populace, territory and infrastructure, as well as its assets in space, may be increasingly vulnerable to these and a variety of other threats, including weapons of mass destruction, missile and other air threats, and electronic or cyber-attacks.

Globalization also empowers small groups and individuals. Nation-states no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Today, small teams or even single individuals can weaponize chemical, biological and even crude radiological or nuclear devices and use them to murder hundreds of thousands of people. Loosely organized and with few assets of their own to protect, non-state enemies are considerably more difficult than nation-states to deter through traditional military means. Non-state enemies could attempt to attack a wide range of targets including government facilities; commercial and financial systems; cultural and historical landmarks; food, water, and power supplies; and information, transport, and energy networks. They will employ unconventional means to penetrate homeland defenses and exploit the very nature of western societies – their openness – to attack their citizens, economic institutions, physical infrastructure and social fabric.

The threat to the U.S. homeland, however, is broader than that posed by terrorists. Hostile states could also attack the United States using WMD delivered by missiles or by less familiar means such as commercial shipping or general aviation. They could attack surreptitiouslythrough surrogates. Some hostile states are pursuing advanced weapons of mass destruction, including genetically engineered biological warfare agents that can overcome today’s defenses. There is also a danger that the WMD capabilities of some states could fall into the hands of, or be given to, terrorists who could use them to attack the United States.

And it discusses appropriate adjustments to DOD’s strategy as a result of this threat context, divided into three categories: lead, support, and enable.

The document notes that DOD will lead in the following areas of homeland defense:

• Executing military missions that dissuade, deter or defeat external attacks upon the United
  States, its population, and its defense critical infrastructure.
• Defending U.S. airspace and protecting the nation’s air approaches.
• Working alongside the Department of Homeland Security to integrate U.S. maritime defense – optimizing the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.
• Deterring adversaries that they cannot achieve their objectives through attacks on the U.S. homeland.

It will support in the following areas:

• Performing designated law enforcement and / or other activities and as part of a comprehensive national response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or to recover from an attack or a disaster.
• Providing additional resources in catastrophes that overwhelm civilian capacity.

The document notes that NORTHCOM will have the authority to stage forces and equipment domestically prior to potential incidents when possible.

And finally DOD will enable homeland defense in the following areas:

• Sharing information, expertise and technology as appropriate across military and civilian boundaries.
• Standardizing operational concepts, developing compatible technology solutions and coordinating planning.
• Improving interagency planning and scenario development and enhancing interoperability through experimentation, testing and training exercises.

This last category of DOD’s homeland defense role is very important, and one that is essential to the success of the first two categories, as well as the success of the government-wide homeland security mission.

The chapter also defines “steady-state” and “surge” homeland defense capacity for the DOD:

Steady-state – detect, deter, and if necessary, defeat external threats to the U.S. homeland, and enable partners to contribute to U.S. national security. Examples of such activities include: routine homeland security training and exercises with other Federal agencies and state and local governments; strategic deterrence; routine maritime operations conducted with the U.S. Coast Guard; North American air defense, including air sovereignty operations; missile defense; and readiness to provide support to civil authorities for consequence management events.

Surge – contribute to the nation’s response to and management of the consequences of WMD attacks or a catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina, and also to raise the level of defense responsiveness in all domains (e.g., air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace) if directed.

The next chapter of the report lays out the QDR’s Force Planning Construct for the next four years, i.e. the practical implications of the strategy in the preceding chapter. But there’s a big disconnect in the QDR between the two chapters. Homeland defense barely notes a mention in the Force Planning Construct. I’m not sure why this is the case; perhaps it reflects a disconnect between the OSD and the DOD Policy office and the services on homeland defense; perhaps there’s a prevailing attitude that homeland defense is a “secondary” function that should use DOD resources opportunistically but not shape future requirements.

There are, however, some items in the category of countering WMDs in the Force Planning Construct that are tangentially related to homeland defense:

• Designate the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as the primary Combat Support Agency for U.S. Strategic Command in its role as lead Combatant Commander for integrating and synchronizing combating WMD efforts.
• Expand the Army’s 20th Support Command (CBRNE) capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.
• Expand the number of U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills and increase
  their speed of response. The Department will develop further recommendations to improve render-safe capabilities for the Fiscal Year 2008 budget.
• Improve and expand U.S. forces’ capabilities to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD, missiles and related materials, including the transportation means used to move such items.
• Reallocate funding within the CBDP to invest more than $1.5 billion over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-terror threats including genetically engineered intracellular bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers.

Finally, there is some good discussion page 87 of the QDR about “complex interagency operations at home,” where the document discusses the need to enhance interoperability, training, and planning with DHS and other agencies for domestic response. The section recommends the creation of a “National Homeland Security Plan” to “clarify the optimum distribution of effort among Federal agencies for prevention, preparation and response.” This sounds a lot like the National Response Plan - I don’t quite understand how a new plan is needed.

Overall, the QDR is an interesting document, but it’s not one that represents a significant shift in DOD’s posture on the subject of homeland defense.

You can now download the Quadrennial Defense Review report here.

I’ll post an analysis of the homeland defense-related sections later today.

According to an article published by the official American Forces Press Service, NORTHCOM is working on developing its role in an avian flu outbreak:

U.S. Northern Command recently hosted representatives from more than 40 international, federal and state agencies for an exercise designed to provoke discussion and determine what governmental actions, including military support, would be necessary in the event of an influenza pandemic in the United States.

“We’re building the knowledge base, trying to get ahead of the curve now as much as we can,” said Gene Pino, director of NORTHCOM’s training and exercise directorate. “We’re here to explore (and) identify issues, identify challenges and identify concerns from each of our particular perspectives.”…

Exercise attendees analyzed topics such as public health care, maintaining civil order and providing continuity of government and private operations in case of widespread infection and worker absenteeism.

“NORTHCOM will not be running the show in the event of a pandemic,” said Dave Wilkins, the NORTHCOM exercise facilitator. “We will be taking guidance and requests from other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, via the secretary of defense.”

It’s good to see NORTHCOM recognizing the importance of this potential threat, and working with key stakeholders across the government to develop its role. One of the issues that I haven’t really seen discussed in terms of the avian flu threat is continuity of military operations and civil defense: how would we handle a situation where 25-30% of active duty forces and other key contributors to homeland defense (National Guard, border officers, law enforcement officers) were sick at any given time? Would this create a temporary vulnerability in our homeland security that terrorists would try to exploit? Hopefully NORTHCOM will be working with DHS and other key stakeholders to wargame these scenarios and develop national contingency plans.

On Wednesday night I attended a policy event with Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Edmund Giambastiani that previewed the soon-to be-released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The event was hosted by my former employer, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and attracted a packed crowd of defense analysts, contractors, government officials, foreign diplomats, and journalists. This Reuters story summarizes some of the remarks at the event.

The comments dealt only briefly with homeland defense. The single substantive mention on the subject was Adm. Giambastiani’s comment that refinements in the 2005 QDR to the Force Planning Construct were driven primarily by two new imperatives: homeland defense and irregular operations.

But two other key points in their comments are worth noting here, even if they’re slightly off-topic, because I think both will be important in future efforts to wage the war on terror.

First, one of the key themes of England’s remarks was the extent to which the QDR focuses on the need to “reshape the defense enterprise,” and enhance the speed, agility, and precision of the military’s structure, organization, and processes. He talked about the need to shift to horizontal business processes, and have jointness at the front-end of the defense system. And he talked about the need to shift from a program-based perspective to a capabilities-based perspective in the management of the acquisition process.

This is an ambitious management agenda for DOD, but it’s one that’s worth taking on, because if implemented successfully, it could have a dramatic and positive impact on DOD’s effectiveness and efficiency. And it’s also the type of management agenda that DHS should consider adopting: all of the perspectives outlined by England (as summarized above) could readily be applied to DHS.

The second interesting concept in their remarks (and those of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry, who joined them for the Q&A) was the idea of tailored deterrence, an idea that Henry has begun to introduce into the political discourse during recent months; for example, in this speech for IFPA and the accompanying Powerpoint slide deck.

Henry talks in the IFPA speech about the need to develop different models of deterrence for states that are potential competitors, rogue states, and at the greatest degree of difficulty, terrorist networks. He then talks about the process by which you develop deterrence:

1. Identify those things which [your adversaries] hold dear, that for the purpose of risk and position, that you can effectively hold at risk.
2. Determine exactly where your capabilities can intersect [with what they hold dear], to be able to make a difference, either to impose costs or to deny benefits.
3. Communicate [these capabilities] to the target so they clearly understand that we have that tool kit and that we’re willing to use it.

Henry noted in this IFPA talk and at the CSIS event that he’s still trying to figure out what tailored deterrence means as it is applied to terrorists and terror networks. He commented that he wants to work with academics and think tanks in the coming year to continue to develop the concept. Tailored deterrence could potentially become an important idea in the national security canon, and it’s worth keeping an eye on.

For more on tailored deterrence, see Arms Control Wonk’s initial assessment of the idea.

Bill Gertz at the Washington Times has a story today that provides some of the first substantive details on the counter-WMD and homeland defense elements of the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review:

A section of the report on combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) said future U.S. military forces will have the capability to interdict and “render safe” weapons of mass destruction before terrorists can use them.

To counter the threat, the Defense Department will “develop new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats,” the report said.

Evolving WMD threats include electromagnetic pulse weapons, portable nuclear devices, genetically engineered pathogens and new chemical arms, the report said. The report states that the four-star general in charge of the Omaha, Neb.-based U.S. Strategic Command has the lead role in countering WMD threats.

“The United States will have increased efforts to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD,” the report said. One key recommendation of the report is that “there shall be a joint task force for the elimination of WMD,” the report said.

At first impression, this sounds like a very important and positive shift in the nation’s defense posture, one that puts the military’s WMD counterproliferation efforts on much more of a strategic footing.

And the report speaks to new DOD efforts to counter genetically engineered bioweapons threats:

For homeland security, the report calls for spending $1.5 billion over the next five years for medical countermeasures against genetically engineered biological warfare agents.

This seems appropriate, given the uncertain but potentially grave vulnerabilities that we face to genetically engineered biothreats. DOD needs to make sure that it works closely with civilian government agencies - NIH, CDC, and DHS - in the development of these new countermeasures.

The Center for American Progress (CAP) has released a new report entitled “Restoring America’s Military Power: A Progressive Quadrennial Defense Review” this week. It represents a preemptive critique of the official Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which DOD will release on February 7th. On the subject of homeland defense, the CAP report provides the following homeland defense-related recommendations:

1. Establish a “Homeland Security Corps” and make the Army National Guard the primary protector of the homeland. Shift its composition to units suited for homeland defense missions (ie. combat support, military police).
2. Prohibit first responders from serving in the Selected Reserve.
3. Have DOD work more closely with DHS and other agencies to build synergies between the homeland security and homeland defense missions.
4. Double homeland defense spending to $20 billion.
5. Increase DOD capabilities to support civil authorities in response to CBRNE attacks.
6. Establish two regional commands within the National Guard to enhance homeland defense and disaster response planning.
7. Enhance Northcom recovery capabilities for catastrophic disasters. Train two active-duty Army divisions in domestic consequence management as a reserve force for the homeland defense mission to the Army National Guard.

Many of the policy recommendations above are sensible, and a lot of them are consistent with the official DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support released in June 2005. The biggest question mark for me in these recommendations is the idea of doubling homeland defense spending. Without a better of idea of what this new spending would deliver, I’m initially skeptical. And from my vantage point, I see a number of mission areas within DHS that have more pressing funding needs than DOD’s homeland defense activities.

It will be very interesting to see what the real QDR says about homeland defense. I’ve been looking doggedly for advance information about this part of the report, but there’s very little info out there as of yet. You’ll definitely see analysis of it here on Feb. 7th.

Inside the Pentagon reports today (by subscription only) on an upcoming DOD-led simulation that will test military support capabilities for response to a catastrophic terrorist attack (in this case, a nuclear attack against Charleston, SC):

The military’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support, headquartered at Ft. Monroe, VA, will host a three-day exercise for commanders of its subordinate units, as well as representatives of other federal agencies that would be involved in managing the consequences of a 10-megaton nuclear blast, enough to inflict mass causalities and devastation on an American city.

Like last summer’s exercise, the Jan. 31 to Feb. 2 event, generically called a “commanders conference,” is centered around a fictional blast that affects nearly half a million people across a 900-square mile section of tidewater South Carolina. The scenario posits 10,000 fatalities and more than 30,000 injuries.

Participants last year were focused on working through nuclear-incident response protocols within the task force. This time around, the aim is to continue honing internal command-and-control actions, while giving military commanders opportunities to interact with representatives of other federal agencies, according to a task force official.

The article goes on to note that DHS officials will be in attendance at the simulation, describes the purpose of the simulation, and offers background context on the threat.

This issue of military support for civilian incident response is a topic that is likely to arise in the final reports of the Katrina investigations in Congress, as noted in this post from last month. If the simulation is realistic and not overly predictable, then this kind of activity can make a real contribution to improving DOD’s capabilities in this area.

For more on this issue, see DOD’s June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

From a story about the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) at military.com (click through to the first story at this Google News link):

Sources said the new force planning construct to be spelled out next month is designed to better account for the post-Sept. 11, 2001, strategic landscape by focusing on three areas: homeland defense, the global war on terrorism and conventional campaigns.

As new details publicly emerge about the QDR’s homeland defense elements, I’ll be right here posting…

Steven Kosiak at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) has released a solid analysis today that tries to measure total federal funding for defense, homeland security, and national security since 9/11. The full analysis can be downloaded at this link.

Kosiak finds a total net increase of $754 billion in federal spending since 9/11 above expected baseline pre-9/11 spending, adjusted for the rate of inflation. Of that total, he estimates that approximately one-third has gone for the war in Iraq, and one-third for national security spending that has little or nothing to do with the war on terror.

The remaining third, for activities directly related to 9/11, includes spending for the war in Afghanistan, recovery from the attacks, and homeland security.

Kosiak calculates the total net and cumulative homeland security spending attributable to 9/11 to be equal to $146 billion, of which $34 billion went to the DOD for homeland defense activities, and the remaining $112 billion for civilian homeland security activities.

This $112 billion represents approx. a doubling of homeland security spending above the pre-9/11 baseline, when adjusted for inflation.

This is solid analysis and is worth a read.

The National Journal has an article in its issue this week, “Congressional Chronicle: Inside the Katrina Probes” on the separate investigations in the Senate and the House into the response to Katrina, which provides some of the first hints as to their likely findings.

The key passages:

To gather evidence, the investigators are sifting through hundreds of thousands of documents and interviewing hundreds of officials in Washington and the GulfCoast region. The aides believe that the effort is likely to lead to crucial policy changes on several issues dealing with the government’s response to natural disasters or to a terrorist attack.

“I think it will lead to major legislation,” said Michael Bopp, staff director of Collins’s committee in the Senate. “The role of the Department of Defense is likely to be one of the most significant findings of this investigation.”

The Senate report could contradict the positive media attention surrounding the military’s response to the storm, Bopp said. He added that the report may also recommend reorganizing the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which was widely criticized for its sluggish response in the critical days following the hurricane, and tweaking the law governing FEMA relief assistance, known as the Stafford Act.

House investigators said their report could lend weight to President Bush’s argument for a greater military role in domestic crises. “It will crystallize a lot of issues,” said Larry Halloran, deputy counsel on the House select committee. He suggested that Congress might change the 1878 law prohibiting the military from acting as a domestic police force, to allow the activation of troops early in a crisis.

Sounds like a potential split opinion between the House and the Senate on the DOD’s role in responding to Katrina, and by implication, what their role should be in responding to future incidents. Will be interesting to watch what emerges in the coming months.