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In February, I wrote about a colleagues idea in a post titled “How to create a resilient infrastructure in 20 years for 1 trillion dollars, create millions of jobs, transition to green transportation, and do all of this at no cost to government.” That post is here. A friend (thanks, George) recently sent a video to me (below) that describes another creative infrastructure idea:

“cover all concrete and asphalt surfaces that are exposed to the sun with solar road panels. This will lead to the end of our dependency on fossil fuels of any kind.

“We're aware that this won't happen overnight. We'll need to start off small: driveways, bike paths, patios, sidewalks, parking lots, playgrounds, etc. This is where we'll learn our lessons and perfect our system. Once the lessons have been learned and the bugs have all been resolved, we'll plan to move out onto public roads.”

(You can read more details about the Solar Roadways project at this link: http://solarroadways.com/vision.shtml I showed the video illustrating the solar roads project to some engineering friends.  Here’s part of the resulting conversation: Dr. R -- That's totally cool. I'd need to be convinced that you could manufacture this stuff as cheaply as asphalt and more importantly, that the total cost of ownership is lower. But how cool would it be to have this running up to your house? You'd get rid of all the lines that are there now and run it all thru this. Dr. T -- This is orders of magnitude better than [the idea posted in February]!  But the bureaucracy and red tape cutting to do this is horrendous. Dr. T -- Question: If you charge power and telecom companies to use it, you could not only pay for it but make a return on investment.  But does it work? Driving a million semis over circuits every week is much different than a lab test. Dr. R -- Yea, durability is the key. I won't be convinced until someone funds a real test case that we can carefully observe for a few years with heavy traffic. Lots of trucks!  Of course, you'll have the occasional 15 year old hacker who finds a way to spell swear words in the LEDs but that would be cool too. Dr. T -- You can read your email while driving on it! Generally power engineers don't believe in this idea because they understand the physics of long haul transmission and it isn't friendly. But I think they [power engineers] have not considered an alternate architecture that incorporates storage. Flywheels, compressed air and batteries are not integrated into their models. The glass highway project plus storage could change all that, but the grid would have to operate as a store-and-forward network rather than as a big electronic circuit. That is, we need about a decade of research that is orthogonal to current linear incremental thinking about the grid. Here’s the 4:38 solar roadways video:

I was reading a paper by my colleague Nick Catrantzos  yesterday when I came across this sentence:

Buy cialis no prescription, “...infrastructure defense is assumed to fall primarily into the hands of the private sector, which operates 85% of critical infrastructure.”

I ranted a year ago about the 85% number in a post that appeared on this blog. Hawaii HI , The Number simply won’t die. It lives beyond truth or lie, cialis en ligne afin. Louisiana LA , Its reality is independent of time and space.

So I wrote back to Nick summarizing what I believe is the problem with The Number, buy cialis online cheap.

Nick -- who loves the English language as a gardener treasures orchids -- once presented me with a knit picker.  So he is aware of my tendency to occasionally pole vault over mouse turds, buy cialis no prescription. Michigan MI Mich. , Nick also has spent time in the same Circus and has been known to pick a nit or two, so he responded back with some evidence about the 85% number.  I pushed back.  He returned fire.  As did I, buy cialis online. Cheap cialis, Then he wrote something that shined a light on a bias I did not see I had.

A year ago, buy cialis, Order cialis online, I wrote:

...the 85% figure has been used to justify a laissez fair critical infrastructure strategy. Private sector “ownership and control” has been interpreted to mean government frequently has to ask politely before it tries to do anything to improve safety and security.

If the 85% figure is wrong — or at least unsupported by any empirical basis — maybe the policies derived from that belief are also wrong.

Basically, order cialis online legally, Generic cialis, I thought the 85% number was used to justify the government not pushing the private sector hard enough when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure.

Nick -- who is a security manager and former security consultant for public and private organizations -- described how this “who owns what” issue looks from the private sector, cialis prices. Rabatt kaufen cialis,

My dilemma, perhaps a distant cousin to your own, cialis, Osta alennus cialis, has been in encountering an obdurate, logic-proof insistence by cops, where to buy cheap cialis, Cialis online kaufen, fire fighters, emergency managers, California CA Calif. , Ordering cialis no rx, fusion center staff, and DHS minions to define my employer and all critical infrastructure stewards as private sector entities.

It does not matter how much we demonstrate that we are a public agency and a regional extension of government.  As far as these people are concerned, billige cialis apotek, Pharmacie cialis bon marché, we are private, hence unworthy of sensitive information (even if we were the ones to originate it) and inherently suspect of being profit driven (no matter how many wasteful, För cialis online, Cialis online kopen, feel-good programs we underwrite for some avowed public good).  Even being part of the same retirement system and driving vehicles with tax-exempt license plates -- two surefire convincers everywhere else -- have no impact in shaking the conviction that we are infrastructure stewards, hence private sector mercenaries.

My unproven suspicion is that much of what is at the bottom of this categorization is a sort of tribal urge to satisfy two unstated objectives:

1.  Limit the in-group to an established comfort zone and organizationally and traditionally familiar faces.

2.  Assure that the existing in-group gains and keeps primacy at the trough of grants and other funding destined for public sector actors who are new both to homeland security and critical infrastructure protection.

If there are points to this fugue that resonate with me as an infrastructure steward, Nevada NV Nev. , παραγγείλετε online cialis, they are these:

A.  Critical infrastructure is definitely in both public and private hands.  Given the types of infrastructure that exist, it is reasonable and credible to accept that they are mainly privately owned and operated.

B.  Whether that percentage figure of 85% is anything more than an approximation or an archly crafted statistic meant to advance an ulterior agenda is mildly interesting to an infrastructure steward. At the end of the day, the hand on the wrench or on the SCADA system comes from the same gene pool, skill set,  and population.

C.  Even a critical infrastructure operation that is entirely managed by a public agency is going to have some private sector involvement and exposure.  Construction comes to mind.  We are always building or modifying facilities and upgrading systems.   Contrary to popular belief, even the wealthiest of public agencies cannot hire everyone they meet.   Contractors and subcontractors are as ubiquitous as they are indispensable.

D.  The original point of emphasizing private ownership and operation, to the extent I absorbed one, seemed to be as a means of emphasizing that protecting critical infrastructure is a shared responsibility and one that would be imperiled by ignoring private sector stakeholders. That point still makes sense to me.

.

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The title of this post is a bit big.  But nowhere near as huge as the idea behind it.

Ordering viagra online cheap, The basic concept is to build new underground electric power transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, and telecommunication, cable TV, and Internet communication lines on rights-of-way already established by America's 40,000 mile Interstate Highway System. The Interstate Highway System reaches nearly every part of the nation, and states own the rights-of-way along these roads. It makes sense to leverage this asset.

The idea -- called the National System of Resilient Infrastructure (or NSRI) -- was developed by Ted G. Lewis, at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Here are the details of this $1, Buy viagra no rx, 000,000,000,000 idea:

----------------------------------------

Proposed

Electric power, energy for transportation, and telecommunications capacity are three major economic drivers for the future economy of the USA.  But these sectors are in trouble, for a variety of reasons, φτηνές φαρμακείο viagra, including NIMBY (not in my back yard), lack of investment, and lack of vision.

To overcome these barriers, stimulate the economy, Ordering viagra online legally, and develop a resilient infrastructure for the 21^st century, the author proposes a "moon shot" scale effort to build a national system of resilient natural gas, electricity, and telecommunications infrastructure along the 40,000 miles of Interstate Highway.

This 20-year, $1 trillion project would be implemented by a public-private partnership structured much like a GSE (government-sponsored enterprise), and mainly funded by the private sector, ordering viagra online cheap. Besides creating millions of jobs, enhancing our ability to transition to clean cars, Connecticut CT Conn. , trucks, and buses, the national system would be immediately self-sustained by usage fees, and therefore profitable. It would not cost the government any money, Ordering viagra online without prescription, and would have an immense impact on the economy.

Infrastructure Equals Prosperity

The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, commonly called the Interstate Highway System (or simply the Interstate) is the largest highway system and largest public works project in the world. Ordering viagra online cheap, More importantly, it propelled the United States into a new era of prosperity. Today, virtually all goods and services are distributed via the Interstate, which is still expanding, ordering viagra online cheap.

In the 1990s the 25-year old Internet was commercialized, stimulating economic growth so much that it produced a bubble in 2000. Yet, the federal government's $200 million investment has already returned 100-fold on investment, after less than 20 years of growth. Comprar viagra baratos, The future of the global economy increasingly depends on the Internet.

It is clear that relatively modest investments in infrastructure reap exponentially large returns due to economic growth, job creation, and innovation, ordering viagra online cheap. Since ancient Rome, no nation on earth has achieved or maintained greatness, security, and prosperity, without plentiful energy, robust communications, Mississippi MS Miss. , and transportation capacity.

The economy of the 21^st century will run on electrical power and Internet packets. Without these, the USA will slip into fourth or fifth place among nations.

The Challenge

The United States faces an "infrastructure challenge" and an equally big opportunity, Acheter en ligne viagra, today. Ordering viagra online cheap, The challenge is to rejuvenate our failing basic infrastructures: water, power, telecommunications, and energy.

Progress in green energy generation is stalled because of inadequate transmission capacity. Telecommunications capacity must be greatly increased to accommodate global 3D virtual reality, multi-party conferencing, and high-performance research and development in medical, environmental, and technical industries, order viagra pills. Think of the possibilities of telemedicine piped directly into your home, or corporate meetings conducted with 100,000 participants from around the globe.

Advances in material science, bioengineering, Viagra online stores, medicine, green energy, revolutionary telecommunications, and green transportation will present great opportunity over the next 20 years to those nations prepared to capitalize on them.

These are the economic drivers of the future, but they require advanced infrastructure, ordering viagra online cheap.

We know how to turn sunlight into electrons, but lack the distribution channel to transport electrons produced in New Mexico to markets in New York. We know how to telecommute via our computers, California CA Calif. , but lack the bandwidth for two-way, 3D telecommunication between grandmother and granddaughter across the continent. We know how to automate transportation systems to reduce auto accidents and congestion, but our highways are "dumb."  In the next 20 years, cars will run on electricity and natural gas, Buy viagra, but we lack the infrastructure to refuel them while achieving energy independence.

Venture capital is pent up, waiting for government to stimulate a "green economy," but we do not currently have the market distribution infrastructure to make it possible.

We need a National System of Resilient Infrastructure (NSRI) to take advantage of opportunities that will create jobs and keep America economically strong Ordering viagra online cheap, .

The Solution

The National System of Resilient Infrastructure plan (NSRI) is designed to address two roadblocks in the way of the next stage of economic growth: NIMBY, and the enormous cost of rebuilding the power and telecommunications infrastructure of the 21^st century.

NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) is currently blocking many projects because people do not want power lines in their backyards, Kaufen viagra. In addition, infrastructure is enormously expensive and unattractive as an investment because it does not give companies a competitive advantage. For example, the current 1 trillion dollar electrical power grid is fragile due to a lack of transmission capacity. It is also based on 1940's technology, ordering viagra online cheap. But who can afford to invest 1 trillion dollars to rebuild it. Buy viagra from canada, NSRI proposes to avoid NIMBY by placing critical infrastructure underground. NIMBY can be avoided by building underground electric power transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, and telecommunication/CATV/Internet communication lines on rights-of-way already established by the Interstate Highway System. States already own these rights-of-way, and the Interstate Highway System reaches nearly every part of the nation. Ordering viagra online cheap, It therefore makes sense to leverage this asset even more so.

Energy, köpa rabatterade viagra, Power, and Communications infrastructure also requires storage nodes (for surge resilience), "service stations" (for distribution), and several network operation centers. The NSRI will be resilient because of its storage, Acheter viagra, security, and distributed architecture [decentralized assets].

Robust and redundant, able to transmit commodities such as Internet packets, electrons from solar farms, natural gas for future cars, trucks, Hawaii HI , and buses, and bountiful electrical power for future cyber businesses, the NSRI will be a quantum step forward for the nation and the economy.

NSRI is America's 21^st century "moon shot."

How to Pay for It

The NSRI network would be constructed much like the Interstate Highway network, over a 20-30-year period at an estimated cost of $50 billion per year.

The author estimates it would cost $25 million/mile to build the necessary tunnels, pipes, wires, etc, ordering viagra online cheap. Ordering viagra pills, The Interstate is 40,000 miles long, hence a total estimated cost of $1 trillion over 20 years.

This may seem high, but it represents 3.6% of the combined revenues of the natural gas, electrical power, telecommunications, Georgia GA Ga. , gasoline, and broadcast industries, see Table I.

The Interstate Highway System is "pay-as-you-go", with 90% of the funding coming from the Federal government, Køb discount viagra, and the remaining 10% from the States. In its first year of construction, 1958, total costs were $37.6 billion. Ordering viagra online cheap, By 1991, the cost was $128 billion. But these billions contributed nothing to the national debt because they were paid for by a 40 cent per gallon tax on gasoline. Title II of the Highway Revenue Act of 1956 created the Highway Trust Fund to collect and dispense funding for the Interstate System.

Similarly, order viagra overnight delivery, the NSRI would be financed through a Trust Fund established by Congress to create and operate NSRI. The NSRI financing plan needs to be worked out in detail, but two attractive options are: Option I: GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprise), and Option II: excise taxation, similar to the model used by the Highway Revenue Act of 1956.

Ultimately, the NSRI must be self-sustaining, through revenues generated by its use, ordering viagra online cheap. Osta viagra online, A toll fee would be charged for use of the pipelines, communication lines, storage facilities, and service stations. These fees can be based on current regulated fees charged by telephone, utility, and pipeline companies - a familiar fee structure for these industries, comprare viagra sconto.

Option I: GSE: Ginny Mae, Sallie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are GSEs, i. e., αγοράζουν online viagra, government-backed enterprises listed on stock exchanges, and therefore, investor supported. Ordering viagra online cheap, The idea here is to raise the major portion of funding from investment banks, retirement funds, and personal investors through an IPO [initial public offering]. Like a GSE, the NSRI Trust Fund would be backed by the Federal government, and at some point reach a self-sustainable level through usage fees. This model, however, would probably require temporary taxation to raise the full $50 billion needed to initiate NSRI.

Option II: Excise Taxes: The Interstate Highway System was funded by a $0.40/gallon tax on gasoline (part Federal and part State). This tax can be rolled back as expenses are replaced with usage fees. Consider this: a 3.6% excise tax on revenues shown in Table I would raise $50 billion per year, ordering viagra online cheap. Alternatively, an additional $0.40/gallon excise tax would raise $56 billion per year.

Both options are no-cost options for the Federal Government. Both options follow the Interstate Highway model whereby States own the infrastructure. Unlike the Interstate Highway model, however, the NSRI can easily achieve sustainability through an industry-accepted fee structure.

----------------------------------------

Dr. Lewis can be reached at tlewis[at]nps.edu.

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America's trains carry more than 12 million passengers every weekday.  There have been no successful attacks on US rail systems in recent history.  Globally, however, railway systems remain an attractive target for terrorists. Between 1998 and 2003, there were more than 180 attacks on trains and related rail targets around the world.  Terrorists have attacked railway systems most dramatically in Mumbai, Moscow, Madrid, and London, killing hundreds and injuring thousands. What are America's railroads doing to prevent a similar attack? In January 2009, DHS reported "that more than 75% of the nation's major rail and bus systems aren't meeting [voluntary] Homeland Security guidelines" established in 2007.   The same report, according to a story written by Frank Thomas, found that "96% of airlines are complying with security requirements." [my emphasis] I don't know enough about rail security to know what to make of the comparative findings. But I do know that guidelines are not the same as requirements. As a TSA leader phrased it, there is no penalty for failing to comply with guidelines. Two years ago, The RAND Corporation released "Securing America's Passenger-Rail System,"  offering a framework for railroad security planning.  As far as I know, it remains the most comprehensive treatment of the vulnerabilities and threats faced by American railroads. To understand railroad system vulnerability, RAND "identified 11 potential target locations (e.g., system-operation and power infrastructure) within a notional rail system and eight potential attack modes (e.g., small explosives).  These targets and attack modes were combined to produce 88 different attack scenarios of concern." Today's guest blogger is a security executive with a major rail system.  Her idea about improving homeland security begins with a different kind of scenario.  She outlines a vulnerability created by the networked nature of America's railroads, and suggests what can be done about it. Here's the scenario: Assume that Rail Carrier A institutes specific security procedures based upon its own risk assessment. Rail Carrier B shares track with Carrier A but does not prioritize the trains entering A’s environment based upon A's risk assessment. Security measures on B’s trains are limited.  Because A and B trains operate simultaneously in the same environment it is possible that the security efforts of A are less effective because of B’s inadequate measures. Both Carriers are operating under individual risk assessments, but the inter-connectivity between the two carriers has not been adequately addressed. Now, what to do about this vulnerability:

1. What one sentence best describes your idea about how to improve homeland security?

The Department of Homeland Security should conduct a universal rail transportation vulnerability assessment to effectively address national risk.

2. Describe the idea in more depth.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires rail transportation entities, both passenger and freight, to conduct vulnerability/risk assessments.  The TSA does not identify one methodology for conducting these assessments.   In order to better assess the vulnerability of the nation's rail and mass transit systems, the TSA, as directed by the DHS, should conduct a universal rail risk/vulnerability study with one defined methodology to accurately assess the entire inter-connected national rail system. In many areas track is shared by freight, regional and other passenger rail systems.  Although each of these entities conducts risk and vulnerability studies, they are not shared among the carriers or effectively evaluated from an overall homeland security perspective. A universal approach would better reveal high risk locations and could assist individual carriers in determining how to effectively deploy limited resources. The risk and vulnerabilities can then be prioritized on a broad scale and evaluated to maximize the effective use of federally and otherwise funded security projects.

3. What problem does your idea address?

It is undeniable that rail, both freight and passenger systems, are key components of the United States' critical infrastructure. It is also well known that the rail transportation sector is a preferred target for terrorists.  Independent risk assessments, which may not accurately reflect inter-connectivity, will not be effective in determining the actual vulnerability of our national rail system and, subsequently, assist in accurately deploying security resources.

4. If your idea were to become a reality who would benefit most and how?

The traveling public would be the primary beneficiary of a universal assessment.  A broad based evaluation of risk may increase security by placing the limited resources where they are most needed. Individual rail companies have separate owners, budgets and priorities.  They add security measures and harden targets that are important to them as individual carriers.  This go-it-alone strategy may only result in pushing the terrorist to a less vulnerable target, instead of using a nationally defined risk to improve the security of the entire system.  Adding security improvements on a broader scale may deter a terrorist from attacking the transportation sector as a whole.

5. What are the initial steps needed to get the idea off the ground?

The DHS must take a more active role in the overall security of the rail system than it has to date and promulgate a federal regulation or directive.  Resources would be needed to define the risk methodology and to conduct this assessment in coordination with the rail carriers. It is possible that there may be limited support for this new assessment from rail carriers because assessments have already been completed.  Consequently the value of what I am proposing may not be understood or accepted.  Funding to conduct the assessment is also a significant issue. Individual next steps will include promoting the idea through the appropriate chain of command in the various Carrier groups, and obtaining permission to discuss the concept with an appropriate member of the TSA.

6. Describe the optimal outcome should your idea be selected and successfully implemented? How would you measure that outcome?

In the best case, all rail transportation would be universally assessed based upon the same methodology.  Security resources and funding awards would be deployed based upon these assessments.  Completing this universal assessment and resulting recommendations for a safer rail system could be a measure of success. But the key to a safer rail will not be a report, but changes in rail security implemented because of the new assessment. The desired outcome will be to harden the entire rail system and make it a less attractive target for terrorists. As in many cases, measuring the effectiveness of any security enhancement may not be possible.  But with a security approach derived from a universal rail sector risk assessment, we can achieve a new level of confidence in the security of America's railroads.

At 10:55 this morning, President Obama will announce the long-awaited plans  for dealing with cyber security in his White House.  A cyber czar, albeit at a level lower than desired (special assistant), will be supported by a new cyber directorate within the National Security Council.  That person will also report to the National Economic Council. Expect the announcement will be broad in scope and discuss goals for dealing with the global threat of cyber security, as well as address such issues as a public awareness campaign for the challenges of cyber security and the need for a strengthened technology workforce in the U.S. The 60 day review (that ended approx 30 days) ago, led by Melissa Hathaway, is the fourth attempt in the last 12 or so years to address cyber security.  In late 1996, President Clinton created the Presidential Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) that issued a report on its findings in 1997. That effort led to the 1998 Presidential Directive-63, the emergence of ISACs, and the creation of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) at the Department of Commerce, among other organizations at various agencies.  Those two are worth noting as we continue, a decade later, to see a tension, as evidenced by the dual NEC and NSC reporting announcement expected today, between law enforcement/security and economic/commerce interests in cyber security.   Interestingly enough, the term "cyber czar" originated during that time - Dick Clarke in the White House. In 2003, President Bush released the Clarke-led National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace which provided recommendations for "government-industry" cooperation.   Soon thereafter Clarke left the government. The strategy laid a framework for how the federal government would try to address cyber issues and promoted public-private partnerships.  DHS' leadership on the issue was laid out about this time with the merger of most of the major cyber functions (NIPC, CIAO, FedCert, etc) into a new National Cyber Security Division. These efforts led to the creation of sector coordinating councils and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).   There was wide-spread criticism that the Director of the NCSD was buried too far into DHS and the nation needed a WH czar. Congress responded by creating an Assistant Secretary position at DHS. Round three happened in 2008. President Bush initiated the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative.   The CNCI, officially established in January 2008 (though rumored as early as Sept 2007) by National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 was a multi-agency, multi-year plan laying out twelve steps to securing the federal government's cyber security networks.  DHS would have the lead (mostly) on civilian systems while DoD would take the lead on .mil systems.  The role of NSA and the DNI was questioned, though hard for most to pen down given the classified nature of the program. By this point, the White House had a  Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Policy, Neill Sciarrone, and a multi-agency task force headed by Melissa Hathaway leading the CNCI efforts.  DHS, meanwhile, also created a Deputy Undersecretary for cyber at the National Protection and Programs Directorate - a role fulfilled by Scott Charbo in the Bush Administration and by Phil Reitinger in the Obama Administration.   Silicon Valley guru Rod Beckstrom was brought in as the First Director of the National Cyber Security Center.  He left several months ago, claiming that the NSA and intelligence agencies were taking too much of a leading role in the cyber efforts. That leads us to today's announcement in a few hours.  While in a condensed timeframe, there is much history in the nation's cyber security efforts. Today's efforts will set a framework - even if broadly- for how we are going to tackle round four.  The real question will be whether we can advance our efforts or will we be repeating this exercise in a few years.  Stay tuned for a more in-depth analysis of the cyber security analysis this afternoon. Also worth noting - after the cyber announcement,  the President will attend a hurricane preparedness meeting at FEMA headquarters.  Hurricane season is only a weekend away so FEMA's preparedness efforts and posture are critical.

Boy meets girl. Boy loses girl. Boy gets girl back. That doctrine guides innumerable novels and movies.  In the right hands, the formula can be used to create a film as sublime as Casablanca.  In the wrong hands you get something like "Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay." Homeland Security owns an equally well known formula: "Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability and consequence."  Used in the right hands (see Bob Ross' comments in the previous post), the formula can be a helpful way to structure thought. The formula can also produce risk assessments. Risk assessments are stories  -- in the good sense of that word -- used to justify spending money for some activities rather than others. The generic story is built around threats to harm something, ways the something can be harmed, and the results if that something is harmed. The moral of the story is "If you give us money, we will mitigate the risk." Good homeland security risk assessment stories are not easy to write. Risk based anything is a cornerstone of the illusive homeland security doctrine.  Here's the assertion in the 2007 National Homeland Security Strategy:  “We must apply a risk-based framework across all homeland security efforts in order to identify and assess  potential hazards ..., determine what levels of relative risk are acceptable, and prioritize and allocate resources among all homeland security partners...."  Here's the 2009 formulation from the Obama administration's homeland security agenda: "Allocate Funds Based on Risk: Allocate our precious homeland security dollars according to risk, not as pork-barrel spending or a form of general revenue sharing. Eliminate waste, fraud and abuse that cost the nation billions of Department of Homeland Security dollars." The risk acolytes sometimes sound like one of the characters in Harrold and Kumar: "If you want to know the secret of being, you'll come with us." Seven and a half years after the onset of the Overseas Contingency Operation (nee GWOT), there remains a substantial gap between the theory and the practice of the risk formula.   A June 2008 GAO report concludes DHS "reasonably" uses "empirical risk analysis and policy judgment" to allocate grants. (See another helpful GAO report on this issue here.) I read "empirical risk analysis" to mean DHS used numbers. Where do those numbers come from? I read "policy judgment" to mean politics and opinions were involved. Who is making those "policy judgments," and how do people outside Washington get in on that judgment? I read "reasonable" in the GAO report to be an acknowledgement that determining risk is really hard; DHS has done they best they can with the data available and the constraints they face; they are better at doing this than they used to be; and they are continuing to improve. But is it acceptable inside the "fierce urgency of now" to wait 7 years to get an equation right? What to do about this?  How is it that homeland security came to place so much faith in the logic of risk and its conceptual offspring?  Are there alternatives we can try? Perhaps we could acknowledge homeland security risk assessment's dependence on a falsely precise empiricism, and experiment with allocating resources explicitly (and with accountability) on the basis of opinion and politics.  Or maybe we could try an allocation strategy built around the "redundancy, flexibility, and diffuse control" options Geerat J. Vermeij discusses in Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World? (Edited by Sagarin and Taylor, and available here.) Another approach is to blow off  such alternatives (what's a nice word for naive?), and work harder at "solving" the problem. I came across a numbingly-titled but intellectually honest paper called: "Incorporating Assessments of Terrorism Risk in Homeland Security Resource  Allocation Decision Making: Closing the Gap Between Current and Needed  Capabilities." Its 10 pages are worth reading by anyone who cares about homeland security and risk, and who believes "the problem" is fixable.  (The paper is available here; it appears to have been written to support an April 13-16 conference called "Risk-Informed Decision Making for HLS Resource Allocation;" information about what looks to be a thoroughly interesting conference can be found here). Some excerpts from the paper [and my overly simplified interpretations]:

"Despite the best efforts of numerous experts from the government, industry, and academia, fully effective and transparent integration of risk assessments into DHS homeland resource allocation decision making remains an elusive goal." [The theory is not working in practice.]

"The risk construct ... [Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequences] is logical, intuitively appealing, and consistent with conceptualizations of risk used in other domains. However, uncertainty inherent in deriving estimates for its components in the case of terrorism risk continues to compromise its usefulness in DHS resource allocation decision making. As a result, terrorism risk assessments have not played the prominent role they were expected to play in DHS resource allocation decision making. More robust and defensible methods for generating required inputs for this terrorism risk construct are required if it is to become an important factor in homeland security resource allocation decision making."   [The theory sounds good, but the data to use it aren't there.]

Risk Management:

"Significant perceived shortfalls in our current ability to generate defensible estimates of the threat of terrorism, terrorism vulnerability, and the consequences of terrorism continue to hamper DHS’ ability to effectively incorporate terrorism risk assessments into its resource allocation decision making process. In addition, predicting and/or measuring the risk reduction effect or payoff of terrorism risk management initiatives remain a complex and unresolved challenge." [We can't defensibly calculate the values the formula needs; we also can't figure out the effect of reducing risk.]

Threat: "[The] statistically oriented, historical frequency approach [to determine threat] is useful for that portion [of the] DHS’ “all hazards” mission space associated with natural catastrophic and accidental events. However, [that analytical approach] does not apply to the threat (i.e., probability of attack) of terrorism. Risk analysts assessing the risk of terrorist activities are not faced with accidental random loss-inducing outcomes or acts of nature. They must deal with the potential for harm and/or loss deliberately inflicted by intelligent and adaptive adversaries willing to operate outside normally accepted patterns of behavior. Simply identifying all potential terrorists is a monumental challenge. Predicting their behavior – i.e., which targets or kinds of targets terrorists may strike, how they will choose to strike (i.e. weapons and/or threat vector), and when they will strike is an even more daunting and uncertain element of terrorism risk assessment." [Terrorism is a really different kind of threat.]

Vulnerability: "Assessing the vulnerability of potential terrorism targets might seem to be a theoretically more tractable problem. However, it requires detailed knowledge of the target, the nature of the terrorist attack, and the circumstances under which it will occur. Thus, vulnerability assessment involves many of the same uncertainties encountered when assessing the intentions and capabilities of potential terrorist adversaries.  Even where credible estimates are possible, the sheer magnitude of the task of assessing the vulnerabilities of every potentially lucrative terrorist targets in our open society is overwhelming." [Everything is vulnerable to something.]

Consequences: "Predicting the consequences of terrorism events also presents difficult intellectual, philosophical, and emotional challenges. Most previous catastrophic risk assessments have limited their prediction and/or measurement of consequences to direct effects which can usually be estimated in relatively straightforward, transparent, and reliable ways. These direct effects typically include human fatalities, injuries, and the direct economic cost of the physical damage inflicted. However, it is widely acknowledged that terrorism events usually result in a broad range of secondary or indirect effects or costs that can be more extensive, and often more important and long lasting....Not only are these secondary or indirect effects of terrorist events difficult to predict or measure, but knowing how to prioritize them, and/or to compare them with the consequences of catastrophic accidents and/or natural disasters remains an unanswered question with complex societal and emotional dimensions." [Consequence streams approach singularity.] Risk Mitigation Effectiveness/Cost-Effectiveness: "Assessing the effectiveness or payoff of a terrorism risk mitigation measure might initially seem to be a reasonably straightforward challenge. However, the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of any terrorism risk mitigation initiative is inevitably dependent upon, and confounded by the way terrorists react to that measure....  Related closely to the issue of predicting the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of risk mitigation measures is deciding how much our Nation should be willing to allocate to terrorism risk reduction, or how great a risk of terrorism we should be willing to accept. In reaching this judgment it must be recognized explicitly that resources allocated to reducing the risk of terrorism impose an economic cost on the Nation since they are unavailable for other needs. Thus, anti-terror initiatives represent other opportunities foregone and must be evaluated as such." [Perhaps money allocated to homeland security could help the Nation more if it were used for something other than homeland security.]

Maybe risk can be salvaged as a way to allocate homeland security resources effectively.  If you are in that camp, I think you will find the paper -- and the questions it contains for the conference panels -- intriguing and thoughtful. The problems we have experienced trying to get homeland security risk assessments correct might also signal an opportunity to try something fundamentally different.  Maybe we have traveled long enough down the risk assessment path. Captain Renault: What in heaven's name brought you to Casablanca? Rick: My health. I came to Casablanca for the waters. Captain Renault: The waters? What waters? We're in the desert. Rick: I was misinformed.

A new version of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has been released. The complete report is available from DHS . The 188 page report (with appendices) opens with the following purpose statement: Protecting and ensuring the resiliency of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. Some call-outs: Resilience is an increasingly popular term-of-art. Bad things will happen. How can we bounce-back more quickly and completely? Is resilience the new “robust” – jargon to camouflage lack of thought? Or will the Obama administration be serious in cultivating true resilience? The risk of catastrophic consequence requires prevention and mitigation. Response, no matter how effective, is insufficient. CIKR are vulnerable to terrorist, natural, manmade and technological hazards. It not just a war against terrorism, it is a struggle to manage and mitigate risk. CIKR can be weaponized. CIKR are not just potential targets. Transportation resources, material processing, financial systems and much more can be used to attack other targets. Elephant, gorilla, or other significant aspect treated as if it were a kitten: Private sector ownership and control of CIKR is acknowledged but not seriously engaged. The goals and processes of the NIPP will only be meaningful if enthusiastically embraced by the private sector. How this level of collaboration might be cultivated is not given serious attention. This absence reminds me of Chris Bellavita’s (Director of Programs at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security) fabulous fable of what works and what does not work in planning of every sort. This is available on YouTube (have your audio on).

Day One at DHS started with Secretary Napolitano at the helm issuing five Action Directives centered on the Protection mission for the Department. The directives request internal reviews to be conducted on how DHS protects critical infrastructure, conducts risk analysis, shares information with state and local authorities, “integration” of DHS engagement of states, localities, and tribes, and protection measures aimed at air, surface, and maritime transportation sector. The last one includes a “side by side comparison of the threat environment, resources and personnel devoted to each transportation sector.” “One of my top priorities is to unify this department and to create a common culture. These action directives are designed to begin a review, evaluation and dialogue between the various functions of this department and me,” said Secretary Napolitano. Further directives are expected to come soon concerning preparedness, response, recovery, and immigration. Following is the text describing the directives as issued at DHS:

• Critical infrastructure protection. This core mission of DHS entails a broad mandate to reduce the vulnerability of key systems and structures to natural and manmade threats. DHS oversees the national critical infrastructure list and manages 18 infrastructure sectors established under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, with primary responsibility for information technology, telecommunications, chemical, transportation, emergency services, and postal and shipping. This entails extensive dealings with other federal agencies, states, and the private sector, involving collaboration, data collection, risk analysis, and sharing of best practices. What is the current status of the critical infrastructure list, relations with the 18 sector security councils and the other departments that have critical infrastructure protection roles? What are the plans to enhance protection? How do we enhance private sector participation? An oral report is due Jan. 28. • Risk analysis. Given the extensive number of vulnerabilities to manmade and natural disasters and the limitations on resources, determining national priorities and the judicious distribution of resources are a major element of the department’s mission. What is the status of risk analysis metrics and what is the plan and time frame for setting up a full-blown system to govern the establishment of critical infrastructure programs, the priorities among national planning scenarios, and the distribution of grants to state, local, and tribal entities? More broadly, how can DHS enhance risk management as the basis of decision making? An oral report is due Jan. 28. • State and local intelligence sharing. Core to the department’s ability to successfully carry out its mission is sharing information within the department, and between DHS and other federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector entities. Across the department there are currently multiple operational, technological, programmatic, and policy-related activities underway to focus on improved information sharing. o Given the importance of this mission, please provide a complete inventory of all operational, programmatic, technology, and policy related activities currently underway. o Provide an evaluation of which activities hold the most promise for achieving the smooth flow of information on a real time basis. The inventory and evaluation should take into account the voices of all stakeholders, especially state, local and tribal entities. The evaluation should also consider the private sector's perspective and its relationship to these stakeholders. o The inventory and evaluation should focus on ensuring that the department’s information sharing efforts are closely linked to government-wide efforts to establish the Information Sharing Environment as called for the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. o DHS Intelligence & Analysis should evaluate whether DHS is meeting all of its information sharing missions as described in Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, especially Section 201(d)(1). An oral report is due Jan. 28. • Transportation security. TSA is directed to provide a review to the Secretary of the current strategies, plans and programs for security of the air, surface, and maritime transportation sector, to include a side by side comparison of the threat environment, resources and personnel devoted to each transportation sector. TSA shall coordinate, as necessary, with all pertinent components and offices in DHS, as well as with all relevant outside bodies and advisory councils. An oral report is due Jan. 28. • State, local and tribal integration. To promote policies to more fully integrate American state, local, and tribal governments in the development of policies and programs to protect our nation and help it recover from natural and manmade disasters consistent with the homeland security interests of the United States, the DHS Office of Intergovernmental Affairs shall: o Immediately contact every relevant governmental association, e.g. the National Governors Association, National Association of Counties, League of Cities and Towns, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, National Emergency Management Association, and the National Congress of American Indians, announcing that DHS intends to revitalize its relationship with state, local, and tribal governments effective immediately with the intent of creating a working partnership. o Immediately plan for an accelerated process of soliciting and collecting input from our state, local and tribal partners on how to improve the programs and processes of DHS. o This input should include, but not be limited to, the following topics: a. Critical infrastructure b. Grant making c. Interoperability d. Intelligence collection and dissemination e. Emergency services A preliminary written report is due Feb. 10.

I'm still out a Livermore with the Stimson Center task force and so only have a couple updates: HLSwatch reader William Cumming sent in word that The Society of American Military Engineers, Alexandria, Va., has been chosen for the role of Secretariat for The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP)-a public-private partnership dedicated to improving the nation's critical infrastructure resilience (SAME). The role of Secretariat had formerly been filled by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). As Secretariat, SAME will provide logistical support to the organization; however, TISP will retain its own identity, branding and mission. Part of SAME's new role in moving TISP forward will include helping to initiate a series of quarterly forums addressing issues related to the nation's infrastructure and featuring panel discussions with a wide variety of leaders. In the meantime, David Bodenheimer of Crowell & Moring will moderate a panel discussion entitled “Securing Our Critical Infrastructure: Money, Security, and Homeland Security Opportunities” on October 2, 2008, with: • Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security • Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Partner, Monument Policy Group and Former Staff Director and General Counsel, House Homeland Security Committee • Paul B. Kurtz, Partner, Good Harbor Consulting, LLC • Mick Kicklighter, Director, Center for Infrastructure Protection, School of Law, George Mason University.

China won the competition to host the recently concluded 2008 Olympics on July 13, 2001 – just two months before 9/11. For those wondering whether or not we are more secure today than we were before 9/11, consider a broader metric offered today by Thomas Friedman. Friedman reflects on how China and America have spent the last seven years:

China has been preparing for the Olympics; we've been preparing for al-Qaeda. They've been building better stadiums, subways, airports, roads and parks. And we've been building better metal detectors, armored Humvees and pilotless drones.

The Olympics are over – and were a triumph. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, remains a threat. Fighting terrorism is harder than putting on a $50 billion international competition. (The latter is the Olympics.) But, Friedman points out that the hidden costs are beginning to show:

Compare arriving at La Guardia's dumpy terminal in New York City and driving through the crumbling infrastructure into Manhattan with arriving at Shanghai's sleek airport and taking the 220 mph magnetic levitation train, which uses electromagnetic propulsion instead of steel wheels and tracks to get to town in a blink.

At least he notes that China is not equally blessed. Beyond Beijing, that country is still in worse shape than the U.S. Friedman’s point is different: Consider how much modern infrastructure has been built in China since 2001 and how much infrastructure has been postponed in America since 2001. The next president needs a devoted nation-building program in America. “The next president,” Friedman explains, “can have all the foreign affairs experience in the world, but it will be useless if we, as a country, are weak.” Homeland Security, in other words, is a critical part of keeping America competitive and investments in securing America can also pay dividends in quality of life. A safe and efficient public transportation system is both more secure and more effective. The next election is not about who is tough enough on terrorists. Both Obama and McCain are equally committed to combating terrorism. The real metric is who is “strong enough, focused enough, creative enough and unifying enough to get Americans to rebuild America.”

Yesterday the Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee held its hearing entitled “Partnering with the Private Sector to Secure Critical Infrastructure: Has the Department of Homeland Security Abandoned the Resilience-based Approach?” I had the opportunity to testify along with DHS Assistant Secretary Bob Stephan, Bill Raisch of the International Center for Enterprise Preparedness at NYU, Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New Orleans Health Department, and Shawn Johnson, Vice Chairman (soon-to-be chair), Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council. Dr. Stephens provided stark details about the state of the health system's ability to manage another crisis in New Orleans, given the poor state of the infrastructure there nearly three years after Hurricane Katrina. The 14th is part of a month of hearings the Homeland Security Committee is dedicating to resilience. Wednesday’s hearing focused on clarifying exactly how DHS views resilience as a priority in the overall strategy of the Department and on identifying ways that DHS can do better in working with the private sector to increase our resilience. Perhaps the best way to paraphrase everyone’s position would be as follows: Chairwoman Jackson-Lee: Resilience should be part and parcel of the nation’s effort to protect the homeland. To do so requires that DHS effectively share threat information with the private sector, measure resilience (since protection can’t be measured: when is enough, enough?), and think creatively about the enterprise value to a company that invests in resilience. Citing the number of times we use the term resilience isn’t proof enough that action is being taken. A/S Stephan: We already do resilience. It is mentioned ## times among our existing documents, such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the National Response Framework, and various sector specific documents. Through the NIPP, sector-specific plans are developed to accomplish the goal of security, resiliency, and preparedness. Moreover, the emphasis on resilience is a red herring generated by some in academia and think tanks to suggest that (a) DHS is misguided and (b) we ought to sacrifice efforts to prevent and protect in order to bounce back from likely fatal attacks. Czerwinski: Resilience is more than the ability to “bounce back.” Measures to make the private sector more resilient must provide a “double bottom-line” that delivers both the ability to minimize the impacts of terrorism or natural disasters, but also the value of increased performance and improved commerce during the majority of the time when a threat isn’t present. Doing so requires connecting effectively across the sectors with a balanced approach to three key factors: strategic human capital, technology, and governance. Naturally, the framework offered in our paper on Global Movement Management would be a brilliant step forward. Johnson: Nothing to see here. The Financial Services Sector has worked closely with the Treasury Department since long before 9/11 to manage an interdependent relationship among partners and competitors in this sector. DHS, through the FS-Sector Coordinating Council, works well in coordinating our efforts to be resilient, which for this sector means the ability to get business back online if ever a disruption were to interrupt our operations. I wouldn't change a thing. Raisch: If resilience is the goal, then a method to measure or assess progress is indispensable in order for businesses to determine if their investments in resilience are actually accomplishing anything and to be able to claim to stakeholders or possible adversaries that they are prepared to manage a crisis or disruption. Voluntary accrediting measures provided for in the 9/11 Act (H.R. 1) require the government to take the initiative “as a catalyst and investor in this process.” Stephens: Help. Main take-away is this: Resilience is still a complex concept that can be approached from a variety of different angles. DHS is doing a lot to make sure the private sector is prepared and protected, but more can be done through an overarching framework that recognizes the interdependencies among the different sectors and the ways in which the risks of the 21st century make those interdependencies more important than any specific sector. Incentivizing the private sector to take action can be done by embracing a broader definition of resilience to include some level of value that actually improves commerce during those times when no attack or disaster is taking place. Investments in security and performance can be mutually reinforcing, not just mutually exclusive. The streamed recording is available at the Subcommittee's website on the hearing.

The Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee convenes its resilience hearing this Wednesday, the 14th. I'll testify with DHS Assistant Secretary Bob Stephan, Bill Raisch of the International Center for Enterprise Preparedness at NYU, and the Director of the New Orleans Health Department. The 14th is part of a month of hearings the Homeland Security Committee is dedicating to resilience. Wednesday's hearing is intended to educate the members on what resiliency really means, what the private sector is doing to achieve resilience, and how DHS can work with the private sector within a framework to promote resilience. The hearing begins at 2PM in the Homeland Security Committee's room (311 Cannon House Office Building). Consider attending if you are in WDC. It’ll also stream at the Subcommittee website after the hearing concludes. Among other things, I intend to describe ways in which the Global Movement Management framework applies to the goal of resiliency and will upload the oral statement later on Wednesday. In the meantime, please feel free to send in your thoughts on the issues in which the Subcommittee is interested for this hearing.

One of our readers offered a healthy does of skepticism about resilience as a concept. I thought it would be valuable to make this part of a new post to follow up the recent coverage of this topic and the hearings in the House this week. >>[Jonah does] not include concerns about response in this concept: “Turning victims into patients is important for response, but resilience is different.” Yet your guest poster, Robert Kelly, does: “That is the essence of resilience – the ability to rapidly respond to and recover from a catastrophic event.” I see a difference between response/recovery and resilience. Being resilient should render the ability to respond effectively. However, rapidly flying in emergency food and water to a hurricane zone, for example, to limit the hardship of the victims would be response, while resilience would be building homes less vulnerable to the effects of a hurricane and getting the ports and businesses up and running. (I should note that my guests on this blog don’t have to agree with me and vice versa.) >>And Steve Flynn includes it among his “four pillars of resilience” in his recent Foreign Affairs piece: “Second is resourcefulness, which involves skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds…Ensuring that U.S. society is resourceful means providing adequate resources to the National Guard, the American Red Cross, public health officials, firefighters, emergency-room staffs, and other emergency planners and responders.” It is important to take Steve’s four factors as a whole. If we selected only the third factor -- rapid recovery -- I could see the point that my separation of response and resilience would be problematic. However, Steve's factors are robustness, resourcefulness, rapid recovery, and the means to absorb new lessons. Taken together, I think you'd agree that resilience is more than emergency response, but nevertheless dependant on it being executed well. >>Unfortunately, I think the concept requires a lot of refining. But hopefully these hearings will not be the only cuts at this effort. I, too, hope these hearings are the beginning of a sustained effort to build in, rather than bolt on, the important capability of resilience. But the concept of resilience already has been refined to a point that enables action. First steps would include making resilience a strategic goal as part of such plans as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. To refine this concept further, consider the following parameters:

Resilience should afford a deterrent value: Terrorists are not deterred by fear of retaliation, but by fear of failure. Resilience delivers a deterrent value by reducing the likelihood that the impact of an intentional attack will transpire.

Resilience helps to avoid self-inflicted wounds: Resilience -- if done right -- affords the decision maker the enhanced ability to focus response efforts on the part of the system that is actually stressed.

Investments in resilience should be "dual use" in nature: Investments in resiliency not only address vulnerabilities due to terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Resilience also facilitates the global flows of trade/travel.

The private sector is an asset first, a target second: This is a critical step toward being able to make the case for private sector engagement. Several options exist.

Redundancy is not resiliency. Having costly back-up systems or two of everything is the easy and most expensive way to “bend and not break.” If done correctly, resiliency is more akin to the concept of Intelligent Immunity we put forth in the latest GMM paper.

The Middle East is beginning to appreciate the importance of homeland security in new ways, and the United Arab Emirates appears to be at the forefront. With what’s being billed as the Middle East's first event focused exclusively on homeland security, Abu Dhabi will host a conference on protecting national borders, building disaster resilience, and countering international terrorism next month. Entitled “International Security / National Resilience,” the gathering takes place March 2-5, 2008, at Abu Dhabi and is sponsored by HH General Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, along with the UAE Ministry of Interior. ISNR Abu Dhabi follows ISNR London, which was held 4-5 December 2007. Last year the UAE President, His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan created a new government agency charged with protecting vital facilities and utilities in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. With critical infrastructure that includes onshore and offshore petroleum facilities, power generation stations, water desalination plants, a natural gas transportation network, airports, seaports, and service networks, its no wonder they see the value in their own version of a DHS. However, since all of this infrastructure is owned by the emirate, they’ll likely have an easier go of it than DHS, which must navigate a domain of critical infrastructure owned almost entirely by the private sector. Promoters of ISNR Abu Dhabi explain that the gathering will provide a comprehensive look at homeland security issues to enable “governmental authorities to respond resiliently to natural disasters as well as man-made ones.” This is just the sort of opportunity the U.S. Department of Homeland Security should capitalize on by sending delegates armed with speeches and presentations that explain the way we perceive the threat, the lessons we’ve learned, and the interest we have in supporting their efforts in a partnership against a threat that requires cooperation in order to be combated. This blog has written before about the opportunities – some missed – for sharing our expertise in homeland security to benefit reluctant friends overseas. We have a shared interest in protecting our civilians. And the U.S. could really use some friends nowadays in that region.

The Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa was the target of an armed assault yesterday. Nevermind the talk of flying airplanes into reactors, this is a real world case wherein armed men were able to penetrate a series of security measures and actually enter the control room. This article was sent in by reader Steve Bogden. A CRS study in 2005 entitled “Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack,” argues that despite the heightened security measures imposed on nuclear facilities in the U.S. by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, industry has been slow to implement them. The NRC explains its position on protecting nuclear facilities here with its three phase plan that was to be completed by now. I do not know where this effort stands. In the past, security measures known as “buffers” or “layers” were considered the best way to restrict unauthorized access to such crucial infrastructure as a nuclear power plant’s control panel. Earlier this month, a man was discovered to be bringing a pipe bomb into a nuclear plant in Arizona – the largest one in the country in fact.  If the perpetrators of the break-in at Pelindaba had been armed with such a bomb, it is doubtful that any existing buffers would have stopped a terrible outcome. Here is the article:

Attack at Pelindaba nuclear facility By Graeme Hosken The Pretoria News November 09, 2007 A brazen attack by four gunmen on the Pelindaba nuclear facility has left a senior emergency officer seriously injured. Anton Gerber, Necsa emergency services operational officer spoke to the Pretoria News from his hospital bed hours after the attack. He was shot in the chest when the gunmen stormed the facility's emergency response control room in the early hours of Thursday morning. The shooting comes four months after Necsa's newly appointed services general manager Eric Lerata, 43, was gunned down in front of his Montana home after returning from a business trip in France. 'one of them attacked me with a screwdriver' Pelindaba is regarded as one of the country's most secure national key points. It is surrounded by electric fencing, has 24-hour CCTV surveillance, security guards and security controls and checkpoints. The attack comes as the country prepares to preside over an International Atomic Energy Agency convention on nuclear safety. The convention is aimed at achieving a high level of global nuclear safety via safety related technical co-operation; establishing and maintaining effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards and preventing accidents with radiological consequences. A visibly shaken Gerber, who was rushed to Eugene Marais hospital, on Thursday said that he was sitting in the control room with his fiancée Ria Meiring when he heard a loud bang. 'I could not let anything like that happen' Meiring, who was working nightshift, is the supervisor of the control room. Gerber said he kept Meiring company. "I do not like it when she is at work at night and I go with her to keep her company and ensure that she is safe," he said. Describing the attack Gerber said they were inside the electronically sealed control room when they heard a loud bang. They then spotted the gunmen coming into the facility's eastern block. It is believed that the attackers gained access to the building by using a ladder from Pelindaba's fire brigade and scaling a wall. The men are thought to have forced open a window by pulling out several louvers. Pushing Meiring underneath a desk, Gerber attacked two of the gunmen as they forced their way into the control room and ran straight for the control panel. "I did not know what they were going to do. I just kept on hitting them even when one of them attacked me with a screwdriver. "I knew that if I stopped they would attack Ria or do something to the panel. "I could not let anything like that happen," he said. Unbeknownst to Gerber one of the robbers had shot him in the chest as he fought them off. The bullet narrowly missed his heart breaking a rib before puncturing his lung. Doctors said the bullet missed his spine by 2cm. Gerber, who at one stage thought he was going to die, said he had been very scared. "The facility is meant to be safe. There are security guards, electric fences and security control points. These things are not meant to happen," he said. Necsa spokesperson Chantal Janneker confirmed the attack. She declined to say how the gunmen had gained access to the facility or whether they had stolen anything. Janneker said Necsa was conducting an internal investigation into the attack. Once the police investigation was complete Necsa would divulge what happened, she said. Later in the afternoon, Pretoria News was phoned by a man identifying himself as a Necsa legal adviser, saying the newspaper will be breaching the National Keypoints Act by publishing the story. He said that Necsa may seek a court order preventing dissemination of the story. He claimed that the interview with Gerber was "unethical" as "he was under sedation and thus incoherent" when it was conducted. Pretoria News sought and was granted permission to interview Gerber, by hospital management, and Gerber himself. While he was obviously in pain, he appeared coherent and made sense throughout the interview. His recall of the events was sequential and to the point. He also agreed to have his picture taken in his hospital bed. North West police spokesperson Superintendent Louis Jacobs said that no arrests had been made. "A case of armed robbery and attempted murder are being investigated," he said.

GAO released a statement this week on the SAFE Port Act. The Act covered a range of policies focused on maritime security, but may be best known for its mandate to scan 100% of all incoming maritime cargo. DHS is principally responsible for executing on the Act, but relevant component agencies include the U.S Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the Transportation Security Agency. GAO delved into this one. They “visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors.” GAO’s recommendations focus on the need to develop strategic plans, better plan the use of DHS human capital, and establish performance measures. The programs addressed in this document can be organized as follows: