Homeland Security Watch

Carol Haave will be named the next DHS Assistant Secretary for International Affairs on (or around) July 7, 2008. While it may at first seem ironic that our Homeland Security agency has an international affairs portfolio, this is perhaps one of the more interesting and valuable position in the DHS leadership. Readers will be familiar with proposals made here and elsewhere for an elevated role for the A/S for International Affairs at DHS. The previous occupant, Marissa Lino, is a former diplomat. (She left unexpectedly after only months on the job.) The new A/S has a decidedly different background on the international scene.

Haave served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations. In those positions, she led the development of the Iraq National ID Card program. Additionally, she led a cross-DOD team to develop policies, process, and procedures for sharing counterterrorism information with coalition partners.

Prior to joining DOD in 2001, Haave spent more than 15 years as a consultant to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. There she focused on transitioning technology into the military and commercial markets, and was a team leader for the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff.

She received a direct commission as a military police officer in the Army and was one of the first female Army officers to attend airborne school.

Yesterday IBM and GW’s Homeland Security Policy Institute convened a panel event and discussion entitled “Technology in Homeland Security: A Double-Edged Sword.”

Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for S&T at DHS kicked it off with a presentation on how his directorate views the technology landscape, with a focus on not falling victim to the “failure of imagination” the 9/11 Commission blamed as one of the reasons the 9/1 attacks were not disrupted. This notion caused a number of us to ask about the practical limits on such an approach to technology. Specifically, how to insure against spending money on an “anything’s possible” mentality that invests in countermeasures against any threat imaginable? Buswell explained that White House guidance, Department level plans, and input from the customer community (the component agencies at DHS) helps bound the imagination.

Jan Lane stepped in for Frank Cilluffo to moderate Busewell’s presentation and Q&A and I joined the panel as moderator and occasional referee. Frank was able to join toward the latter half and weigh in on the issues.

Our panelists provided a diverse treatment of this challenging topic. Parney Albright, former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, and now Managing Director & Vice Chairman at Civitas, weighed in on the challenges confronting the innovators on the business side of the equation who seek to take pre-prototype solutions to market and how that shapes the spectrum of technology solutions deployed at the state level.

Christian Beckner, Professional Staff Member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, explained some of the rough patches still preventing a more accelerated trend in technology as a homeland security advantage, as well as indications of areas of interest from an oversight perspective. (Note that Christian spoke not on behalf of the Committee.)

Greg Nojeim, Director of the Project on Freedom, Security, and Technology at the Center for Democracy and Technology offered insightful warnings about the unintended consequences of technology when it is not developed or deployed with privacy protections at the initial stages. He cited such things as the PATRIOT Act and government wire-tapping outside of FISA.

Langdon Greenhalgh, CEO of Global Emergency Group, provided the needed perspective of the international emergency response community, which depends to an ever increasing degree on technology as an enabler.

I’m working with Jan and Frank to generate an after action report that condenses the highlights of the discussion. Look for it to be available here and possibly on the HSPI website.

Over 70 participants attended representing the following, among other, organizations:

• DHS, NPPD, IP, HITRAC
• DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council
• Homeland Security Institute (DHS S&T)
• DHS S&T
• U.S. Secret Service
• Department of State
• Department of Energy
• The White House
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
• Government Accountability Office
• European Union
• IBM
• Bingham Consulting Group
• Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Lockheed Martin
• Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
• Trade Security Institute
• Dutko Worldwide
• The Washington Times
• USA Today
• Swedish Institute of International Affairs
• Embassy of El Salvador
• Embassy of Switzerland
• International Association of Fire Chiefs
• Embassy of Australia
• International Development Bank
• Latin America Working Group
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Partnership for Public Service
• Center for Democracy and Technology
• MSCL, LLC International Maritime Consultancy
• Oxford Analytica, Inc.
• American Red Cross
• Institute for Regulatory Science

Secretary Chertoff and his Mexican counterpart, Juan Camilo Mouriño Terrazo, Secretary of the Interior, signed a binding agreement between the U.S. and Mexico on science and technology related to homeland security. The signing took place at last week’s annual North American Leaders Summit in New Orleans. President Bush and the leaders of Canada and Mexico also attended.

The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for executing on the agreement, which was described as focusing on cross-border cooperation, information sharing, research and development, test and evaluation, pilot projects, and vulnerability and risk assessments.

Readers may recall the posts here about missed opportunities for greater international coordination in combating terrorism by way of strategic relationships based on a common interest in protecting civilians. Well, I have to say that I was overly focused on Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean regions to even think of Mexico as a potential partner in this regard. Or maybe I’ve watched too much Lou Dobbs.

This agreement is being vaunted as a framework to enhance scientific and technical understanding for the benefit of both countries. Its mission-area focuses include maritime security, counter-explosives equipment, the detection of infectious diseases, travel and trade security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Not much is ruled out.

This will get the bizarre and misguided Minute Men and Mr. Dobbs talking: The agreement allows the sharing of classified information between Mexico and the United States and can be used across the federal government. The professionals in the intel community and law enforcement know the limits in this regard. As analysts become more proficient at writing to the tear line and open-source material becomes more instrumental in identifying and assessing risks, this type of information sharing only makes sense.

Models for this exist with long-time near-peer allies like the UK, Canada, and Australia. But Mexico is a different case altogether. That the focus is first on science and technology is worth pointing out. This effort is also intended to build the capacity of our Mexican partners so that better coordination can take place. S&T is not only less polarizing than building a wall, its also far and away a wiser investment for the long-term: We gain improved Mexican cooperation and capabilities.

Below the radar, similar efforts are taking place through non-government channels to engage countries such as Iran, Israel, and Palestine on the basis of science and technology. From what I can tell so far, this is time, expertise, and money well spent.

Readers may recall the February 28, 2008, post that described ways in which we could work with other countries to build their counter- and anti-terrorism capacity through existing multilateral mechanisms to gain better cooperation overseas. The Center for Strategic and International Studies yesterday rolled out their new report that delves into the same topic with a focus on how the State Department and Pentagon ought to be better integrated in executing security assistance programs. While interagency coordination is the goal, and the report makes significant gains in this direction, there no mention of the Department of Homeland Security and its overseas presence serving a role.

The explicit recommendation in the paper is to rebalance the roles of State and DOD in carrying out “preventative civilian foreign and development policy instruments.” In doing so, the authors of the report, Kathleen Hicks and Stephen Morrison, recommend a better engagement of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and international NGO’s. Congresswoman Susan Davis, Congressman Geoff Davis, former DOD CFO Dov Zakheim, and president and CEO of CARE USA Helene Gayle spoke on the panel that convened at the Capitol to introduce the paper’s findings.

The aspects of the report most relevant to this blog deal with counter terrorism capacity building. The report suggests that “joint strategic planning and coordination” ought to occur between State, DOD, and USAID. The report offers solid recommendations for accomplishing this, but includes no mention of the role of the federal agency most involved with civilian efforts to combat terrorism: the Department of Homeland Security. The panel expressed doubt that DHS could contribute much to the mission due to its own lack of organization. The moderator even questioned whether the topic has anything to do with the new report.

It is no surprise that DHS does not immediately come to mind when considering an international strategy. However, this one, focused on civilian capacity for combating terrorism with reduced role for DOD, is incomplete with out DHS. And while DHS may not yet be up to the task, let’s make it so. The February 28, 2008, post offers some specific options.

Much of the CSIS report focuses on critical details about how things work now and where the drivers of the problems actually exist. For example, it describes the potential of USAFRICOM, the use and misuse of CERP funds, and the lessons learned from Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It is clear that an interest remains in attempting to reassert the role of the State Department’s regional Assistant Secretaries in the context of powerful country ambassadors and unified combatant commanders (formerly CINCs). There is a call for joint regional planning entities to better integrate these roles.

For more on this topic, see the 2001 report on Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies. The report is the product of a taskforce led by former Army Chief of Staff Shy Meyer and former Undersecretary for Political Affairs Tom Pickering.

Reader Eric asked about the adoption by other nations of the ‘homeland security’ concept. HLSWatch asked Secretary Chertoff in yesterday’s meeting to discuss his recent trip to the Middle East. A member of the media there asked him a question that allies in general ask the U.S.:

The “U.S. fights terrorism overseas to prevent terrorists from performing terrorist acts in the U.S. What’s your comment on these thoughts?

Read: The U.S. advocates a layered global defense against terrorism to keep the threat away from the homeland. This implies to audiences overseas that we’d rather have it out on their homelands. Can’t blame them for assuming the worst, but Chertoff is right to say that a layered defense is the best defense. How that helps allies is in how we define “layers.”

A layered defense isn’t just about geographic layers though. There are information layers that reveal intentions and enable us and our allies to act before an attack. Financial flows also serve as a layer to create a hurdle that terrorists must cross in organizing an attack. Layers like these are opportunities to complicate the efforts of an adversary and force him into a vulnerable or detectable position.

Allies don’t just benefit from the U.S. pursuing a layered defense. We all do since a true layered defense in the 21st century requires certain basic agreements to be struck among allies. They include the nature of the threat, concepts of success, and acceptable trade-offs. In this sense, any progress the U.S. and Europe make in resolving information sharing for transatlantic flights is mutually beneficial. Of course, if we can’t convince our allies of the mutual benefit, either there isn’t one or we’re not very convincing.

As described on this blog before, the U.S. can better engage multilateral entities, such as NATO, ASEAN, and the EU, to work with important countries in pursuit of the shared interest in combating terrorism and protecting civilian populations.

In researching further details of what NATO has to offer, I decided to highlight here the Alliance’s Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism deserves attention by this year’s NATO Summit, taking place this week in Hungary. The PAP-T involves nearly forty countries through NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Participating countries agree on the level of their participation individually with NATO. PAP-T facilitates intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, the development of capabilities for defense against terrorist attacks and for managing the consequences of attacks. The PAP-T takes a pragmatic approach and focuses on:

Consultations and information sharing

Operations and exercises

Assisting Partners’ efforts against terrorism

Targeting terrorist finances

Civil emergency planning

Cooperating with other international organizations

Science and environment

With the heads of State and Government from the 26 NATO nations, 24 Partners, and other representatives from international institutions meeting in Bucharest this week to discuss NATO enlargement and operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo as part of NATO’s biannual summit, the dearth of counterterrorism issues on the agenda is worth noting. Readers are encouraged to send in any comments with details about the Summit that actually do address this topic.

We’ve discussed on this blog the opportunities for greater cooperation between the U.S. and critical countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions that is focused on the shared interest we have in protecting civilians.  Secretary Chertoff is in Kuwait today meeting with government counterparts, including:

• Assistant Undersecretary of Kuwait’s Interior Ministry for Border Security Affairs Major General Suleiman Al-Fahad,
• Director General of the General Directorate of Security of Land Borders Brigadier Abdullah Al-Mehanna, and
• Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry Lieutenant General Ahmed Al-Rujaib.

The focus of his meetings appears to be on border security and what he called “security cooperation.”  This is critically important dialogue that can enable the U.S. to demonstrate both our capabilities and our lessons learned over the past five years of having the Department of Homeland Security.  However, Kuwait is low-hanging fruit in the diplomatic realm.

Working with Kuwait is valuable, but it isn’t exactly difficult to obtain their cooperation.  (Long history there.)  However, the same cannot be said about their media. Chertoff sat for a brief media roundtable yesterday (transcript here) in Kuwait City to field some questions. Sure there were some softballs about our airports, but these questions typified the exchange:

President Bush has mentioned…that the … U.S. fights terrorism overseas to prevent terrorists from performing terrorist acts in the U.S. What’s your comment on these thoughts and these statements from the President, given the fact that some Arab countries are in contradiction with those statements?

How are you trying to convince Arab countries with this policy, and is that part of your agenda for the trip?

Can you comment on the policy of the U.S. to manage crisis in the Middle East, given the fact that Syria and Iran are in almost a war state?

Is there a list of what’s called the blacklist of people (inaudible) to the U.S…?

But this question is the one that we sort of expected:

Since the U.S. announced a launch on a war on terrorism after the event of September 11th, in your assessment is the world a safer place now after all that has been done? And… what is the level of cooperation between Kuwait and the United States in achieving a safer world?

Hmm. Is the world safer? He didn’t ask whether terrorism has been vanquished. Just whether there’s been any improvement since the several hundred billion dollars have been spent over the past seven years in response to the 9/11 attacks.  The answer?

“Well, let me answer the second question first — it’s easier.”

Led by the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. yesterday signed agreements with Latvia and Estonia enabling them to join the U.S. visa waiver program (VWP). Negotiations with Hungary begin tomorrow in Washington. Enter Commissioner Frattini.

The European Commissioner handling the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio is itching to get his time with Secretary Chertoff. He told reporters that his “proposal will be to go ahead with political discussions from now until June at a high political level.” Higher than Chertoff? Perhaps he is hoping that Secretary of State Rice will weigh in on his interest in maintaining momentum for an EU-wide visa waiver agreement.

Chertoff maintains that the U.S. negotiates visa waiver status on a country-by-country basis, but the European Commission views this as an EU issue that should lead to a waiver for all EU member states. Frattini and the EU are being challenged by a split in the ranks.

The Commission has jurisdiction over visa reciprocity for the EU, but the slow pace of the supranational government led the Czech Republic earlier this year to sign their own deal, which spurred a chain reaction. In addition to Latvia and Estonia, both EU members, 15 other EU countries already participate in the visa waiver program. As the European Commission seeks to negotiate a visa-waiver pact for the entire 27-nation EU, Frattini’s negotiating hand is weakening. Nevertheless, Commissioner Frattini is hoping to use today’s meeting with Chertoff to strike a visa waiver for the EU before October.

The U.S. needs to be careful in making sure that further negotiations avoid the appearance of undermining EU governance mechanisms. We gain nothing by doing so and risk fracturing a reluctant ally in the fight against terrorism. A unified and well organized EU is better that the sum of its parts in this context. One way to move forward would be to agree to a set of principles in negotiating further agreements with EU nations that protects privacy in the way the EU seeks and accelerates country-by-country progress toward the VWP requirements among remaining EU nations to facilitate a broader blanket for this program.

A post here earlier this week detailed a conference on homeland security taking place in the Middle East next month. I suggested the U.S. should be more proactive in engaging that region on such issues as protecting civilians as a means to bridging a perception gap about the threat of terrorism made worse by the Iraq war, among other things. That we have an attaché attending the conference in Abu Dhabi, whereas the British and Spanish are dispatching senior officials, represents an important missed opportunity.

Some readers – only half joking – thought we wouldn’t have much to say of value at the conference anyway. We have a lot to gain from sharing what we do know about protecting the homeland, especially with governments in that region. However, doing so would benefit greatly first by deploying multilateral mechanisms for engagement. NATO is ready for such a role.

NATO’s unique map of nearly sixty countries represents the only multilateral consultative environment in the world wherein the U.S retains a significant – albeit underutilized – political advantage. Creative U.S. leadership of NATO in the 21st century can foster a better consensus between the U.S. and the many other countries within that framework for how to combat the evolving threat posed by terrorism. This would include a targeted mix of security cooperation efforts, deeper dialogue on counterterrorism best practices, and capabilities training. Ultimately, such leadership would serve as the basis for greater cooperative efforts in crucial regions that serve U.S. security and foreign policy interests.

While the very purpose of NATO was questioned after the Cold War ended, many observers expected the post-9/11 security environment to offer the Alliance a lifeline, if not a renewed raison d’etre. Ultimately, uneven U.S. engagement of NATO in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), combined with the deterioration of U.S.-European relations in the lead up to and conduct of the Iraq war, fed doubts about NATO’s relevance as the 21st-century security environment took shape. Without an engagement of NATO that redeploys the non-military legitimacy and outreach of the Alliance, the U.S. risks finding its cooperative security options unnecessarily limited when they are needed most.

The first seven years of the war against terrorism demonstrated the importance of developing trust and confidence with non-traditional allies, namely those in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. U.S. national and homeland security interests would benefit from developing innovative security assistance relationships here as it would garner more confidence and trust among countries that, while not pro-American, have not assumed entrenched anti-American positions. NATO offers the potential to assist in developing capabilities for counterterrorism (defeating terrorists) and antiterrorism (protecting civilians) as the new currency of cooperation.

The current level of political engagement of NATO by the U.S. obliges Western policymakers to pursue a less unified – and suboptimal – approach to working with important countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East, which includes approximately fifteen countries within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. The U.S. can focus resources that reinforce a relatively pro-American political environment without forcing nations of the region to choose between the U.S. and Europe or spurn regional allies by appearing overly pro-western if we engage them through such consultative mechanisms as the Med/D and ICI.

This initiative would enable the development of policy options to help pursue U.S. homeland security and counterterrorism interests while cultivating a more productive dialogue between the U.S. and critical countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East. This includes maximizing or augmenting current NATO programs such as the Program of Work on Defense Against Terrorism, NATO Security Through Science, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center. Each of these efforts contributes greatly to U.S. interests. Yet the U.S. has allowed or even led efforts to cut funding of some of these most essential programs.

Certain perennial challenges would complicate an effort by the U.S. to recalibrate engagement of NATO in this way. First, EU leadership remains reluctant to encourage members also belonging to NATO to support a more substantive NATO role in protecting civilians as well as troops. This “EU Bloc” in NATO can be formidable: France, Belgium, and Germany, among others, regularly obstruct efforts to broaden NATO’s non-military engagement. France routinely objects to – and almost as often succeeds in preventing – proposals at NATO to focus its existing capabilities on homeland security requirements.

This proposed initiative should identify ways for the U.S. to neutralize – or at least offset – unnecessary competition with the EU. One model might employ the NATO “Quad,” whereby political directors from Germany, France, UK, and the U.S. work together on an ad hoc basis to identify shared objectives and negotiate acceptable solutions on a wide range of security concerns through NATO. The tensions surrounding the Iraq war left the Quad to languish, but U.S. leadership to reinitiate this dialogue could generate useful progress.

A second problem is in Washington: Disunity between the U.S. Homeland Security Department’s objectives and the Departments of State and Defense further complicates the use of NATO for these purposes. After more than three years since its creation, DHS runs few, if any, coordinating efforts with State or Defense at the U.S. NATO mission.

Failure to change course from the currently constricted approach to NATO risks denuding this historic alliance that has served American interests for over fifty years, while severely limiting U.S. freedom to develop broader consensus in the war against terrorism, deeper cooperative engagement with the Middle East and Mediterranean region, and a more durable dialogue with the nearly sixty countries under NATO.

The Middle East is beginning to appreciate the importance of homeland security in new ways, and the United Arab Emirates appears to be at the forefront. With what’s being billed as the Middle East’s first event focused exclusively on homeland security, Abu Dhabi will host a conference on protecting national borders, building disaster resilience, and countering international terrorism next month.

Entitled “International Security / National Resilience,” the gathering takes place March 2-5, 2008, at Abu Dhabi and is sponsored by HH General Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, along with the UAE Ministry of Interior. ISNR Abu Dhabi follows ISNR London, which was held 4-5 December 2007.

Last year the UAE President, His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan created a new government agency charged with protecting vital facilities and utilities in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. With critical infrastructure that includes onshore and offshore petroleum facilities, power generation stations, water desalination plants, a natural gas transportation network, airports, seaports, and service networks, its no wonder they see the value in their own version of a DHS. However, since all of this infrastructure is owned by the emirate, they’ll likely have an easier go of it than DHS, which must navigate a domain of critical infrastructure owned almost entirely by the private sector.

Promoters of ISNR Abu Dhabi explain that the gathering will provide a comprehensive look at homeland security issues to enable “governmental authorities to respond resiliently to natural disasters as well as man-made ones.” This is just the sort of opportunity the U.S. Department of Homeland Security should capitalize on by sending delegates armed with speeches and presentations that explain the way we perceive the threat, the lessons we’ve learned, and the interest we have in supporting their efforts in a partnership against a threat that requires cooperation in order to be combated.

This blog has written before about the opportunities – some missed – for sharing our expertise in homeland security to benefit reluctant friends overseas. We have a shared interest in protecting our civilians. And the U.S. could really use some friends nowadays in that region.

GAO reports on how well the DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI) has contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security and strengthened overall container scanning operations.  It raises problems with the CSI concept of operations, but there is a way to improve this — and its accruacy in targeting risky containers.

GAO praises CBP for following its earlier recommendations, but then drills into a core operational reality in the CSI program: limitations in evaluating inspections processes related to the accuracy and completeness of data collected. That data is essentially the main take for this program and its role in informing our targeting of high-risk cargo bound for the U.S. GAO goes on to suggest that if we don’t exercise better control over this aspect of CSI, the security value of the program declines pretty quickly.

Click image to view a conops of the CSI targeting process.

The net net of all this is that CBP “potentially lacks information to ensure that host government examinations can detect and identify weapons of mass destruction, which is important because containers are typically not reexamined in the United States if already examined at a CSI seaport.”

Hold on here. The purpose of CSI is to bring added security through greater transparency in the maritime shipping domain. CSI does this by adding scrutiny to cargo traveling to the U.S., before it arrives in the U.S. (at the foreign CSI port). But if the scrutiny is conducted by host government authorities, that sure dials up the risk.

In a sense, this brings us back to the concern over balancing throughput and security. The last thing we want to do is clamp down on the maritime trade to assure 100% security if that is done at the total expense of economic flows. However, too light of a touch on the system and we wind up adding false scrutiny without adding any value.

Striking the right balance requires revisiting the way in which we look at the maritime domain. It is not only an avenue for sea-based cargo. It is one medium for five global flows: cargo, people, information, finances, and the conveyances themselves (ships in this case). Securing the U.S. by examining every piece of cargo is a sledgehammer approach that we should use if necessary, but a more surgical option would seek to knit together these five flows across the maritime domain, for example, to generate the kind of transparency and intelligence we seek with the container scanning conducted by foreign port authorities.

Treating the information about cargo as a source of risk targeting limits our ability to identify the actual threat and it favors indiscriminate scrutiny that slows throughput without adding any real security. Generating and combining information on cargo in the context of the other four flows would provide an exponentially more accurate understanding of the true risk. Granted, CSI does not operate in a vacuum, but maximizing transparency – and therefore better informed risk targeting – can be more productive with a comprehensive approach that views the domain in a different way.

Brooks Tigner reports today on a trend we’ve discussed here on a few occasions: The Europeans are more comfortable with homeland security than we give them credit for. The Brits have their “civil” security, the Swedes have coined “societal” security, and even NATO has long owned a “civilian emergency planning” capability. Tigner identifies what he calls “the proliferation” of EU actors, institutions, and decision-makers in civil security across the EU’s institutional map, which has prompted a familiar debate across the Atlantic: Should the array of Homeland Security-related entities be streamlined?

To be sure, streamlining is different from the perennial practice of “reorganization” that we engage in on this side of the Pond. The Lisbon Treaty elevated justice and home affairs decisions to EU-level.  More than a dozen of the European Commission’s (EC) 23 directorates general (DGs) have some civil security policy jurisdiction. Streamlining efforts may result in reducing the number of directly involved DGs or in the appointment of a single DG to have overall responsibility.

The EC’s foreign affairs and security/defense portfolios will be handled by a single position. That new “High Representative” will operate as part of the EC that proposes policy and as a member of the European Council that approves policy.  Now that’s streamlining.  If its wise remains to be seen.

Top priorities in the justice and home affairs agenda resemble issues here. Tigner points out a few, including border patrol and immigration issues, judicial and police operations, critical infrastructure protection, visa and passport procedures, counterterrorism efforts and the fight against organized crime.

Another development to watch is the French thought leadership on this topic. The French government plans to issue a white paper on security and defense this spring. How much of this topic the paper will address is unknown, but it will surely gain attention when France assumes the EU presidency in July.

International cooperation in combating terrorism is a no-brainer value add.  And we often try to address on this blog ways in which cooperation can be deepened – or established in the first place as the case may be.  So I was interested — and concerned — to read about a database under joint development by the U.S. Australia, UK, Canada, Japan, and China. 

The database will house biometric data on individuals in order to identify people based on fingerprints, but also such things as voice and facial expression.  These “signatures” are intended to help homeland security authorities better identify and trace terrorists and other suspects.

A story today on News.com.au covered an international forensics conference taking place this week in Australia where this developing database was described by American Patrick Wang, a professor at Northeastern University who spoke at the event. Wang explained that “cross-country collaboration is already under way. There have been some very minor achievements, but people still expect to spend more money and time and to achieve a solution that cannot afford any more mistakes - aiming for 100 per cent accuracy.”

Biometrics are used across many parts of the private sector for facility entry credentials.  But the homeland security and law enforcement communities are gaining momentum. Next month, the FBI will let a contract for a $1 billion revamp of their fingerprints database (IAFIS) into a robust multi-metric identification database called Next Generation Identification that will include the ability to process, store, and analyze several other biometrics. DHS recently started its Biometric Storage System to support its immigration services and other credentialing programs. Could the international database gain access to NGI and BSS? Perhaps these U.S. databases will hoover the international sources.

Professor Wang scopes the effort as follows: “We’re talking about the internet, telephony, mobile phones, mobile phone cameras, digital cameras - all of these are being used not only to commit crimes but also to solve crimes,” he said.

Reader Michael Stanton-Geddes sent in word from Brussels that the European Commission is evolving its counterterrorism (CT) strategy. Commissioner Franco Frattini, who has the Justice, Freedom and Security portfolio for the EC, rolled out the new CT “package” last week as we continue to review the Homeland Security strategy recently released on this side of the Pond. There are some similarities, but differences are apparent in substance as well as style.

Like the U.S. strategy, this EU document begins with an assessment of the threat. Both acknowledge that terrorism poses an evolving risk to respective civilian populations and both consider the potential threat of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons sought by terrorist groups. The threat assessments differ mostly at this point.

The U.S. is chiefly focused on al-Qaeda, whereas the EC doesn’t mention this group. Ours goes on to cite Hizbollah, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and even the threat of “homegrown terrorists.” The Europeans are surely aware of this last possibility, but they do not mention it in thier description of the threat. Of course, the potential audience on the Continent is far more heterogeneous than ours and the EC therefore faces a more daunting communications challenge in describing this difficult subject.

Europe’s more discrete efforts under this strategy reveal more similarities:

• Stopping violent radicalization;
• Protecting our critical infrastructure;
• Improving the exchange of information between national authorities and cooperation between all stakeholders when appropriate;
• Reacting to non conventional threats;
• Improving the detection of threats;
• Depriving terrorists of financial resources;
• Supporting victims;
• Research and technological development

The U.S. Strategy organizes its goals as follows:

• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks
• Protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources
• Respond to and recover from incidents

It is important to note the similarities across the Atlantic when considering big-picture approaches such as those we’ll find in strategy documents. It is also important to note that the big picture is defined differently by the U.S. than by our allies overseas. While the EC document reaches beyond combating terrorists to more long term preventative measures (e.g. radicalization in general), the U.S. invests in management challenges (homeland securty management system) and cultural issues (preparedness, radicalization at home) to support its strategy.

Future posts will look into this ongoing update of Europe’s counterterrorism strategies. For more on this topic in the meantime, CDI published a detailed paper last year on EU CT efforts.  A CRS study released this summer provides a very helpful distillation of US-EU CT cooperation.  Finally, these recent posts offer relevant links and information:

“9/11 Is Over?”

“Hearts, Minds, and the Homeland”

Other HLSWatch posts on international HLS issues.

Port terminals at the UK, Pakistan, and Honduras are the first of a batch of countries to sign up for DHS’s current phase of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). SFI screens US-bound maritime containers for nuclear or other radiological materials. It is unclear whether the agreements, protocols, equipment, and other requirements put in place to screen for nuclear threats will be put to use for other valuable security and trade purposes.

SFI is part of the DHS response to fulfilling the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, which requires non-intrusive scanning for nuclear material on 100% of all maritime containers headed for the U.S. Data from these inspection systems informs the National Targeting Center in its assessment of what seems threatening enough to warrant added scrutiny. SFI almost entirely focuses on the nuclear threat. Jay Ahern, CBP Deputy Commissioner, said “…preventing a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb attack has to be one of our highest priorities. This initiative (SFI) advances a comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain and substantially limits the potential for terrorist threats,” said CBP Deputy Commissioner Jayson Ahern.

The “comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain” suggests much more than just detecting smuggled nuclear material. Subsequent phases of SFI may reveal a more robust – and much needed – program to view the global supply chain more strategically. The tools being developed and put in place for the nuclear threat, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, can provide significant leverage for bringing more security to the global trade flows. Illicit trafficking – not only of nuclear material – is always a threat in some way to some legitimate party. And the transparency that a program like SFI could generate promises the potential to do much more that detect loose nucs.

The kind of vulnerability these global flows confront carry with them a global concern for their resilience and protection, as well as their economic viability. Imagine if the Secure Freight Initiative and the Advanced Trade Data System were combined with the Proliferation Security Initiative. That would align many of the efforts and interests of DHS, DOD, DOE, State, and the Department of Commerce. It would also reflect a more “comprehensive” approach to a shared concern between the U.S. and her overseas partners – many of whom are reluctant partners – in securing global trade against both terrorism and general threats to economic efficiencies that these global flows attempt to maximize.

NOTE: Thank you for accommodating my absence while I was away. HLSWatch is back up and running.

Tom Friedman’s piece in yesterday’s NYT made a heck of a sound point: “We have to get our groove back.” By that he means that the America we knew may have changed on 9/11, but it doesn’t need to go on changing along the same hyper-secure trajectory along which the costs risk outweighing the benefits.  I’ll be the first to admit that our efforts to secure the homeland against terrorism are needed and unfinished. However, Friedman’s observation suggests we do not need to have only two views on this issue:

In one corner we have the New York Times editorial staff. In the other corner is Secretary Chertoff. The NYT ran an editorial suggesting that the Administration’s invocation of 9/11 and the terrorist threat supports political objectives and obscures the real challenge of securing the homeland. Secretary Chertoff’s “how dare you” rebuttal roundly criticized the NYT for failing to mention a number of accomplishments and risking the reemergence of another vulnerability: a public’s eroding commitment.

Break it up, gentlemen. Freidman offers a third way that makes sense. Recognize that we are winning in the fight against terrorism, narrowly defined. Consider the externalities of our “global war on terror,” particularly the ones that come back to bite us (i.e. declining credibility in crucial regions, important international organizations, and visitors to the U.S. that make this country great).

Despite all the negative overtones when just about anyone in the world is asked about the fight against terrorism that followed 9/11, we are not in it alone. While researching this topic I found several dedicated programs underway at the European Union, NATO, and countless non-government organizations. Get this: there’s an International Institute for Homeland Security, Defense and Restoration. Sign me up. We run a serious risk of losing the fight against terrorism and the effort to protect civilan populations if we fail to work together. Collaboration can be a decisive advantage.  That’s something the terrorists can’t attack.

However, Friedman’s correct when he points out that we can lose this fight by simply changing who we are. Its just not worth it to be secure in a non-America where the role of government, free speech, and commitments to the next generation are obscured. Friedman calls for a “9/12” mentality as opposed to a “9/11” mindset.

If the NYT is 9/10 and the Secretary is 9/11, who will represent the 9/12 way forward? Perhaps we should give some space on this site for the presidential campaigns to weigh in….

Looks like the U.S. and EU overcame the most recent tussle concerning how the two allies will share private or personal information in pursuit of terrorists (and other criminals, or course).  The press release from this afternoon is available here.  Following are the main points:

• The Department of Homeland Security will collect 19 types of PNR data.
• The data will be maintained for seven years in an active file, and eight years thereafter in a dormant file with limited access.
• How DHS collects PNR data from airline reservation systems changes, too. Air carriers will now transmit PNR data directly to DHS.
• European air carriers get legal assurance that they will not be in violation of EU privacy law.

CQ reported that Senate Republicans agreed to assign conferees to consider HR1, the House bill that implements several of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.  (They were holding out until Democratic leadership dropped their provisions granting certain labor rights to the workforce of airport screeners.  The President also threatened to veto the entire bill if it included these rights for airport screeners.) This post is the first in an occasional series to highlight important sections of HR1 as it undergoes conference proceedings.

Section 1301 of Title XIII is provision recommended earlier this year (see this post) to create an institutional mechanism at DHS charged with promoting HLS capabilities and cooperation overseas.  Creating the Science and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office is an important investment, but one that needs to be revisited in terms of its limited scope and organizational placement.

The bill’s provision offers a half-dozen findings, beginning with these two: 

(1)   The development and implementation of technology is critical to combating terrorism and other high consequence events and implementing a comprehensive homeland security strategy.

(2)   The United States and its allies in the global war on terrorism share a common interest in facilitating research, development, testing, and evaluation of equipment, capabilities, technologies, and services that will aid in detecting, preventing, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against acts of terrorism. 

All six reflect a similar scope.  While technology surely is critical to implementing a comprehensive homeland security strategy, the sort of international cooperation we need is in both capabilities and strategy.  The notion that we share an interest with our allies in developing the technical capabilities to combat terrorism is hard to argue with.  However, the technology is in many ways the easy part.  All six of this section’s findings focus on technology as a means toward enhanced cooperation.  It is unclear if the intention is to strengthen our capabilities by learning from others, or to bolster cooperation in a general sense by sharing technology-based capabilities with other countries.  Both would be worthwhile, but only part of the solution.

This blog has posted on the critical role allies serve in securing the homeland.  The focus of this Office should be broad enough to encompass a range of HLS priorities that include threat perception/assessment, public education/training, operational cooperation, and exchanges similar to the way our Defense Department executes mil-to-mil relationships around the globe.

For this reason, a new Science and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office would be more appropriately placed in the DHS Policy Office.  There, the assistant secretary for international affairs would be placed in charge of this important office, which could be renamed simply the Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office with a mission of identifying opportunities to cooperate with allies in a range of areas representing shared interests that protect against the threat of terrorism, natural disasters, etc.  It could even be a joint office with the State Department.

A grant- or loan-making mechanism for DHS could be established under the authority of the Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office and may work similar to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA), which enables countries with a shared interest in security to build more effective defense capabilities through training, capacity building, and materiel sales.  The new Office also would be responsible for liaising with the G8-established Counterterrorism Action Group.  The CTAG is a multinational organization charged with connecting mutual interests and shared strengths among partners and allies while “building political will, [and] coordinating capacity building assistance where necessary….”  Ah, yes, “political will.”  Wouldn’t want that job.

Ever wonder what happened to public diplomacy?  “Hearts” and “minds” clogged the talk shows’ airwaves and pundits pontificated about soft power until an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy was finally appointed in July 2005.  I think they still hate us out there, but the closest Washington gets to public diplomacy nowadays is proclaiming the limits of a “military solution.” 

Changing hearts and minds starts with one thing: shared interests.  If we can identify that shared interest, then nothing should stop our diplomats and others from taking it and running with it as far as possible.  The problem these days is that shared interests are too often viewed as rare, and resident primarily among the willing coalitionists.  We are missing a great opportunity. 

The most widely shared interest among nations (albeit with a few exceptions) is the protection of their civilian populations.  That’s what homeland security is for.  The U.S. happens to be a late comer to this game, but we’ve dumped more treasure and energy into the antiterrorism pursuit that any other nation.  Today, we’ve made significant progress in a wide range of capabilities crucial to protecting against terrorism attacks on our civilian population.  We ought to do a better job of sharing those capabilities with others, especially reluctant partners facing the political turmoil and violence threatened by terrorism. 

I wrote about this in a paper for the Center for the Study of the Presidency in 2005.  In suggesting NATO is a sunk cost that could be engaged better by the U.S. to meet more relevant threats, my point was that the global pursuit of homeland security could help to combat the global discontent with the West, and the U.S. in particular.  NATO is an easier starting point for the U.S. because there we still have a significant amount of political influence with the governance structure in place to combine resources focused on mutual security.   Here’s an excerpt from that paper: 

NATO’s unique map of nearly sixty countries represents the only multilateral consultative environment in the world wherein the U.S retains a significant – albeit underutilized – political advantage.  Creative U.S. leadership of NATO in the 21st century can foster a better consensus between the U.S. and the many other countries within that framework for how to combat the evolving threat posed by terrorism.  This would include a targeted mix of security cooperation efforts and deeper dialogue on counterterrorism best practices.  Ultimately, such leadership must serve as the basis for greater cooperative efforts in crucial regions that serve U.S. security and foreign policy interests. 

The first five years of the war against terrorism demonstrated the importance of developing trust and confidence with non-traditional allies, namely those in the Mediterranean and Middle East.  U.S. national and homeland security interests would benefit from developing innovative security assistance relationships as it would garner more confidence and trust among countries in those regions that have not assumed entrenched anti-American positions.  NATO offers the potential to assist in developing capabilities for counterterrorism (defeating terrorists) and antiterrorism (protecting civilians) as the new currency of cooperation.

NATO already pioneers a set of targeted programs for this purpose, including the Program of Work on Defense Against Terrorism, the Mediterranean Dialogue, Security through Science, the NATO Counter-terrorism Technology Development Programme, and their partnerships through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center. 

Other options exist for developing capabilities and a shared understanding of the threat posed by terrorism and other 21st century dangers.  The U.S. should take a leadership position by exporting the best practices, capabilities, and even technologies to countries susceptible to both the threat of terrorism and anti-western sentiment, which is not restricted to the Middle East. 

A promising recent example is a small scale partnership that led the Dominican Republic to develop its port and maritime trade infrastructure in ways that both secure the infrastructure and better facilitate vital trade.  The U.S. joined with the support of SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard. 

The director of the International Harbor Security Program in the Atlantic said according to this release that “since 2004 Dominican Republic has utilized mechanisms and procedures in harbor security, and even managed to have the sanctions lifted, which had prevented the country’s ships to use U.S. ports freely.” 

Now the DR is being encouraged to share those practices, know-how, and basic return-on-investment rationale with neighboring countries.  It could be a sign of what’s come if the U.S. actively joins the effort on a broader scale.

The House will consider a bill tomorrow that would establish a Science
and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office. The bill (HR 884) reflects a logical, albeit piecemeal (and wordy), progression to empower the Department of Homeland Security with the organizational and legislative capability to pursue Homeland Security objectives overseas.

Collaborating with allies and partners, even reluctant ones, is a valuable step toward communicating our national interests as the shared interest. A report by the Center for the Study of the Presidency made a contribution to the discussion of how DHS could engage internationally with better success. Another paper, by James Carafano, Rich Weitz, and me weighed in on the role of S&T in this effort. These documents, along with DHS 2.0 and others, highlight the potential for engaging such organizations as NATO, the European Union, OSCE, and others to both build counter- and anti-terrorism capabilities and develop a shared understanding of the nature of the threat.

HR 884 is unclear if the Director of the proposed S&T Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office reports to the Under Secretary of S&T or the U/S Policy at DHS. There’s an argument that could be made for either, but the real value is the strong interagency coordination required of its Director – and the $25 million budget. In a climate when DHS S&T appears to be suffering budget blow after blow, this one may fare better if attached to the Policy Directorate, which does have an Office of International Affairs. Of course, reconciling OIA with the new S&T Office would be a first step.

The Australian Homeland Security Research Centre released a short report within the last week entitled “2007 Trends for Homeland Security in Australia,” a document that is interesting both in terms of understanding current issues in that country, and also as a contrast to the current American homeland security agenda.

The Centre has also published a number of other interesting reports which are also worth browsing.

Today’s edition of the Federal Register provides notice of the interim agreement that was reached in October 2006 between the United States and the European Union on passenger name record (PNR) data, following the European Court of Justice’s decision to strike down the earlier PNR agreement that dated from 2004. There are no surprises in the new notice - its contents had been widely aired last fall - but it’s useful as a complete record of the new agreement.

Russia is hosting the “Global Forum for Partnerships between Government and Businesses to Counter Terrorism” this week in Moscow, an event created in conjunction with their chairing of the G8 this year. This press statement on it describes some of the topics of discussion at the forum:

“For example, international trafficking in precious metals and diamonds in estimated in astronomical sums. Part of these illegal funds are used to finance terrorism. Companies working in this sector have announced an initiative to combine the possibilities of government and business to create an effective global system for preventing the smuggling of precious metals. I repeat, the objective is not only to stop the financing of terrorism, but also to cut short the criminal possibilities of this business.”

“Another promising idea was proposed by Finmeccanica and provides for setting up a public/private consultative board to ensure protected and effective communication between critical infrastructures, in particular in the energy sector. The initiative on insuring against terrorism has been advanced as part of the objective to protect the rights of terrorism victims. These are only a few of the multitude of ideas the forum will discuss,” the minister writes.

This latter idea is already well-developed in the United States through ISACs and other tools, but in many countries this framework for public-private partnership on infrastructure issues is less mature. And the first idea is an an intriguing one, building on activities such as the Kimberley Process.

More on the event in this Defense News story.

Homeland security-related issues figured prominently on the agenda of the APEC ministerial meeting in Vietnam last week, building on related work at these meetings over the past several years. The joint statement from the ministerial meeting contains a lengthy discussion of ongoing work on counter-terrorism, pandemic influenza, and emergency preparedness issues among APEC member nations. There are a number of interesting programs and activities mentioned in the document, such as the Asian Development Bank’s Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative, APEC work on “Mitigating the Terrorist Threat to the APEC Food Supply”, and a Regional Movement Alert List (RMAL) pilot between the United States, Australia and New Zealand, described as “a world first in real time multilateral travel document data exchange.” There are also descriptions of a number of supply chain security initiatives - an issue of particular importance in the Asia-Pacific region.

It’s difficult to judge any one of these programs in isolation, but collectively, I think they serve an important and necessary purpose, building and strengthening the web of ties among nations and government agencies on homeland security issues, in a way that ultimately improves the security of all participating nations.

The LBJ School at the University of Texas recently published a report entitled “Port and Supply-Chain Initiatives in the United States and Abroad,” a compendium and analysis of existing activities in this area on a global basis. The report received media attention recently in this DC Velocity article.

The first half of the report looks at broad supply chain and port security topics, such as the ISPS code, the MTSA, C-TPAT, and the World Customs Organization SAFE Framework. These chapters feature the results of interviews with key stakeholders, which highlight the ongoing challenges associated with implementing these rules and programs. For example, the report notes how the lack of uniformity and clear standards in the implementation of the ISPS code has led to a situation where investments have low efficiencies of scope and are therefore difficult to justify.

The second half of the report consists of case studies of security initiatives at ports in Santos, Brazil; Marseille, France; Hong Kong; Jawaharlal Nehru, India; Veraruz, Mexico; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; and Durban, South Africa. These case studies are the most interesting part of the report, describing the challenges that these seven very different ports have faced in implementing the ISPS code and (in some cases) the Container Security Initiative into their operations. The case studies paint a picture of a maritime trade system that, while vastly more attentive to security matters today, is still struggling to make security a normal and routinized part of its operations. The descriptions of the developing country ports are particularly worth reading, as a way to better understand the practical challenges and limitations of implementing high-tech security tools in environments that rely upon informal and/or non-automated standard operating procedures.

On a personal note, I was also glad to see the white paper I co-authored for IBM on Global Movement Management last year summarized on page 66 of the report.

Overall, a very good report and a useful addition to the public body of knowledge about port and supply chain security.

The lead story in the UK today was a speech by the Director General of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, on the terrorist threat in the UK. Her full remarks are available here, and are worth taking the time to read in full. Some key excerpts:

On recent plots in the UK:

In the years after 9/11, with atrocities taking place in Madrid, Casablanca, Bali, Istanbul and elsewhere, terrorists plotted to mount a string of attacks in the UK, but were disrupted. This run of domestic success was interrupted tragically in London in July 2005. Since then, the combined efforts of my Service, the police, SIS and GCHQ have thwarted a further five major conspiracies in the UK, saving many hundreds (possibly even thousands) of lives.

On the scope of current surveillance activities in the UK:

What I can say is that today, my officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don’t know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas.

On the nature of the current threat:

What we see at the extreme end of the spectrum are resilient networks, some directed from Al-Qaida in Pakistan, some more loosely inspired by it, planning attacks including mass casualty suicide attacks in the UK. Today we see the use of home-made improvised explosive devices; tomorrow’s threat may include the use of chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and even nuclear technology.

Perhaps the most interesting section of the speech is a passage where Dame Manningham-Buller address the frequently-aired critique regarding the proportionality of the government’s response to the terrorist threat:

A word on proportionality. My Service and the police have occasionally been accused of hype and lack of perspective or worse, of deliberately stirring up fear. It is difficult to argue that there are not worse problems facing us, for example climate change… and of course far more people are killed each year on the roads than die through terrorism. It is understandable that people are reluctant to accept assertions that do not always appear to be substantiated. It is right to be sceptical about intelligence. I shall say more about that later.

But just consider this. A terrorist spectacular would cost potentially thousands of lives and do major damage to the world economy. Imagine if a plot to bring down several passenger aircraft succeeded. Thousands dead, major economic damage, disruption across the globe. And Al-Qaida is an organisation without restraint.

In the latter part of the speech, Dame Manningham-Buller describes the internal changes to MI5 after 9/11, as it has added staff and enhanced its ability to discern and uncover intelligence about the new types of terrorist networks. Overall, a very interesting speech, and a somber reminder of the continued need for vigilance, not just in the UK but all over the world.

In September the European Security Research Advisory Board issued a report entitled “Meeting the Challenge: the European Security Research Agenda,” which I just read through this evening.

EU policy reports are typically not the most intellectually stimulating reads, which is perhaps why I put off reading it until now. But I’m glad I finally went through it. It provides some very insightful analysis of the technology playing field for homeland security R&D, presented in a thorough and strategic manner that captures the multidimensional complexities of this issue.

The beginning of Section 2 describes the methodology used to analyze the security R&D challenge, as summarized in this chart, which shows the conceptual links between security missions, capabilities and technologies:

The next part of Section 2 then takes this framework and applies it to four key security missions: (1) border security, (2) protection against terrorism and organized crime, (3) critical infrastructure protection, and (4) restoring security in case of crisis. The result is a detailed and analytical rigorous roadmap of the technology challenges for each of the four missions; for example, the border security mission (click on the chart for a full-size version):

These mission analysis charts, and the cross-mission analysis section that follows, provide a useful contribution to the existing literature on strategies for security R&D. Section 3 of the report looks at societal issues related to security, arguing that security-related technologies need to be rooted in and legitimized by the societies in which they are adopted, and that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for Europe. The final sections of the report offer recommendations for action, but this section of the report is mundane in contrast with the preceding analysis.

Overall though, a very useful report, and one which should be carefully studied on this side of the pond and applied toward further efforts to conceptualizing security R&D activities.

Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (and future Prime Minister) in the United Kingdom, yesterday discussed the development of a unified budget for UK homeland security efforts, as noted by the Guardian:

Gordon Brown took another step towards setting up a possible department of homeland security by telling the cabinet yesterday he is looking at creating a single £2bn annual budget for fighting terrorism.

The chancellor is also stressing that he would like more government departments to put security - and the battle for hearts and minds - at the centre of their thinking.

The chancellor is working closely with the home secretary, John Reid, on the proposals, which are being studied as a central issue in the coming spending review. At the Labour conference in Manchester in September, Mr Reid announced a fundamental review of the counter-terrorist police and security services’ ability to tackle the new security threat. He said he wanted a seamless approach to what had become a seamless threat. He is not thinking of merging MI5 and MI6.

The creation of a unified security budget would be a wise step for the UK to take, as a means to measure and rationalize the effectiveness of various types of measures that fall under the aegis of the war against terror. Indeed, the United States could also benefit from stronger efforts to develop a unified security budget as well. To be sure, DHS has a single budget, and the OMB tracks government-wide homeland security spending, but there is still too little integration and prioritization of efforts across the spectrum of national security tools that are bucketed as defense, homeland security, intelligence, diplomacy, and economics.

These remarks by Brown at Chatham House in early October are consistent with the ideas discussed in the Guardian piece.