Homeland Security Watch

News and analysis of critical issues in homeland security

February 2, 2011

A Resilient Revolution

Filed under: Events,International HLS — by Mark Chubb on February 2, 2011

In previous posts, I have referred to five metatrends that I think define resilience: local, simple, varied, connected and open. The events over the past few days in Egypt demonstrated once again the power and significance of these concepts. What we have witnessed in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other Egyptian cities as well as Egyptian and sympathetic Arab communities around the globe is a sort of resilient revolution.

Hosni Mubarek’s regime and his 30-year tenure as Egypt’s ruler have been defined by a commitment to stability both internally and externally. To be sure, this track record considered in light of current events should make clear to all the error of confusing longevity with resilience even in a place as volatile as the Middle East.

The U.S. — placing a premium on stability over resilience itself — backed Mubarek despite his decidedly undemocratic tendencies until it became evident such support was both largely irrelevant and ultimately unsustainable. Indeed, the real question now is whether we have harmed our national interest and the credibility of our commitment to human rights and the rule of law by not making it clear where we stood with respect to the protests raging throughout the country and elsewhere in the Middle East sooner than we did.

Putting that aside and returning to the five metatrends, each has played out in interesting ways in recent days despite Mr. Mubarek’s efforts to retain power and his allies’ reluctance to play their hands in public: The people have sensed their power lies in their own resilience as evidenced in the following ways:

Local — Despite efforts by the government of Egypt to interfere with communication and co-opt media for their own aims, spontaneous protests emerged across the country, organized by small groups that relied on decentralized and horizontally aligned allegiances among small groups united by a shared vision rather than a common leader or clear structure. The government’s vertically-oriented hierarchical model of control simply could not keep up with much less outmaneuver the protesters once they sensed an advantage and decided to act.

Simple – The protesters’ amplified their power through the simplicity and directness of their demands: Mubarek must go. The absence of a single, identifiable opposition leader — notwithstanding the prominence of Mohamed elBaradei and his efforts to position himself in front of the mass movement for change — played in the protesters’ favor by making it clear that their objective was the nation’s welfare and therefore interest-based not personality-driven. It also made the movement very difficult to co-opt, control or reorient and will make it all but impossible for President Mubarek to remain in power until his term ends no matter how the next fews days go.

Varied — Decentralized control and local organization coupled with the simplicity of the messages and demands of protesters made it easy for people with very different agendas from every corner of Egyptian society, including marginalized groups that have been excluded from the nation’s social and political life for decades, to join the popular uprising without immediate fear of reprisals for their participation. Christians and other religious minorities have joined the ranks of Muslims just as crowds have seen men and women, young and old, educated and uneducated mixing freely and largely peacefully.

Connected — Even the disruption of Internet and other telecommunications services by the government did not significantly disrupt or interfere with the ability of protesters to organize or communicate their demands. When the army took to the streets at Mr. Mubarek’s direction, they had few good options. Their legitimacy, like his lack of the same quality, hinged on the desires of the people to see their country under democratic control, not simply control. The willingness of protesters to embrace the military and work alongside soldiers to maintain order, prevent looting, protect cultural institutions and suppress disruptive behavior and even violence prevented events from spinning hopelessly out of control.

Open — The willingness of the military and the protesters alike to play their cards face-up has prevented a dangerous situation from becoming truly chaotic. Violence and bloodshed have occurred, but seem to have been limited by the willingness of protest leaders and military leaders alike to make their intentions and expectation clear to all concerned. With the U.S. government’s arrival in the ranks of the openness parade, things have started to look like they might start resolving themselves in a fashion more rather than less consistent with our most fervent hopes for the emergence of peaceful, moderate and more democratic civil institutions in the Middle East. We have a long way to go, but this is looking better than almost anybody could have imagined even a short time ago.

It’s worth noting that this last principle — openness — may have played an unusually significant part in the process from the start. Some commentators have suggested that the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere have been fueled by the release of once secret communications regarding the Middle East peace process and U.S. efforts to deal with states and their leaders, particularly to resolve the Palestinian crisis. This assessment suggests the importance of ensuring that our policies not only reflect our principles in their ends but also in the means by which we pursue them.

February 1, 2011

Egypt, the US, and the relationship paradox

Filed under: Events,International HLS — by Dan OConnor on February 1, 2011

As we’ve witnessed in real time, Egypt and revolution are now synonymous. Regionally relevant, Egypt every day slips away, from purported democracy to overthrow, to anarchy. With enough similarities to Iran in the late 70’s, another “ally” has fallen aside in a region that fuels the world.

We preach often and with interpretive translations or dramatic renditions about stability and maintaining it. We want financial stability. We want national stability and we want economic and social stability. But the “stability” we believe we had and embraced and embellished isn’t stability at all. My question is: is it repression or is it a necessary evil?

I ask as we see Tunisia fall — or begin to — and Jordan begin to wobble, while the Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, increases its activity. And now Egypt. Why is Egypt so important? Fundamentally, their geography, their peace accord with Israel, the three million barrels of oil moving through the Suez canal daily, and Mubarek’s affinity to “help” us made them a necessary ally. Except for Jordan, Egypt is the only country in the region that attempts or manages to acquit themselves with maintaining a de facto peace and civil relationship with Israel.

But what of Egypt’s suppressed radicals? The basic ideology of political Islam finds its origin within Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has a long history of assassinations (Sadat) and attempts (Nasser) creating radical and political leaders (Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri and Sayyid Qutb) and influencing the world’s most wanted man (Usama Bib Laden) and terrorist group (Al Qaeda).

The current situation has its roots in post WWII, with Britain’s diminishing influence and the emerging Arab Israeli relations. Nasser’s rise to power and his rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood fueled growing animosity and hostility in Egypt. With Nasser’s rejection of pro Western government and Islamist rule, it left him as an ideal partner for the Russians, hence our need to maintain active vigilance and persuasion within the region.

Nasser’s rejection of an Islamic government was an affront to the Brotherhood and in particular Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was the leading Islamic theologian of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. Qutb was an Egyptian author, educator, Islamist, poet, and catalyst of political and radical Islam. After a failed attempt to assassinate Nasser, Qutb and others believed to be involved were jailed, and tortured. Qutb was released and re-arrested and finally martyred. His writings, coupled with his education in the United States and his subsequent rejection of America were additional fuel for his radical thoughts and embrace of a more fundamental Islamic point of view, with some calling it a Salafist one.

All that said, the Martyring of Qutb and the success of the Brotherhood’s assination of Anwar Sadat (my father-in-law was in the reviewing stands several rows behing Sadat) was in direct conflict with the secularist roots of Egypts’ quasi Democracy.

Enter Mubarek. Vowing to only remain one term, Mubarek has remained “President” or better stated benevolent dictator since 1981, but as of late perhaps not so. Having been the ruler of Egypt for nearly 30 years, Mubarek has utilized Egypt’s Emergency Law for his entire tenure. He considers the country to be in a permanent state of emergency and under that guise has expanded his powers, exercised force and intimidation and diminished civil rights as a result. The Egyptian government routinely arrests and detains citizens for any number of reasons, with limited or no due process. Their record on human rights is also quite spotty and they are not considered to be a free society. But they are our ally.

So now the rub: should we not have been concerned with Egypt’s issues as long as they showed us favor? Much of the rhetoric trumpeted by radical Islam about the United States is its propping up of corrupt rulers and despots to ensure access to the middle east’s oil and maintain low prices. Is there any truth to their argument? Is there fundamentally a different argument that can be made about Iran and now Egypt? Certainly there are differences, but there are also similarities. I read recently that we have supported upwards of 25 dictators since WWII. Do we do this simply to maintain cheap oil? Clearly one could make a case for that. Our entire Newtonian or industrialized economy is built on hydrocarbons. The world’s economy is still based on an industrial age hydrocarbon economy. Is this the march of civilization? Is this repetitive activity, exploitation of one nation for the betterment of another, the expectation or status quo? Isn’t this the definition of hegemonic empire?

So are we willing to weigh the merits of our relationships with dictatorial leaders against our need to fuel our machines and maintain spheres of influence? Objectively and for purpose of debate, can we entertain the possibility that our activity and “needs” have created, to some extent, the environment that causes terrorist activity to occur? Do our desires and malleable stance toward human rights make us global hypocrites? Are we responsible for some of our pain? Should we be at all surprised that repression over an extended period of time creates environments and opportunities for inflamed and agitated populaces to revolt against their oppressors?

In order for the United States to flourish and reach its zenith as a nation, fuel was required; cheap energy to power an economy and industry. Cheap energy was required to create revenue to distribute as aid around the globe. Cheap energy was required to garner global influence and global force projection. Is this the march of civilization and is American Exceptionalism much different than British, Spanish, French, Roman, or Greek periods of power? I’d like to think we’ve been more humanistic in our hegomony. However, can we get past our hubris to entertain the possibility that our wealth, influence, and power were not abstract or arbitrary gains, but gained by exploiting other nations that had neither the might nor influence to stop us? And, are we all “good” with that because that’s how Nations grow and become influential? I believe one must ask the questions.

One must ask because in order to protect our way of life and defend the homeland — homeland security — one must have the historical context and not simply monkey grinder rhetoric. If we are to defend our Nation against all enemies, foreign and domestic and against existential threats, we must also be able to identify our hand in causation. Nothing happens in a vacuum; to believe it does is folly and dangerous.

If one believes in some sense of American Exceptionalism and also that same sense of International responsibility as I do, than one has to entertain all the facts, not those that simply fit our rationale. How else can one make and execute an effective homeland security plan and enterprise if we choose to ignore all the facts? As has been said before, we are all entitled to our own opinions informed or otherwise. We are however not entitled to our own facts.

The revolutionaries in Egypt are determined and growing more emboldened to bring down Mubarak’s regime. I wonder aloud if the leaders of the last 50 years of Egypt’s secular tyranny realized they spawned two enemies: the present revolutionaries and the theocratic absolutists. How much play the Muslim Brotherhood has remains to be seen and having reporters on 24/7 infotainment channels speculate or report that “leaders” pontificate about their role and/or are trying to separate Christians from Muslims is reckless and dangerous. But is it factual? I wonder if Egypt is more important than Sangin, Afghanistan where Marines engage in daily fire fights and die every day.

I wonder if the revolutionaries trying desperately to maintain calm and suppress anarchy have given any thought to what will replace the current regime. In the three act play, we are still in act one. Could this be the last of a series of dominos as former American strongholds topple or is this beginning of the people’s revolt against tyranny? Do the Saudis worry or dismiss? Does this devolving situation change our homeland security posture and procedures? These are interesting times.

And what is the definition of Homeland Security… Complexity, here we come!

January 27, 2011

Unrest in the Middle East: implications for homeland security?

Filed under: International HLS — by Arnold Bogis on January 27, 2011

Trying to predict the outcome of all the protests rocking Middle Eastern countries is a mug’s game.  Will authoritarian regimes fall or will they crush the uprisings?  If political change occurs, will democracy (of any sort) necessarily be the result?

Middle East expert Marc Lynch of George Washington University addresses some of the underlying issues:

The end of the Tunisian story hasn’t yet been written. We don’t yet know whether the so-called Jasmine Revolution will produce fundamental change or a return to a cosmetically-modified status quo ante, democracy or a newly configured authoritarianism. But most of the policy community has long since moved on to ask whether the Tunisian protests will spread to other Arab countries — Egypt, of course, but also Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and almost every place else. Most experts on each individual country can offer powerful, well-reasoned explanations as to why their country won’t be next. I’m skeptical too.

But I found it unsatisfying to settle for such skepticism as I watched the massive demonstrations unfold in Egypt on my Twitter feed while moderating a panel discussion on Tunisia yesterday (I plead guilty). As I’ve been arguing for the last month, something does seem to be happening at a regional level, exposing the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarianism and empowering young populations who suddenly believe that change is possible. There are strong reasons to expect most of these regimes to survive, which we shouldn’t ignore in a moment of enthusiasm. But we also shouldn’t ignore this unmistakable new energy, the revelation of the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarian regimes, or the continuing surprises which should keep all analysts humble about what might follow.

Harvard realist Stephen Walt does not believe we’ll see what happened in Tunisia occur in Egypt or elsewhere….maybe:

Do the large and angry demonstrations in Egypt mean that I was wrong to predict that the revolution in Tunisia wouldn’t spread? Not yet, but I will be watching events closely and developments there could eventually prove me wrong. (As Keynes famously retorted, “when the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do?”) But thus far, I’m sticking with my original forecast.

And Daniel Drezner of Tufts University asks a question that touches on a potential homeland security implication:

Which neoconservative impulse will win out — the embrace of democratic longing, or the fear of Islamic movements taking power?

Experts have pointed out that while there was little Islamic fundamentalist-based opposition to the Tunisian government, that is not true in Egypt.  While it appears the current protests are organic in nature and not organized by any particular group, the largest opposition group in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood.  Clearly spelling out the nature of the group is for others with a much deeper understanding of their beliefs and activities, but I would bet that many U.S. security officials would be nervous about them gaining power in the largest Arab state.  Many homeland security analysts are already wary of groups operating in the U.S. that are associated with the Brotherhood.

A larger issue is if regime change does come to some of these nations, will it have a net positive effect in terms of terrorist recruitment in the future? One of the reasons given by Bin Laden for attacking the U.S. is that we prop up these “apostate” regimes in the Arab world–regimes that people like Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have been unable to topple themselves.  So they focused on the “far enemy” (the U.S.) so that we would retreat from the Middle East and they could then topple the “near enemy” (regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.).

So if there is regime change of any sort, will that decrease the terrorist threat to the U.S.?

As appealing as the prospect of democracy spreading across the Middle East is, it is not the primary national security interest in the region for the U.S.  That would be keeping the flow of oil unimpeded by ensuring that no one state dominates the area.  Could that clear interest come into conflict with a murky opportunity to perhaps decrease the long-term terrorist threat?     

January 11, 2011

A flood that covers Texas and Oklahoma

Filed under: International HLS — by Christopher Bellavita on January 11, 2011

Nick Earls is an Australian author, transplanted from Ireland. He wrote an essay in Sunday’s New York Times about another one of those apparently annual once-a-century events that visit our planet.

This one is the flood in Australia’s state of Queensland. The flood covers an area the size of Texas and Oklahoma. (That’s an area the size of France and Germany.)

This flood is a huge deal.

Nick Earls’ article reminded me of something I witnessed in Australia during the 2000 Olympic Games.

But first the homeland security resilience observation from Earls’ article:

Queensland faces a flood affecting an area the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. The mines that supply one-third of the world’s coking coal are shut down. Crops have been destroyed and the soil that grew them has been carried away. Mercifully few lives have been lost so far, but the economic impact has been estimated at $5 billion. Some 200,000 people have been affected, many of them forced from their homes by water and mud.

Nevertheless, there is none of the clamor of disaster, none of the chaos one might expect. Crisis management plans have been activated. Townships, towns and cities are hard at work, not only as governments but as communities. Neighbors are helping neighbors, and then helping people they have never met. When the hard-hit coastal city of Rockhampton put a call out over the radio for people to fill sandbags, 70 volunteers turned up within minutes.

…. Even after the rain stops, we’re told, it will be weeks before all the water is gone. As the less-fortunate evacuees return home, they will find mud everywhere: in their filing cabinets, their kitchen cupboards, their photo albums. As I learned in the aftermath of the Brisbane flood of 1974, the smell will remain for years — a swampy stench that comes out of the walls and down from the ceiling on hot days.

Those people will need room for grief and anger. Most of them, though, when interviewed standing in the wreckage, talk about how life goes on.

Events like this flood not only show our stoicism, but create it. It’s important to Queenslanders, like all Australians, that we see ourselves as people who look adversity in the eye, stare it down and band together to overcome it.

Houses will be repaired, and new ones will be built. Businesses will get back to work. In ground that was baked dry but is now soaked deep, eggs will hatch, seeds will germinate and hidden species will reveal themselves and make the most of this change in their luck before the next drought sets in. Life will go on and, for farmers and those dependent on the land, the next crop should be a good one, if the weather holds.

Ten years ago I was sitting along with 80,000 other people in Sydney’s Olympic Stadium. An Australian athlete named Jane Saville was leading in the final stage of the 20 kilometer race walk event.

An Olympic athlete trains almost her entire life for a very slim chance to win a gold medal. The gold was 100 meters within Jane Saville’s reach.

She approached the Stadium filled with 80,000 cheering and excited mostly Australian spectators.

I’ve been to a number of Olympic Games. I had never seen anything to match the national unity created in Australia by the 2000 Olympic Games. You could hear roars travel like waves throughout Sydney whenever one of its athletes won a gold medal (Australia won 16 of the 186 gold medals awarded.)

Winning an Olympic gold medal is a huge deal.

Here’s the transcript from an Australian broadcast about what happened as Saville moved into the stadium:

Announcer: It’s Saville of Australia. You’ll hear the roar all round Australia when she walks into the stadium. I heard the boys say to her, “80,000 there”. Wang [the Chinese athlete] is chasing her. She’s not all that far behind her, but Saville is leading still as they’re about to go out of my vision. And we’ll go to the commentator… she’s got a red disc! she’s got a red disc!

She was just about to enter the stadium, and the leader, Jane Saville of Australia has been disqualified. Can you believe that?

Jane Saville, leading the 20 kilometre walk and about to enter the main stadium, receives a red disc and has been disqualified from the competition. And that leaves Lipang Wang of China in front.

Well, that is unbelievable. She was within the shadows of the stadium, and Jane Saville has been disqualified from the women’s 20 kilometre walk.

She has broken down. She’s burst into tears. The cameras are following her. They’re not worrying about Wang. And Jane Saville, when she was about to reach out and grab Olympic gold, has been disqualified.


————

I was close enough to Saville to see her tears, her face contorted by what must have been total devastation.

Ten seconds later — at most 20 seconds — I saw her take a very deep breath, draw herself together, and transform herself from devastation to something close to serenity.

I have no clue how she did it.

Saville (a few moments after she was disqualified): “[Disqualification] is always playing in the back of your mind because as a walker there are the rules and things like that can happen. I wasn’t confident ’til I crossed that line, but I didn’t think it’d happen. I thought it’d be absolutely outrageous for it to happen, you know, where I was. I can’t say anything. I don’t know, I don’t know. Back to the drawing board and try and work out what’s wrong with my technique.”

When I think of resilience, I think of Jane Saville. When I read what Nick Earls writes about the floods in Queensland, I think he is probably right about the resilience of the Australian people.

I have no clue how they do it.  I wonder how our nation can learn from Australia.

December 17, 2010

Germans target advocacy of sharia as unconstitutional

Filed under: International HLS,Legal Issues,Radicalization,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on December 17, 2010

According to Deutsche Welle:

German security officials conducted raids on two alleged Islamist groups in three states on Tuesday, suspecting the groups were involved in anti-constitutional activities. Authorities searched property belonging to the groups Invitation to Paradise (EZP in German), with offices in Moenchengladbach and Braunschweig, and the Islamic Cultural Center of Bremen (IKZB in German), in the city-state on the North Sea coast, as well as the private residences of some members.

A spokesman for the German Interior Ministry, explained:

EZP and IKZB are suspected of acting against the constitutional order by planning to create an Islamic theocracy in Germany. Salafists understand the Islamic religion to be an ideology of order and a system of law that is incompatible with parliamentary democracy. According to Salafist ideology, the laws can only be from God (divine sovereignty) and can not be made by the people… Salafi Islamist networks such as these organizations are opposed to liberal democracy and as such the laws-of-association can apply. For an embattled democracy, it is necessary — without waiting for the jihad to emerge in the form of armed struggle — to take action against anti-constitutional organizations. (Original German press release is available from the Ministry of InteriorWarning: I translated this myself and my German is even more amateur than my Greek.)

The Interior Ministry emphasized there is no evidence or accusation that the suspects were planning terrorist activity.  Rather, the charge being investigated is the purposeful undermining of German constitutional principles.

I cannot find a bill of particulars and my inquiries to the German Embassy in Washington have not yet been answered.  But it seems likely action is being taken under section 90b or section 92 of the German Criminal Code relating to Crimes against Peace, High Treason and Endangering the Democratic Rule of Law.  If correct, this is a significant twist in the German anti-terrorism strategy.  This may be the first time these provisions have been applied to Islamic organizations.  The decision of the Ministry to target and reference “Salafist” groups is  worth particular note. (In 2008 Khalil Al-Anani, then with the Brookings Institution, provided a brief backgrounder on Salafism.)

The chapter entitled Crimes against Peace, High Treason and Endangering the Democratic Rule of Law is the so-called “Special Part” or “anti-Nazi section” of the criminal code.  Section 92 reads:

(1) Within the meaning of this law, a person undermines the continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany if he causes the abolition of its freedom from foreign domination, the destruction of its national unity, or the separation of one of its constituent territories.

(2) Constitutional principles, within the meaning of this law, shall be:

1. the right of the people to exercise state power in elections and ballots and through particular organs of legislative, executive and judicial power and to elect parliament in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections;

2. the subjection of legislation to the constitutional order and the subjection of the executive and judicial power to law and justice;

3. the right to form and exercise a parliamentary opposition;

4. the replaceability of the government and its responsibility to parliament;

5. the independence of the courts; and

6. the exclusion of any rule by force and decree.

(3) Within the meaning of this law:

1. efforts against the continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be such efforts, the supporters of which work toward undermining the continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany (subsection (1));

2. efforts against the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be such efforts, the supporters of which work toward undermining the external or internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany;

3. efforts against constitutional principles shall be such efforts, the supporters of which work toward destroying, invalidating or undermining a constitutional principle (subsection (2)).  (The German Criminal Code is available in an official translation.)

Number 3 immediately above strikes me as the most likely legal basis for conducting the raids and collecting evidence.

In October Chancellor Angela Merkel gave a speech which seems to have presaged this new legal strategy.  According to a Reuters report (I do my own translations only as a last resort):

“Now we obviously also have Muslims in Germany. But it’s important in regard to Islam that the values represented by Islam must correspond with our constitution,” said Merkel.

“What applies here is the constitution, not sharia.”

Merkel said Germany needed imams “educated in Germany and who have their social roots here” and concluded: “Our culture is based on Christian and Jewish values and has been for hundreds of years, not to say thousands.”

The Chancellor’s words are now being put into action.

November 13, 2010

Haiti update

Filed under: Catastrophes,International HLS — by Philip J. Palin on November 13, 2010

On Friday the Haitian Ministry of Public Health reported 796 deaths and 12,303 hospitalized cases of cholera.  A complete report can be downloaded from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).

According to PAHO:

While the impact of Hurricane Tomas was not as immediate or severe as many had feared, Dr. Jon K. Andrus, Deputy Director of the Pan American Health Organization said, “We have every reason to expect that the widespread flooding has increased the risk of cholera spreading.” The effects of this could become apparent through a spike in cases in the coming days.

Also of concern—though not unexpected—are cases being reported in the country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, which is home to some 3 million people.

Even before the earthquake last January, the city had inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure and crowded living conditions in many areas. Now, conditions in the city are “very ripe for rapid spread of cholera.”

“We have to prepare for a large upsurge in cases,” Andrus said. “We have to be prepared with all the resources that are needed for a rapid response.”

Based on previous cholera outbreaks the PAHO projects upwards of 270,000 cases in Haiti before the epidemic is contained.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has released a new response strategy for cholera response through the end of December.  To implement the plan the United Nations is requesting the urgent contribution of $164 million.

Given the professional background of many HLSWatch readers, following are the planning assumptions for the new UN response plan:

In order to guide the planning process, the following assumptions were made to estimate the potential evolution of the outbreak.

  • Assuming all of the population (estimated at about 10 million for the purpose of this plan) is at risk of contracting cholera, and estimating a cholera attack rate of 2% (not a conservative estimate, given the prevalence of risk factors for cholera transmission including lack of safe water supply, poor sanitation conditions and the rainy season), the estimated number of cases would be 200,000 (10,000,000 pop x 2%). Of course, the effectiveness of the control measures put in place will influence this estimated figure.
  • In most cholera outbreaks, approximately 10-20% of symptomatic cases of cholera develop a severe form of the disease which requires vigorous rehydration. Therefore, approximately 20,000 cases at least would require admission for intensive rehydration treatment, and potentially antibiotics. Other symptomatic cases will have to be treated in out-patient capacities and at community level.
  • A capacity of 1,000 beds has been already set up throughout the country and will be expanded rapidly to 2,000 beds. Accordingly, the agreed holding capacity of a CTC for the purpose of this plan is 50 beds. The human resources and material and logistical requirements have been estimated based on this operational figure
  • For each CTC to be established, a cholera kit for 100 people may be used to initiate the response. Additional materials shall be made available as per the request of the responsible CTC coordinator, but kits should no longer be used to run operating CTCs and CTUs.
  • Capacity of primary health facilities for triage, outpatient management of cholera cases, and safe referral of severe cases to CTC, in agreement with the MSPP plan, must be assessed and strengthened. Hospital readiness for surge capacity and infection control and contingency plan to be able to cope with sudden influx of cholera patients must be in place to ensure safe management of patients along with prioritization of other health activities to continuity of care to other patients suffering life-threatening conditions.
  • From the WASH perspective the above scenario implies a caseload of 10 million people, i.e. those at risk of contracting cholera who need to be targeted for preventive measures. Therefore, WASH actions will need to be prioritized and strongly informed by health data, and will focus primarily on camps, high-density urban and sub-urban populations where the attack rate is difficult to slow down once the disease establishes itself.
  • Particular attention should be paid to cross-border areas and to the displaced, mobile and vulnerable populations as high-risk groups for disease outbreak and the spread of cholera.
  • All humanitarian organisations involved in cholera response are expected to contribute to the emergency stock and subscribe to this inter-cluster operational plan.

March 15, 2010

Is the Internet Creating Terrorists?

Filed under: International HLS,Privacy and Security,Radicalization,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Jessica Herrera-Flanigan on March 15, 2010

Happy birthday today to the Internet as we know it.  It was on March 15, 1985,  that Symbolics Computers of Cambridge, Massachusetts registered Symbolics.com, the first .com domain.   Today, there are more than 84 million addresses and growing as more than 668,000 sites are registered each month.

Interestingly, the Los Angeles Times ran a story late last week entitled “Internet making it easier to become a terrorist,” detailing how the Internet has become a “crucial front” in the battle for and against terrorism, making it easier for potential homegrown terrorists to get and share information.  Potential terrorists no longer have to travel around the world to terror training camps but can become militarized and taught to “wage violent jihad” in their PJs from the comfort of their bedrooms, according to the article.

Much of the article focused on the transformation of Colleen R. LaRose from a bored middle-aged American into her Internet alter-ego, “Jihad Jane.”  The Christian Science Monitor ran a similar story Friday, noting an increase in U.S. terror suspects and how “advances in online communication have made it easier to recruit Americans to radical Islam.”  The publication did a separate story last week about the troubling and possibly increasing ability of Al Qaeda to attract American women to terrorism. The story, however, only noted only two other instances where women have been charged in the U.S. with terror violations:

  • The case of Lynne Stewart who was convicted of helping imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman communication with this followers; and
  • Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani scientist found guilty of shooting at U.S. personnel in Afghanistan while yelling, “Death to Americans!”

Neither of these cases, however, involved the Internet or sophisticated plots to communicate with others via email or technology to commit terrorist acts.  Which leads us to the question – should the Jihad Jane case be of concern or is it an anomaly?

Women are increasingly turning to the Internet, according to a number of studies.  According to the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 74% of women use the Internet (as of December 2009).  Other studies show that women are increasingly turning to the technology to conduct many daily activities.  A Burst Media study released in March 2009 found that 69.4% of women cited the Internet as the “primary source for information to keep their household running with information on family activities, recipes, health news, and entertainment listings.”  Just over 62% used Internet to research products or services. Those statistics increased for women in the 35-54 range, with 71.1% an 66.6% using the Internet to help run their households and research products, respectively.

A survey by BlogHer, a woman’s blog network, in May 2009 found that approximately 53% of adult U.S. women participate in social media.  The survey found that more than 31.5 million participate weekly in social networks such as Facebook and MySpace, 23 million blog, 16.8 million participate in message boards/forum; and 6.7 million conduct status update (e.g. Twitter).  Given the high rate in which social networking has increased over the past year, especially with more wireless devices now able to allow users to use social media interfaces, these numbers surely have increased as well.

Of course, a mere increase in women online does not necessarily translate into women turning to terrorism.  We do know, however, that marketers and online behavioral advertising experts are increasingly exploring how to market and tailor material to women online.  Why wouldn’t terrorist groups looking for new recruits do the same?  According to expert Gabriel Weimann in his 2006 book “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the new Challenges” – they already have.  Terrorist groups can narrow their message to a particular audience, appealing to specific sympathies and touch points.

We know that terrorist organizations are also increasingly turning to the Internet to recruit and communicate.   According to a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder on “Terrorists and the Internet,” prepared by Eben Kaplan in January 2009, “terrorists increasingly are using the Internet as a means of communication both with each other and the rest of the world.” Indeed, the number of terrorist organizations using the Internet has increased from 12 in 1998 to more than 4,800 this year.

Kaplan notes that the “most effective way in which terrorists use the Internet is” for spreading propaganda and promoting sympathetic views of terrorist organizations.  As Weimann has noted, the Internet is a perfect tool for a new breed of terrorist. It is anonymous and uncontrollable.

In general, the trends and studies show that terrorist groups are going online and that the use of the Internet by those groups to spread propaganda and recruit potential terrorists is of concern.  The increase in the number of women online and the ease by which information can be tailored to specific demographics should be not be overlooked, especially with the access to populations of potential recruits who may not otherwise be allowed or recruited to attend terrorist training camps abroad.  Jihad Jane is likely not an anomaly but a troubling preview of the future of terrorism.

(Look to Friday’s post to explore how the government can counteract these efforts and the challenges with fighting terrorism and propaganda online).

January 25, 2010

Severe Threats

Last week, Congress held a series of hearings on the December 25th attempted bombing.  More hearings will follow this week.   While there have been countless analysis and assessments of the hearings, here is my 17 syllable assessment:

Intelligence Failed

Technology Will Save Us

Send More Money, Please

On Friday, the United Kingdom raised its threat level from “substantial” to “severe.”  The level, made by the U.K. government upon recommendations of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), “means that a future terrorist attack is ‘highly likely,’ although not necessarily imminent.” The UK threat level had been at substantial since last July, when it had been lowered after two years at the “severe” level.  The level, previous to that, had shifted between severe and critical since the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and on a Double Decker bus.  Interesting, U.K. officials were very quick to point out that its move was not related to the December 25th underwear bomber attack, though little information and lots of speculation as to the real reason has emerged.

Also on Friday, India raised its threat level, deploying air marshals and issuing a Civil Aviation Ministry security alert to airports and airlines for the “the stepping up of security arrangements at all concerned airports and airlines following inputs received from security agencies as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs.” The alert was issued just days before tomorrow’s celebration of Republic Day, which notes the country’s adoption of a constitution (following its independence form the U.K.).

Also, on Friday, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano met with members of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in Geneva regarding aviation security standards.  IATA represents approximately 230 airlines and 90 percent of the world’s air traffic. IATA raised several issues with the Secretary including industry operational capacities, better mechanisms for sharing passenger information, more input from airlines into security measures, and better international coordination between governments imposing security on the aviation industry.

These announcements came before the weekend reporting of a new video recording from Osama bin Laden claiming responsibility for the Christmas Day attempted bombing AND reports of non-Arab female suicide bombers, carrying Western passports, possibly attacking the U.S.

Collectively, this past week of events and announcements provide insight into the various challenges faced by the U.S. and its global partners in their terrorist-fighting efforts, both here and abroad.

Here are some observations:

  • Congressional Hearings: The hearings made clear that eight and a half years after 9/11, intelligence sharing, culture, and assessments still are lacking -  Commissions, Administration reorganizations, and Congressional actions not withstanding.  Whether posed as failures or challenges, it is clear that some change is needed — what that change is remains the question. Or is it simply the case that intelligence challenges are unfixable and as a nation we need to reassess how we work around them?
  • International Efforts: Despite the “homeland” in homeland security, the actions in the U.K. and India remind us that terrorism is an international issue that links us all together.  Terrorism is not only a threat against the U.S., but one that has harmed a number of our allies.   Consequently, our efforts – both on the intelligence and counterterrorism fronts – have to be bigger than the U.S.  They also have to be bigger than the Inside-the-Beltway fighting over who “owns” terrorism as an issue within the political parties.
  • Private Sector as Partner: The IATA-Napolitano meeting demonstrates that security is not  a government-only function.  The government’s efforts affect the private sector, requiring the private sector to be a key partner in any security efforts.  Add the international angle, then this partnership becomes even more complicated and in need of constant communication.  While much of the attention relating to the December 25th bombings have focused on the airlines and aviation industry, it would behoove the government and DHS to reach out (or better publicize) its efforts with others affected by security measures.  After all, it was the traveling public that diverted the underwear bomber attack.
  • Terrorists Come in Different Sizes, Colors, and Genders: The threat of people who may not “look like Al Qaeda terrorists” is one that experts and Congress have raised on numerous occasions over the past several years.  In reality, none of us know what a terrorist looks like – we just know who has attacked us in the past.  That image is constantly evolving and changing as more attacks are thwarted and responsible individuals come to light.   What’s becoming clear is that we cannot and should not rely on “profiling,” as we will be left unprepared.
  • Bin Laden as Boogie Man: Interestingly, after Bin Laden took credit for the December 25th attack, a number of U.S. intelligence agencies stepped up to adamantly discredit the claims. Does it really matter if he was behind the attacks to the average American? Well, it may or may not but there are reasons for these strong assertions.  First, if Bin Laden wasn’t involved, then there is evidence of a continued splintering of Al Qaeda and its strength, though such splintering could arguably make our terrorist-fighting efforts even more difficult.   Second,  if Bin Laden was involved, it is just a reminder that he is still out there and has not been captured or brought to justice.  Third, Bin Laden epitomizes terrorism to many average Americans and his omnipresence in all episodes that are terrorism make him an even more iconic figure to those who would follow him.

January 5, 2010

International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress

Filed under: International HLS — by Christopher Bellavita on January 5, 2010

A new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report about international terrorism and transnational crime is available.  You can find a copy of the 50+ page report at the Open CRS website.

From the summary of the report:

This report provides a primer on the confluence of transnational terrorist and criminal groups and related activities abroad. It evaluates possible motivations and disincentives for cooperation between terrorist and criminal organizations, variations in the scope of crime-terrorism links, and the types of criminal activities—fundraising, material and logistics support, and exploitation of corruption and gaps in the rule of law—used by terrorist organizations to sustain operations. This report also discusses several international case studies to illustrate the range of crime-terrorism convergence and non-convergence, including Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the 2004 Madrid bombers; the Taliban; Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; the 2005 London bombers; Al-Shabaab; as well as known or alleged crime-terrorism facilitators such as Viktor Bout, Monzer Al Kasser, and Abu Ghadiyah. Policy considerations discussed in this report include possible tensions between counterterrorism and anti-crime policy objectives, implications for U.S. foreign aid, gaps in human intelligence and analysis, the value of financial intelligence in combating the crime-terrorism nexus, impact of digital and physical safe havens and ungoverned spaces, implications for nuclear proliferation, and effects of crime-terrorism links in conflict and post-conflict zones. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not address potential crime-terrorism links in the domestic or border environment.

If you’re not familiar with the sometimes difficult to obtain CRS reports, they are worth checking out.  The research is conducted primarily for members of congress, so the analysis tends to be balanced.

The OpenCRS web site: “Congressional Research Reports for the People” (http://www.opencrs.com/) is one of just a few places to find CRS reports.

Unless you know someone in congress, of course.

January 1, 2010

Homeland Security: What’s In and Out for 2010

Filed under: Border Security,DHS News,Events,General Homeland Security,International HLS — by Jessica Herrera-Flanigan on January 1, 2010

Happy New Year or Happy 20-10 if you prefer.  I would say welcome to a new decade but having read that there is a debate going on on whether the decade ended yesterday or a year from yesterday, I’ll leave that one alone.

It has been a busy year on the homeland security front, starting with a new President and Secretary of Homeland Security and ending with lots of politics surrounding a Christmas Day thwarted terrorism attack.   For a  quick view of the top stories of 2009 and what to expect in 2010, here is an overview of what we can expect to be in and out on the homeland security front for 2010.

OUT

IN

Across the Spectrum, Praise for DHS Nominee Napolitano

Republican Criticism of Secretary Napolitano

Subpoenas for White House Gatecrashers Salahis To Appear on January 20th in Congress

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Prosecution in Federal Court

Privacy

Full-Body Scanners

System Failure (Again) of Intelligence Information Sharing

Connecting the Dots

Iraq

Afghanistan

Border Enforcement Only

Comprehensive Immigration Reform

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity

H1N1

Next Pandemic?

Hold on Appointees at DHS

New TSA Administrator, Other Appointments

Homeland Security- Bipartisan Kinda?

The Blame Game

December 1, 2009

Turkey Leftovers

Filed under: International HLS — by Christopher Bellavita on December 1, 2009

From conference notes I took in Ankara several days ago, participant quotes about Islam, Al Qaeda, radicalization, homeland security, and perceptions of U.S. foreign policy.  This post closes with a reminder from 1848.

Al Qaeda

  • “Al Qaeda is present in anywhere from 60 to 90 different countries.”
  • “It used to be said that Al Qaeda wanted a few people killed, but a lot of people watching.  Now, Al Qaeda wants a lot of people dead and a lot of people watching.”
  • “Al Qaeda’s biggest victory was getting ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’ used in the same sentence.”

Islam

  • “There is no religion untainted by terrorism.”
  • “There is no one version of Islam, no one Islamic culture.  So how can there be a class of cultures?”
  • “There is nothing wrong with Islam.  But there are some things wrong with some Muslims.
  • “The Qur’an, like any holy book, you open it and read it.  But it also reads you.”
  • “There is an Islam of Identity and an Islam of Truth.  Two competing identities will fight each other.  Two truths will cooperate.”
  • (An annoyed university professor after another speaker’s presentation about Islam and homegrown terrorism) “I know we are in a seminar setting where there is free and open discussion.  And that is good. But it is important to remember that Islam and jihad are two sacred words to Muslims. And one should be careful using those words in conjunction with terrorism.”
  • “The primary responsibility for combating extremist ideology should fall on the shoulders of the Muslim community.”
  • (Islamic scholar citing  a quote from Muhammad) “You will kill each other over interpretations of the text.”

Radicalization

  • H.R. 1955 (cited by an Eastern European university professor) –  “The term ‘homegrown terrorism’ means the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
  • “In the 1960s, left wing terrorists [in Europe] were motivated by communism.  We did not call them ‘homegrown terrorists.’ But that’s what they were.  Why do we use that term now?  Is it a coded way to say ‘Islamic terrorism?’ “
  • “There is very little evidence to support the claim that the internet is an effective channel for radicalization.”
  • “There are more than 5,000 radicalization websites; there are fewer than 100 counter radicalization websites.”
  • “Most of the online Al Qaeda stuff is dense and boring.  Very few people will plow through that [on line] material.”
  • Singapore has a strategy (described here) to rehabilitate those who have been radicalized.  It is based in part on the idea that those who have been radicalized “… are the faithful, but they have gone the wrong way.  They need to be taught the correct way.”

Homeland Security

  • “In some places in America, ‘community policing’ is evolving into ‘homeland security policing.’”
  • “Does the proliferation of and language about homeland security contribute to the production of terrorism?”
  • “While there may be no universally accepted definition of terrorism, we can more easily agree on definitions of terrorist acts.”
  • “I am an advocate of homeland security.  My critics call me an ‘agent of a repressive state.’ I wear the label proudly.”
  • “What comes after ‘homeland security?’  How about ‘human security.‘”

US Foreign Policy

  • A Pakistani officer’s suggestion for U.S. policy makers: “Take your soldiers out of Afghanistan.  Allow us to deal with the problem.” [For another perspective, see Jessica's "Afghan Policy - Making A Presidency" immediately below this post.]
  • A senior Pakistani army officer just back from the battlefield talking about not knowing who they are fighting. “It’s not Al Qaeda or Taliban. We go into a village.  Everyone is friendly to us.  We leave and they start shooting….” Who is the enemy? “Someone is providing the enemy with massive quantities of powerful weapons,” he said. He suspects “U.S. interests” – whatever that means. He said the US is making more enemies in Pakistan than friends. “Every death affects 10 people.  It’s your soldiers dying. But it’s our people and our children who continue to suffer. We are not like you where everyone can earn a living.  For us, one person earns a living for 10 people.” He gives us 2 years to find a way out or “It will be worse for you than Vietnam.” The man seemed a little sad, a bit desperate, a lot resigned. As if he were under a sentence of death.
  • We were reminded that “The U.S. allowed Iran “to purchase a small [nuclear] … research reactor for Tehran University. In 1967, Tehran’s research reactor was fueled with highly enriched uranium provided by the United States.”
  • Eastern European army officer: “I am worried that [the U.S.] will go to war against Iran.  Then what will happen?  Israel will get involved.  Then the Arab world.  Then it will be 1914 Sarajevo all over again.  But this time with nuclear weapons.”
  • “If a nation bombs, say, one of your power stations, you will respond with full force.  But what is the proper response if someone uses a cyber attack to shut down your power station?”
  • “Six failures in the War in terrorism: 1) Failure to capture Bin Laden and Zawahiri; 2) Afghanistan — allowing Al Qaeda and the Taliban to re-infiltrate the country; 3) the strategic blunder that is the War in Iraq, with its 3 trillion dollars in costs to the U.S.; 4) the failure to prevent Al Qaeda from using organized crime to move money across international borders; 5) the failure to win hearts and minds of the Muslim world and its diaspora; 6) failure to maintain solidarity and optimize cooperation within the Coalition Against Terrorism.”
  • “Improved cooperation among nations and agencies — even if not perfect — is better than no cooperation.”

Last Word

“We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies.  Our interests are perpetual and eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”  Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary (1848)

November 30, 2009

Afghan Policy – Making a Presidency

Filed under: International HLS,Strategy,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Jessica Herrera-Flanigan on November 30, 2009

Tomorrow at 8pm, President Obama will be giving one of the most important speeches to date of his presidency at West Point.  In it, as has been widely reported today, he will be laying out his Administration’s strategy for dealing with the crisis in Afghanistan. He met yesterday with his top advisers, including  Vice President Joe Biden, Admiral Mike Mullen, General James Cartwright and David Petraeus, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel.  He also spoke to General Stanley McChrystal, the top military commander in Afghanistan Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, about his decision.

He was scheduled to spend most of today calling world leaders telling them about his strategy and asking for continued and renewed support Afghanistan.  He already secured a commitment from Britain, with Prime Minister Gordon Brown announcing today to Parliament that the country would send 500 new troops to Afghanistan next month, bringing the United Kingdom’s totals to 10,000 (9,500 troops plus 500 special forces).  France has commitment to maintain its presence, though has not indicated whether it will increase its numbers.

Here is what to expect of President Obama tomorrow:

  • A 40 minute speech outlining the strategy
  • The deployment of an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops, bringing the U.S. totals in the country to 100,000
  • Increasing the number in the Afghan army to 240,000 and the Afghan police to 160,000 by October 2013
  • An announcement that the U.S. will ask its NATO partners for 7,000 to 10,000 more troops (currently U.S. allies have 36,230 troops in country)
  • An acknowledgement of the “limits” on U.S. resources -both in manpower and funding – for the war
  • Some details of an exit strategy

It is not expected that the President will go into great details about the cost of the escalation or that he will touch upon the proposals by some in the Democratic party, led by House Appropriations Chairman David Obey, for a “war tax.”

Chairman Obey conveyed to CNN recently that he has to “to look at the entire federal budget, as chairman of the committee, for instance. I have to see what $400 billion or $500 billion, $600 billion, $700 billion, over a decade, for this effort, will cost us on education, on our efforts to build the entire economy.”

Chairman Obey’s words sum up perfectly why tomorrow’s speech is perhaps one of the most important speeches of this young Presidency.  With an ambitious domestic agenda, President Obama must convince the left tomorrow that spending on Afghanistan is the right thing to do and that his domestic priorities will not suffer.  At the same time, he has to convince the right (and most of the moderate middle) that he is tough enough on terrorism and that spending on both domestic and international priorities can be done simultaneously.  What the President says and how convincing he is tomorrow will set the tone for politics in D.C. for 2010.

November 24, 2009

Homeland Security is about destroying terrorism

Filed under: International HLS — by Christopher Bellavita on November 24, 2009

I spent two days in Turkey last week. I had been asked to give a paper about “Homeland Security in the U.S. After 9/11″ at a NATO counter-terrorism conference.  Somehow I had the impression it was supposed to be an academic paper. So that’s what I wrote.

Once the conference started, it took me about 15 minutes to realize none of the 60 participants would have much interest in hearing  about “U.S. homeland security as the emergent consequence of a complex adaptive system.”

When it was  my turn to present, I made up something else to talk about. I hobbled through my 30 minutes doing, I think, little lasting damage to U.S. — NATO relations.
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The homeland security vision outlined in the 2007 strategy says that “along with our partners in the international community” we “will work to achieve a secure homeland that sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America.”

When Phil Palin wrote for this blog, he would occasionally write about the international part of homeland security. His perception was most people were not interested in that topic. Count me as one of those people. There’s enough to focus on domestically, and one has only so much mental bandwidth.

They say — whoever “they” are — travel broadens one.  I now consider myself getting a little broadened.
—————————-
The conference included representatives from 19 countries.  What I thought would be an academic conference turned out to be a meeting filled (mostly) with young (30 to 40 year old) military officers primarily from eastern European and Asian nations — Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Bosnia, Singapore, and several other countries.
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There also were half a dozen senior army officers from Pakistan. A few weeks ago they had been in the midst of the Afghanistan/Pakistan battlefields. I asked them who they were fighting, who the enemy was, and why they were fighting. I was told, in the rhythmic speech patterns of the Pakistani version of English, “Good question. We don’t know. We are soldiers. We follow orders. We fight.”

The answer surprised me a little. Actually it surprised me a lot.
—————————-
The conference was conducted in English. While not all the participants spoke English fluently, they all understood English quite well. (How is it the language of a small island in the upper latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere turned into the common tongue of the world? I’m sure there are books that explain how that happened. Maybe someone can suggest one of those books for my holiday reading.)
—————————-
There was no doubt Turkey is at war. As we entered our hotel, we had to pass through metal detectors and our baggage was screened, just like the airport. The road to the conference was peppered with barbed wire enclaves, concrete blocks, sniper towers, and other martial artifacts. The meeting facility was in a compound, secured by seriously armed soldiers. (During one of the breaks, I watched a helmeted soldier, weapon at the ready position, looking straight ahead at the highway, about 100 yards in front of him.  I watched him for 5 minutes.  He did not turn his head once.)

Terrorism is real not just for Turkey, but for practically all the states represented at the conference. (Heard anything lately about the Tartar separatists in Crimea?) In the world represented by the participants at the security conference, the reality of terrorism is substantially different from what I experience the “terrorist threat” to be in the United States.

Despite the somewhat numbing title of the conference — “NATO Advanced Research Workshop: Homeland Security Organization in Defense Against Terrorism” — the officers were not at the conference to listen to research findings. They wanted something practical to take back to their own “homeland.”
—————————-
In subsequent posts I will summarize some of what I consider to be highlights of the conference, including  Al Qaeda’s most significant success in the terrorism wars, the difference between Mohammad’s Mecca and Medina periods and its impact on understanding the concept of jihad, Singapore’s strategy for countering radicalization, and what comes next after “homeland security” is no longer in vogue.
—————————-
I’ll conclude this introductory post with two observations.

First, some people may think the word “homeland” is an awkwardly Teutonic name for national security. But the term seems to be in the process of being adopted in both old and new Europe, and in parts of Asia.

That surprised me.

In the U.S., it is not unusual to be cynical about the phrase “homeland security.” Elsewhere in the world, it symbolizes a new opportunity to shape — for good or for ill –  security futures.

Second, I am persuaded by people like Louise Richardson (“What Terrorists Want”) and others that terrorism cannot be defeated. But, like the old Soviet Union, it can successfully be contained. I think there is substantial theoretical and historical support for that position.

During my thirty minute presentation, I explained how in the United States “homeland security” is often used as a synonym for concern about fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other incidents — in addition to terrorism — that constitute “all hazards.”

The participants listened politely.  But they were not buying any of it.  For them, homeland security is only about terrorism.  And the people in that conference room want terrorism destroyed.

October 20, 2009

Rah-i-Nijat Tuesday update

Filed under: International HLS,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on October 20, 2009

Following are some non-US media links reporting on unfolding events  in Pakistan.

Chief of Army Staff Kayani writes to Mehsud tribal leaders. (DAWN)

DAWN editorial on Wazirstan operation. “It will be difficult to know when ‘victory’ has been won.”

Tuesday  attack on International Islamic University.  Women and law faculty targeted. (BBC)

Pakistan cuts deal with anti-American Militants (AP)

Pakistan forces making progress (Aljazeera)

Pakistan plans to overwhelm Taliban within two weeks (The Telegraph)

It is my perspective that this operation is directly relevant to homeland security given what we think we know about the location of “core al-Qaeda” and the relationship between AQ and the Taliban in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere.

October 17, 2009

Pakistan begins ground operations against Taliban (and AQ) in South Waziristan

Filed under: International HLS,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on October 17, 2009

pakistan_map_wazir_466

The map above is provided by the BBC.  It shows real-time reports coming in from journalists and others on the ground as of 0900 Eastern on Saturday.

You can follow local coverage at www.dawn.com.  This is one of the most trustworthy local English language media operations in Pakistan.

Another source of value-added and usually reliable information is Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal (www.longwarjournal.org).

Early reports are available from the New York Times, The Telegraph, and most mainstream media. 

The last time the Pakistani military moved into Waziristan they were badly bruised.  When they withdrew, ancient antagonisms were given new ambition.  This time the army leadership realizes they are probably fighting for the survival of the Pakistani state.  This fight may also improve conditions for a successful outcome of the US/NATO operation in Afghanistan.

In any case, a victory will be hard-won, failure will come at a steep price, and anything in-between will be excruciating.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON UPDATE:

With reports by Saeed Shah in Lahore, Emal Khan in Peshawar and Dean Nelson in London, The Telegraph has a helpful overview of the operation that was launched about midnight Saturday in Pakistan. 

The long-awaited army ground offensive had been delayed for weeks as army generals agonised over how the country would cope with the militant backlash which would inevitably follow an all-out assault in the Taliban’s heartland.

The breakthrough came late on Friday night when, in a highly unusual move, the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kiyani, summoned the all the main opposition party leaders to a meeting at the home of the prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani.

There, they were asked for united support for what would be one of the army’s most controversial operations: the use of overwhelming force against their own people – many of them tribal militants who had once been trained and encouraged by some of the leaders and generals now moving against them.

In an essay filed with The Telegraph from London, Ahmed Rashid, a long-time Pakistani journalist and author of The Taliban, could not be more stark regarding what is at stake in this fight.

Pakistan’s militants are intent on nothing less than toppling the government, assassinating the ruling establishment, imposing an Islamic state and getting hold of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Regular readers of The Watch will recall that while I have long advocated Pakistani operations in Waziristan, I have not been surprised by the long delay.  If not for the audacious Taliban attacks of the last two weeks, I wonder if delay might have continued right into the winter snows.   M. Ilyas Khan, writing for the BBC from Islamabad, offers his explanation for the doubts that delayed Waziristan attack.

SUNDAY UPDATE:

Despite several reports of “heavy” Taliban resistance, the Sunday edition of DAWN includes,

Ground forces launched the three-pronged push on Saturday, starting a much-anticipated assault in a bid to crush networks blamed for some of the worst attacks that have killed more than 2,250 people over the past two years. ‘The resistance is not as stiff as we were expecting, maybe because we are still moving and not yet reached the strongholds of the Taliban like Kotkai, Makin, Ladha and Kanigurram,’ one military official told AFP.

Jay Shankar reporting for Bloomberg has about the best, if still spotty,  description of the tactical situation I can find.  A couple of hours after Mr. Shankar,  at about 9AM eastern, the BBC is providing a good update.

Shortly before 2:00 eastern on Sunday Jane Perlez’ update on the battle appeared in the New York Times.  She reports,

… the Taliban said part of their strategy was to encourage the military to progress deeper into the militant enclave in the center of South Waziristan, and then tie the soldiers down with hit-and-run tactics that would keep the soldiers in a protracted campaign in the inhospitable terrain over the winter. The government forces would be hit hard once they penetrated further into the mountains, the favorite fighting areas for the militants, a Taliban organizer who is not involved in the current fighting said by telephone on Sunday from Wana, the capital of South Waziristan.

Gen. David Petraeus, chief of US Central Command, will arrive in Pakistan on Monday for consultations.

An official report on the first 24 hours of combat is available from the Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations website.  The government operated Associated Press of Pakistan also provides details difficult to find elsewhere.

In a Saturday interview with CNN, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said,  “I’m very impressed with the commitment that the Pakistani government, both the civilian leadership and the military have made… They’re very much focused on also going into the heartland of where the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda are located and where these plots and these attacks are planned and directed.”  The Secretary’s comments came in the context of several questions related to US strategy in Afghanistan. (CNN Transcript via the Boston Globe.)

Nick Meo has an interesting report in the Sunday Telegraph, Taliban’s Afghan allies tell Barack Obama: “Cut us a deal and we’ll ditch al-Qaeda’.

MONDAY MORNING UPDATE

From today’s edition of DAWN:

The army says it has surrounded the militants in their main zone, a wedge of territory in the north of South Waziristan, and soldiers backed by aircraft and artillery are attacking from the north, southwest and southeast… the offensive could be its toughest test since the militants turned on the state, and the army will be hoping Afghan Taliban factions elsewhere in South Waziristan and in North Waziristan stay out of the fight.

Declan Walsh reporting for The Guardian from Islamabad writes,

Soldiers are attacking the Mehsud territory from Razmak in the north, Jandola in the east and Wana in the south. Officials estimate the drive will take a minimum of six weeks and could stretch through the winter. The non-Mehsud parts of South Waziristan, which are controlled by the rival Wazir tribe and border with Afghanistan, have not been affected.

Dean Nelson, writing in the Monday morning Telegraph, offers a sobering analysis of the situation facing Pakistan, including,

After the American-led offensive in Afghanistan that ousted Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime in 2001, several key Taliban figures were protected by the Pakistan army, which still regards them as “strategic assets”. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, are among them. They continue to organise attacks on Nato forces from Waziristan, unmolested or challenged by the Pakistan army.

The Pakistan military believes the Americans and the British will withdraw from Afghanistan – and when they do they will need old Taliban friends such as Haqqani once again to minimise the influence of its Indian enemy in its Afghan back yard. It is for this reason too that Islamabad has turned a blind eye to the presence of Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura, the ruling council that co-ordinates the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan from a hideout close to the Balochistan state capital.

These leaders are what the Pakistan military have in mind when they talk of “good” and “bad” Taliban – those who pose a threat to Pakistan and those who do not. Those who pose a mortal threat to British and American troops over the border can still be “good Taliban” in Pakistan.

It is the rise of the “very bad Taliban”, such as Hakimullah Mehsud’s pro-al-Qaeda Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – which threatens both Pakistan and Nato forces in Afghanistan – that has brought the largest deployment of Pakistani troops to the tribal areas since the British Indian Army arrived in the Thirties to crush the Faqir of Ipi’s jihad against the Raj.

Senator John Kerry is in Islamabad and Rawalpindi for discussions with Pakistani leadership (as is Gen. Petraeus).  This morning’s Pakistani media is giving significant attention to Sen. Kerry’s comments Sunday morning on State of the Union with John King.  Here’s what DAWN is reporting:

Asked if he believed that a ‘giant US presence’ in Afghanistan would do more harm than good to Pakistan, the senator said: ‘there is a legitimate question about whether or not a certain number of troops, depending on their mission, might drive people into Pakistan, and thereby present further difficulties in the western part of that country or even fuel the extremism there.’

October 11, 2009

Context matters, never more than in AfPak

Filed under: International HLS,Strategy,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on October 11, 2009

Three bits worth your attention as a decision approaches related to the  US  strategy for AfPak:

The Sunday New York Times includes a piece by Scott Shane on Mullah Omar’s remarkable resilience as leader of the Afghan Taliban.  This come back, how it was achieved, and what it really means is at the heart of current strategic considerations by the White House.

Sunday’s Washington Post reports on the competition between Pakistan and India for influence in Afghanistan.  Understanding this aspect of regional geopolitics is essential to accurately perceiving Pakistan’s attitude vis-a-vis the Taliban. Please see Attack may Intensify India-Pakistan Proxy War  by Emily Wax.

Late Sunday, Pakistan time, it sounds increasingly likely that sustained  military operations will soon begin in South Waziristan.  Yesterday’s attack on Army General Headquarters and hostage taking, while supposedly aimed to deter, has instead spurred government authorization to claim the offensive.  See stories in DAWN, The Age, and The Telegraph.  

While I claim no special insight, some of those who do claim expertise, wonder if — once again — the Taliban-in-Pakistan have overplayed.  They say many in Rawalpindi were using the White House decision-making process to delay taking the offense in Waziristan.  The same circles have exploited controversial elements of the Kerry-Lugar aid package to foster further distraction. Soon winter snows will provide another excuse for delay.  But now the attack on Army GHQ is seen as requiring a response.

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