Homeland Security Watch

The House recently passed a bill introduced by Rep. Langevin to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to grant the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) authority for the development, approval, implementation, integration, and oversight of certain DHS cyber security initiatives (e.g “information management and information infrastructure”). The Homeland Security Network Defense and Accountability Act of 2008 authorizes the CIO to manage the policies, procedures, activities, funding, and systems relating to DHS networked information and infrastructure, and this surely bears on the Department’s role in the National Cyber Security Initiative.

Why the CIO? The GAO issued a report in June questioning DHS’s organization for addressing its cyber missions. There is CERT. There is an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Communications and the director of the National Cyber Security Center at DHS. Of course, most of the component agencies of DHS also have their own CIOs.

The new bill directs the DHS CIO to establish and manage security control testing protocols to protect DHS’s and contractors’ information infrastructure against cyber-based attacks. It also tasks the DHS Inspector General with determining the effectiveness of the Department’s cyber security policies and controls. Moreover, the Secretary – through the CIO – has to determine that any contractors have their own cyber security policies and protections in place before entering into or renewing a covered contract.

That’s a lot on the CIO. The bill therefore sets forth a list of qualifications for the CIO. These quals include at least five years of executive leadership and management experience in IT and information security.

The Euroscience Open Forum 2008 taking place in Barcelona, Spain, is covered in a short UPI story highlighting the Forum’s focus on nuclear forensics, which is the science specializing in nuclear threat detection.

Nuclear forensics cuts across the entire mission space from deterrence and dissuasion, to detection through consequence management, to attribution and response. It is a core part of the mission of combating smuggled nuclear weapons.

Speaking at the Eurpean Forum, Gabriele Tamborini of the European Commission Joint Research Center Institute for Transuranium Elements told UPI that the threat posed by nuclear terrorism has become a serious field of study.

“Nuclear forensics may provide information on the history, the intended use and possibly on the origin of nuclear material.”

“This scientific discipline is at the interface between physical science, prosecution, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.”

For our part, the U.S. has formed the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) under the DNDO. It represents an important reorganization.

While the Department of Homeland Security is not responsible for the entire spectrum of nuclear forensics, the NTNFC is a step forward in two clearly needed capabilities:
1. Across the government, unify various competencies and programs that are focused on aspects of the forensics mission.
2. Develop, enhance, and maintain technical forensics capabilities for pre-event needs.

The FBI provides the Deputy Assistant Director at the NTNFC, and it also provides a senior liaison from the FBI lab. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy both provide detailees.

The Forensics Center also has a Working Group, made up of members from each relevant federal agency and members of the intelligence community, which meets regularly. There is an “Interagency NTNF Program & Budget Crosscut” under development to help align relevant programs and harmonize budget requests. Lastly, the NTNFC – and the DNDO in general – work with interagency partners in planning and executing exercises that support the research, development, and deployment of technologies, as well as shared concepts of operations.

DHS Inspector General conducted a comprehensive review of the Department’s intentional activities and interests. This blog considers the international side of homeland security to be one of the most important dimensions to successfully carrying out the Department’s missions. The IG appears to agree in his new and in-depth investigation of DHS international affairs. Coupled with a rare study of the Department’s global efforts, this new report offers a number of recommendations for improving the institutional capacity of DHS to meet its important international objectives.

I’ve been looking at this issue since 2004 and subsequently wrote a short paper with colleagues at the Center for the Study of the Presidency on how DHS can be more creative in tapping into existing networks overseas among allies and distant friends. We focused on creating dialogue based on shared interests and the exchange of capabilities through training and technology sharing. Ultimately, we came to the realization that no significant progress could be made without a strategic plan for DHS international activities. The IG confirmed these findings and in his Executive Summary he similarly calls for a “strategic plan to prepare guidance on training and technical assistance abroad.”

The IG also takes aim at how DHS is managing its interests overseas with an enterprise perspective and management mindset. The report notes that while the DHS Office of International Affairs, led by an Assistant Secretary for Policy, is the chief management entity stateside, the Department relies upon a mix of management approaches to its presence abroad. In some cases, DHS relies upon component staff (CBP, ICE, USCG, etc.) or they’ve named actual attaches to represent the Department. The IG finds that neither version is optimal and that this approach must be strengthened and refocused.

In all, the IG makes eighteen recommendations. They cover such topics as organizational issues, interagency coordination, implications of funding constraints, and tangible (missed) opportunities for more valuable efforts that support U.S. homeland security interests overseas. Where the IG addresses the importance of international training and technical assistance (T&TA), three constraints on DHS are called out:

1. Insufficient coordination among DHS, State, and DOD.
2. Insufficient information about funds available for DHS international programs
3. Uneven commitment of staff by larger component agencies to valuable T&TA initiatives. (IG specifically calls out FEMA, CBP, and TSA.)

T&TA represents the most tangible work OIA and the Department can do in this mission without drifting into operations that are carried out by component agencies and are part of a different debate/analysis. I noted in particular the echoes of previous works by others and posts here on strengthening DHS’s hand in adding value in the T&TA mission area, as well as related interagency coordiantion challenges. For example:

Forge a New Currency of Counterterrorism Cooperation Through NATO

Middle East Eyes Homeland Security

Europe Steps In to Bridge Mediterranean. But Where’s the U.S.?

Panel Seeks to Integrate CT and Security Assistance, Sans DHS

Int’l Security Summit Misses HLS Opportunity

DHS 2.0 (section on international affairs)

Homeland Security Technology, Global Partnerships, and Winning the Long War

Congress last month received the pre-release draft of a new report focused on managing DHS through the coming presidential transition. The final public report is now available by its authors, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), which had undertaken the study at the request of Congress to prepare the Department for the management challenges – as well as security vulnerabilities – it will face between November and January 20, 2009.

Given that we’ve seen spikes in terrorist attacks at times of political transition, such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the presidential transition carries with it an added challenge for DHS. It must manage the institutional flux that occurs with any change in the presidency while also maintaining, if not bolstering, the ability to defeat, deter, defend against, or respond to a terrorist attack seeking to exploit such a symbolic window of time.

The policy community has embarked on a number of ongoing transition studies that aim to inform the next team’s policy slate as it takes over DHS. I participate in two of them, and there are at least two others I’m aware of. For the most part, these efforts do not address the management challenge of keeping DHS running during this key timeframe. This is where the NAPA study comes in.

The report suggests that, while the ratio of political appointees to career leaders is typical at DHS given the rest of the Executive branch, DHS should shift more executives to field operations and convert deputy slots to career positions. This process is well underway, but we are seeing cases where political appointees are getting the deputy jobs as career positions.

In all, NAPA offers a transition plan in 22 steps. Among them are the following:

June through the Democratic and Republican conventions:
• Appoint a full-time transition director.
• Develop a comprehensive transition plan.
• Enhance current transition initiatives and a transition training plan.
• Fill vacant senior executive service positions quickly.

Between the conventions and the election, DHS should:
• Ask the presidential candidates to name a potential Homeland Security transition team.
• Expedite security clearances for all transition team officials.

Between election day and inauguration the president-elect should designate, and Congress should vet, a new DHS secretary to be sworn in on Inauguration Day

After the election:
• Other key political appointees should be approved no later than December.
• DHS should offer training for likely presidential appointees.
• DHS should continue joint training exercises with career and non-career executives.

As with nearly all such reports, the NAPA panel calls for Congress to consolidate its oversight of DHS. However, the focus it gives to the less exciting, but equally vital, management imperatives makes this study unique. I have no doubt the current DHS leadership is committed to carrying out the NAPA report’s recommendations. But let’s hope that all the concern over security vulnerabilities during the transition proves to be unnecessary.

Carol Haave will be named the next DHS Assistant Secretary for International Affairs on (or around) July 7, 2008. While it may at first seem ironic that our Homeland Security agency has an international affairs portfolio, this is perhaps one of the more interesting and valuable position in the DHS leadership. Readers will be familiar with proposals made here and elsewhere for an elevated role for the A/S for International Affairs at DHS. The previous occupant, Marissa Lino, is a former diplomat. (She left unexpectedly after only months on the job.) The new A/S has a decidedly different background on the international scene.

Haave served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations. In those positions, she led the development of the Iraq National ID Card program. Additionally, she led a cross-DOD team to develop policies, process, and procedures for sharing counterterrorism information with coalition partners.

Prior to joining DOD in 2001, Haave spent more than 15 years as a consultant to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. There she focused on transitioning technology into the military and commercial markets, and was a team leader for the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff.

She received a direct commission as a military police officer in the Army and was one of the first female Army officers to attend airborne school.

I’ve covered the work of the DHS Essential Technology Task Force here and here, and yesterday the ETTF reported out its final recommendations to the Secretary during the public portion of the HSAC’s bi-annual meeting with the Secretary.

The Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council with establishing an Essential Technologies Task Force (ETTF) to address the following questions:

• What are the legal, financial and operational issues that must be understood to assess whether and to what extent DHS should acquire various types of technology on a service or lease basis, rather than as a purchase/capital investment?

• What types of technology might be considered as candidates for different approaches?

• What types of financial arrangements would the private sector likely be prepared to accept, and how should DHS assess the pros and cons of each?

IBM’s Scott Gould and I were among those invited to testify before the Task Force. On the two occasions that I presented to them, my testimony focused on key attributes of successful technology acquisition from other parts of the USG, as well as opportunities for DHS to collaborate with international partners for joint technology development, the models for which reside at the EU, NATO, and elsewhere.

Both Scott and I made the point that without an overarching framework to guide a Department-wide acquisition strategy, little progress is likely. Scott actually recommended using the Global Movement Management framework as a model, which the Task Force chose to include as a specific example in their final report. That report described in detail the following seven top-level recommendations:

1. Build a high performance acquisitions and program management function implemented by capable staff.

2. Adopt a rigorous Department-wide requirements management process.

3. Develop a Department-wide acquisition strategy with a clear implementation plan.

4. Improve engagement with the private sector.

5. Manage innovation though a variety of approaches.

6. Use the regulatory and standards setting role of DHS to generate economies of scale across stakeholder domains.

7. Continue to advocate for the reduction of homeland security Congressional committees.

The Secretary stayed only to delivery praise to the Task Force and swear in three new members to the HSAC. He left before ETTF chairman George Vradenburg delivered his presentation on the Task Force’s findings. This is unfortunate. The ETTF is another example of how the HSAC is becoming a more focused and more useful advisory entity to the DHS leadership. Kudos to Chuck Adams and Amanda Rittenhouse for their tireless efforts over the last several months in leading the Task Force’s staff team.

Before he left, Chertoff charged the HSAC membership with one more task: “What are the ten tasks for the next Administration to take up and accomplish over its first year or two?”

It seemed odd to charge this group with something so trite. However, he explained, rightly, that it is important that efforts be made to preserve the institutional knowledge of the Department into and through its first ever Presidential transition.

I’d like to know what you think should make the top ten list. Comment below.

The Stimson Center’s Cooperative Nonproliferation Program (CNP) announced the launch of a new task force charged with leveraging national laboratory S&T for the 21st century security environment. Fran Townsend, President Bush’s former Homeland Security Advisor, and Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton, will serve as co-chairs. The bipartisan group, composed of national security experts, scientists, and businesspeople, will convene for the first time on June 27th, 2008 in Washington, DC.

The Task Force is led by The Stimson Center’s Libby Turpen, with clear involvement of Ellen Laipson, who was vice-chair at the National Intelligence Council the first time I met her. She was appointed president and CEO at Stimson in 2002. Libby used to be on the Hill before she joined Stimson in 2001 to establish the Security for a New Century congressional study group.

I have the privilege of serving on this taskforce over the next several months. While the proceedings of this Task Force will be private until reporting out to sponsors at DOE and the Lounsbery Foundation, I’ll do my best to keep readers informed of the work. After our first meeting is on the 27th, we’ll be heading out to Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, to visit with the people at Los Alamos National Lab, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) ongoing transformation from a Cold War complex to a modern national security enterprise is faced with the distinct challenge of repurposing to some extent the overall mission and focus of the nuclear labs, namely Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore.

The Task Force’s key objective is to develop a strategy to ensure retention of nuclear weapons related core competencies at the national labs while better leveraging their scientific and technological capabilities to serve a broader set of 21st-century national and homeland security needs. This initiative should create a comprehensive R&D strategy to serve this objective. One can anticipate a likely slate of issues to include cybersecurity, climate change modeling, and possibly energy security issues.

The DHS S&T Stakeholders conference taking place this week is a sprawling array of panels, booths, displays, and coffee breaks. Nearly one hundred speakers by my estimate, and perhaps one thousand attendees. The event is sometimes organized along the paradigm of bugs, bombs, borders, bodies (people), business, and buildings.

Today’s panel discussion under the Bodies channel was chaired by Sharla Rausch, head of the Department of Homeland Security’s Human Factors Division. Her panelists represented TSA and the Screening Coordination Office. I interviewed the Associate Director of the SCO, Patricia Cogswell, after the panel adjourned and asked about what’s on the horizon for the SCO because it’s a unique kind of office with a strategic, cross-DHS mission.

First, a bit about the SCO. It was born in the FY06 President’s Budget Request as part of a program consolidation effort, and was followed up in FY07 as part of a program coordination effort. Note the difference. Rather than have the SCO absorb programs, it now coordinates them. Today, the SCO is part of the DHS Policy Directorate.

Its director, Kathy Kraninger, is technically an Assistant Secretary of Policy. Of the SCO’s two Associate Directors, Patty Cogswell mainly handles the SCO’s Credentialing Framework, Immigration Reform/USCIS Transformation, FBI Name Checks/IAFIS, the Information Sharing Council, and matters dealing with biometrics and DHS’s IDENT program. I understand the lead-up to yesterday’s announcement of the Pre-Travel Authorization Program for Visa Waiver travelers has kept the SCO rather busy.

Screening is actually a rather specific term for DHS with a discrete definition. A DHS briefing obtained by HLSWatch defines screening as “the process of identifying, enrolling, and checking applicants to determine their eligibility for entry into the US, or access to privileged travel and transportation programs.” Given the added scope of such things as USCIS benefits, the “access” scope might be broadened to include immigration benefits.

To give you an idea of the SCO’s purview, consider these numbers:

DHS component agencies:

Process over 1.2 million travelers at the border, including over 630,000 aliens,

Screen over 1.8 million domestic air travelers,

Process 30,000 applicants for immigration benefits, and

Conduct 135,000 national security background checks relating to immigration benefits.

Credentials 750,000 workers requiring unescorted access to facilities and maritime vessels (through the TWIC program)

Today the SCO also serves as something of a budgetary pilot program itself by planning its requirements and budget needs through 2014. A Department-wide 5-year budget planning process is likely a far way off still. In its coordinating, its clear from Patty’s portfolio alone that this relatively small office has its hands in almost everything. We discussed today the ways in which SCO supports the CIO, CFO, and USCIS.

Other issues on the horizon surely include the forthcoming presidential transition. The SCO, like other offices (DNDO, ONA, Operations Coordination) will face a change in the presidency that could bring a change in priorities that’ll demote or devolve such things as screening coordination. Were that to be proposed, it would seem the SCO could count on champions from across the agency to speak to its value and utility.

Here’s another thought on that: If the budget is looking five years out, then it ought to be reflective of the Quadrennial (four-year) Homeland Security Review. Since the next Administration will inherit a draft QHSR, among other things, it would make sense for that document to be explicit about this priority.

In follow up to the April 22 post detailing an aspect of the DHS Transition Plan, the House Homeland Security Committee posted a presentation from Under Secretary for Management Elaine Duke on their website that explains the stages of the transition and succession plan the Department is executing.

As part of this transition plan, DHS is addressing the interagency dimension to establish communications paths among new officials, transfer relevant knowledge to new officials, engage in curricula that can enhance relationships among agencies with homeland security missions. The presentation cites the Executive Order on National Security Professionals and an apparent role that is now given to department or agency Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Transition.

But through all the briefing books and guidance documents, there was a recommendation of the Administration Transition Task Force that doesn’t appear to be a part of the current plan. (There are a few, actually, but this is one of the more important.) To mitigate the on-boarding process of incoming appointees and staff at DHS, the ATTF recommends providing a process “by which federal, state, local, tribal and the private sector authorities may submit to DHS officials their list of priorities and compilation of decisions made and decisions needed.”

This could help reduce the speed bumps that are largely outside of DHS’ control, but will be waiting in the new person’s in-box on day one. Some of these priorities will be parochial, but many will not be. This process enables the interagency and the broader homeland security community to contribute to the transition in a meaningful way that can shine a light on problems under the surface that the outgoing team may not be addressing.

For more on the transition efforts, see this page at the House Homeland Security Committee’s website.

An AP story by Scott Lindlaw sheds some light on how DHS is preparing for its first ever presidential transition. On or about January 20, 2009, DHS will lose its political appointees who will leave when the new president comes to town. Shane Harris at the National Journal put that into perspective with his piece on the impending transition as follows:

According to figures compiled in the quadrennial Plum Book by the Office of Personnel Management, as of September 2004 the 180,000-employee Homeland Security Department had more than 360 politically appointed, noncareer positions.

By contrast, the Veterans Affairs Department — the government’s second-largest department, at 235,000 employees — had only 64. And the Defense Department — far and away the largest department in the government, at 2.1 million employees, including military and civilian — counted 283 appointed, noncareer billets. That figure includes political appointees at the Army, Navy, and Air Force. DHS’s own reports show that since 2004, it has often added more political positions to its ranks, and more frequently, than other large departments.

Secretary Chertoff told Lindlaw that the department is “working to line up career officials for about 50 key roles” to manage DHS until the next president’s appointees are named and, if necessary, confirmed by the Senate. This could take months, but the new Secretary of Homeland Security is likely to be on a fast track through the Senate.

Next month, AP reports, DHS is convening a three-day conference with nearly 200 senior career officials to conduct a table-top exercise in response to a scenario depicting a national-level incident. It is unclear if this effort includes state and local partners, international counterparts, or even officials from other departments (i.e. Defense).

In some ways, we are seeing the impact of the work done by the Administration Transition Task Force, organized under the auspices of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, that issued earlier this year its report with basic recommendations for the DHS transition. However, there is still a sense in the Congress that DHS is conducting the transition planning effort behind closed doors. An article in the Wall Street Journal about the effort to convert political appointee positions to career slots in advance of the next election contributed to the Congressional oversight of DHS transition planning.

House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson and Secretary Chertoff traded letters in which Thompson requested more information on the DHS plans. In his response, Chertoff declines to provide the laundry list of details requested by the Committee. “In most cases, the transition planning documents are still under development and, in any event, they constitute executive branch materials intended to be shared in the first instance with the incoming administration.”

UPDATE: Special thanks to William Cumming for sending in the CRS report released yesterday on “National Security Considerations and Options” related to the 08-09 presidential transition. You can download a copy here.

The report outlines critical issues that pertain to five phases of a transition, spanning from the campaign to the inauguration. The report also includes a table of recent military operations occurring during Presidential transitions and a table of Congressional legislation addressing various aspects of national security during Presidential transitions.

The research arm of Congress issued a report questioning the statutory legitimacy of the White House Homeland Security Council. Thanks to reader William Cumming and CQ Homeland Security for identifying this paper, which FAS made available. It reveals the haphazard way in which the former White HouseOffice of Homeland Security (OHS) – led by Tom Ridge – faded away after the Department of Homeland Security stood up and Ridge took the job as its first chief. According to budget documents and appropriations bills, most of the funding and personnel that ran OHS quietly shifted to the Homeland Security Council. The only problem was that for purposes of appropriations (the law), the HSC doesn’t exist.

I’m pretty sure its there. After all I have friends there and have had the opportunity to work with the people staffing the HSC. It is no shell either. While bureaucratically denuded, the HSC issued the 23 Homeland Security Presidential Directives we have today (that often times are issued jointly as National Security Presidential Directives also). Heck, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 actually mandated the creation of a “National Homeland Security Council” to be chaired by the president. (See Title IX of the Act for more.) This was the same Act that created DHS and led to the closing of the Office of Homeland Security at the White House.

According to the Congressional Research Service, that’s also the last we’ve seen, officially, of the HSC. The public does not know how many people work there, what they do, how they do it, and where the money goes that funds this White House operation.

At issue is the practice the White House has of requesting funding for the HSC through a shell sub-account with in the “White House Office” account that was left after the Office of Homeland Security closed its doors. Harold Relyea, author of the CRS paper, found that the Congress tried to call them out on this:

In late July 2003, House appropriators, in their report on the Departments of Transportation and Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2004, revealed that the Bush Administration had changed the “Office of Homeland Security” account, previously listed for the EOP, to an account for the “Homeland Security Council.” The report also questioned the continued role of OHS, saying “it is not clear what work remains that cannot be effectively performed by the Department of Homeland Security.” The account change also implied the shift of 66 staff personnel from OHS to the HSC, which the report questioned, “given the existence and support of the Department of Homeland Security.” The committee cut the President’s request of $8.3 million for the council to $4.1 million. Senate appropriators declined to fund the HSC through the White House Office (WHO) account, as requested, and recommended the $8.3 million sought by the President for the council in a separate account for the HSC.

To get appropriations, the HSC needs to have authorization from the Congress. Relyae explains that the House has tried repeatedly to fund the HSC through its own account – separate from the WHO account – as a symbolic gesture to shine some light on the subject.

All of this emerges within the context of an ongoing debate in Washington about what the future of the HSC should be. With a new administration coming in and the new HSC head only just taking on the job, the HSC’s days look numbered.

The Bush administration has named four candidates to fill top homeland and national security positions after a protracted effort to fill the top White House counterterrorism post, left open since January.

HLS Advisor to POTUS - Wainstein

Frances Fragos Townsend announced her resignation last November as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. In that position, Townsend also served as chair of the White House Homeland Security Council. News reports surfaced that known figures, such as retired Army Gen. John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, and Adm. (Ret.) James Loy, former Coast Guard Commandant and Deputy Homeland Security Secretary, turned down offers by the White House to succeed Townsend. With one year left in this term, it is hard to blame them for declining to return to government service on that note. Townsend’s former deputy, Joel Bagnal, a former Army colonel, has served in an Acting position since her departure and according to those I’ve spoken with, he maintains a great deal of respect in the interagency.

On Wednesday, the President nominated Kenneth Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, to replace Frances Townsend at the White House. Townesend came from the Department of Justice, and Wainstein seems to fit the mold of stalwart Administration supporter and institutional insider that would serve Townsend’s successor well. Since the position is not Senate confirmed, his prickly relationship with the Senate Judiciary Committee is unlikely to be an issue. Wainstein’s main responsibility at this point, barring any attack on the homeland in the meantime, will be to shepherd a transition to the next Presidential administration.

Chief CT Advisor - Leiter

Vice Admiral (Ret.) John Scott Redd stepped down as director of the National Counterterrorism Center last October for health reasons. The post went officially unfilled until this week when the White House announced that the President is nominating Michael Leiter to become succeed VADM Redd. Leiter is well respected in the intel community and has served since Redd’s departure as Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Cyber Czars Named - Beckstrom, Charbo

The president announced a multi-agency cybersecurity initiative late last year after the director at the National Cyber Security Division, Amit Yoran, resigned in October 2007. The job was previously a White House position held by Howard Schmidt and Richard Clarke.

Four months later, President Bush picked Scott Charbo as Deputy Undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate at DHS, primarily in charge of the Department’s cybersecurity mission. It seems Charbo will have two roles: combating attacks on U.S. cyber netrworks and weathering attacks from the House Homeland Security Committee. Chairman Thompson is not a fan.

Last Thursday, Secretary Chertoff announced the appointment of Rod Beckstrom as Director of the National Cyber Security Center, which replaces the National Cyber Security Division that Yoran led.

As part of the Administration’s recently announced Cyber Initiative, DHS is responsible for leading federal efforts to protect government networks against cyber-associated threat. Beckstrom is the co-founder of the open-source wiki software system, TWIKI.net, founder of Cats Software, and author of The Starfish And the Spider, which is about the advent of leaderless, decentralized organizations and the power of networks (both human and electronic).

A post here earlier this week detailed a conference on homeland security taking place in the Middle East next month. I suggested the U.S. should be more proactive in engaging that region on such issues as protecting civilians as a means to bridging a perception gap about the threat of terrorism made worse by the Iraq war, among other things. That we have an attaché attending the conference in Abu Dhabi, whereas the British and Spanish are dispatching senior officials, represents an important missed opportunity.

Some readers – only half joking – thought we wouldn’t have much to say of value at the conference anyway. We have a lot to gain from sharing what we do know about protecting the homeland, especially with governments in that region. However, doing so would benefit greatly first by deploying multilateral mechanisms for engagement. NATO is ready for such a role.

NATO’s unique map of nearly sixty countries represents the only multilateral consultative environment in the world wherein the U.S retains a significant – albeit underutilized – political advantage. Creative U.S. leadership of NATO in the 21st century can foster a better consensus between the U.S. and the many other countries within that framework for how to combat the evolving threat posed by terrorism. This would include a targeted mix of security cooperation efforts, deeper dialogue on counterterrorism best practices, and capabilities training. Ultimately, such leadership would serve as the basis for greater cooperative efforts in crucial regions that serve U.S. security and foreign policy interests.

While the very purpose of NATO was questioned after the Cold War ended, many observers expected the post-9/11 security environment to offer the Alliance a lifeline, if not a renewed raison d’etre. Ultimately, uneven U.S. engagement of NATO in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), combined with the deterioration of U.S.-European relations in the lead up to and conduct of the Iraq war, fed doubts about NATO’s relevance as the 21st-century security environment took shape. Without an engagement of NATO that redeploys the non-military legitimacy and outreach of the Alliance, the U.S. risks finding its cooperative security options unnecessarily limited when they are needed most.

The first seven years of the war against terrorism demonstrated the importance of developing trust and confidence with non-traditional allies, namely those in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. U.S. national and homeland security interests would benefit from developing innovative security assistance relationships here as it would garner more confidence and trust among countries that, while not pro-American, have not assumed entrenched anti-American positions. NATO offers the potential to assist in developing capabilities for counterterrorism (defeating terrorists) and antiterrorism (protecting civilians) as the new currency of cooperation.

The current level of political engagement of NATO by the U.S. obliges Western policymakers to pursue a less unified – and suboptimal – approach to working with important countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East, which includes approximately fifteen countries within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. The U.S. can focus resources that reinforce a relatively pro-American political environment without forcing nations of the region to choose between the U.S. and Europe or spurn regional allies by appearing overly pro-western if we engage them through such consultative mechanisms as the Med/D and ICI.

This initiative would enable the development of policy options to help pursue U.S. homeland security and counterterrorism interests while cultivating a more productive dialogue between the U.S. and critical countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East. This includes maximizing or augmenting current NATO programs such as the Program of Work on Defense Against Terrorism, NATO Security Through Science, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center. Each of these efforts contributes greatly to U.S. interests. Yet the U.S. has allowed or even led efforts to cut funding of some of these most essential programs.

Certain perennial challenges would complicate an effort by the U.S. to recalibrate engagement of NATO in this way. First, EU leadership remains reluctant to encourage members also belonging to NATO to support a more substantive NATO role in protecting civilians as well as troops. This “EU Bloc” in NATO can be formidable: France, Belgium, and Germany, among others, regularly obstruct efforts to broaden NATO’s non-military engagement. France routinely objects to – and almost as often succeeds in preventing – proposals at NATO to focus its existing capabilities on homeland security requirements.

This proposed initiative should identify ways for the U.S. to neutralize – or at least offset – unnecessary competition with the EU. One model might employ the NATO “Quad,” whereby political directors from Germany, France, UK, and the U.S. work together on an ad hoc basis to identify shared objectives and negotiate acceptable solutions on a wide range of security concerns through NATO. The tensions surrounding the Iraq war left the Quad to languish, but U.S. leadership to reinitiate this dialogue could generate useful progress.

A second problem is in Washington: Disunity between the U.S. Homeland Security Department’s objectives and the Departments of State and Defense further complicates the use of NATO for these purposes. After more than three years since its creation, DHS runs few, if any, coordinating efforts with State or Defense at the U.S. NATO mission.

Failure to change course from the currently constricted approach to NATO risks denuding this historic alliance that has served American interests for over fifty years, while severely limiting U.S. freedom to develop broader consensus in the war against terrorism, deeper cooperative engagement with the Middle East and Mediterranean region, and a more durable dialogue with the nearly sixty countries under NATO.

Brooks Tigner reports today on a trend we’ve discussed here on a few occasions: The Europeans are more comfortable with homeland security than we give them credit for. The Brits have their “civil” security, the Swedes have coined “societal” security, and even NATO has long owned a “civilian emergency planning” capability. Tigner identifies what he calls “the proliferation” of EU actors, institutions, and decision-makers in civil security across the EU’s institutional map, which has prompted a familiar debate across the Atlantic: Should the array of Homeland Security-related entities be streamlined?

To be sure, streamlining is different from the perennial practice of “reorganization” that we engage in on this side of the Pond. The Lisbon Treaty elevated justice and home affairs decisions to EU-level.  More than a dozen of the European Commission’s (EC) 23 directorates general (DGs) have some civil security policy jurisdiction. Streamlining efforts may result in reducing the number of directly involved DGs or in the appointment of a single DG to have overall responsibility.

The EC’s foreign affairs and security/defense portfolios will be handled by a single position. That new “High Representative” will operate as part of the EC that proposes policy and as a member of the European Council that approves policy.  Now that’s streamlining.  If its wise remains to be seen.

Top priorities in the justice and home affairs agenda resemble issues here. Tigner points out a few, including border patrol and immigration issues, judicial and police operations, critical infrastructure protection, visa and passport procedures, counterterrorism efforts and the fight against organized crime.

Another development to watch is the French thought leadership on this topic. The French government plans to issue a white paper on security and defense this spring. How much of this topic the paper will address is unknown, but it will surely gain attention when France assumes the EU presidency in July.

This week, the Administration Transition Task Force reported out to Secretary Chertoff and the overall Homeland Security Advisory Council on its recommendations for how the Department leadership can prepare for and manage the first transition for DHS.  Its a rather skeletal report at 9 pages (the remaining 18 pages are appendixes), but it represents the beginning of a very worthwhile process of managing what will surely be a challenging transition. 

 Many people, even the Secretary, are advocating for a depoliticized transition that focuses on the mission.  This report speaks to that with some detail.  Other efforts to manage the HLS transition are underway at the DNDO, the HSC, and even by contractors of DHS (namely the Council on Excellence in Government).

The “Secure Borders Open Doors Advisory Council” — more easily referred to as the SBODAC — also reported out.  This report can be downloaded here. 

UPDATE: Thanks to reader William Cumming for identifying the related story in today’s Washington Post.  Stephen Barr interviews acting Deputy DHS Secretary Paul Schneider about how the Department is gearing up for the transition.  Check out William’s comment on this post for more.

In a CQ story today, Matthew Johnson invokes the perennial question of whether we need a Homeland Security Council in addition to a National Security Council at the White House. The non-government experts interviewed both suggest the HSC’s days are numbered, while Congressman Peter King defends the need for a separate HSC.

P.J. Crowley at the Center for American Progress gets the award for most cutting response:

“… it doesn’t make sense to have an Iraq policy where you are creating terrorists disconnected from a homeland security policy where you are supposed to be able to defend against them.”

Whether one agrees that the Iraq war is making more enemies than friends, it stands to reason that if combating terrorism overseas is a national security concern, why would defending against terrorism at home not be? No one would argue that the two efforts are completely disconnected, but sometimes all it takes is a little extra bureaucracy to install a stovepipe.

Imagine if the next President had a national security advisor with two deputies responsible for different portfolios that required a great degree of coordination and shared assets/resources (like the President’s attention)? One deputy for national security, the other for homeland security. The NSC staff would enlarge enough to accommodate the extra workload and the membership on the NSC would be rebalanced to include some of the members from the former HSC. (The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Transportation may be the only two members of the HSC who are not also members of the NSC.)

CSIS’s David Heyman agrees. Not to put too fine a point on it, David clarifies that “We should abolish the HSC and it should be subsumed by the National Security Council….”

And in the other corner: Peter T. King of New York, the Ranking Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee, opposes the idea of merging the two Councils.

“Just as the president has a secretary of State and needs a national security adviser, he also needs a Homeland Security secretary and a homeland security adviser,” King said.

By this logic, we’ll need a Housing and Urban Development Advisor and a HUD Council at the White House, along with an Education advisor and National Education Council.  You see where I’m going with this.

Determining the HSC-NSC fate requires a different argument from this one.  Consider the unique roles that the HSC carries out that have no obvious overlap with the NSC (i.e. State and Local coordination, Emergency Preparedness and Response, or Critical Infrastructure Protection) and ask the following questions:

“Do these portfolios require a separate structure to serve the President or can they be represented by individual senior directors on an expanded NSC staff?”

“Do these responsibilities require direct White House coordination and guidance in the fist place?”

“Would a double deputy and single National Security Advisor be effective in managing a broadened portfolio?”

“Is homeland security a separate endeavor from national security?”

DHS is back to the drawing board with its National Applications Office. In hindsight, it was impressive that this new Office should come together so quickly and in final format with a Fact Sheet and all more than a month ahead of its roll-out. The interagency negotiations and burdens of transforming the legacy aspects of the Civil Applications Office must have quite a challenge. But not as challenging as the Congress would prove to be.

Bennie Thompson, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee released a statement this week that began by explaining that “After several requests from the Homeland Security Committee calling for a moratorium on the controversial use of spy satellite imagery for domestic purposes, the Department has heeded the call and delayed its planned October 1st launch of its new National Applications Office (NAO).”

Readers may recall the September 10 post here explaining the plans for this new office. This is effectively a modernization of the Civil Applications Office (CAO) to reflect a joint effort of two new entities: DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. A lot has changed since the days of the CAO. Evidently the civil liberties questions today are no match for the NAO. Thompson explains that as a result of the “moratorium,” DHS “has cited the need to address unanswered privacy and civil liberties questions from Congress – as addressed in the Committee’s September 6th hearing on the matter and also in letters from August 22nd and September 6th from Committee Members.”

This sounds a lot like the days when we rolled out the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. While the challenges had more to do with political science than with privacy protection, the Congress felt as if they were in the dark about the DNDO and pushed back hard. Both Democrats and Republicans were skeptical of the DNDO since they were effectively told of its existence when it showed up in the President’s budget request. (The Presidential Directive creating it was not released.) It made a Congressional Affairs expert out of the DNDO Director real quick. Vayl Oxford spent upwards of 30 visits to the Hill over a few months. Eventually, as he explained it to me, they went from “justifying our existence to justifying our investments.”

That may be a better fate than the NAO will meet.

A new office opens in October at DHS that will manage civilian use of intelligence community and DoD assets. The National Applications Office is the post-9/11 incarnation of what used to be called the Civil Applications Committee that started in 1974 as the result of the President’s Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission).

Beginning next month, the National Applications Office (NAO) will serve as the “principal interface” between the intelligence community and the Civil Applications, Homeland Security, and Law Enforcement Domains.  According to Bobby Block at the Wall Street Journal, it was a May 25 memo that empowered DHS through the NAO to gain access to some of the U.S.’s most powerful intelligence-gathering capabilities.  Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell designated DHS as the executive agent and functional manager of the National Applications Office.  It was this May 25 memo to Secretary Chertoff that assigned responsibility to DHS for:

• Enabling a wide spectrum of civil applications, homeland security, and law enforcement users greater access to the collection, analysis, and production skills and capabilities of the intelligence community;

• Enhancing intelligence and information sharing and dissemination to federal, state, and local government and law enforcement users;

• Educating customers about the capabilities and products of the intelligence community;

• Advocating future collection technology needs of the civil applications, homeland security and law enforcement customers in the intelligence community and Department of Defense forums; and

• Providing a forum for discussion of proper use oversight and management of new uses of classified information on behalf of domains, in addition to already established uses.

Last week, the House Homeland Security Committee convened a hearing about the NAO as noted here. Witnesses from DHS included Charlie Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer; Hugo Teufel, Chief Privacy Officer; and Dan Sutherland, the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer.

A National Applications Executive Committee will be established to provide interagency oversight. A DHS fact sheet issued on 15 August describes how the NAO will work with the “advice and support” of three customer domain working groups:

• Civil Applications Domain Working Group: This working group will continue the efforts of the Civil Application Committee that have been ongoing for more than 30 years, including scientific, geographic and environmental research.

• Homeland Security Domain Working Group: The “Homeland Security Domain” includes those government agencies and activities involved in the prevention and mitigation of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural or man-made disasters, including terrorism, and other threats to the homeland. This domain can encompass the many operational and administrative components of DHS, as well as other federal, state, local, and tribal elements who partner with the department. Its work will complement the Civil Applications Working Group in areas like natural disaster response.

• Law Enforcement Domain Working Group: This working group includes federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and those activities which support both the enforcement of criminal and civil laws, and the other operational responsibilities and authorities of these entities.

UPDATE 9/11/07: For video stream and complete statements for the record by those testifying before the House Homeland Committee, click here.

Out of the ashes and tumult of Katrina, a new National Response Plan is near ready.  This might be considered a debut for the National Protection and Programs Directorate at DHS, but I am certain many had a hand in the drafting of this document.  CQ Homeland Security’s Eileen Sullivan obtained from Hill sources a pre-decisional draft of what is now termed the National Response Framework.

There will be no shortage of analysis by the press, but I thought a few specific items warranted highlighting as of this first glance.

Two places we witnessed painful missed opportunities in the response to Hurricane Katrina included the failure to fully tap into the resources of the private sector and the inability, or perhaps reluctance, to optimize the resources and aid donated by well intentioned allies and friends overseas.

 The National Response Framework includes this text to address the role of the private sector:

The Private Sector. A quick word about certain nomenclature used herein is appropriate. Common English usage draws a binary distinction between the public and private sectors – meaning those organizations and activities that are formally governmental at all levels, and those that are not. The private sector thus includes many distinct entities, including for-profit businesses (publicly-traded or privately owned), trade associations and nongovernmental organizations, not-for-profit enterprises, faith-based organizations and other voluntary organizations. Of course from another perspective, the private sector is comprised not only of organizations, but of individual citizens and families, who have important obligations to be prepared for emergencies, as discussed further in Chapter I. 

Private sector businesses play an essential role in protecting critical infrastructure systems and implementing plans for the rapid restoration of normal commercial activities and critical infrastructure operations in the event of disruption. The protection of critical infrastructure and the ability rapidly to restore normal commercial activities can mitigate the impact of a disaster or emergency, improve the quality of life of individuals and accelerate the pace of recovery for communities and the nation. The private sector, NGOs in particular, contributes to response efforts through engaged partnerships with each level of government to assess potential threats, evaluate risk and take actions as may be needed to mitigate threats.

Not a whole lot more than that could I find in my first run through the draft.  Several mentions of the private sector are threaded throughout the document, but it appears that the main plug-in for private sector coordination remains the Incident Command Structure.  There were some readers a while ago with significant experience in the plans that preceded the NRP and FEMA’s history in this regard.  Your comments on how this works would be greatly appreciated.  In the current draft, the ICS is depicted as follows:

 

The new Framework provides a nod to the importance of thinking ahead in terms of how the U.S. can effectively manage offers of assistance from other countries.  In what may appear to be a necessary division of labor, the NRF states rather clearly that the State Department has that task.  This may also reflect a cautious approach to accepting aid out of concern that any hasty approval or denial of aid offered could risk unintended diplomatic consequences unrelated to the emergency itself.  Here is language from the draft NRF to this effect:

For major incidents in which foreign governments, individuals or organizations wish to make donations, the U.S. Department of State is responsible for coordinating such donations. Detailed guidance regarding the process for managing international donations is provided in the International Support Annex.

The head of Customs and Border Protection, Commissioner Ralph Basham, circulated a memo to employees this week announcing plans to open a new Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination on October 1 under his command.  Frankly, I’m fond of any reorganization that includes the word Coordination.  I’m not sure if its possible to have too much. 

The main points at this stage are that the OIOC is not operational, it appears to be more of an executive management function, and it reflects a focus on information analysis and flow.  This is key language from the announcement: 

The office will be comprised of an optimal blend of operators and analysts and will be structured in such a way as to optimize their interaction and collaboration.  The office will be focused on programmatic oversight, analysis and coordination, rather than conducting operations.  The new OIOC will establish mechanisms to ensure the flow of valuable information to and from field intelligence assets and the integration of field information into broader analytic products that directly support headquarters and field operators. 

And the starting line-up:

• Al Gina, Deputy Assistant Commissioner
• Tom Bortmes, Executive Director of Intelligence and Situational Awareness
• Tom Bush, Director of Targeting and Analysis
• Jeanne Ray-Condon, Director of Field Coordination
• Rodney Scott, Director of Incident Management and Operations Coordination

The Basham memo: 

 

To go with the second installation in this series of posts looking into sections of the conference version of HR1, note the provision establishing a second Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.  A posting here in February detailed a then-newly released report of the Homeland Security Advisory Council on the culture at DHS.  Readers will recall that it included a recommendation for creating another Deputy Secretary, but one for “operations.” 

That report made more hay with its comments about a lack of unity among the ranks coinciding with the release of the Federal Human Capital Survey, which placed DHS at the bottom of the list measuring its performance culture.  However, its recommendation for a Deputy Secretary for Operations (DSO) gained enough support in the Congress to find a version of it proposed into law.  Section 1601 of the bill “to provide for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” (read: the 9/11 Bill) creates a second Deputy Secretary for DHS.  This one is charged with a Management portfolio, whereas the HSAC believed a new DepSec was needed to focus on Operations. 

There is a significant difference between these two portfolios.  Title VII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the U/S for Management, described it as being responsible for: 

the management and administration of the Department, including the following:

(1) The budget, appropriations, expenditures of funds, accounting, and finance.

(2) Procurement.

(3) Human resources and personnel.

(4) Information technology and communications systems.

(5) Facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources.

(6) Security for personnel, information technology and communications systems, facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources.

(7) Identification and tracking of performance measures relating to the responsibilities of the Department.

(8) Grants and other assistance management programs.

(9) The transition and reorganization process, to ensure an efficient and orderly transfer of functions and personnel to the Department, including the development of a transition plan.

(10) The conduct of internal audits and management analyses of the programs and activities of the Department.

(11) Any other management duties that the Secretary may designate.

That has to rank among the world’s most difficult jobs.  The language in the 9/11 Bill elevates the current DHS Under Secretary for Management (now Paul Schneider) to a Deputy level that is implicitly junior to the existing Deputy Secretary (now Michael Jackson).  But managing the finances, IT, and facilities just doesn’t seem like the role that needs elevating at DHS.  The HSAC proposed a new DSO for specific reasons having little to do with human resource management.  Their report states: 

The DSO would be responsible for creating and/or championing strategic initiatives that reinforce the assumption that all efforts should be about “the Security of the Homeland” – not about the Department of Homeland Security….

Originally, the report made no mention of the U/S for Management.  I was asked to read a draft of the report and made a few very minor suggestions.  One was to cite the role of Management Under Secretariat in order to clarify its relative role, which would be unchanged and junior to the DSO.  The text: 

This [Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Operations] would also be in a position of continuity to help drive organizational maturation and to reinforce the culture required for the long-term success of DHS and its components. The DSO would be selected from candidates with a strong National Security operations background similar to a Chief Operations Officer…. The DSO would also maintain close coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, whose ultimate role would be reinforced by the DSO’s seniority and Department-wide jurisdiction.…

So what will happen to Section 1601?  There is some saving language that might compensate for actually moving the U/S Management into second in line of succession behind the regular DepSec (Sec. 1601(g)(2)).  HR1 actually changes Sec. 701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to alter the responsibilities of the U/S Management as follows: 

The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management shall serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary on matters related to the management of the Department, including management integration and transformation in support of homeland security operations and programs.

That’s closer to the HSAC’s original intent.  However, the HSAC report also stipulated that this new position should be filled by a careerist, as opposed to a political appointee, in order to instill some continuity and overcome some of the politicized nature of the Department’s image.  The HSAC report went a step further by offering this candid assessment of the workforce challenge facing DHS (in 2006): 

Historically and for reasons of urgency it would appear that much of the decision making within the Department’s headquarters has been made by a core group of trusted appointees. … we recommend immediate efforts be undertaken to … identify, select, formally train and empower Government Service personnel throughout the Headquarters to assume positions for a leadership transition period that should be in effect for at least six months on either side of the November 2008 presidential election.

HR1 offers a second nod to the intent of the HSAC recommendations by imposing (albeit with caveats) a five-year term on the position of Deputy Secretary for Management.  That’s a valuable detail to gain the continuity value, but the responsibilities of this new DepSec could be made more concrete and relevant to the challenge by adding some of the more strategic roles envisioned by the HSAC.  Perhaps something will change in conference.

A National Bio and Agro-defense Facility, or NBAF, is proposed in HR 1717, which is scheduled for a mark up this afternoon by the Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee. 

As the Department of Homeland Security continues to grow organizationally, it would seem that a good portion of its mission also continues to be shared among other agencies previously in charge of addressing certain threats.  The NBAF will be led by a director appointed by the Homeland Security Secretary, but it also will serve both the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture “in defending against the threat of potential acts of agroterrorism and natural-occurring incidents related to agriculture with the potential to adversely impact public health, animal health, and the economy, or may otherwise impact homeland security” according to the bill.  HR 1717 may reflect an emerging trend in DHS reorganization of the S&T missions. 

The proposed National Bio and Agro-defense Facility represents something not unlike the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.  Both the NBAF and DNDO are responsible for “directing basic, applied, and advanced research, development, testing, and evaluation.”  In fact the authorizing language for the DNDO and NBAF look very similar in scope and structure. 

Could this be the beginning of an over all trend to reshape DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate into threat-oriented Offices or Facilities?  Will there next be an organization focused solely on bio-terrorism (there almost was)?  And another on just chemical threats?  Or MANPADS?

As we debate the Department of Homeland Security’s Securing the Cities Initiative, its worth considering the actual impact of a nuclear weapon detonated in a densely populated urban environment.  Defense Canada’s R&D arm partnered with Battelle to produce a schematic illustrating a “preliminary analysis on the economic impact of a nuclear weapon event in Vancouver.” 

The city of Vancouver has a population (578,041) about the size of Washington, DC (581,530).  The project considers the impact of a 0.7 kiloton bomb, a 13kT bomb, and a 100kT bomb.  The presentation identifies five different categories of cost:

1.      Loss of productivity of earnings forgone

2.      Indirect effects or multiplier

3.      Loss and damage to building structures

4.      Decontamination

5.      Evacuation 

Perhaps the costliest aspect would be the response to a nuclear detonation in a North American city.  One of the more important developments underway right now within the counter nuclear threat community invests in both the pre-event and post-event challenges.  The creation of a more unified forensics capability to identify, characterize, and source nuclear material – hopefully pre-detonation – is making progress. 

The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center is being developed under the guidance of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS.  The interagency Center is charged with serving as “a national capability developer for pre-event rad/nuc materials forensics” and with providing “end-to-end planning, enhancement, and integration” of nuclear forensics capabilities.  Three areas comprise its mission:

·        Signatures development

·        Analysis

·        Capabilities enhancement 

With about $17 million in the FY08 budget request, this is a modest start, but an important one. 

The original impetus behind creating the DNDO rested on the understanding that the smuggled nuclear threat is different from other WMD threats in several ways.  One principle way is the dispersed ownership of the mission across the Executive branch.  A uniquely interagency approach is critical.  The NTNFC reflects this as a microcosm.  Participating agencies in the forensics center include DHS, FBI, and the Departments of Energy and Defense. 

DHS leads the pre-event interdiction mission, DOD, the post-detonation part, DOE has pre-det “nuclear device technical nuclear forensics”, FBI is in charge of investigations and analysis.  One big happy family.  Let’s hope this whole Center is merely an academic exercise, but should forensics – or attribution – become necessary, this unified approach makes sense.

Update: I am traveling until Monday, June 4, without access to the site.

Deputy Under Secretary for Preparedness Robert Zitz and Acting Director for US-VISIT Robert Mocny testified March 20 before the House Homeland Security Committee about the National Preparedness and Protection Directorate (NPPD). 

Zitz said the NPPD will integrate risk reduction activities of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Cyber Security and Communications, and US-VISIT.  Mocny explained that US-VISIT will move to the new Directorate to support DHS-wide risk management efforts, but also to better share VISIT-gathered information across other authorities of the USG (State, DOJ, the intelligence community). 

Connecting up State, Justice, and the IC with information gathered from screening conducted by ICE, CBP, USCIS, Consular offices, and FBI sounds like an important priority, and a significant undertaking.  Oversight of this kind of information sharing would appear to be almost as difficult given the privacy issues and permissions likely to be involved, let alone the coordination of it to reduce redundant screening and resolve inconsistent data.  Where the DHS Screening Coordination Office fits into this effort is pretty important, too.  I did not attend this hearing so I do not know if Members raised the SCO an issue.  If any readers have insight on this, please comment.

The House will consider a bill tomorrow that would establish a Science
and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office. The bill (HR 884) reflects a logical, albeit piecemeal (and wordy), progression to empower the Department of Homeland Security with the organizational and legislative capability to pursue Homeland Security objectives overseas.

Collaborating with allies and partners, even reluctant ones, is a valuable step toward communicating our national interests as the shared interest. A report by the Center for the Study of the Presidency made a contribution to the discussion of how DHS could engage internationally with better success. Another paper, by James Carafano, Rich Weitz, and me weighed in on the role of S&T in this effort. These documents, along with DHS 2.0 and others, highlight the potential for engaging such organizations as NATO, the European Union, OSCE, and others to both build counter- and anti-terrorism capabilities and develop a shared understanding of the nature of the threat.

HR 884 is unclear if the Director of the proposed S&T Homeland Security International Cooperative Programs Office reports to the Under Secretary of S&T or the U/S Policy at DHS. There’s an argument that could be made for either, but