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Buy cheap cialis online, Downtown Washington D.C. Order cialis online, braced this morning for traffic and business disruptions resulting from this week's Nuclear Security Summit, where leaders of 47 nations are gathering to discuss how to keep nukes away from terrorists, kjøpe billig cialis. Cheap cialis tablets, The meeting comes less than a week after the United States and Russia, which currently hold 95% of existing nukes, comprare cialis sconto, Order cialis online, signed a treaty that would reduce the two nations' stockpile of weapons significantly.  The treaty would reduce the number of nuclear weapons each country would have to a maximum of 3100 (1,550 each) by 2017, comprar en línea cialis. Cheap cialis online, *

* This number doesn't include exceptions- including the tactical/battlefield nukes, "reserve" weapons, Kjøp Discount cialis, Cialis pedido en línea, and those waiting for dismantling, which account for approximately 12, cheap cialis, Cialis sale, 000 more warheads.  That said, the number is significantly lower than the 60, acheter cialis, Florida FL Fla. , 000 nuclear weapons that were floating around during the height of the Cold War.

The treaty, which gained a significant amount of attention last week, cheap cialis overnight delivery, Billig cialis apotek, left untouched a more frightening issue  that is the subject of this week's summit- what to do about terrorists and rogue actors who might be intent on gaining access to and using nuclear weapons.  The summit will specifically focus on two areas of concern:

• How to secure nuclear materials (i.e. the "loose nukes" problem)


• How to prevent nuclear smuggling

Both of these threats potentially can allow terrorists to gain access to separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, Um cialis online, Köpa cialis online, both of which are critical to nuclear bombmaking.  Unfortunately, achieving success against these threats is easier said than done, South Carolina SC S.C. , Kentucky KY Ky. , especially since each country had different regimes for handling the materials and, in many cases, Delaware DE Del. , Cialis without a prescription,   the materials reside with private individuals instead of government agencies.

In some instances, the materials and the scientific skills to use them are for sale on various black markets, awaiting the highest bidder.  According to a recent Christian Science Monitor report, between 1993 and 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) clocked 336 confirmed reports of criminal activity involving nuclear material, including 421 incidents of stolen or lost nuclear material.*

* Lost materials have been a significant concern since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, a situation that only worsened after economic turmoil hit the nation.  Much of the Soviet's stockpile was stored in the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, where large amounts of uranium and plutonium may still exist.  The U.S, buy cheap cialis online. made earlier strides to secure those materials through the Nunn-Lugar program, comprare cialis, Order cialis from canada, but much remains to be done.

The Summit this week could be important in addressing the non-state actor threat and for setting the stage  for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), cialis kopen, Buy cialis without prescription, scheduled for May 3-28, 2010 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.  That review will address a number of key issues including:

• universality of the Treaty;


• nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures;


• nuclear non-proliferation, including the promoting and strengthening of safeguards;


• measures to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy, safety and security;


• regional disarmament and non-proliferation;


• implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;


• measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty;


• measures to further strengthen the review process; and


• ways to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament education.

As for the summit this week, success can be found if the participating nations reaffirm their commitment to secure nuclear materials within their jurisdiction and agree to help other nations who cannot afford or do not have the capability to secure their materials.   It would also be useful to come away with an agreement to take strong legal stances against smugglers and rogue nuclear scientists willing to sell their bombmaking expertise to the highest bidders.  Also, a commitment to develop uniform security standards for non-weaponized nuclear materials, including medical and energy uses, to assure that those materials cannot be used for wrongdoing, would be a big success.

Of course, even if 47 nations agree this week to do all of the above there are nations not at the table whose efforts will be critical to any attempts to achieve global nuclear security.  Neither Iran and North Korea were invited to the conference, as they have violated the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  In any event, Iran has already said that it will not be bound by any agreements made this week.  Among the meetings scheduled for this week, is a bilateral meeting between President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, where President Obama is expected to press his counterpart to support the United Nations Security Council's efforts to impose tougher sanctions on Iran.

Also worth noting is that Israel is not participating in the Summit. Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu withdrew last week as he believed that a number of nations - including Turkey and Egypt - planned to raises questions about Israel's nuclear arsenal and its refusal to sign the NPT.

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This post is about the assumptions used to prepare for a deliberate nuclear attack on an American city.  The post summarizes a recent article that argues policy makers are using the wrong assumptions. The author suggests alternatives. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Terrorists are determined to attack us again—with weapons of mass destruction if they can. Osama bin Laden has said that obtaining these weapons is a “religious duty” and is reported to have sought to perpetrate another “Hiroshima.” .... America’s margin of safety against a WMD attack is shrinking. -- "World At Risk; The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism;" December 2008 Herman Kahn wrote On Thermonuclear War in 1960.  He thought the unthinkable, and believed the nation could survive a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, even though cities would be destroyed and millions would die. His views contributed to the Cold War’s MAD doctrine (mutually assured destruction), characterized most vividly by the Doomsday Machine in “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Back in the day (or at least the 80s part of the day), people speculated about the Fate of the Earth if we had a nuclear exchange with Russia. Humanity would be destroyed and life as we know it on the planet would come to an end. It was all fairly hopeless.  Civil defense, bomb shelters, hiding under the desk -- why bother?  We’re all dead anyway. Then we won the Cold War.  No nuclear winter.  Time for fear to take a break. But fear demands something to be afraid of. Apparently nukes don’t do it for us anymore. The WMD Commission report generated maybe 15 minutes of  concern. The global economic crisis, H1N1, -- that worked for a little while. Maybe 20 minutes in fear time. We don’t get worked anymore up about humanity ending.  If it didn’t happen in the Cold War, it’s certainly not going to happen now. So... what to fear?   This week, we -- or at least the media -- worry about an al Qaeda cell detonating a hydrogen peroxide bomb in, maybe, Pittsburgh. Change the channel. What time does "Dancing With The Stars" come on?  Isn’t Tom DeLay going to come out against health care while he’s dancing? ------- Behind the public’s Andy Warhol attention span, serious people think about threats to the nation in serious ways. Maybe these people are ignored, but when public fright time arrives, they are ones who have done the thinking policy makers will use during times of crisis. Robert C. Harney, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, is one of the serious thinkers about the evolution of the domestic nuclear threat. Al Qaeda wants to detonate a nuke in the United States.  If they are successful, millions will die. That's the conventional narrative. What follows is an excerpt from Harney’s recent article in Homeland Security Affairs: Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness. OK, the title may not sing.  But the content does.  [Disclosure: I am the executive editor of Homeland Security Affairs.] Harney demonstrates estimates of millions dying and cities becoming wastelands are based on flawed assumptions. Yes, ten of thousands could die in a nuclear attack. Maybe more.  Harney is the first to acknowledge it would be horrific.  But -- and here’s the unthinkable part -- not hopeless.  We would recover. Why is Harney’s argument important? If policy makers believe millions will die and cities will become uninhabitable, why even bother preparing?  Why not spend limited resources on what you can do something about? But if the conventional wisdom’s estimates are wrong, then policy makers can justify preparing for the unthinkable. Here’s Harney’s argument (summarized largely in his words from the paper; my emphasis is in bold). ------------------------- The unthinkable is probably inevitable. At some time in the future a terrorist group will detonate a nuclear explosive in a major metropolitan area. Once nuclear weapons are in the hands of unstable states or states that support terrorism, there is little doubt that one or more will ultimately wind up in the hands of non-state or state-supported terrorist organizations. Terrorist possession of a nuclear weapon will result in its use against a “highest-value” target – most likely a large city with major economic value, cultural and/or religious significance, and a dense population in which high casualties will result. The likelihood of an attack has prompted considerable public debate about what are the best steps to prevent such an attack. In many of these discussions estimates of the number of casualties or the size of the area that would be damaged by an attack are used to reinforce the importance of action. Ironically ... these estimates may evoke inaction in some critical areas. Paraphrasing many examples, [the examples] typically state: a Hiroshima-sized weapon detonated in a major metropolitan area will kill a million people or will vaporize everything within a half-mile of ground zero or some other equally dramatic claim.... To this author, the estimates do not ring true – they sound excessive. The estimates are often quoted or repeated by individuals who clearly lack technical expertise in nuclear weapons effects and original sources for the estimates are seldom cited. Although it is possible that some are the product of hyperbole used in political oratory to reinforce a point, the frequency is too high for this to always be the case. It is more likely that valid estimates made for a military attack scenario have been improperly extrapolated to the terrorist scenario. However, if the policymakers making such statements actually believe these estimates, then inaccurate information is being used to set policy, and something should be done to rectify the situation. Harney discusses the standard methodology used to predict the effects of nuclear weapons. The “standard” analysis is an outgrowth of military effects analysis. ... virtually all examples used to guide novice or inexperienced effects predictors will be based on military analyses.  The optimum altitude airburst [i.e., dropping a nuclear device from an airplane at exactly the right height above a city] is far and away the most common analytical assumption in nuclear effects analysis. As we shall see, this may be the source of the putative overestimates. He applies the standard analysis to a hypothetical 10 killoton airburst explosion in Manhattan and concludes, ... over six million people are directly affected, and total casualties are estimated to be in excess of 2,700,000. The areas and the casualty estimates determined in this fashion are consistent with those mentioned in the public debates. This traditional casualty analysis coupled with observations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki presents a nearly “hopeless” picture. That is, one would expect that the southernmost one-quarter of Manhattan would be devastated. Roads through damaged areas would be impassable. Evacuation to mitigate fallout effects would probably be impractical in some areas. Power, water, communications, transportation, and sanitation disruptions would extend well beyond the damaged areas. The expected number of injuries would exceed the number of hospital beds in the entire nation ....  A significant fraction of the first responders would be among the casualties. Many of the “injuries” might become “fatalities” due to inadequate medical care, shortages of food, and lack of shelter. The expected economic damage is severe, almost beyond comprehension. Economic repercussions would continue for years. Guided by a strategic analysis that uses these standard assumptions, ... a weak U.S. government might consider giving in to terrorist demands (if voiced ahead of time), rather than suffer the effects of such an attack. Since permitting such a catastrophic attack would be utterly unacceptable, actions likely to be taken to prevent anticipated attacks might further erode Constitutional rights. As the aftermath of such an attack is “hopeless,” planning for emergency response would probably be inadequately funded. Why prepare for something that is beyond accommodation, especially when there are always competing priorities for using available funds? Furthermore, since the Cold War has conditioned the public to view nuclear attack as the end of the world and the “hopeless” scenario does nothing to contradict this view, little or no personal preparation will be made for self-preservation and survival. Inadequate planning and preparation at all levels would greatly magnify the effects of an attack when it comes. Harney’s conceptual innovation is “nontraditional effects analysis,” an alternative to the standard assumptions that paralyze policy makers. There are fundamental differences between an airburst and a surface burst.....  For a variety of reasons, we anticipate that terrorist attacks are more likely to use a [less damaging] surface burst than an airburst. ... A terrorist bomb is unlikely to be mounted on a missile. It is unlikely to be man-portable. It is likely to be large and heavy. Delivery by aircraft will probably require a multi-engine aircraft,... [but] an airburst can be made extremely difficult, if not prevented. Transport to the top floors of the tallest skyscrapers is difficult and likely to be detected.... Even if the bomb could be detonated on a tall building, the effects would be closer to surface burst levels than to airburst levels. Transport by truck, however, is relatively easy and difficult to prevent. Thus, it is more likely for a terrorist weapon to be detonated at street level than at the optimum airburst height. Harney then describes three models of surface level detonations, under a variety of conditions. He maintains: Contrary to the predictions of traditional analysis and experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the more “realistic” analysis presents a picture that is much less dire. Fatalities are 20% of those predicted by the standard analysis, while injuries are 10% of those predicted and the damaged area is 5%. Much of the infrastructure will survive. Most evacuation routes will remain viable (permitting relocation for fallout mitigation). Food, water, sanitation, power, communications, and transportation will remain available to most of the city. Transportation to or from the rest of the country, especially air travel, is likely to be minimally affected. Airports are seldom located in the high population density areas that are attractive for casualty production. The first response system will remain intact. At most one or two police precincts and fire stations will be within damage zones. Only a small fraction of first responders will be among the casualties. The majority of the health care system will remain intact. Few hospitals, clinics, or potential shelter areas may be located within the small damage zones and thus will remain intact and operational. Few health care professionals will become casualties. Regional health care facilities ... have the theoretical capacity to handle the most badly injured. However, most of the 60,000-70,000 beds are occupied during ordinary times and emergency rooms are almost always crowded. Diagnostics and elective procedures account for at least part of the occupation of beds and many emergency room visits occur in lieu of seeing primary care physicians. In a major emergency, many could be discharged by applying triage to those already at the facilities as well as to the victims of the explosion. Nevertheless, emergency treatment facilities will be stressed. This should be considered during planning for disaster preparedness, as well as in any discussions of generally improving national health care. Harney estimates that instead of 2 or 3 million casualties (in the hypothetical Manhattan scenario), a more realistic estimate is less than 400,000 casualties. Although horrific and highly stressing of existing resources, this scenario is nearly ideal for disaster response and relief by local, state, and national entities. Because structures and roads will be undamaged outside the immediate blast area, the effects of fallout from a single nuclear event can be minimized through immediate and effective response including fallout prediction and a combination of evacuation, sheltering in place and/or decontamination. Sheltering for as little as one day can reduce the fallout exposure to less than 20% of the maximum possible accumulated exposure at any location, even if the individual then elects to remain in the contaminated area. It can reduce the total exposure to less than 1% of the maximum possible if the individual elects to walk out of the fallout zone (estimated to take a few hours at most). There is a place for renewed interest in civil defense. Such civil defense must have a personal emphasis, not just a governmental emphasis. An unprepared population will suffer needlessly in any disaster, manmade or natural. In general, those people most likely to survive are those who are prepared to survive and who will not wait passively for the government to save them. Government has been willing to educate people what to do to prepare for earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados, although it could be more aggressive in this education. It should do the same for terrorist attacks, especially in likely target areas. Harney concludes: The promulgation of unrealistic estimates does the government and the general population a great disservice. People should not be persuaded to believe that a terrorist-initiated nuclear attack is the end of the world. We will probably experience such an attack at some point in the future and the world will not end. Millions will not be killed by a single event, although tens of thousands may. We will be forced to deal with the consequences. People tend to rise to the challenge in adverse situations, but they give up in situations perceived as hopeless. Terrorist attacks, no matter how devastating, should not be made to appear hopeless. The government must not be forced by public opinion to take short-sighted actions, such as appeasement, to avoid such attacks. Appeasement seldom works in the long term and even appeasement will not prevent every possible attack. This does not mean the government should not act vigorously to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but it should be proactive not reactive, and certainly not over-reactive. The public and especially public servants and elected officials deserve better education concerning the facts about weapons effects. Disaster planning should consider realistic and stressing scenarios but not doomsday scenarios. Emergency response capabilities adequate to address the threat of limited nuclear attack should be developed, and the nature of those capabilities should be communicated to the public. --------- Reading Harney’s article will change the way you think about threat of terrorists using a nuclear device.  In the realm of the unthinkable, Harney offers hope and reasons to act. You can read his article online here, or download it here.

Yesterday the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities heard testimony on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives(CBRNE)  consequence management.  (See and hear the video.)  David Heyman, DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy, set out the CBRNE threat.  Reviewing a list of recent events, Heyman concluded, "We can no longer discuss risk abatement of chemical, biological, and nuclear/radiological attacks as if these types of attack are unthinkable or undoable. U.S. intelligence, and the most recent intelligence around the world, continue to report that terrorists are intent on acquiring CBRNE weapons for use against the United States." There is a brigade-size federal active duty element allocated to NORTHCOM as a "CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force"  a/k/a CCMRF. A second brigade is scheduled to be in place by October.  A third by October 2010.  While specializing in CBRNE threats, the same forces could be deployed in response to a variety of events. In his prepared testimony, General Victor Renuart, the USAF four-star who heads NORTHCOM, explained, "CCMRF is a task force (approximately 4,700 people) that operates under the authority of Title 10. CCMRFs are self-sustaining and may be tailored to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed of Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force units with unique CBRNE training and equipment and general purpose units trained to operate in proximity to a hazardous or contaminated environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and equipment, HAZMAT handling, air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and general logistical support to sustain extended operations.” In October 2008 the American Civil Liberties Union initiated a FOIA request that raised several concerns regarding the CCMRF, including, "The deployment of CCMRF marks the first time an active military unit has been given a dedicated assignment to Northern Command, which was established in 2002 to assist federal homeland defense efforts and coordinate support of civil authorities. It raises important questions about longstanding separation between civilian and military government within the United States -- a separation that dates to the Nation's founding and that has been reiterated in landmark statutes, most importantly, the Posse Comitatus Act 18 U.S.C. Para. 1385."  The Posse Comitatus Act forbids federal troops to be deployed with police powers. Following Hurricane Katrina an effort to significantly weaken the Posse Comitatus Act  was initially successful, but the legal changes were subsequently overturned in 2008. The current language is the same originally adopted by Congress in 1878.  The potential life-saving and order-restoring capacity represented by the CCMRF is widely recognized.  The use of active duty federal troops for this purpose is seen by some as a creeping militarization of the home front. At yesterday's hearing the Congressmen -- of both political parties -- kept coming back to "who's in charge?"  About nineteen minutes into the hearing, Mr. Smith, the subcommittee chairman, interrupted an explanation of HSPD-5's intricacies, asking, "Does anyone of those groups have the lead?"  If there's a real catastrophe, what's the real chain-of-command? It is a good question.  The answers, of course, are variations on "Well, it depends."  As the hearing proceeded -- maybe because of the provisional answers offered -- the questions were increasingly directed to General Renuart.  The implicit assumption seemed to be: the man in uniform will be in charge.  Encouraging this impression is a principal reason why uniforms are worn.   If the General is in charge, then who's in charge of the General? The prepared testimony of each witness was constitutionally restrained: federal forces will be deployed at the request of Governors to support civil authorities. The  protocols of HSPD-5 and the National Response Framework will ensure effective collaboration across roles and responsibilities.  But what about when local civil authority has been overwhelmed by the catastrophe? About half way through the hearing Congressman Kline began his inquiry by stating, "I am still, sort of grappling -- and I think all of us are at one level or another -- with the fundamental question of who's in charge."  The Congressman then reviewed a variety of National Guard and DOD assets and asked, "When are these forces federal, when do they work for the state, when do they work for the Governor, when do they work for the General?" The General responded, appropriately and accurately, well... it depends. A bit later Congressman Miller, asked what happens, "if the Governor and the local officials don't get it; they absolutely have  become overwhelmed -- as they did with Katrina -- and don't make the call (to the President) quick  enough?" There was a pregnant pause before the General responded.  "Well, Mr. Miller, I think  the President ultimately has a responsiblity for the nation to make a determination of the speed at which some event is unfolding.  That is not a NORTHCOM decision.  My role is to ensure that, if I'm asked, to be sure that I have all the pieces in place to be supportive.  So I would defer to the national leadership to make a policy decision as to the ability of an individual state. That's really not mine to call." I expect the General's answer is accurate... even in its  opacity.  Is it an appropriate answer? In terms of civil-military authority, certainly yes.  In terms of constitutional balance of powers? Probably not. Funny how the Tenth Amendment can suddenly rise up as if from the dead:  "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." General Renuart is a practical man.  He wants to do his duty.  In a time of crisis he will be prepared to render protection and care.  How can we allow him to do so with confidence while preserving the practical benefits of local capacity and the constitutional protections of state sovereignty? The hearing was rather chaste in exposing the Tenth Amendment issue, but the bare skin was there for all to see.  Whether titilating or horrifying probably depends on your taste. Buried in the prepared testimony -- never referenced in open session -- was an interesting suggestion for how we might restore some constitutional  modesty and, even perhaps, some honest dignity.  More on this in a Friday post. UPDATE: A July 30 New York Times editorial entitled: The military is not the police.

The WMD Commission released today its public report to the President and Congress. Commissioners briefed President Bush and this afternoon briefed Vice President-elect Biden and Secretary-designate of Homeland Security Napolitano before they hosted a conference call with a few bloggers to discuss their new report. The WMD threat is dynamic, as are our abilities to defend against it or defeat it. However, the threat is evolving in ways that open new vulnerabilities or further expose existing ones. The challenge, Commissioners told us, is to better direct today’s efforts with more coordination from the White House and to focus new resources on those worsening vulnerabilities. It is the Commission’s view that nuclear and bioterrorism represent the most pressing of these vulnerabilities. There’s a noticeable demotion of chemical and high explosives in the WMD threat embraced by the report. The Commission, mandated by Congress, is a follow-on to the 9/11 Commission. And this Commission’s recommendations are just as sweeping. The WMD Commission urges such steps as: • Undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism • Undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism. • Work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. • Undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security programs, and develop a global strategy that accounts for the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to a cooperative partnership. • Stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. • Work with the Russian government on initiatives to jointly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear and biological weapons. • Reform, reorganize, and consolidate the NSC and HSC structures. • Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better address intelligence, homeland security, and other national security programs. • Accelerate integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues. In the post-9/11 Commission era, such as it is, all Commissions and task forces deal with a new high-water mark in terms of publicity sought and impact measured. Parts of the WMD Commission report are written with this in mind (not least of which is the report’s title). As a result, vagueness or hyperbole clouds the message on some serious points. For example:

“This time we do know. We know the threat we face. We know that our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. And we know what we must do to counter the risk.”

We’ve spent about $500B on homeland security alone since 9/11. Is this investment failing to keep even a bad situation from getting worse?

Impose “a range of penalties for [Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty] violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof to the state under review for noncompliance.”

Does this mean that a nation accused of proliferating nuclear weapons is guilty until proven innocent?

The Commission strongly endorses the creation of a senior White House advisor whose sole responsibility is to serve as the President’s advocate and overseer of the policy nexus between WMD proliferation and terrorism. The position of senior advisor could readily be placed within the National Security Council structure. Alternatively, such an advisor could be placed within the office of the Vice President or made the head of a separate White House office.

The last time the Vice President’s office was in charge of assessing the risk of a nexus between terrorism and WMD...well, you get the point. Let’s be clear: The Commission doesn’t mean to assert that we have near nothing to show for the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on homeland security. (Although Commission co-chair Bob Graham did state in the interview that we are “less safe today than we were.”) And the Commission probably doesn’t endorse converting the NPT regime into a gotcha game of guilt and suspicion. Nor does the Commission really believe that the Office of the Vice President needs to serve a role like it did between 9/11 and the Iraq war. In fact, the Commission actually stands for several initiatives and investments already on the table or already underway. Their recommendations make sense because, in a way, they’ve been made before and we already accept them. Hopefully, they’ll get the influx of Presidential prerogative these recommendations deserve. Also check in on Armchair Generalist for more reflection on this report. Jason was one of the other bloggers on the call.

The bipartisan Partnership for a Secure America gave the U.S. an overall grade of C in its progress toward preventing a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack on U.S. soil and combating the proliferation of WMD abroad. Three D's, eight C's, and seven B's. Spencer Hsu at the Washington Post first reported the story today in advance of tomorrow’s roll-out at the PSA offices in Washington, DC. Lee Hamilton, co-chairman of the 9-11 Commission and Obama adviser will introduce the findings with Republican Slade Gordon, also a member of the 9-11 Commission and former Congressman from Washington. Both 9-11 Commission chairs, Hamilton and Gov. Tom Keane, sign the report's introduction. The WMD Report Card will be released tomorrow. Get the information on attending here The WMD Report Card is not only a report for well-known experts no longer in government to criticize those still in. The WMD Report Card offers advice. On the nuclear threat, for example, it recommends that the U.S.:

Conduct a comprehensive re-evaluation of the changing threat of nuclear terrorism Eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to proliferation prevention Strongly encourage foreign partners to live up to commitments under G8 Global Partnership, UNSCR 1540, and other agreements. Resolve outstanding bilateral legal disputes to facilitate continuation and expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Strengthen existing science and human engagement programs to leverage US science and technology capacity, global development assistance, and other potential inducements as a means of building deeper and sustained cooperation for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, materials and know-how.

Full disclosure: I serve on the PSA’s Board of Directors. However, this project was well underway before I joined. Executive Director Matt Rojansky, led the charge on this with PSA's new Associate Director, Michael Landweber. I look forward to seeing how tomorrow’s roll-out unfolds. Fortunately, PSA’s report comes as the Congressionally mandated WMD Commission, which is charged with expanding counter-terrorism efforts to prevent WMD, is slated to report out soon. Members of the WMD Commission are consulting the PSA report according to the Washington Post and what sources tell me. Let’s hope this gets on the radar of the presidential candidates, one of whom will inherit an evidently average effort to deal with one of the greatest threats to national security.

The Euroscience Open Forum 2008 taking place in Barcelona, Spain, is covered in a short UPI story highlighting the Forum’s focus on nuclear forensics, which is the science specializing in nuclear threat detection. Nuclear forensics cuts across the entire mission space from deterrence and dissuasion, to detection through consequence management, to attribution and response. It is a core part of the mission of combating smuggled nuclear weapons. Speaking at the Eurpean Forum, Gabriele Tamborini of the European Commission Joint Research Center Institute for Transuranium Elements told UPI that the threat posed by nuclear terrorism has become a serious field of study.

"Nuclear forensics may provide information on the history, the intended use and possibly on the origin of nuclear material.” "This scientific discipline is at the interface between physical science, prosecution, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism."

For our part, the U.S. has formed the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) under the DNDO. It represents an important reorganization. While the Department of Homeland Security is not responsible for the entire spectrum of nuclear forensics, the NTNFC is a step forward in two clearly needed capabilities: 1. Across the government, unify various competencies and programs that are focused on aspects of the forensics mission. 2. Develop, enhance, and maintain technical forensics capabilities for pre-event needs. The FBI provides the Deputy Assistant Director at the NTNFC, and it also provides a senior liaison from the FBI lab. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy both provide detailees. The Forensics Center also has a Working Group, made up of members from each relevant federal agency and members of the intelligence community, which meets regularly. There is an “Interagency NTNF Program & Budget Crosscut” under development to help align relevant programs and harmonize budget requests. Lastly, the NTNFC – and the DNDO in general – work with interagency partners in planning and executing exercises that support the research, development, and deployment of technologies, as well as shared concepts of operations.

Barack Obama today delivered remarks at Purdue University in which he laid out a set of national security priorities. He specifically identified “nuclear, biological, and cyber threats – three 21st century threats that have been neglected for the last eight years.” He explains in the speech -- in so many words -- that by “neglected” he means underinvested in and deserving of greater priority. It can be said that when everything’s a priority, nothing is. But if you read the whole speech Senator Obama makes the case that its wiser to focus on the ways in which we are vulnerable as opposed to focusing on the specific enemies. Sounds weird, but it makes sense to suggest that, while national security is broadly defined, we must focus on the threats that can be presented, regardless of the adversary. For example, while it may be al Qaeda that seeks to use bio-terrorism, we need to focus on defeating that threat if it is employed by any enemy. Same goes for nucs and cyber. And since I’m still here at Maxwell AFB for the Air Force Cybersecurity Symposium, following are Obama’s proposals on addressing cyber threats:

Every American depends – directly or indirectly – on our system of information networks. They are increasingly the backbone of our economy and our infrastructure; our national security and our personal well-being. But it's no secret that terrorists could use our computer networks to deal us a crippling blow. We know that cyber-espionage and common crime is already on the rise. And yet while countries like China have been quick to recognize this change, for the last eight years we have been dragging our feet. As President, I'll make cyber security the top priority that it should be in the 21st century. I'll declare our cyber-infrastructure a strategic asset, and appoint a National Cyber Advisor who will report directly to me. We'll coordinate efforts across the federal government, implement a truly national cyber-security policy, and tighten standards to secure information – from the networks that power the federal government, to the networks that you use in your personal lives. To protect our national security, I'll bring together government, industry, and academia to determine the best ways to guard the infrastructure that supports our power. Fortunately, right here at Purdue we have one of the country's leading cyber programs. We need to prevent terrorists or spies from hacking into our national security networks. We need to build the capacity to identify, isolate, and respond to any cyber-attack. And we need to develop new standards for the cyber security that protects our most important infrastructure – from electrical grids to sewage systems; from air traffic control to our markets.

For a brief speech, this was about as much detail as we can expect from a candidate. However, the next president is going to have to delve into such challenges as how effectively to draw the line between monitoring, detecting, dissuading, deterring, and defeating cyber threats. And should we actually endure an attack, we’ve yet to carve out our conops for response, recovery, and retaliation. What does it mean to retaliate for a cyber attack that steals secrets? Or one that shuts down an electrical grid, leading to actual casualties? Or one that isolates our armed services from its chain of command? Cyber security ought to be a presidential priority and it is positive to see Senator Obama call it out as a strategic concern. We’ll see if John McCain is focused on cyber should his campaign offer a counter-speech.

Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain yesterday outlined his views on nuclear weapons, proliferation, and America’s role in pursuing a world altogether free of nuclear weapons. His speech in Denver invoked a number of pre-existing programs, but also offered some bold departures from the Bush Administration. HLSwatch.com takes a look at the speech to break it down to its basics in the hope that we might find some residual homeland security benefits in this position. I’ll leave it to ArmsControlWonk.com and others to dissect the proposals about the weapons postures and treaty nuances, such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the special arrangements with India. Senator McCain’s speech began with a description of America in carefully chosen words. “…We remain a young nation,” proclaimed the candidate. “We still possess the attributes of youth -- spirit, energy, vitality, and creativity,” McCain explained. In sum, he asserted that “America will always be young.” Wonder what he's getting at. The rest of McCain's speech unfolds with lofty goals representing a departure from what GOP politicians have embraced over the last couple decades, along with some commitments to keep the status-quo. In the Maverick mold, McCain: • Recommends that “America must be a good citizen of the world - leading the way to address the danger of global warming and preserve our environment, strengthening existing international institutions and helping to build new ones, and engaging the world in a broad dialogue on the threat of violent extremists….” • Adopts Reagan’s goal that "our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." • Proclaims that “It is my hope to move as rapidly as possible to a significantly smaller [nuclear] force.” Of course, he couldn’t resist repeating a reference to a part of Senator Obama’s foreign policy. McCain claimed that “some people seem to think they've discovered a brand new cause, something no one before them ever thought of. Many believe all we need to do to end the nuclear programs of hostile governments is have our president talk with leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran, as if we haven't tried talking to these governments repeatedly over the past two decades.” While half-truths can be avoided in this presidential campaign, some things will never change: No policy speech is complete without the requisite strawman statement. “Others think military action alone can achieve our goals, as if military actions were not fraught with their own terrible risks. While the use of force may be necessary, it can only be as a last resort not a first step.” Not exactly the stuff of a Maverick. On to “the how” of it: Following is a breakdown of what McCain proposes in this nuclear weapons position. The very first move isn’t all that exciting: He would ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “engage in a comprehensive review of all aspects of our nuclear strategy and policy.” (Homework that any new President would assign.) Regardless of the outcomes of that study, McCain stakes out some preordained positions. They can be organized as selectively embracing current efforts underway, pursuing new dialogues with other countries (emphasis on Russia and China), and familiar counter-proliferation measures (that noticeably leave out the detection mission). Stay on the current track: • Continue to deploy a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent, robust missile defenses and superior conventional forces that are capable of defending the United States and our allies. • Seek to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest number possible consistent with our security requirements and global commitments. • Continue America's current moratorium on nuclear testing. • No new nukes, except the ones we want:

“I would only support the development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent, that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal, and furthers our global nuclear security goals.”

New dialogues with other countries: • Seriously consider Russia's recent proposal to work together to globalize the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. • Russia and the United States should reduce – and hopefully eliminate – deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. • Share with Russia early warning data and prior notification of missile launches. • Begin a dialogue with China on strategic and nuclear issues to achieve “the greatest possible transparency and cooperation on nuclear force structure and doctrine.” • Work with China to encourage conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including working toward nuclear arsenal reductions and toward a moratorium on the production of additional fissile material. Counter-proliferation measures: McCain wants to strengthen authorities and capabilities of the Proliferation Security Initiative, increase funding for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs established by the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and ensure the highest possible standards of security for existing nuclear materials. Nothing here on improving the science and strategy behind detecting the illicit movement of special nuclear material. It is hard to discern why McCain would have left out the effort to detect smuggled nuclear weapons, an initiative this country has supported since the Manhattan Project. The candidate agrees with the need to build an international consensus that “exposes the pretense of civilian nuclear programs as cover for nuclear weapons programs.” McCain also asserts that the most effective way to prevent this practice is to limit the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing. To persuade countries to forego enrichment and reprocessing, he would support international guarantees of nuclear fuel supply to countries that renounce enrichment and reprocessing, as well as the establishment of multinational nuclear enrichment centers in which they can participate. McCain concedes that the Iranian government has so far rejected this idea. His solution: “Perhaps with enough outside pressure and encouragement, they can be persuaded to change their minds before it is too late.” As if we haven't tried talking to these governments repeatedly over the past two decades….

Reader Arnold asked whether we can expect a public report on the lessons learned from the TOPOFF 4 exercise, which took place October 15-19, 2007, with thousands of federal, state, and local officials responding to a full scale response to a simulated dirty bomb attack in Oregon and Arizona. The Secretary explained that the TOPOFF lessons learned are under review now and being circulated for sign off. Two things to consider: 1. The Secretary also said that planning for TOPOFF 5 is underway. It would be important for the lessons from TOPOFF 4 to inform that design. 2. Its unclear if the lessons from TOPOFF 4 are being drafted as a deliverable to the public, including state and local officials, who clearly drew their own lessons that should probably have a hand in crafting the review. Look for a public version no sooner than summer.

The Department of Homeland Security program to partner with major cities in an effort to defend against the use of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks, called Securing the Cities, received rare coverage in the press yesterday. The Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu was invited to New York City by Richard Falkenrath, NYPD's deputy commissioner for counterterrorism. You may recall Falkenrath as the Harvard instructor and then White House staffer who joined up after 9/11 with the Office of Homeland Security. Falkenrath today occupies a perch unlike any other and was probably interested in spreading the word about the City’s efforts to defend against rad/nuc and bio threats. (Spencer ran an earlier story on anti-bioterrorism, too.) The Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) is operated by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office with a budget of about $40 million this year. Supporters of the program suggest that it makes straight forward sense that we invest in technology and techniques that will help avert an attack on a major city with something as deadly and disruptive as a dirty bomb. Critics argue that efforts like STC throw bad money and bad money in a futile effort to defend against a terrorist tactic that should be defeated far away from any U.S. city, if it can be defended against at all. I’m cited in the story as a member of the former group because I believe that the U.S. is uniquely equipped with the innovation and budget to make significant progress in defeating the threat of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks. I do not believe that domestic defense should be pursued at the expense of vigorous nonproliferation efforts that should reduce the likelihood of an attack overall. The two efforts are equal parts of a comprehensive approach. And STC is more than an effort to design and deploy detectors throughout New York City. In addition to improved training and information sharing for state and local authorities, STC also works to secure the sources of domestically available radiological material that could be misappropriated for use in a dirty bomb. Think of STC as the Nunn-Lugar aspect the DNDO mission. In the same way that such Cooperative Threat Reduction programs endeavor to work with Russian nuclear facilities to keep “loose nukes” and poorly guarded nuclear material from being stolen by terrorists or black marketeers, STC works with hospitals that – for medical procedures – routinely use Cesium-137 or Strontium 90, both potentially deadly isotopes, to enhance their stewardship and protective measures to secure these dangerous sources. We covered this program last year in a post that includes supporting material. This post also speaks to the issue. For further reading, consider checking Charles Ferguson’s report, "Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism", or his article in Foreign Affairs, entitled The "Four Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritized Response," in addition to Michael Levi’s new book On Nuclear Terrorism. (NB: I still have to read Michael’s new book, but I sure look fwd to it.) My friend Jeffrey Lewis runs the best blog on the overseas aspects of this issue.

Port terminals at the UK, Pakistan, and Honduras are the first of a batch of countries to sign up for DHS’s current phase of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). SFI screens US-bound maritime containers for nuclear or other radiological materials. It is unclear whether the agreements, protocols, equipment, and other requirements put in place to screen for nuclear threats will be put to use for other valuable security and trade purposes. SFI is part of the DHS response to fulfilling the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, which requires non-intrusive scanning for nuclear material on 100% of all maritime containers headed for the U.S. Data from these inspection systems informs the National Targeting Center in its assessment of what seems threatening enough to warrant added scrutiny. SFI almost entirely focuses on the nuclear threat. Jay Ahern, CBP Deputy Commissioner, said "…preventing a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb attack has to be one of our highest priorities. This initiative (SFI) advances a comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain and substantially limits the potential for terrorist threats," said CBP Deputy Commissioner Jayson Ahern. The “comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain” suggests much more than just detecting smuggled nuclear material. Subsequent phases of SFI may reveal a more robust – and much needed – program to view the global supply chain more strategically. The tools being developed and put in place for the nuclear threat, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, can provide significant leverage for bringing more security to the global trade flows. Illicit trafficking – not only of nuclear material – is always a threat in some way to some legitimate party. And the transparency that a program like SFI could generate promises the potential to do much more that detect loose nucs. The kind of vulnerability these global flows confront carry with them a global concern for their resilience and protection, as well as their economic viability. Imagine if the Secure Freight Initiative and the Advanced Trade Data System were combined with the Proliferation Security Initiative. That would align many of the efforts and interests of DHS, DOD, DOE, State, and the Department of Commerce. It would also reflect a more “comprehensive” approach to a shared concern between the U.S. and her overseas partners – many of whom are reluctant partners – in securing global trade against both terrorism and general threats to economic efficiencies that these global flows attempt to maximize. NOTE: Thank you for accommodating my absence while I was away. HLSWatch is back up and running.

This is a placeholder post for lack of time today. DNDO and the Coast Guard announced today the West Coast Maritime pilot.  This effort builds upon the Securing the Cities initiative and the recent feat by DHS to outfit and train all Coast Guard boarding teams with nuclear detection capabilities. 

Seattle and San Diego made the list for this pilot due to the massive flow of small boats making use of these domains, the significant military installations there, and the proximity to international borders.

The main purpose of this new pilot is to create more effective coordination among the defensive efforts at the international, national, and state/local levels by creating a framework for the deployment of detection capabilities, training, response protocols, and alarm resolution.  Following is an excerpt from today's announcement:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) announced today the West Coast Maritime pilot program that will provide maritime radiation detection capabilities for State and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San Diego areas. The three-year pilot program involves the development of a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be illegally transported on recreational or small commercial vessels. The pilot will be conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.

As we debate the Department of Homeland Security’s Securing the Cities Initiative, its worth considering the actual impact of a nuclear weapon detonated in a densely populated urban environment.  Defense Canada’s R&D arm partnered with Battelle to produce a schematic illustrating a “preliminary analysis on the economic impact of a nuclear weapon event in Vancouver.”  The city of Vancouver has a population (578,041) about the size of Washington, DC (581,530).  The project considers the impact of a 0.7 kiloton bomb, a 13kT bomb, and a 100kT bomb.  The presentation identifies five different categories of cost: 1.      Loss of productivity of earnings forgone 2.      Indirect effects or multiplier 3.      Loss and damage to building structures 4.      Decontamination 5.      Evacuation  Perhaps the costliest aspect would be the response to a nuclear detonation in a North American city.  One of the more important developments underway right now within the counter nuclear threat community invests in both the pre-event and post-event challenges.  The creation of a more unified forensics capability to identify, characterize, and source nuclear material – hopefully pre-detonation – is making progress.  The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center is being developed under the guidance of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS.  The interagency Center is charged with serving as “a national capability developer for pre-event rad/nuc materials forensics” and with providing “end-to-end planning, enhancement, and integration” of nuclear forensics capabilities.  Three areas comprise its mission: ·        Signatures development ·        Analysis ·        Capabilities enhancement  With about $17 million in the FY08 budget request, this is a modest start, but an important one.  The original impetus behind creating the DNDO rested on the understanding that the smuggled nuclear threat is different from other WMD threats in several ways.  One principle way is the dispersed ownership of the mission across the Executive branch.  A uniquely interagency approach is critical.  The NTNFC reflects this as a microcosm.  Participating agencies in the forensics center include DHS, FBI, and the Departments of Energy and Defense.  DHS leads the pre-event interdiction mission, DOD, the post-detonation part, DOE has pre-det “nuclear device technical nuclear forensics", FBI is in charge of investigations and analysis.  One big happy family.  Let’s hope this whole Center is merely an academic exercise, but should forensics – or attribution – become necessary, this unified approach makes sense. Update: I am traveling until Monday, June 4, without access to the site.

This is another question for the record Chairman Wu submitted after the March 8 hearing on the DNDO and DHS S&T budgets (previous post here).  His question gets to the heart of how technology and strategy should be required to work together.  He rightly points out that too much emphasis on technology (detectors) at the expense of smart tactics (deployment strategy) results in a waste of money and time, not to mention the introduction of unnecessary vulnerabilities.  In some ways, this issue is central to rationalizing what DHS calls a global nuclear detection architecture.

From the FY 2008 budget request and information I’ve received from DNDO, It seems that deployment of detection technologies is limited to highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of entry with relatively little attention given to intercepting smuggled materials in foreign countries or detecting materials smuggled across more remote borders. Is this an appropriate way to deploy detection technologies? If not, what factors should DNDO consider when determining where to deploy their detectors?

The deployment strategy of detectors and other countermeasures in combating smuggling nuclear weapons may be one of the most important considerations in assessing the DNDO strategy.  However, that the strategy and budget seem to indicate a focus on domestic choke points (i.e. highly trafficked points of entry) is appropriate at this stage for two reasons.  First, efforts to detect or otherwise counter the threat of smuggled nuclear material overseas are mainly conducted by other agencies, although there is an important role for the DNDO.  Second, the DNDO was wise to begin their deployment strategy at major points of entry first given the priority of closing obvious gaps soonest, but they must move forward with a plan to deploy along less populated, and therefore less guarded, sections of the U.S. border, among other improvements. The effort to combat smuggled nuclear material is a global one.  Indeed the DNDO was originally named the National Nuclear Defense Office to reflect a broader mission than the one it is perceived to have today.  After working its way through the interagency process, this title lost the word “national,” which was replaced with Domestic, and the word “defense” became detection, in an apparent effort to winnow the mission of this new office.  In practice, this makes some sense since both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense also play a role in this area.  The DHS office was given the detection mission only, but that has since evolved, and for good reason.  Today, the DNDO works very closely with other agencies to develop not only new capabilities, but also the global deployment strategy that reflects and informs the use of detection efforts by all federal agencies including DOE, DOD, and others. When the DNDO was created in April 2005, the White House placed significant emphasis on deploying detection capabilities quickly and in the most needed places.  This had both positive and negative effects.  The priority on deploying detectors quickly naturally sacrificed quality in the short run.  The “pagers” and first-generation portal monitors (RPMs) suffered from poor selectivity that forced them to signal an alarm when encountering non-threatening materials that naturally contain radiation.  This led to news reports and internal assessments that showed RPMs signaling a “hit” when only ceramic tile or other commercial material was found in an a container or truck hold.  The other major trade-off that resulted from an accelerated deployment schedule was the low sensitivity of the earlier detectors (many of which are still in use).  Low sensitivity leads many detectors to be unable to sense the presence of source material because, ironically, HEU and other elements actually give off very low levels of radiation prior to detonation.  Current research and development underway at DNDO already shows major progress in both selectivity and sensitivity in a variety of settings. The priority of placing detection capabilities at highly trafficked points of entry reflects a judgment call the DNDO and DHS leadership had to make at the time DNDO stood up and began using its first budget in FY 2005.  Given limited resources, the constraints of a new organization, and an evolving threat, the choice was made to start with the most likely choke points based on traffic patterns (both licit and illicit) and the risk these areas posed to surrounding infrastructure and populations.  Over time, the DNDO plan reflects an intention to contribute to anti-terrorism programs overseas by supporting the DHS-DOE-State Department Secure Freight Initiative and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor.  This is a positive development that also indicates the aggressive progress DNDO is making in the field of nuclear detection.  Future development in DNDO’s deployment strategy certainly includes efforts like Securing the Cities, but also networked detection capabilities in less traveled sections of the border to close those serious gaps you cited.  An important improvement in strategy would include the use of decoys, hidden detectors, and mobile sensors to offset the adversary and increase the deterrent value of our anti-terrorism capabilities.

Three interesting questions for the record followed the March hearing before the House Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation.  They may reflect wider sentiment among those providing oversight of federal efforts to reduce the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons.  I believe they are public now, so here's the first one from Chairman Wu:

1.   In your opinion, what are the benefits of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Securing the Cities Initiative? Is this type of project likely to be successful in preventing the unlawful transport and detonation of nuclear or radiological devices in the US? Do you believe that the requested funding level of $30 million for FY 2008 is appropriate?

The DNDO’s Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) reflects an investment in an important part of a layered defense.  While efforts to secure sources of nuclear material in troubled areas like the former Soviet states remain critical, in addition to interdiction operations like the Proliferation Security Initiative, efforts like STC help close an important gap in today’s detection mission.  Because even the most effective global effort to stop illicit movement of dangerous nuclear material will be less than 100% successful, it is wise to consider domestic detection efforts in major cities.  A perpetrator may be able to obtain nuclear material and evade detection overseas, en route, and across the U.S. border, which is known to be porous in parts.  If this occurs, it is likely that intelligence communities will have some warning and be able to provide law enforcement and other authorities with valuable information to aid an apprehension.  An STC effort would greatly help augment intelligence and law enforcement officials by providing added warning and more accurate information about the location of nuclear material. The scenario of nuclear material smuggled across U.S. borders, while dangerously possible, is perhaps as likely as nuclear material obtained from within the United States for use against a major U.S. city.  Dangerous source material for a dirty bomb can be found in unsecured commercial locations or universities where nuclear material is located for legitimate uses.  If a perpetrator steals this material, STC capabilities provide a better ability to locate and isolate the material. Whether or not STC will be successful is difficult to say at this stage, but some precedence already exists that indicates such an effort could indeed be effective.  The Department of Defense (DOD) already deploys their own version of STC focused exclusively on protecting bases within the U.S.  Detectors are in place surrounding the bases to detect a potential nuclear threat in vicinity of the base.  Ongoing R&D for these programs is focused on increasing the ability to detect source material moving at greater speeds along public roads that lead to these bases.  The potential for cooperation between DNDO and DOD should be pursued for mutual benefit. Lastly, DNDO’s budget request for STC deserves attention.  The nation’s investment in STC should reflect a commitment to thinking creatively and responsibly about the threat of nuclear terrorism in America’s cities.  The nearly $11 billion to be spent on missile defense this next year places the STC budget in perspective.  With an overall DNDO budget of approximately $550 million, dedicating $30 million to Securing the Cities seems appropriate.  At this early stage, a healthier investment like this would help identify more promising routes to success while weeding out potential dead-ends.  STC is equal parts R&D and strategy.  These early months will require a dedication of brain power that must be hired as well.

DHS – through the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office – is starting to test and evaluate equipment focused on the blind spots around the shipment of containerized cargo.  While this effort satisfies Section 121(i) of the SAFE Port Act of 2006, it also reflects proposals made by the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 2005 when it’s Task Force on Preventing Weapons of Mass Effect explained the importance of adopting a layered prevention strategy.  Intermodal chokepoints served as key examples for the Task Force’s argument.  Specifically, the gaps in scanning and other preventive measures needed to be in place when a target item (i.e. cargo container) transferred one conveyance (boat) to another (rail).  The Task Force considered this next layer a "critical deficiency" that required the Department’s attention.The DNDO announced yesterday that: 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon begin conducting multiple projects in the Port of Tacoma, Wash., to evaluate technology and concepts of operations for radiation detection that will scan cargo at various points in transfer from ship to rail.  By establishing a Rail Test Center (RTC) at the port, DHS will identify and evaluate radiological and nuclear detection solutions for intermodal rail port facilities that can be used across the country.

A major recommendation and recurring theme from the Nuclear Defense Working Group at the Center for the Study of the Presidency held that detection efforts were strongest when targets were in motion or under scrutiny already (i.e. cargo was only screened when checked, registered, or loaded, and usually at only one of those points).  Containers and other targets at rest were a glaring weakness, according to the NDWG, in need of innovative solutions that did not include scattering expensive scanners over every square inch of an airport or seaport.  The same DNDO announcement reminded me of that recommendation with this detail:

Projects being considered for further evaluation at the RTC include scanning cargo on the dock, during transport to the rail yard, entering the rail yard, in the container storage stack, during train assembly, and as the train leaves the port.

These are promising efforts, albeit nascent ones.  These are also only one part of the broader effort to reduce the threat of smuggled nucs.  Let’s hope the non-proliferation and Nunn-Lugar-type programs get the same attention.  More on that can be found at Jeffrey's ArmsControlWonk.com.