Homeland Security Watch

Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain yesterday outlined his views on nuclear weapons, proliferation, and America’s role in pursuing a world altogether free of nuclear weapons. His speech in Denver invoked a number of pre-existing programs, but also offered some bold departures from the Bush Administration.

HLSwatch.com takes a look at the speech to break it down to its basics in the hope that we might find some residual homeland security benefits in this position. I’ll leave it to ArmsControlWonk.com and others to dissect the proposals about the weapons postures and treaty nuances, such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the special arrangements with India.

Senator McCain’s speech began with a description of America in carefully chosen words. “…We remain a young nation,” proclaimed the candidate. “We still possess the attributes of youth — spirit, energy, vitality, and creativity,” McCain explained. In sum, he asserted that “America will always be young.” Wonder what he’s getting at.

The rest of McCain’s speech unfolds with lofty goals representing a departure from what GOP politicians have embraced over the last couple decades, along with some commitments to keep the status-quo. In the Maverick mold, McCain:

• Recommends that “America must be a good citizen of the world - leading the way to address the danger of global warming and preserve our environment, strengthening existing international institutions and helping to build new ones, and engaging the world in a broad dialogue on the threat of violent extremists….”

• Adopts Reagan’s goal that “our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.”

• Proclaims that “It is my hope to move as rapidly as possible to a significantly smaller [nuclear] force.”

Of course, he couldn’t resist repeating a reference to a part of Senator Obama’s foreign policy. McCain claimed that “some people seem to think they’ve discovered a brand new cause, something no one before them ever thought of. Many believe all we need to do to end the nuclear programs of hostile governments is have our president talk with leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran, as if we haven’t tried talking to these governments repeatedly over the past two decades.”

While half-truths can be avoided in this presidential campaign, some things will never change: No policy speech is complete without the requisite strawman statement.

“Others think military action alone can achieve our goals, as if military actions were not fraught with their own terrible risks. While the use of force may be necessary, it can only be as a last resort not a first step.” Not exactly the stuff of a Maverick.

On to “the how” of it: Following is a breakdown of what McCain proposes in this nuclear weapons position. The very first move isn’t all that exciting: He would ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “engage in a comprehensive review of all aspects of our nuclear strategy and policy.” (Homework that any new President would assign.) Regardless of the outcomes of that study, McCain stakes out some preordained positions. They can be organized as selectively embracing current efforts underway, pursuing new dialogues with other countries (emphasis on Russia and China), and familiar counter-proliferation measures (that noticeably leave out the detection mission).

Stay on the current track:
• Continue to deploy a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent, robust missile defenses and superior conventional forces that are capable of defending the United States and our allies.

• Seek to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest number possible consistent with our security requirements and global commitments.

• Continue America’s current moratorium on nuclear testing.

• No new nukes, except the ones we want:

“I would only support the development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent, that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal, and furthers our global nuclear security goals.”

New dialogues with other countries:
• Seriously consider Russia’s recent proposal to work together to globalize the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

• Russia and the United States should reduce – and hopefully eliminate – deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

• Share with Russia early warning data and prior notification of missile launches.

• Begin a dialogue with China on strategic and nuclear issues to achieve “the greatest possible transparency and cooperation on nuclear force structure and doctrine.”

• Work with China to encourage conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including working toward nuclear arsenal reductions and toward a moratorium on the production of additional fissile material.

Counter-proliferation measures:
McCain wants to strengthen authorities and capabilities of the Proliferation Security Initiative, increase funding for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs established by the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and ensure the highest possible standards of security for existing nuclear materials.

Nothing here on improving the science and strategy behind detecting the illicit movement of special nuclear material. It is hard to discern why McCain would have left out the effort to detect smuggled nuclear weapons, an initiative this country has supported since the Manhattan Project.

The candidate agrees with the need to build an international consensus that “exposes the pretense of civilian nuclear programs as cover for nuclear weapons programs.” McCain also asserts that the most effective way to prevent this practice is to limit the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing. To persuade countries to forego enrichment and reprocessing, he would support international guarantees of nuclear fuel supply to countries that renounce enrichment and reprocessing, as well as the establishment of multinational nuclear enrichment centers in which they can participate.

McCain concedes that the Iranian government has so far rejected this idea. His solution: “Perhaps with enough outside pressure and encouragement, they can be persuaded to change their minds before it is too late.” As if we haven’t tried talking to these governments repeatedly over the past two decades….

Reader Arnold asked whether we can expect a public report on the lessons learned from the TOPOFF 4 exercise, which took place October 15-19, 2007, with thousands of federal, state, and local officials responding to a full scale response to a simulated dirty bomb attack in Oregon and Arizona. The Secretary explained that the TOPOFF lessons learned are under review now and being circulated for sign off.
Two things to consider:

1. The Secretary also said that planning for TOPOFF 5 is underway. It would be important for the lessons from TOPOFF 4 to inform that design.

2. Its unclear if the lessons from TOPOFF 4 are being drafted as a deliverable to the public, including state and local officials, who clearly drew their own lessons that should probably have a hand in crafting the review.

Look for a public version no sooner than summer.

The Department of Homeland Security program to partner with major cities in an effort to defend against the use of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks, called Securing the Cities, received rare coverage in the press yesterday. The Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu was invited to New York City by Richard Falkenrath, NYPD’s deputy commissioner for counterterrorism. You may recall Falkenrath as the Harvard instructor and then White House staffer who joined up after 9/11 with the Office of Homeland Security. Falkenrath today occupies a perch unlike any other and was probably interested in spreading the word about the City’s efforts to defend against rad/nuc and bio threats. (Spencer ran an earlier story on anti-bioterrorism, too.)

The Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) is operated by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office with a budget of about $40 million this year. Supporters of the program suggest that it makes straight forward sense that we invest in technology and techniques that will help avert an attack on a major city with something as deadly and disruptive as a dirty bomb. Critics argue that efforts like STC throw bad money and bad money in a futile effort to defend against a terrorist tactic that should be defeated far away from any U.S. city, if it can be defended against at all.

I’m cited in the story as a member of the former group because I believe that the U.S. is uniquely equipped with the innovation and budget to make significant progress in defeating the threat of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks. I do not believe that domestic defense should be pursued at the expense of vigorous nonproliferation efforts that should reduce the likelihood of an attack overall. The two efforts are equal parts of a comprehensive approach.

And STC is more than an effort to design and deploy detectors throughout New York City. In addition to improved training and information sharing for state and local authorities, STC also works to secure the sources of domestically available radiological material that could be misappropriated for use in a dirty bomb.

Think of STC as the Nunn-Lugar aspect the DNDO mission. In the same way that such Cooperative Threat Reduction programs endeavor to work with Russian nuclear facilities to keep “loose nukes” and poorly guarded nuclear material from being stolen by terrorists or black marketeers, STC works with hospitals that – for medical procedures – routinely use Cesium-137 or Strontium 90, both potentially deadly isotopes, to enhance their stewardship and protective measures to secure these dangerous sources.

We covered this program last year in a post that includes supporting material. This post also speaks to the issue. For further reading, consider checking Charles Ferguson’s report, “Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism“, or his article in Foreign Affairs, entitled The “Four Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritized Response,” in addition to Michael Levi’s new book On Nuclear Terrorism. (NB: I still have to read Michael’s new book, but I sure look fwd to it.) My friend Jeffrey Lewis runs the best blog on the overseas aspects of this issue.

Port terminals at the UK, Pakistan, and Honduras are the first of a batch of countries to sign up for DHS’s current phase of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). SFI screens US-bound maritime containers for nuclear or other radiological materials. It is unclear whether the agreements, protocols, equipment, and other requirements put in place to screen for nuclear threats will be put to use for other valuable security and trade purposes.

SFI is part of the DHS response to fulfilling the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, which requires non-intrusive scanning for nuclear material on 100% of all maritime containers headed for the U.S. Data from these inspection systems informs the National Targeting Center in its assessment of what seems threatening enough to warrant added scrutiny. SFI almost entirely focuses on the nuclear threat. Jay Ahern, CBP Deputy Commissioner, said “…preventing a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb attack has to be one of our highest priorities. This initiative (SFI) advances a comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain and substantially limits the potential for terrorist threats,” said CBP Deputy Commissioner Jayson Ahern.

The “comprehensive strategy to secure the global supply chain” suggests much more than just detecting smuggled nuclear material. Subsequent phases of SFI may reveal a more robust – and much needed – program to view the global supply chain more strategically. The tools being developed and put in place for the nuclear threat, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, can provide significant leverage for bringing more security to the global trade flows. Illicit trafficking – not only of nuclear material – is always a threat in some way to some legitimate party. And the transparency that a program like SFI could generate promises the potential to do much more that detect loose nucs.

The kind of vulnerability these global flows confront carry with them a global concern for their resilience and protection, as well as their economic viability. Imagine if the Secure Freight Initiative and the Advanced Trade Data System were combined with the Proliferation Security Initiative. That would align many of the efforts and interests of DHS, DOD, DOE, State, and the Department of Commerce. It would also reflect a more “comprehensive” approach to a shared concern between the U.S. and her overseas partners – many of whom are reluctant partners – in securing global trade against both terrorism and general threats to economic efficiencies that these global flows attempt to maximize.

NOTE: Thank you for accommodating my absence while I was away. HLSWatch is back up and running.

This is a placeholder post for lack of time today. DNDO and the Coast Guard announced today the West Coast Maritime pilot.  This effort builds upon the Securing the Cities initiative and the recent feat by DHS to outfit and train all Coast Guard boarding teams with nuclear detection capabilities. 

Seattle and San Diego made the list for this pilot due to the massive flow of small boats making use of these domains, the significant military installations there, and the proximity to international borders.

The main purpose of this new pilot is to create more effective coordination among the defensive efforts at the international, national, and state/local levels by creating a framework for the deployment of detection capabilities, training, response protocols, and alarm resolution.  Following is an excerpt from today’s announcement:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) announced today the West Coast Maritime pilot program that will provide maritime radiation detection capabilities for State and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San Diego areas. The three-year pilot program involves the development of a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be illegally transported on recreational or small commercial vessels. The pilot will be conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.

As we debate the Department of Homeland Security’s Securing the Cities Initiative, its worth considering the actual impact of a nuclear weapon detonated in a densely populated urban environment.  Defense Canada’s R&D arm partnered with Battelle to produce a schematic illustrating a “preliminary analysis on the economic impact of a nuclear weapon event in Vancouver.” 

The city of Vancouver has a population (578,041) about the size of Washington, DC (581,530).  The project considers the impact of a 0.7 kiloton bomb, a 13kT bomb, and a 100kT bomb.  The presentation identifies five different categories of cost:

1.      Loss of productivity of earnings forgone

2.      Indirect effects or multiplier

3.      Loss and damage to building structures

4.      Decontamination

5.      Evacuation 

Perhaps the costliest aspect would be the response to a nuclear detonation in a North American city.  One of the more important developments underway right now within the counter nuclear threat community invests in both the pre-event and post-event challenges.  The creation of a more unified forensics capability to identify, characterize, and source nuclear material – hopefully pre-detonation – is making progress. 

The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center is being developed under the guidance of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS.  The interagency Center is charged with serving as “a national capability developer for pre-event rad/nuc materials forensics” and with providing “end-to-end planning, enhancement, and integration” of nuclear forensics capabilities.  Three areas comprise its mission:

·        Signatures development

·        Analysis

·        Capabilities enhancement 

With about $17 million in the FY08 budget request, this is a modest start, but an important one. 

The original impetus behind creating the DNDO rested on the understanding that the smuggled nuclear threat is different from other WMD threats in several ways.  One principle way is the dispersed ownership of the mission across the Executive branch.  A uniquely interagency approach is critical.  The NTNFC reflects this as a microcosm.  Participating agencies in the forensics center include DHS, FBI, and the Departments of Energy and Defense. 

DHS leads the pre-event interdiction mission, DOD, the post-detonation part, DOE has pre-det “nuclear device technical nuclear forensics”, FBI is in charge of investigations and analysis.  One big happy family.  Let’s hope this whole Center is merely an academic exercise, but should forensics – or attribution – become necessary, this unified approach makes sense.

Update: I am traveling until Monday, June 4, without access to the site.

This is another question for the record Chairman Wu submitted after the March 8 hearing on the DNDO and DHS S&T budgets (previous post here).  His question gets to the heart of how technology and strategy should be required to work together.  He rightly points out that too much emphasis on technology (detectors) at the expense of smart tactics (deployment strategy) results in a waste of money and time, not to mention the introduction of unnecessary vulnerabilities.  In some ways, this issue is central to rationalizing what DHS calls a global nuclear detection architecture.

From the FY 2008 budget request and information I’ve received from DNDO, It seems that deployment of detection technologies is limited to highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of entry with relatively little attention given to intercepting smuggled materials in foreign countries or detecting materials smuggled across more remote borders. Is this an appropriate way to deploy detection technologies? If not, what factors should DNDO consider when determining where to deploy their detectors?

The deployment strategy of detectors and other countermeasures in combating smuggling nuclear weapons may be one of the most important considerations in assessing the DNDO strategy.  However, that the strategy and budget seem to indicate a focus on domestic choke points (i.e. highly trafficked points of entry) is appropriate at this stage for two reasons.  First, efforts to detect or otherwise counter the threat of smuggled nuclear material overseas are mainly conducted by other agencies, although there is an important role for the DNDO.  Second, the DNDO was wise to begin their deployment strategy at major points of entry first given the priority of closing obvious gaps soonest, but they must move forward with a plan to deploy along less populated, and therefore less guarded, sections of the
U.S. border, among other improvements.

The effort to combat smuggled nuclear material is a global one.  Indeed the DNDO was originally named the National Nuclear Defense Office to reflect a broader mission than the one it is perceived to have today.  After working its way through the interagency process, this title lost the word “national,” which was replaced with Domestic, and the word “defense” became detection, in an apparent effort to winnow the mission of this new office.  In practice, this makes some sense since both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense also play a role in this area.  The DHS office was given the detection mission only, but that has since evolved, and for good reason.  Today, the DNDO works very closely with other agencies to develop not only new capabilities, but also the global deployment strategy that reflects and informs the use of detection efforts by all federal agencies including DOE, DOD, and others.

When the DNDO was created in April 2005, the White House placed significant emphasis on deploying detection capabilities quickly and in the most needed places.  This had both positive and negative effects.  The priority on deploying detectors quickly naturally sacrificed quality in the short run.  The “pagers” and first-generation portal monitors (RPMs) suffered from poor selectivity that forced them to signal an alarm when encountering non-threatening materials that naturally contain radiation.  This led to news reports and internal assessments that showed RPMs signaling a “hit” when only ceramic tile or other commercial material was found in an a container or truck hold.  The other major trade-off that resulted from an accelerated deployment schedule was the low sensitivity of the earlier detectors (many of which are still in use).  Low sensitivity leads many detectors to be unable to sense the presence of source material because, ironically, HEU and other elements actually give off very low levels of radiation prior to detonation.  Current research and development underway at DNDO already shows major progress in both selectivity and sensitivity in a variety of settings.

The priority of placing detection capabilities at highly trafficked points of entry reflects a judgment call the DNDO and DHS leadership had to make at the time DNDO stood up and began using its first budget in FY 2005.  Given limited resources, the constraints of a new organization, and an evolving threat, the choice was made to start with the most likely choke points based on traffic patterns (both licit and illicit) and the risk these areas posed to surrounding infrastructure and populations.  Over time, the DNDO plan reflects an intention to contribute to anti-terrorism programs overseas by supporting the DHS-DOE-State Department Secure Freight Initiative and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor.  This is a positive development that also indicates the aggressive progress DNDO is making in the field of nuclear detection.  Future development in DNDO’s deployment strategy certainly includes efforts like Securing the Cities, but also networked detection capabilities in less traveled sections of the border to close those serious gaps you cited.  An important improvement in strategy would include the use of decoys, hidden detectors, and mobile sensors to offset the adversary and increase the deterrent value of our anti-terrorism capabilities.

Three interesting questions for the record followed the March hearing before the House Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation.  They may reflect wider sentiment among those providing oversight of federal efforts to reduce the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons.  I believe they are public now, so here’s the first one from Chairman Wu:

1.   In your opinion, what are the benefits of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Securing the Cities Initiative? Is this type of project likely to be successful in preventing the unlawful transport and detonation of nuclear or radiological devices in the US? Do you believe that the requested funding level of $30 million for FY 2008 is appropriate?

The DNDO’s Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) reflects an investment in an important part of a layered defense.  While efforts to secure sources of nuclear material in troubled areas like the former Soviet states remain critical, in addition to interdiction operations like the Proliferation Security Initiative, efforts like STC help close an important gap in today’s detection mission. 

Because even the most effective global effort to stop illicit movement of dangerous nuclear material will be less than 100% successful, it is wise to consider domestic detection efforts in major cities.  A perpetrator may be able to obtain nuclear material and evade detection overseas, en route, and across the U.S. border, which is known to be porous in parts.  If this occurs, it is likely that intelligence communities will have some warning and be able to provide law enforcement and other authorities with valuable information to aid an apprehension.  An STC effort would greatly help augment intelligence and law enforcement officials by providing added warning and more accurate information about the location of nuclear material.

The scenario of nuclear material smuggled across U.S. borders, while dangerously possible, is perhaps as likely as nuclear material obtained from within the United States for use against a major U.S. city.  Dangerous source material for a dirty bomb can be found in unsecured commercial locations or universities where nuclear material is located for legitimate uses.  If a perpetrator steals this material, STC capabilities provide a better ability to locate and isolate the material.

Whether or not STC will be successful is difficult to say at this stage, but some precedence already exists that indicates such an effort could indeed be effective.  The Department of Defense (DOD) already deploys their own version of STC focused exclusively on protecting bases within the U.S.  Detectors are in place surrounding the bases to detect a potential nuclear threat in vicinity of the base.  Ongoing R&D for these programs is focused on increasing the ability to detect source material moving at greater speeds along public roads that lead to these bases.  The potential for cooperation between DNDO and DOD should be pursued for mutual benefit.

Lastly, DNDO’s budget request for STC deserves attention.  The nation’s investment in STC should reflect a commitment to thinking creatively and responsibly about the threat of nuclear terrorism in America’s cities.  The nearly $11 billion to be spent on missile defense this next year places the STC budget in perspective.  With an overall DNDO budget of approximately $550 million, dedicating $30 million to Securing the Cities seems appropriate.  At this early stage, a healthier investment like this would help identify more promising routes to success while weeding out potential dead-ends.  STC is equal parts R&D and strategy.  These early months will require a dedication of brain power that must be hired as well.

DHS – through the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office – is starting to test and evaluate equipment focused on the blind spots around the shipment of containerized cargo.  While this effort satisfies Section 121(i) of the SAFE Port Act of 2006, it also reflects proposals made by the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 2005 when it’s Task Force on Preventing Weapons of Mass Effect explained the importance of adopting a layered prevention strategy.  Intermodal chokepoints served as key examples for the Task Force’s argument.  Specifically, the gaps in scanning and other preventive measures needed to be in place when a target item (i.e. cargo container) transferred one conveyance (boat) to another (rail).  The Task Force considered this next layer a “critical deficiency” that required the Department’s attention.The DNDO announced yesterday that: 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon begin conducting multiple projects in the Port of Tacoma, Wash., to evaluate technology and concepts of operations for radiation detection that will scan cargo at various points in transfer from ship to rail.  By establishing a Rail Test Center (RTC) at the port, DHS will identify and evaluate radiological and nuclear detection solutions for intermodal rail port facilities that can be used across the country.

A major recommendation and recurring theme from the Nuclear Defense Working Group at the Center for the Study of the Presidency held that detection efforts were strongest when targets were in motion or under scrutiny already (i.e. cargo was only screened when checked, registered, or loaded, and usually at only one of those points).  Containers and other targets at rest were a glaring weakness, according to the NDWG, in need of innovative solutions that did not include scattering expensive scanners over every square inch of an airport or seaport.  The same DNDO announcement reminded me of that recommendation with this detail:

Projects being considered for further evaluation at the RTC include scanning cargo on the dock, during transport to the rail yard, entering the rail yard, in the container storage stack, during train assembly, and as the train leaves the port.

These are promising efforts, albeit nascent ones.  These are also only one part of the broader effort to reduce the threat of smuggled nucs.  Let’s hope the non-proliferation and Nunn-Lugar-type programs get the same attention.  More on that can be found at Jeffrey’s ArmsControlWonk.com.

If the Iraq supplemental bill (HR1591) becomes law, Congress will have added $400 million to the DNDO bank for purchasing radiation portal monitors to be placed at weak points along the borders.  This is in addition to the FY08 request in which DNDO’s overall budget is ~$500mil. 

In the meantime, DHS moves forward with another outlay to accelerate the research side of the equation.  Balancing the immediate needs for deployable technology and long-term needs for more effective nuclear defense capabilities is a difficult objective.  Observers usually prefer that investments show a near-term payoff ($400mil for more RPMs that show up on the border within months), but the real payoff in which game-changing capabilities reduce the likelihood of an attack while supporting the other nuclear non-proliferation imperatives takes years.

This is today’s press release from DHS:

DHS AWARDS $8.8 MILLION FOR EXPLORATORY RESEARCH IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) announced ten contract awards today totaling $8.8 million to nine companies that will perform exploratory research in advanced nuclear detection technology.  The Exploratory Research Program is designed to transform nuclear detection technology by funding aggressive research and development that is unconstrained by pre-existing user expectations and initial technical risks.

The nine companies selected are: Alliant Techsystems Incorporated, Mission Research Division; Canberra; EIC Laboratories, Incorporated; General Electric Global Research Center (two awards); Physical Optics Corporation; Radiation Monitoring Devices, Incorporated; Rapiscan Systems Corporation; Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); and Westinghouse Electric Company.

Each contract consists of multiple phases, including an advanced technology demonstration, before potentially transitioning to a systems development and acquisition program.  Successful technologies will be deployed to provide port-of-entry (POE) and non-POE radiological and nuclear detection capability.

Earlier this year, DHS announced the award of Exploratory Research Cooperative Agreements with Academia totaling approximately $3.1 million to make significant advances in basic nuclear detection technology.  Seven universities were awarded cooperative agreements: California Institute of Technology, Florida Institute of Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, State University of New York at Stony Brook, University of Michigan, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, and Washington University. 

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Congressman David Wu, chairman of the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, convened a hearing today on funding for homeland security R&D.  Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Vayl Oxford testified, along with Admiral Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology at DHS.  I testified on the role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the applicability of risk assessments, and other items.  Jerry Epstein, Senior Fellow at CSIS, testified on the Department’s biosecurity investments.  And, from a first responder-as-user perspective, Marilyn Ward of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council testified.

Fortunately, the hearing avoided the non-starter subject of whether DNDO should be consolidated into the S&T Directorate.  The whole reason it is separate is due the special nature of nuclear terrorism and nuc detection R&D.  The hearing focused instead on the importance of strategic level judgments about how to balance near-term needs to deploy technology solutions to the challenges of securing the homeland with long-term commitments to R&D that can lead to major leaps in capability down the road.

My statement focused on the nuclear challenge from a non-physicist perspective by introducing a different view of success factors for the DNDO, and the public sector in general.  There’s a certain amount of attention given to the use of a broader framework for gauging value in R&D investments in there, too, that makes use of an IBM model — Global Movement Management – developed originally by Scott Gould and Christian Beckner.  Full disclosure: I’m now on that project to generate the 2.0 iteration.  I’d welcome any reactions to my testimony, and you can view the statements offered by the other expert witnesses by clicking below.

Vayl Oxford testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Admiral Cohen testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Dr. Epstein testimont for 3-8-07 hearing

Ms. Ward’s testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Czerwinski testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Update 3/11/07: GovExec’s Winter Casey covered the hearing in this story.

This was released tonight by DHS. 

Press Office

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 

Press Release

February 16, 2007

Contact: DHS Press Office (202) 282-8010

NSF Press Office (703) 292-7730

DHS FORMS PARTNERSHIP WITH NSF FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH INITIATIVE ON DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION

 

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) recently issued a potential $58 million, over five years, in grant opportunities for colleges and universities that will focus on detection systems, individual sensors or other research relevant to the detection of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, radiation dispersal devices and related threats.  The program is called the Academic Research Initiative and will foster frontier research and build the nation’s intellectual capital in nuclear sciences.

“This Academic Research Initiative is a critical element in building the Nation’s intellectual capital in nuclear detection capability,” said DNDO Director, Vayl S. Oxford.  “Continued advances in science and technology are a key element in the long-term effort to protect the Nation against nuclear attacks.”

Proposals submitted to NSF through the Fastlane electronic system, or through Grants.gov, will be reviewed through NSF’s merit-based process using panels of peer reviewers and experts recruited jointly by NSF and DNDO.  Seven NSF units will be participating in the effort including five directorates and two additional offices.  Spanning multiple academic disciplines, this broad expertise will form a comprehensive platform for fundamental research on domestic nuclear detection.”

The National Science Foundation is an independent federal agency created by Congress in 1950 to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense. With an annual budget of about $5.58 billion, NSF is the funding source for approximately 20 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by America’s colleges and universities. NSF funds reach all 50 states through grants to nearly 1,700 universities and institutions.

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is a jointly staffed office established to improve the nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.

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The House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation holds a hearing March 8 at 10:00 a.m. on the Department’s R&D efforts related to nuc and bio terrorism.  Look for more about outreach to the academic community then.

William Langewiesche has a compelling story in the December 2006 issue of the Atlantic Monthly entitled “How to Get a Nuclear Bomb.” (The full article is only available online to subscribers.) It’s a compelling piece, looking at the challenges that a terrorist organization might face in terms of acquiring nuclear material, smuggling it, and building a nuclear device. It’s in some ways reassuring, playing down some of the threats that have received attention in the last few years, such as the ex-Soviet “suitcase nukes,” and depicting a gradually improved security situation at Russian nuclear facilities due to investments over the past 15 years. But on balance, it’s a disquieting story, in particular in terms of the remaining gaps at those facilities and the ongoing risks of insider theft of nuclear materials. Definitely worth reading if you’re interested in understanding the ground realities of non-proliferation programs at a richer level of detail.

The GAO issued a report today that criticizes the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s cost-benefit analysis of investment in second-generation radiation portal monitors (RPMs). The report argues that this analysis does not provide a sound basis for investment in next-generation RPMs, which cost $377,000 per unit vs. $55,000 per unit for current RPMs, and according to the GAO, provide a negligible additional benefit in terms of their capabilities. From the report:

DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis does not provide a sound analytical basis for DNDO’s decision to purchase and deploy new portal monitor technology. DNDO did not use the results of its own performance tests in its cost-benefit analysis and instead relied on assumptions of the new technology’s anticipated performance level. Performance tests also showed that the ability of new radiation detection portal monitors to correctly identify masked HEU (placed next to or within another, usually more benign, radiological substance) was even more limited. According to the cost-benefit analysis and radiation detection experts to whom we spoke, masked HEU is a significant concern because it is difficult to detect. DNDO also focused the analysis exclusively on identifying HEU and did not consider in the analysis how well (either as a goal or in testing) new portal monitor technology can correctly detect or identify other dangerous radiological or nuclear materials. Furthermore, the analysis did not include the results from side-by-side tests that DNDO conducted of the advanced portal monitors and current portal monitors.

The cost-benefit analysis for acquiring and deploying portal monitors is also incomplete because it does not include all of the major costs and benefits required by DHS guidelines. In particular, DNDO did not assess the likelihood that radiation detection equipment would either misidentify or fail to detect nuclear or radiological material. Rather, it focused its analysis on reducing the time necessary to screen traffic at border check points and reduce the impact of any delays on commerce. DNDO also used questionable assumptions about the procurement costs of portal monitor technology. DNDO assumed a purchase price for current portal monitor technology that is more than twice what CBP typically pays.

The DNDO responds to these charges on pages 25-26 of the report, arguing that the testing that the GAO cited was for baselining and source selection purposes, and not intended to represent the final capabilities of second-generation RPMs. And in fairness to the DNDO, it’s inherent difficult to assess the benefits of any investment like this, since the value of any single layer in a system of protection are difficult to isolate. Nevertheless, the concerns put forward by GAO are valid, and it’s imperative that DHS not move forward with full-scale acquisition until value can be demonstrated.

The GAO issued a report today entitled “Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened,” which takes a look at a couple of issues related to the nation’s abilities to respond to a catastrophic radiological or nuclear attack.

The report makes two key points: first, that DOE’s two key emergency response facilities, at Andrews and Nellis AFB, have inadequate physical security; and second, that DOE should conduct additional aerial surveys of major cities to establish a baseline for background radiation and potentially locate existing unknown radiation sources - as was the case when New York City conducted an aerial survey in 2005 and found an old industrial site that was previously unknown to be contaminated with radium.

The Department of Homeland Security announced today that it would award contracts totaling $1.35 billion in value to three companies as part of the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System program:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced today the award of the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program contracts totaling an estimated $1.35 billion to SAIC of San Diego, Calif., American Science & Engineering of Billerica, Mass., and L-3 Communications of Woburn, Mass. The CAARS award, which comes following a fully competitive acquisition, will complement the nation’s radiological and nuclear detection capabilities.

For more on the CAARS program, see this recent presentation by DNDO director Vayl Oxford.

Wired Magazine has a story today on a $12,000 nuclear detector built by a group of volunteer researchers in San Francisco:

Here on the San Francisco Bay, a group of do-it-yourself volunteer researchers are not waiting for the mushroom cloud. They say they are close to perfecting a portable device that could do much the same thing right now, for total out-of-pocket costs of about $12,000.

The group, led by physicist and Sandia Lab weapons subcontractor Stanley Glaros, says it has already built a boat-mounted scanner with off-the-shelf parts that might reliably spot radiation spikes in containerships at sea from a kilometer away. The team’s detector has been up and running for eight months, and the group plans to publish its test findings in the Review of Scientific Instruments.

“Can we detect hazardous material at a distance?” said Glaros. “Yes, easily.”

….the team is now testing a homemade detector based on a 4-inch by 4-inch by 16-inch sodium iodide crystal, custom grown by Saint Gobain, a subsidiary of Compagnie de Saint-Gobain headquartered in Paris, France. It is the same technology used in many monitors currently deployed at ports around the country. It will also be used in most of the new Advanced Spectroscopic Portals being purchased by DHS.

“The crystal is like Frodo’s sword,” explained a Glaros collaborator. “It starts to glow when the bad stuff’s around, kind of a blue fluorescence.”

Faced with a large-crystal scanner, terrorists would find it extremely difficult to hide 10 kilograms of Uranium 235, the amount needed to construct a first-generation Chinese- or Pakistani-designed weapon. To shield it, a terrorist “would have to get a shit load of lead bricks and put the source inside,” said Glaros. Theoretically, the device could also detect a Soviet era plutonium fueled suitcase bomb.

The article provides additional details on how this system works, and discusses the challenges about how to respond to a positive indication from a detector. If this system can do what it claims, then it’s something that DHS should consider for deployment on other vessels, essentially as a small “side bet” as part of its broader portfolio of intended nuclear detection capabilities.

RAND released a new report today that’s not recommended for bedtime reading, entitled “Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack.” The report, mentioned in this L.A. Times story today, uses scenario analysis techniques to predict the potential short-term and long-term repercussions of a 10kt nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach. The report considers the possibility of devastating near-term consequences, in terms of death, injury, property destruction, panic, mass evacuation, and energy shortages. And it looks at the potential long-term consequences of such an attack, focusing on the impacts on the global supply chain and the national economic system. On the former issue, the report predicts the following conflict between security and economic interests:

In terms of global shipping, the main tension might be between the political aim of preventing a future attack and the business interest in seeing that U.S. ports and the global shipping supply chain continue to operate. The only way to completely mitigate the risk of a second strike would be to close all U.S. ports and suspend all imports indefinitely. This would be the national security community’s likely position. Yet in business terms, this position would be untenable. The loss of the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles alone, which handle 30 percent of U.S. shipping imports, would already be substantial. All U.S. ports combined carry out 7.5 percent of world trade activity. Accordingly, the business community would likely call for ports to stay open, or to reopen as early as possible.

But harsh realities facing the financial and real estate communities might prove a barrier. The Long Beach attack might cripple an insurance industry struggling to absorb massive losses from claims. Insurance would be in tremendously short supply—particularly for terrorist and nuclear risks. Without it, ports and related infrastructure could not operate. Further complicating the issue is the high probability that people would flee port cities, severely depleting local labor supplies. Given these conditions, all U.S. ports would likely close indefinitely or operate at a substantially reduced level following the attack. This would severely disrupt the availability of basic goods and petroleum throughout the country.

This current probability is a key reason why the global supply chain needs better awareness about what’s moving through it. With better information, officials can more easily track down the perpetrators and develop assurances that another attack is not looming, and will therefore not be compelled to shut down the entire supply chain. This awareness will make the supply chain more resilient, and mitigate the long-term consequences of any attack.

Overall, a very interesting report, and one that drives home the fact that combating the nuclear terrorism threat needs to be the #1 priority of U.S. national security.

The Department of Homeland Security announced contracts awards for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program, totaling $1.157 billion, to Raytheon, Thermo Electron Corporation, and Canberra Industries. The program is intended to develop the next generation of radiation portal monitors, for use at seaports, rail depots, and mounted on trucks. This is an important and necessary program, given the performance limitations of the current generation of passive detectors. As DHS noted in its press release:

The ASP program improves upon the existing polyvinyl toluene based radiation portal monitors which are currently being deployed to the nation’s points of entry by Customs and Border Protection, as well as overseas through the Department of Energy Megaports Initiative. These new systems will enhance current detection capabilities by more clearly identifying the source of detected radiation through spectroscopic isotope identification.

“The ASP program provides significant improvement in the detection of special nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium,” said Vayl S. Oxford, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. “The program is critical to implementing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. By identifying these materials through spectroscopy, these next-generation systems will reduce the false alarm rate by distinguishing between special nuclear materials and naturally occurring radioactive materials.”

This statement of work for the procurement and this specification document provide detailed information on the program.

I had an interesting ride on the DC metro this morning. The train car I entered had a Metro transit security officer on board, and about a minute after I got on, he notified a guy who was standing right next to me that the guy was triggering his Radiation Detection Pager (I believe it was this model). Its reading jumped rapidly from a level of ‘1′ to a level of ‘5′. The officer began asking him a number of questions. Did you have an x-ray or other medical treatment recently? No. Do you have a smoke alarm with you? No, he said, but I had changed the battery on it within the previous day. Do you have anything else on your person that might set this off? No. He then waived the radiation detector again, showing him clearly that something on his person - not in his bags - was setting this off.

The train arrived at the next station, and the two of them got off and he waved the radiation detection over him again out on the platform. The passenger got back on the train, and the officer left the car - there was some kind of medical emergency elsewhere on the train - and that was it. End of incident.

As far as I could tell, the officer never resolved why the radiation detector was going off near the guy. And he did not ever ask the man his name, or take down any other personal information.

Is this the right way to deal for Metro officials to deal with incidents such as this? Wouldn’t a better response have been to stay with the guy until this was resolved, and take down his personal information - and if necessary, send an FBI agent out to his primary residence to see if there were any abnormal readings of radiation?

There’s at least a 99% chance that this was unconnected to any malicious threat. But in spite of those odds, I don’t think it was right to simply let this pass without taking further action (at the very least getting his name). And not only for terror-related reasons, but also for public safety purposes - perhaps the guy was being exposed at home or elsewhere, without his knowledge, to some dangerous source of radiation.

So what’s the story? How often do these ‘detections’ occur on the Metro? (I’ve traveled on the metro at least a thousand times in the last few years, and have never witnessed an incident like this before). What’s the policy to deal with them? Was this response within that policy?

The Senate Appropriations Committee moved the DHS FY 2007 appropriations bill out of the full committee today; this press release summarizes their version of the legislation.

At the beginning of the budget season, I predicted that this would be a painful budget season for DHS. The Department’s decision to propose a fee increase for TSA that they knew would be dead-on-arrival created a $1.2 billion hole in the middle of the budget; a hole that both the House and the Senate appropriations committees have struggled to fill. The new operational costs created by the border funding (e.g. the National Guard deployment) in the FY 2006 supplemental made this an even deeper hole.

As a natural result, both versions of the bill propose funding decisions that would be real setbacks to U.S. homeland security, in a number of different areas. The programs that were cut or not fully funded are generally newer programs; it’s much easier to scale back new programs than to propose cuts to programs that have existing workforces and established cost structures. But the result of this is that some of the most important and urgent DHS missions are likely to be underfunded this year, in areas like infrastructure protection, preparedness, and science & technology.

Take the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, responsible for developing a national architecture to detect and prevent the use of nuclear or radiological weapons on U.S. soil. By all accounts the DNDO has been doing a solid job in its first 17 months of existence. The DHS budget request proposed $536 million for the DNDO in FY 2007. The House bill cuts this funding level to $500 million, and the Senate bill scales it to $442.5 million - all out of the DNDO’s R&D budget.

Preventing a nuclear attack on U.S. soil is, for my money, far and away the most important mission of the Department of Homeland Security. And the technologies to detect radiological and nuclear materials are by all accounts inadequate today. Given these realities, how can it be a good idea to roll back the DNDO’s R&D budget by $93 million (nearly one-third of the total)? The security return-on-investment from the DNDO is potentially enormous. If anything, I’d suggest spending more. A comparison of its value to U.S. national security with many big ticket items in the DOD’s procurement budget (for example, the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor at $361 million per plane) raises profound questions about whether we are truly serious about stopping mass casualty terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission led by Hans Blix (not to be confused with the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission) released its final report yesterday, “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Arms.” The release of the report was covered in stories by The Guardian, UPI, and the AP. From the latter story:

A study led by former U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix called Thursday for outlawing nuclear weapons and reviving global cooperation on disarmament, including security guarantees to curb the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.

As long as any nuclear, chemical and biological arms remain in any country’s arsenal, “there is a high risk that they will one day be used by design or accident,” the two-year probe by the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission concluded.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the stocks of such weapons remain “extraordinarily high” including 27,000 nuclear weapons, about 12,000 of them still actively deployed, the commission said.

The commission made 60 recommendations to free the world from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Other media commentary focused on comments by Blix criticizing the United States for its missile defense system and its general lack of leadership on counterproliferation.

Pages 154-55 of the report are the most relevant to homeland security, discussing the impact of efforts related to the “control of movement of goods”:

The difficulties of preventing proliferation-related activities hiding under the cover of legitimate commerce led the United States in May 2003 to launch the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which focuses on interdicting and seizing illicit shipments while in transit. By September 2003, the United States had assembled a coalition consisting of 10 additional states (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), which agreed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles. Since then, many additional countries have joined this initiative, including all members of the EU and the G8.

Described by one of its architects as an ‘activity’ rather than a ‘treaty-based bureaucracy’, the PSI has encouraged greater international cooperation in undertaking interdictions, including joint participation in a number of exercises organized in different regions. Its participants have stressed that the interdiction activities will be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with international law.

It is difficult, however, and perhaps somewhat premature to assess the value of the PSI, as little concrete information has so far been made available to the public about its application, beyond press releases about interdiction exercises and official claims that it has been a great success. Although the initiative has gained the support of a large number of states, it has also generated concerns among critics who prefer a more multilateral approach, tied more closely to the treaty regimes and the UN Security Council.

The launch of the PSI marks the first time that states and organizations have cooperated to improve the security of the full supply chain for goods in international trade. Efforts have also been made in recent years to control the movement of thousands of large shipping containers that travel through world commerce each day. Such efforts have led to new capacities and cooperation for outbound inspection (for export control enforcement), and inbound inspection (for threat reduction), and control of goods and individuals at borders. Technology is being sought to make this process as nonintrusive as possible. The World Customs Organization (WCO) is also working to secure and protect the international trade supply chain from being used for acts of terrorism or other criminal activity.

I’m glad that the report includes this finding; too often these “homeland security” concerns are ignored by the counter-proliferation community. I disagree with the concern about the fact that the PSI is not multilateral, but Blix is correct to demand more transparency into the PSI so that its performance can be publicly gauged. The report then makes the following recommendation in response to this finding:

All states should conduct audits of their export control enforcement agencies (customs, police, coast guard, border control and military) to ensure that they can carry out their tasks effectively. States should seek to establish a universal system of export controls providing harmonized standards, enhanced transparency and practical support for implementation. Members of the five export control regimes should promote a widening of their membership and improve implementation in view of current security challenges, without impeding legitimate trade and economic development.

That sounds like an appropriate long-term goal for export control and cargo security.

The Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing yesterday on the topic of “Enlisting Foreign Cooperation in U.S. Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling.” The testimony of the committee’s witnesses - Jayson Ahern of CBP, David Huizenga of the NNSA, Frank Record of the State Dept., and Vayl Oxford of the DNDO - is on the committee’s website at the preceding links. There’s very little new information in the prepared statements, but it provides a solid overview of the current status of efforts in the respective agencies charged with carrying out this important mission.

Update (5/31): A summary of the hearing available here.

On Saturday the Washington Post had a good story on U.S. government efforts to combat radiological and nuclear threats, focusing on the debate over the nature of the threat, the challenges of detection, and the steps that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is taking to improve detection capabilities. The debate within the story over the value of investment in detection is interesting:

To skeptics, even some close to the administration, the focus on stopping a nuclear bomb hidden in a container at the border is a costly fixation on a scenario that — while nightmarish — is not supported by intelligence and is overshadowed by other threats.

“This is the equivalent of a comet hitting the planet. Of all the things that are in the world, why are we fixated on this one thing?” Carafano asked. “Scanning containers full of sneakers for a ‘nuke in a box’ is not a really thoughtful thing.”

Former Virginia governor James S. Gilmore III, who led a congressional commission on weapons of mass destruction, said the Dubai port controversy showed how the Bush administration has profited politically from fears of terrorism at ports yet given Americans a false sense of security about conventional attacks, which are more likely.

“They have hyped the threat, and that has been a political advantage,” said Gilmore, a former Republican National Committee chairman. “You can’t rule out the possibility of something like this happening, but there isn’t any evidence that I’m aware of that al-Qaeda or other terrorists have their hands on these weapons.”

But many other analysts looking at the data, such as Harvard University proliferation expert Graham T. Allison, conclude otherwise.

Vayl Oxford, director of the Homeland Security office Bush created a year ago today to put nuclear detection efforts back on track, said critics’ concerns reflect a Cold War assumption that solid intelligence can be obtained against a terror group. The country must also consider its vulnerabilities and the consequences of the worst catastrophes, he said, which in this case tip the scale toward action.

“If you don’t see a direct intelligence report that says there is something there, someone will leap to the conclusion the threat is not there,” Oxford said. “But I don’t think it’s political hype. It’s prudent planning to take action on this count. Sitting in hindsight saying ‘Why didn’t we see it in the intelligence?’ is not the kind of hearing I want to go to.”

I generally agree with the latter perspectives here. No one would argue that nuclear detection investments are a silver-bullet fix for radiological and nuclear threats, but I do think they have an essential role as part of a broader system of prevention, protection, and deterrence, alongside investments in nonproliferation programs, intelligence efforts, and interdiction activities. And I think Gov. Gilmore’s argument about the threat being overhyped provides false comfort; bin Laden’s attempt to secure a fatwa to justify the use of nuclear weapons shows that al-Qaeda has the motive, if not today the means and opportunity, to use nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of March, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) released a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for “Exploratory Research in Nuclear Detection Technology.” Over the past month, the team that is leading the procurement have released a series of fact sheets, briefs, and powerpoints that clarify the DNDO’s intended strategy to an extent not previously discussed with such detail or clarity.

For example, this powerpoint deck (click read-only when opening) by DNDO Deputy Director Michael R. Carter expands upon his presentation last August at DHS S&T’s industry conference, and provides a top-level vision for the threats that a global nuclear detection architecture is designed to combat in slide 4:

The actual BAA provides a good companion overview of the challenges of nuclear detection today, explaining the rationale for the DNDO and singling out five key technology “areas for improvement” in the global nuclear detection architecture:

• Robust detection and verification of shielded special nuclear material at our nations ports of entry,
• Radiation monitoring along our unattended air, land, and sea borders,
• In-transit monitoring of cargo and conveyances,
• Mobile or re-locatable radiation detection and monitoring, and
• Unattended or ubiquitous radiation detection sensing systems.

Overall, an informative set of documents that help to clear up the strategy, mission, and objectives of one of the most important (but heretofore largely opaque) parts of DHS.

The Christian Science Monitor has a good story out tonight that tackles the issue of nuclear plant security, in light of a GAO report that is scheduled to be released on Tuesday:

If the terror attacks of 9/11 taught one lesson, it was that America must make itself less vulnerable to attack by air - perhaps nowhere more urgently than at the nation’s 103 nuclear power plants, given their potential for inflicting massive casualties and destruction if hit by a plane loaded with fuel.

Yet 4-1/2 years later, those plants are little safer from air attack, say critics. And squabbling has set in over what the security standards should be.

Some antiterror experts are concerned the current criteria do not require nuclear plants to be protected against a threat equal to the one posed by the 9/11 hijackers, particularly if they attack again by air. A report to be released Tuesday by the Government Accountability Office is also critical of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), finding that it has not increased standards enough to ensure plants are genuinely secure, but only as much as industry officials believed was necessary.

The article goes on to summarize a long-running debate among security experts and the nuclear over what types of threats that nuclear plants need to protect against and the scope of those protective measures; for example, whether a nuclear power plant could withstand a 9/11-type strike from a large airplane without damaging the reactor and fuel rods within the containment dome.

Overall, an interesting story; I’ll append a link to the GAO report when it comes out tomorrow.

Update (4/4): Here’s the relevant GAO report, out today. And here’s a New York Times story on the hearing held today on this subject.

The Council on Foreign Relations has issued a new report by Charles D. Ferguson entitled “Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism.” The report provides a concise but fact-filled survey of the current state of nuclear prevention activities, and offers a cogent vulnerability assessment that compares the different ways in which a terrorist group might acquire a nuclear capability. Ferguson argues that the greatest vulnerability comes not from the theft of a weapon, but from the manufacture of a crude device using stolen or illicitly-acquired HEU or plutonium. He makes a strong case for strengthening key non-proliferation programs such as the “Megatons to Megawatts” HEU conversion program.

My only real critique of the report is that it gives short shrift to the nuclear detection side of the problem. Ferguson acknowledges that “developing and deploying radiation detection technology” is a part of a “multilayered defense strategy,” but then dismisses the value of these efforts without going into detail. These nuclear and radiological detection efforts certainly are problematic today, but I think they’re worth a more detailed consideration (looking at the potential for advances in detection technology) than they are given in this report.

Overall though, a very useful study on what is probably the greatest long-run threat to our national security.

On the eve of his Senate hearing on “Neutralizing The Nuclear And Radiological Threat: Securing the Global Supply Chain,” Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN) distributed three GAO reports to the media that will be publicly released at the hearing. From CNN’s description of the first report:

Two teams of government investigators using fake documents were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources to make two dirty bombs, according to a federal report made available Monday.

The investigators purchased a “small quantity” of radioactive materials from a commercial source, according to a Government Accountability Office report prepared for Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Chairman Norm Coleman, a Minnesota Republican.

The investigators posed as employees of a fictitious company and brought the materials into the United States through checkpoints on the northern and southern borders, the report stated.

And the second report:

A second GAO report notes that while the departments of State, Energy and Defense have provided radiation-detection equipment to 36 countries since 1994 to combat nuclear smuggling, operating the equipment has proven challenging.

Those challenges include technical limitations of some of the equipment, a lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites and corruption of some foreign border security officials.

And on the third report:

A third GAO report observes that, while the Department of Homeland Security has made progress in deploying radiation-detection equipment at U.S. ports — which include 670 portal monitors and more than 19,000 pieces of hand-held radiation detection equipment as of last December — the agency’s program goals are “unrealistic” and its cost estimate is “uncertain.”

GAO’s analysis concluded that the program may exceed its budget by $342 million.

I’ll loathe to make a judgment until I see the full reports, but my initial impression from a close read of this story and related stories is that this is not necessarily the bad-news story for DHS, DOE, et al. that the relevant news headlines would imply. There are still gaps in the system, and the GAO is right to point these out. There’s still a lot of work that needs to be done. But I think the federal government has made a lot of solid progress in the area o