Homeland Security Watch

The new National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) , which was released last month is definitely a work in progress. And yet, exactly how far we have now come in general with respect to synchronizing planning and communications as we work to achieve national preparedness objectives including the NECP was apparent, for example, during the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s meeting earlier this week with FEMA and state and local representatives.

In a free-flowing, roundtable discussion, state and local representatives spoke directly to the full Commission along with FEMA Director David Paulison. Among the issues raised was the need for federal personnel to actually take part in large-scale drills and exercises. This sort of frank exchange was unimaginable a few years ago. Today, however, it is essential. Making the NECP a coherent and user-friendly plan in a short amount of time requires a serious effort from all stakeholders.

The NECP’s stated “milestones” illustrate just how little time they have.

The first milestone calls for a review of the DHS’ emergency communications capability framework within 18 months “during a series of technical working group meetings with stakeholders from the emergency response community.” Another requires the creation within 24 months of the new emergency communications capability framework, which will be incorporated as the communications and information management capability in the DHS/FEMA National Preparedness Guidelines/TCL. This will serve as a basis for future grant policies.

The very next initiative demands that “within 12 months, tactical planning among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments occurs at the regional interstate level.”

Consider these goals set forth by the NECP:

Goal 1: By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications 3 within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.

Goal 2: By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.

Goal 3: By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response level emergency communications within three hours, in the event of a significant incident as outlined in national planning scenarios.

Progress toward the initial milestones appears to be underway already. According to the NECP, Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups (RECCWGs) are taking shape in each of the 10 FEMA regions, “to assess emergency communications capabilities within their respective regions, facilitate disaster preparedness through the promotion of multijurisdictional and multiagency emergency communications networks, and ensure activities are coordinated with all emergency communications stakeholders within the RECCWG’s specific FEMA region.”

The NECP makes no mention of how all this greater emphasis on regional coordination ties into the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), a new concept which has received considerable attention lately. This will have to be addressed by the DHS Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) as it fine tunes Communications Unit Leader (COML) training. OIC is charged with devising, “a tool for training (COMLs) and their command and general staff to perform the critical mission of managing interagency and cross-disciplinary communications during all hazards incidents.”

In the next 18 months, OIC must not only develop and disseminate “training program guidance and curricula for emergency communications technical staff,” but also provide, “educational and training opportunities to emergency response agencies per requests through technical assistance programs.”

Roy Jones, communications manager at the Maine Emergency Management Agency, offers an upbeat assessment of the NECP. “It is really good to have these deadlines. Some may be difficult to achieve, and others may need to be revised as with any plan. However, overall, they are reasonable and they reflect input from the stakeholders. This plan allows us to better see what is on the way and what everyone else is currently working on,” says Jones.

Yet deadlines are not the only source of pressure on the implementation of the NECP. The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International stressed to Congress that motivation and organization can only get you so far.

During his testimony last month before the House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response, APCO International Vice President Richard Mirgon asserted that if “the goals of the NECP are to be successful, the Administration and Congress must ensure the NECP and the interoperable emergency communications grant programs are fully funded.”

Peter J. Brown, a freelance writer from Maine, writes frequently about the role of satellite technology in disaster response and emergency management operations.

The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) in the Directorate for National Protection and Programs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will soon be releasing the new National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). OEC’s mission is, “to support and promote the ability of government officials and emergency responders to continue to communicate in the event of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other disaster, and to ensure and advance interoperable emergency communications capabilities nationwide.”

The NECP will provide recommendations for ensuring interoperable emergency communications nationwide. At the same time, the ongoing DHS grants process which is driving interoperability at the state and local level in particular has been in motion for many months. First responders, public safety and emergency management personnel are well down the road with respect to ongoing and well-funded interoperability planning, and training, along with related equipment purchases.

As a result, OEC must be careful to roll out an NECP that is consistent with, and supportive of, current decisions and guidance involving policies, procedures and protocols which in turn greatly influence planning and training. To not introduce what is in effect a truly user-friendly NECP means that OEC may end up disrupting or somehow impeding current state and local efforts to address established interoperability goals.

In its March 2008 report on FEMA preparedness, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) emphasizes that, “there are no fewer than 10 federal interoperability initiatives underway. In light of the importance of interoperability and such large expenditures to strengthen it, the effective management of federal interoperability grants and programs is essential.”

The OIG report added that, “there is no single mechanism in place to link and orchestrate the numerous programs and initiatives underway, nor is there a clear line of accountability. Second, OEC is currently operating with a skeletal, full-time equivalent staff. OEC has assumed a large portion of responsibilities and programs directed at improving interoperable communications, and it requires additional staff and an adequate budget.”

The long-running interoperability program at DHS known as Project SAFECOM is now split between OEC which supports SAFECOM’s development of guidance, tools and templates, and the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) in the Science and Technology Directorate which supports SAFECOM-related research, development, testing, evaluation and standards.

Under the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP), for example, OEC addresses technical issues, policy-making and operational concerns. Assessing and updating existing Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICPs) have been an important offshoot of this activity. Along with TICPs, all states and territories have Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans (SCIPs) that have already been approved by DHS.

Besides the above-mentioned TICPs, SCIPs and ICTAP-related work, there is a Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) program and Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP). IECGP is jointly run by FEMA and OEC with over $48 million awarded to states in FY08. PSIC grants will total over $1 Billion.

Although it is doubtful that anyone would want to challenge the need for the NECP, due to an unfortunate sequence of events, state and local governments may in fact be way out ahead of OEC in this instance, thanks to all these IECGP and soon PSIC grants. And for this reason, the NECP must adapt to this set of circumstances or risk annoying and possibly alienating state and local stakeholders.

Charlottesville (VA) Fire Chief Charles Werner shares good news in this respect. He chairs the SAFECOM Executive Committee, and serves on both the International Association of Fire Chiefs Communications Committee and Virginia’s Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee.

“When you see the NECP, it will begin to make sense. The NECP does not do anything to diminish the progress that has been made by the states and the SCIPs but moreover builds upon them to further define, and direct the future development of the SCIPs through realistic and measurable performance outcomes (not methods or technology),” he says. “OEC Director Chris Essid, who was Virginia’s former Interoperability Coordinator, is very aware of the states’ efforts and the dynamics. OEC and SAFECOM have been working directly with the development, review and approval of the SCIPs. The fact that every state and territory has submitted a plan demonstrates that this program is working and should be recognized as a phenomenal accomplishment.”

He points out that, among other things, more money is coming that is specifically available for additional planning at the state and local levels.

In conclusion, Chief Werner’s assurances deserve attention, given that the OEC has been described as understaffed and perhaps underfunded. Clearly the OEC has its hands full as it completes and implements the NECP which must be a user-friendly document above all else. And as OEC moves ahead, effective partnering with state and local governments is essential to ensure that the NECP is successful, and that other interoperability goals are quickly and easily achieved.

Peter J. Brown, a freelance writer from Maine, writes frequently about the role of satellite technology in disaster response and emergency management operations.

The Department of Homeland Security program to partner with major cities in an effort to defend against the use of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks, called Securing the Cities, received rare coverage in the press yesterday. The Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu was invited to New York City by Richard Falkenrath, NYPD’s deputy commissioner for counterterrorism. You may recall Falkenrath as the Harvard instructor and then White House staffer who joined up after 9/11 with the Office of Homeland Security. Falkenrath today occupies a perch unlike any other and was probably interested in spreading the word about the City’s efforts to defend against rad/nuc and bio threats. (Spencer ran an earlier story on anti-bioterrorism, too.)

The Securing the Cities Initiative (STC) is operated by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office with a budget of about $40 million this year. Supporters of the program suggest that it makes straight forward sense that we invest in technology and techniques that will help avert an attack on a major city with something as deadly and disruptive as a dirty bomb. Critics argue that efforts like STC throw bad money and bad money in a futile effort to defend against a terrorist tactic that should be defeated far away from any U.S. city, if it can be defended against at all.

I’m cited in the story as a member of the former group because I believe that the U.S. is uniquely equipped with the innovation and budget to make significant progress in defeating the threat of dirty bombs and covert nuclear attacks. I do not believe that domestic defense should be pursued at the expense of vigorous nonproliferation efforts that should reduce the likelihood of an attack overall. The two efforts are equal parts of a comprehensive approach.

And STC is more than an effort to design and deploy detectors throughout New York City. In addition to improved training and information sharing for state and local authorities, STC also works to secure the sources of domestically available radiological material that could be misappropriated for use in a dirty bomb.

Think of STC as the Nunn-Lugar aspect the DNDO mission. In the same way that such Cooperative Threat Reduction programs endeavor to work with Russian nuclear facilities to keep “loose nukes” and poorly guarded nuclear material from being stolen by terrorists or black marketeers, STC works with hospitals that – for medical procedures – routinely use Cesium-137 or Strontium 90, both potentially deadly isotopes, to enhance their stewardship and protective measures to secure these dangerous sources.

We covered this program last year in a post that includes supporting material. This post also speaks to the issue. For further reading, consider checking Charles Ferguson’s report, “Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism“, or his article in Foreign Affairs, entitled The “Four Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritized Response,” in addition to Michael Levi’s new book On Nuclear Terrorism. (NB: I still have to read Michael’s new book, but I sure look fwd to it.) My friend Jeffrey Lewis runs the best blog on the overseas aspects of this issue.

Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee (Chairman Jane Harman, D-CA) of House Homeland Security Committee will hold a hearing titled “The Way Forward With Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for Change.”

Date: Thursday, September 27, 1000
Place: 311 Cannon Building
Witnesses:
• Charles Allen - Chief intelligence officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
• Michael Mines - Deputy assistant director, Directorate of Intelligence, FBI
• Eileen Larence - Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
• Todd Masse - Specialist, Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
• John Rollins - Specialist, Terrorism and International Crime, CRS
• Norman Beasley - Coordinator for counter terrorism, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

Fusion Centers started back in 2003 with a good amount of support from DHS, state and local law enforcement, the FBI, and even Congress. Soon after, CQ’s Jeff Stein ran a story on April 25, 2006 about how popular the new Centers are proving to be, called “Local Intelligence ‘Fusion Centers’ Emerge as Major Force”.

At that time about 40 states had established their own “fusion centers,” where local agencies can share and act on criminal and terrorism information with representatives from the FBI and DHS. In August 2005, DHS and the Department of Justice issued guidelines to bring the fusion centers in line with federal practices.

DHS Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charlie Allen would follow these developments with plans to send DHS analysts and officers to one Fusion Center a month over the next two years. Two months later, DHS announced plans to embed their analysts at fusion centers in New York City, Los Angeles, Reistertown, MD, and Baton Rouge.

Today, about 43 Fusion Centers exist. Since 2003, DHS has provided more than $300 million to states and regions to establish these Centers and have assigned only about 15 of its own intel analysts to the Centers. (35 more analysts are to be deployed by year’s end.) A list of state and regional intelligence fusion centers dated March 8 was first published by Secrecy News, and by the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center of the Justice Department in Tallahassee.

According to CQ’s Stein, the popularity of fusion centers reflects state and local disappointment with DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (too many points of contact) and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (too opaque).

But how well are they doing?

The Congressional Research Service issued a withering June 6 report suggesting that little counterterrorism was actually being accomplished by the Fusion Centers. They seemed to be drifting back to their comfort zones: “Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach.” That might be code for “everything and anything.” Its true that connecting dots requires better understanding of the dots and the relationships between them, but do more eyes on the dots necessarily mean better connectivity?

There are those who believe these Centers actually do a little too much work.

At a recent meeting of the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee (a DHS entity populated by private citizens and senior DHS officials), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sent a representative to submit a prepared complaining about FC oversight and management with special focus on the concern that with the added fusion comes an erosion of privacy. The EPIC statement recommends:

• Disclosing the location, jurisdiction, and funding provided for each center.
• Suspending of funds to the centers until a full privacy impact analysis is concluded.
• An inspector general’s investigation to confirm compliance with federal laws about due process, privacy, civil liberties and civil rights.
• Requiring each Fusion Center to publicly name all its federal, state, local and private partners.
• Annual reports from each Fusion Center listing the number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions by category of offense.
• Having any information collected, analyzed or shared with a center comply with the Federal Privacy Act.

Whoa. We’re not already doing this? Chairwoman Harman’s hearing will likely get into these issues, but will more likely focus on performance measures. With both CRS and GAO speaking at the hearing we’ll get some critical details.  But that a local user, Norman Beasley, Coordinator for counter terrorism at the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, will speak means we might here the other side of the story. 

In late December the Congressional Research Service released an excellent, detailed synopsis of homeland security grants over the past four years:

RL33770: Department of Homeland Security Grants to State and Local Governments: FY2003 to FY2006. December 22, 2006

The first one-third of the report describes each of the relevant grant programs (e.g. State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative) and how their rules and conditions have evolved over the past four years. The last two-thirds of the report contain forty pages of statistics on the disbursement of homeland security grants over this time period, an invaluable set of statistics for researchers that I don’t think have been collated in one place until now. By using these statistics, it’s possible to make appropriate comparisons of grant allocations between states and/or from year-to-year, as inputs into statistically-sound policy analyses of the grant programs.

The Department of Homeland Security is holding a press conference today to release a report (which you can download here) that describes FY07 allocations for five homeland security grant programs:

• State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)- $509.3 million
• Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)- $363.8 million
• Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)- $746.9 million
• Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)- $32.0 million
• Citizen Corps Program (CCP)- $14.6 million

As noted yesterday, the most newsworthy dimension of is the selection of cities for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program. Baton Rouge, Louisville, Omaha, and Toledo were dropped from the list, and El Paso, Norfolk, Providence, and Tucson were added to it. Local newspapers in those cities are already beginning to react to these decisions - see, for example, the contrasting pieces in the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Providence Journal.

Also new this year, DHS makes the point of fencing off 55% of UASI funding for six “Tier 1″ cities/regions: New York/New Jersey, the National Capital Region, Chicago, Los Angeles/Long Beach, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Houston. However, this is unlikely to lead to an increase that compensates for the decreased FY 2006 allocations given to NYC and DC. In FY 2006, these six regions already received 53.9% of total UASI funding; an increase of 1% of funding, distributed among these six regions, is approx. $7 million, probably not enough to address NYC and DC’s needs and desires. Therefore, the only way to really increase funding for NYC and DC in FY 2007 will be to cut funding for Chicago, LA, Houston and San Francisco. If this math holds, we’re likely to see a repeat of the FY 2006 UASI allocation imbroglio.

Of better news for the “Tier 1″ cities, DHS makes a change that allows these six cities to spend up to 25% of their allocation “toward current state and local personnel dedicated exclusively to counterterrorism field operations.” This is a welcome change, and one that is particularly valuable to New York City, given its sustained investment in a first-rate counterterrorism unit at the NYPD.

For more detailed information, you can read the overview document that I posted here. And look for the Office of Grants & Training to release more detailed grant guidance on the FY 2007 HSGP shortly.

Update (1/5): This page on the Grants & Training contains voluminous information on the FY2007 grant programs, most notably this 98-page grant guidance document and this guide for fusion center investments.

Update (1/6): Here’s the transcript of the press conference.

CQ Homeland Security has a story today (by subscription only) that previews the impending decisions about which cities to incldue for eligibility in the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI):

The Department of Homeland Security is close to releasing a list of 46 high-risk urban areas eligible for $770 million worth of funding in 2007 — including the Las Vegas and San Diego regions that in 2006 were at risk of losing their high-threat funding eligibility.

This year, six high-risk areas are grouped in a top tier and are eligible for about half of the total Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) pot of funding: the National Capital Region, the San Francisco Bay area, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles/Long Beach and New York City/Northern New Jersey.

Dropped from the UASI list this year are Omaha, Neb., Toledo, Ohio, Louisville, Ky., and Baton Rouge, La., areas, according to sources. Added to the list are Tucson, Ariz., Providence, R.I., Norfolk, Va., and El Paso, Texas.

I argued in a post last month that Las Vegas and San Diego had an “ironclad case” for continued participation in the UASI program, and I think that DHS is making the correct decision in keeping them around. The decision to drop the four cities listed above is also appropriate. The one decision that I don’t immediately understand is the inclusion of the four new cities - Tucson, Providence, Norfolk and El Paso. Tucson and El Paso have legitimate border security needs, but these are perhaps better addressed by programs other than the UASI grants. Norfolk is the most important military port on the Atlantic, but DOD force protection resources should somewhat mitigate the need for UASI funds. And I can’t quite figure out why to include Providence, unless as part of a “greater Boston area” regional allocation similar to the SF Bay Area grouping.

Overall though, this looks to be a vast improvement on the FY 2006 list. More analysis to follow when the list is officially released.

Yesterday DHS released a major report on the state of interoperable communications, giving scores to 75 urban/metropolitan areas on their current capabilities. You can download the full report here, and this webpage summarizes the scores in each area. This AP story summarizes some of the findings in the report:

The report found that while emergency agencies in more than 60 percent of the communities studied had the ability to talk to each other during a crisis, only 21 percent overall showed “the seamless use” of equipment needed to also communicate with state and federal officials.

The report’s highest ratings went to the Washington, D.C., area; San Diego; Minneapolis-St. Paul; Columbus, Ohio; Sioux Falls, S.D.; and Laramie County, Wyo.

The lowest scores went to Chicago; Cleveland; Baton Rouge, La.; Mandan, N.D.; and American Samoa. The report includes large and small cities and their suburbs, along with U.S. territories.

The report led members of the House Homeland Security Committee to argue yesterday in favor of a dedicated grant program for emergency communications, instead of providing this funding within broader homeland security grant programs. This issue is expected to arise in the 9/11 Commission recommendations legislation that will be brought to the House floor next Tuesday.

The National Governors Association and the National Council of State Legislatures and the ACLU both issued press releases yesterday praising legislation introduced late last week by Sen. Akaka and Sen. Sununu (S. 4117) that would repeal Title II of the Real ID Act and restore Sec. 7212 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, language that established drivers license standards but was superceded by the REAL ID Act when the latter was attached to a wartime supplemental bill in March 2005.

This legislation is likely to reemerge early in the 110th Congress, perhaps as part of broader efforts to pass legislation that implements the 9/11 Commission recommendation. As I discuss on page 11 of the policy memo that I issued last week, Recommendation #18 from the 9/11 Commission on “secure identification” can be tackled either by providing new funding to accelerate the implementation of REAL ID as is, or alternatively, by revisiting its provisions in a way that accelerates efforts to strengthen ID standards.

Update (12/15): A good overview of this legislation at Information Week.

The Arizona Republic has a story today that discusses efforts by state and local officials to keep Phoenix on the list of cities eligible for the Urban Area Security Initiative. Last January, eleven cities were put on notice that they didn’t make the risk cut-off for the UASI grant program: Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, Tampa, Louisville, Baton Rouge, Omaha, Las Vegas, Buffalo, Toledo, and Oklahoma City. These cities were still funded in 2006, but are now subject to be dropped from the UASI program unless they can now prove that they are worthy based on the riskiness of the cities’ assets. This story discusses Arizona’s pitch on that point:

“Phoenix is the country’s fifth-largest city, contains the world’s sixth-busiest airport, and is within 50 miles from the country’s largest nuclear power plant,” McCain wrote. “Phoenix is also one of the country’s top tourist destinations, hosting more than 12 million domestic and international visitors and over 500 conventions each year. . . . Phoenix is neighbor to Luke Air Force Base and less than 200 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border.”

Gordon also points out that the region hosts major sporting events, such as the Super Bowl in 2008.

Some of the eleven cities do deserve to be dropped from the list of UASI recipient cities; the only two that I think have an ironclad case for continued inclusion are Las Vegas and San Diego. Phoenix, Tampa, and Buffalo have the next-best cases to make, and a chance of surviving the cut. The other six cities have a harder sell to make, and I wouldn’t be surprised to see all of them drop off the list of UASI recipients.

The SAFECOM Program at DHS issued a survey yesterday that assesses progress on national interoperability. This is an important study, one that attempts to define common terms and benchmarks for interoperability on a national basis. This would help to clarify the public discussion over interoperability and shift it away from what has too often been a confused and easily manipulable debate.

There aren’t any strong conclusions from the study, which is to be expected, given that this study will only become really valuable over time as a benchmark against which future progress is measured. It finds that larger public agencies are more likely to use interoperability, and that cross-jurisdictional interoperability is more advanced than interoperability between state and local agencies. And the reports notes that “approximately two-thirds of agencies reporting use interoperability to some degree,” but it applies no subjective value judgment to that statistic.

DHS issued a press release and fact sheet in conjunction with the report in which Sec. Chertoff states that “The survey reinforces the fact that interoperability is achievable.”

It’s about time. From remarks by Sec. Chertoff yesterday, quoted in the New York Post:

We’ve come to the conclusion that perhaps there was a little too much bean counting and a little less standing back and applying common sense to look at the total picture,” Chertoff told a grant-writing conference.

“And I’ve heard the complaints about it, looking like we’re playing kind of a pop-quiz type of game with local communities,” he said.

“They have to try to guess what we’re looking for - and if they guess wrong, they don’t get the money that they think they’re entitled to, and that they may be entitled to.”

Back when the decisions were announced, I described the analysis that led to this decision as “garbage in, garbage out”, criticizing it for relying too much on illusory statistical certainty and not enough on a gut-check about threats. And when Sec. Chertoff tried to defend the decision in a New York Times op-ed, I wrote:

I think [Chertoff] needs to get out of PR mode and acknowledge that this decision did not live up to his own high standards for risk management, discuss the unique nature of NYC and DC in the nation’s risk profile, and listen to constructive criticism about how to improve the allocation process.

I’m glad to see that he’s come around to acknowledging this reality. Hopefully we’ll see a more robust grant process in FY 2007, one that doesn’t get falsely seduced by a 3.2 billion calculation spreadsheet, but instead uses this analysis as a support tool for informed grant decisions.

The Information Sharing Environment program office within the DNI released their final implementation plan to Congress yesterday, as part of efforts to fulfill a mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to improve information-sharing among the intelligence community and with key external stakeholders. This press release and this Washington Post story summarize the Plan. The Post story focuses on the most newsworthy item in the Plan: the creation of a new Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG), led by DHS and housed at the NCTC, which will be responsible for leading efforts to better coordinate the synthesis and distribution of intelligence and warning information for state and local customers. This chart on page 71 of the report shows the notional framework for the ITACG’s role (click to enlarge):

If this initiative succeeds, it will be a welcome development, given the frustrations that many state and local officials have felt in recent years when it comes to their information-sharing interactions with the federal government, struggling to deal with the reality of too little information coming down too many different pipes. If the intelligence community can integrate and streamline its communications with state and local officials, that effort (in combination with related efforts strengthen fusion centers and build personal ties at the local level) will go a long way to remedying the problems that have existed over the past few years in the area of state and local info-sharing. But there is still a long way to go to turn this framework into reality.

For those who follow intelligence and info-sharing issues, there are a number of other important ideas in the final ISE implementation plan, such as a plan for standardization of sensitive-but-unclassified (SBU) markings across the intelligence community.

The DHS inspector general released an audit of the state of North Carolina’s use of FY 2002 and FY 2003 homeland security grant funds today. It lists a number of problems that have popped up in other state audits of grant expenditures, e.g. inadequate accounting, compliance, and performance measurement. And it notes that 67% of FY 2002 and FY 2003 grant funds had been spent by March 31, 2005. While these are real issues, this is actually a relatively benign audit in comparison with similar ones conducted and released over the last two years.

Generally I’ve found that tales of wasteful spending involving homeland security grant money are taking out of context, but it’s clear that there are examples out there - and the latest one I’ve seen comes from Skagit County in Washington state, where I grew up. KOMO-TV’s Ken Schram reports on the recent doings of the three County Commissioners:

Skagit County Commissioners Ted Anderson, Ken Dahlstedt and Don Munks…come on down!

Anticipating an $8,000 windfall from the Department of Homeland Security, Skagit County’s own version of Moe, Larry and Curly decided to splurge on a brand-spanking-new, state-of-the-art copy machine for their new emergency response van.

Fact is, they haven’t bought the van yet.

Well, with no van to go into, that $8,000 copier wound up tucked away at a county warehouse.

But wait…

That warehouse is where Skagit County also stores all its surplus items. And that warehouse is where the county recently held a big, public auction to sell all those surplus items.

And THAT is how the county’s brand-spanking new, state-of-the-art, $8,000 copier wound up being sold.

For $250.

After about a month goes by Skagit County officials decide they should get the copier returned.

The county reportedly offered $5,000 to buy back it’s $8,000 copier.

“No thanks,” said the businessman who’d bought it.

So now Skagit County officials will spend God only knows how much money as they sue the businessman in an effort to force him to give the copier back.

This is embarrassing and shameful. Hopefully DHS and Washington’s Emergency Management Division will demand that this money be returned, or withdraw it if it hasn’t been distributed yet.

(Hat tip: Mom)

Reuters reports today on a new study by the American Highway Users Alliance that examines 37 major urban areas in the U.S. on how prepared they are to manage emergency evacuation, either in the event of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. The results are not good, as Reuters notes:

The American Highway Users Alliance study of the 37 largest urban areas showed that 25 of the biggest cities were less prepared for a major evacuation than New Orleans, which struggled during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to empty the city before and as it flooded.

The only city to score a top grade for evacuation capability and preparedness was Kansas City, Missouri. The cities that received the lowest scores included Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Miami and the San Francisco/San Jose area.

“The big cities with the biggest traffic problems right now face the biggest challenge,” said Greg Cohen, president of the organization. “Los Angeles did the worst. It has legendary traffic jams on a daily basis.”

The cities were evaluated on internal traffic flow, highway capacity of major exit routes and residents’ accessibility to automobiles.

You can see the comprehensive list of city scores on page 6 of the report. Every first tier risk city in the U.S. gets an ‘F’ on the study.

The report’s recommendations are fairly general: better standards and reporting, better planning, and increased roadway capacity and automobile access. I would go a step further, and argue that this set of vulnerabilities needs to be a stronger factor in homeland security grants (particularly the UASI program) and federal highway spending allocations.

The National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators released a report yesterday that estimated the five-year cost associated with implementing the REAL ID Act at $11 billion over five years. This estimate is broken down as follows:

• Re-enrollment of all drivers license & ID holders to meet guidelines: $8.48 billion
• New processes for verifying applicants: $1.42 billion
• Drivers license and ID design requirements: $1.11 billion
• Support costs: $0.04 billion

This analysis goes a couple of levels deeper in the report, providing a fairly rigorous assessment of the costs of REAL ID. And the report offers nine top-level recommendations:

1. Extend the compliance deadline;
2. Provide the funds necessary for states to comply with Real ID;
3. Provide the federal electronic verification systems necessary to comply with the law;
4. Require states to employ electronic verification systems only as they become available;
5. Implement a 10 year re-enrollment schedule;
6. Adopt uniform naming conventions to facilitate electronic verification between files;
7. Allow reciprocity for persons already vetted by the federal government
8. Establish card security criteria based on performance—not technology; and
9. Grant the Secretary of Homeland Security the flexibility to recognize innovation at the state level.

I’ve written in the past that REAL ID is a bad idea, arguing that:

If Real ID is a “de facto” national ID system, then it’s one of the worst possible forms of one: it’s not likely to deliver the potential security benefits of an integrated system; it doesn’t save money via national-level economies of scale; it has no clear funding stream; and oversight on privacy issues will be difficult in a 50-state stakeholder environment.

This report supports my contention about the lack of national-level economies of scale in the REAL ID model compared with a national ID card.

Back in February, I wrote a post about homeland security grants management in California, focused on a story that ran that month in the San Francisco Bay Guardian. That story noted that California had not spent approx. 1/3rd of federal homeland security grant funds as of 2005, and that Gov. Schwarzenegger was set to issue a strategic plan about how to improve the grants distribution process. That report was due to the California state legislature on February 1, 2006. I made numerous inquiries to try to find it, but was unsuccessful, leaving me to believe that it apparently has yet to be published.

That history helps me to understand the findings of a California state audit report released this week, one which blasts the state’s Office of Emergency Services for its emergency preparedness efforts, most notably its failure to effectively spend federal homeland security grant money that has been directed to the state. According to the report, the state has spent only 42% of the $954 million in federal homeland security grant funds awarded to it from 2001 to 2005, as of June 30, 2006. $239 million of this unspent grant money (most of which has been encumbered) is set to expire at the end of 2006, leaving the state at the risk of forfeiting this money. The report also criticizes the state’s efforts to review local plans, monitor grant spending, and coordinate preparedness efforts.

The report has attracted a firestorm of attention in California - see these stories in the Los Angeles Times and the Contra Costa Times as examples - and rightfully so. I’ve maintained for a long time that the inability of states to channel funds effectively is a worse problem than the oft-cited examples of wasteful overspending, and this report reinforces my belief. California isn’t alone on this - numerous other states have failed to spend their money in a timely fashion - but it is certainly appears to be one of the worst offenders. If I were a California resident, I’d be really wondering why the state government has thus far failed to use all available federal funds to protect the state and prepare for terror-related and natural disaster threats.

The DC metropolitan area issued a new homeland security strategic plan yesterday, available at the website of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, and discussed in a story in today’s Washington Post:

After two years of painstaking effort, officials from the Washington region approved a homeland security strategic plan yesterday, listing steps to improve disaster response in everything from decontaminating victims of a chemical attack to providing for stranded pets.

The 118-page plan takes aim at one of the main problems in coping with a disaster: the fragmentation of the region, which includes more than 20 cities and counties and scores of federal agencies, spread out over two states and the District.

“This is actually a very significant milestone in regional preparedness,” said Gerald E. Connolly (D), chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors. He oversaw a meeting of officials from local and state governments and the Department of Homeland Security at which the document was unanimously approved.

“Trying to bring all these folks and cultures to the table . . . is not an easy task. But it’s an essential task,” Connolly added.

The report was delivered a year later than promised, and several months after a hearing in which U.S. senators blasted regional officials and the Department of Homeland Security for moving too slowly. The plan outlines goals for homeland security spending and activities for the next three years.

Some projects, however, have already begun — for example, the development of an evacuation plan for the region, and a high-tech communications system for emergency responders.

As a resident of the DC metro area, I’m hopeful that this is a sign that the local governments in the region are improving their preparedness for a terrorist attack. Incidents in recent years such as the DC sniper shootings and the flooding of key segments of the DC metro have raised concerns about DC’s preparedness for the consequences of a terrorist attack, and efforts to move forward on many of the items discussed in the strategic plan - such as a comprehensive evacuation plan - are long overdue.

The DHS inspector general released an audit of Virginia’s homeland security grant spending last Friday, attracting the attention of the Washington Post over the weekend. The audit points out examples of irregular grant spending in 2002 and 2003, but these represent less than 1% ($408,000 out of $53.5 million) of the funds in 2002-03 to the state for the programs examined, and I think former Virginia homeland security advisor and current DHS Under Secretary George Foresman is correct when he defends the state’s activity in the Post:

In an interview yesterday, Foresman said the audit failed to take into account the frenzied atmosphere after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. “You have to put this period in context,” he said. “They will find the same thing in all 50 states.”

Meanwhile, the Tulsa World reported yesterday that Oklahoma has spent only one-third of the money awarded to it in homeland security grants in the 2002-2006 period, and finds problems in the execution of many important state preparedness and response programs:

A $16.6 million regional response system using special trailers is unfinished and partially unequipped after years of planning. The system is the centerpiece of the state’s disaster-response plan. Funding for some segments of the plan has been extended since 2003 and probably cannot go beyond December.

A second key element of state’s preparedness plan also faces challenges. The state is spending $28 million to extend an 800-megahertz radio signal linking first-responders across the state. While the radio channel will cover a large swath of Oklahoma, key cities such as Broken Arrow and Oklahoma City would be dead to the signal without a frequency patch. The patch and other transfer methods have their limitations and could be problematic for responders during a disaster.

The findings in this story are much more serious than the IG report on Virginia, and are surprising for a state that has experienced domestic terrorism on a tragic scale. It raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the state’s homeland grant bureaucracy, and prompts questions as to whether Oklahoma deserved to be in the top 50% of states in terms of discretionary homeland security grant spending per capita for FY 2006.

DHS issued a press release today announcing its intention to post intelligence analysts at state and regional fusion centers around the country - a decision that DHS intelligence chief Charlie Allen mentioned in his remarks last week. The announcement coincides with the official opening today of LA’s Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). I’ve been somwhat skeptical in the past about these state & local fusion centers, worrying that they would be disconnected from the federal intelligence apparatus. But as it has become apparent that DHS and DOJ are making a serious commitment to support them, I’ve changed my mind, and I think that they can potentially play the same role that a federal domestic intelligence agency (like the British MI-5) would serve.

McClatchy’s DC bureau published a very interesting piece on Sunday that tells the inside story of the Nationwide Plan Review, citing numerous examples of confusion and disagreement resulting from DHS’s survey and final results:

The results of the $5 million attempt by DHS to determine whether states and cities have adequate emergency plans are troubling, and they offer a glimpse of serious behind-the-scenes disagreements among government officials over how prepared the nation is for another catastrophe.

DHS challenged the self-assessments of almost 60 percent of the states, cities and U.S. territories that participated in the review, according to the internal records obtained by McClatchy Newspapers.

The documents, which Homeland Security officials refuse to make public, reveal that, in most of those cases, the federal agency gave the states and cities significantly higher marks than they gave themselves.

The differing assessments reflect continuing confusion over how states and cities need to handle a catastrophe and what types of disasters they should be prepared to handle. That, in turn, threatens to undermine the federal government’s $18 billion effort to help them prepare for disasters and terrorist attacks.

“There’s a substantial gap between our understanding of preparedness and that of Homeland Security’s,” said Jim Mullen, the director of Washington state’s emergency management division, which rated itself less prepared than federal officials did. “There is not a recognition of the full thrust of what has to be accomplished at the state and local level, and that’s because there’s a fundamental misunderstanding of what we do and what we need.”

….Of the 131 jurisdictions that DHS reviewed, only two - Florida and California - agreed with the federal government’s assessments. Fifty-eight states and cities rated themselves less prepared than Homeland Security did in at least four of nine categories, including evacuation plans, disaster warning systems and the ability to provide emergency medical treatment. Eighteen said they were better prepared.

The story goes on to provide several specific examples of these disagreements between state officials and DHS.

After reading this story, and looking at the Nationwide Plan Review documents, I get the sense that this process has fallen prey to risks that face any attempt to understand the world via a survey-based methodology. The capabilities, institutions, processes, and threats that compose and interact with national emergency preparedness system do not easily lend themselves to the imposition of a clear, logical template, and as a result, any effort to survey baseline preparedness is going to face a trade-off between getting results that can be meaningfully compared across states and results that acknowledge this complexity and are sufficiently rich in their findings. It’s certainly a worthwhile exercise to try to carry out such baseline assessments, but there needs always to be an understanding of the tradeoffs and imperfections in the information-collection process.

The Department of Homeland Security announced its plans today for the collection of infrastructure-related grant programs in FY 2006. The plans are detailed in this summary document, and the transit security allocations are broken out in this spreadsheet.

Overall, the decisions made today look fair and well-reasoned. For the transit security grants, the NYC metro area will receive 41% of total funds, and six other metro areas (DC, Philly, Boston, LA, SF, Chicago) receive another 50% of the total - an appropriate distribution. The allocations for the port security grants have not yet been made; ports need to now apply for them. DHS decided to carve a new line item for chemical security grants out of the Buffer Zone Protection Program, and has appropriately awarded $25 million for such grants, focused on states such as New Jersey and Texas that have large concentrations of chemical facilities.

One oddity in the general Buffer Zone Protection Program: North Dakota and South Dakota both receive grants of $500,000, more than many larger states (e.g. Colorado, Connecticut, Oregon, and Wisconsin all at $189,000), and they are the only two states whose grant allocations are NOT a multiple of $189k. What explains this?

My only real critique of the announcement today is why it took so long. Last year, most of these same grants were awarded in the spring of 2005. By pushing this announcement into the last quarter of the fiscal year (and intending not to award some of these funds until near the end of it), the Department makes it difficult for ports and transit systems to plan and budget for their security activities in an effective manner.

The DHS inspector general published an excellent report yesterday on the shortcomings of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the Department’s woes in developing effective information-sharing with state & local officials.

The report tells the history of the development of the HSIN, pointing to a number of decisions that have hurt the adoption and effectiveness of the HSIN, including poor choices of technology, failure to integrate with existing law enforcement systems, minimal training & guidance, and inadequate consultation with state & local officials.

The result? Low usage of the HSIN among its registered members:

Although the total number of accounts for the law enforcement portal has grown over the past year, only a small percentage of account holders log onto the system daily. As Figure 6 indicates, of the approximately 3,000 account holders on the law enforcement portal, an average of only six percent logged on daily in December 2005. The peak average daily logons for any given month in the year 2005 was 12 percent.

Further, of the approximately 4,000 accounts on the emergency portal, an average of only two percent logged on daily in December 2005. Average daily usage reached its highest monthly level, 11 percent, in September 2005, due to inquiries during the Hurricane Katrina response. Usage of the counter-terrorism portal was similar: of the approximately 9,500 account holders on this portal, an average of only about two percent logged on daily. Again, usage peaked in September 2005 due to Hurricane Katrina; the highest level of average daily logons for that time was three percent.

If few people are using the system, then it will continue to spiral downward; a system like this is only useful if there is a critical mass of participants who actively use the site. Clearly a course correction is necessary for DHS’s information-sharing efforts - toward an approach that is much more consensus-driven and participatory, rather than imposed by DHS.

The New York Daily News and the New York Sun report today on the naming of Richard Falkenrath as the new Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism at the New York Police Department.

It will be interesting to see whether this leads to stronger ties between DHS and the NYPD, which have often seemed more like rivals than partners. The Sun story notes that Falkenrath intends to represent NYC more strongly in the chase for homeland security grant funds:

Mr. Falkenrath told the Sun his priorities for protecting New York City include securing specific terrorist targets, with the subway system “at the top of our list of concerns.” He also said he would work to secure more federal antiterror dollars: “I believe New York is, from a terrorist perspective, the highest priority target in the world. And the federal grants need to reflect that.”

One potential challenge facing Falkenrath will be whether he can rapidly assimilate into the culture of the NYPD and master the operational dimensions of the job. Falkenrath’s expertise on homeland security is unquestioned, but he comes from an academic, policy-focused background, while his predecessors in this job (Michael Sheehan, Frank Libutti) both had military backgrounds, and more extensive management experience coming into the position.

The House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing yesterday on the state & local grant issue. The prepared statements by NYC mayor Michael Bloomberg, DC mayor Tony Williams, and DHS Under Secretary George Foresman are available on the committee website, at the preceding links. GovExec provides a good summary of the hearing:

The District of Columbia’s Democratic Mayor Anthony Williams and New York City’s Republican Mayor Michael Bloomberg urged committee members to examine the funding formula the department used to make grant awards. They both said they support the department’s strategy of using a risk-based approach to make grant awards.

But Bloomberg said the process is “fundamentally broken” and should be reassessed by Congress. “The application process should not be a test for who can write the best college term paper for their class,” Bloomberg said.

Both mayors said another problem involves the department’s preference for financing technology and equipment over personnel and overtime. “The world is not what you see on CSI,” Bloomberg said, referring to the popular television show where investigators use technology to solve crimes. “It is as personal a business as anybody can find.”

Williams added, “I think that technology gets overbilled.” Williams and Bloomberg also said that cities should be given multiyear funding streams in the grants process. King added he plans to meet with Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairwoman Susan Collins, R-Maine, Thursday in an effort to find agreement on legislation that would overhaul the department’s funding formula.

This last sentence is particulary interesting. The House and Senate have sparred in the past two years over the framework for homeland security grant distribution, with the House favoring a more risk-based approach and the Senate trying to preserve mandatory state allocations. It’s possible that they could cut a deal that tilts the urban area risk formula more strongly in favor of the super high-risk cities, in exchange for preserving the 0.75% minimums in the state grant program.

Pam Fessler at NPR has a good segment on the homeland security grant issue today, highlighting a House Government Reform committee hearing on Thursday, at which members of Congress from the DC metro area and NYC blasted Under Secretary Foresman on the grant allocations. The segment then moves to Charlotte, NC, which received a 60% increase in its UASI funds this year, and she interviews the mayor, police chief, and fire chief to find out how they’re spending their homeland security grant money - interviews that provide an insightful look at the mentality of the mid-size cities on this issue.

The Department of Homeland Security is submitting its Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II report to Congress today, a follow-on to the Phase I report released in February. The report makes 39 “initial conclusions” - 15 for state & urban areas, and 24 for the federal government - which strongly suggest that the nation’s preparedness for a catastrophic attack is still lacking in many ways.

The report was previewed in an AP story last night:

Most American cities and states remain unprepared for catastrophes, a government analysis concludes, calling the shortcomings in emergency planning a cause “for significant national concern.”

Nearly five years after the 9/11 attacks and 10 months after Hurricane Katrina, the Homeland Security Department concluded that nationwide response plans for major disasters are antiquated and often uncoordinated.

Although emergency plans appear to be stronger in 18 states along the nation’s “Hurricane Belt,” the analysis cited preparedness gaps in 131 state and city emergency response plans. Planning for evacuations, too, remains “an area of profound concern,” the review found.

The 15 findings for states and urban areas:

1. The majority of the Nation’s current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP).
2. States and urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of “steady state” preparedness.
3. Assumptions in Basic Plans do not adequately address catastrophic events.
4. Basic Plans do not adequately address continuity of operations and continuity of government.
5. The most common deficiency among State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.
6. Many States and urban areas need to improve systems and procedures for communications among all operational components.
7. All Functional Annexes did not adequately address special needs populations.
8. States should designate a specific State agency that is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for including people with disabilities in the shelter operations process.
9. Timely warnings requiring emergency actions are not adequately disseminated to custodial institutions, appropriate government officials, and the public.
10. The ability to give the public accurate, timely, and useful information and instructions through the emergency period should be strengthened.
11. Significant weaknesses in evacuation planning are an area of profound concern.
12. Capabilities to manage reception and care for large numbers of evacuees are inadequate.
13. Capabilities to track patients under emergency or disaster conditions and license of out-of-State medical personnel are limited.
14. Resource management is the “Achilles heel” of emergency planning. Resource Management Annexes do not adequately describe in detail the means, organization, and process by which States and urban areas will find, obtain, allocate, track, and distribute resources to meet operational needs.
15. Plans should clearly define resource requirements, conduct resource inventories, match available resources to requirements, and identify and resolve shortfalls.

And the 24 findings for the federal government:

1. Planning products, processes, tools, and technologies should be developed to facilitate a common nationwide approach to catastrophic planning in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
2. Planning modernization should be fully integrated with other key homeland security initiatives.
3. Clear guidance should be developed on how State and local governments plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners under the NRP.
4. Existing Federal technical assistance should be used to help States and urban areas address the specific issues identified during the Nationwide Plan Review.
5. Critical tasks, target capabilities, and associated performance measures, such as those identified in the National Preparedness Goal should serve as the common reference system for planning and the language of synchronization.
6. Detailed planning assumptions and planning magnitudes for catastrophic incidents should be defined, such as has been initiated through the National Planning Scenarios.
7. Current preparedness data should be readily accessible to planners.
8. Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priorities to Expand Regional Collaboration and Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
9. Collaboration between government and non-governmental entities should be strengthened at all levels, as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration.
10. The Federal Government should develop a consistent definition of the term “special needs”.
11. The Federal Government should provide guidance to States and local governments on incorporation of disability-related demographic analysis into emergency planning.
12. Federal, State, and local governments should work with the private sector to identify and coordinate effective means of transporting individuals with disabilities before, during, and after an emergency.
13. Improvements in public preparedness and emergency public information should be implemented in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
14. Federal, State, and local governments should take action to better integrate nongovernmental resources to meet surge capacity.
15. The Federal Government should provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, standards, and resources necessary to build a shared national homeland security planning system.
16. Identification of desired technologies, tools, and architecture(s) for the national homeland security planning community should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
17. Comprehensive national guidance on the potential consequences associated with catastrophic risks and hazards should be developed to drive risk management and operational planning.
18. Development of focused training, education, and professional development programs for homeland security planners should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
19. Collaborative planning and planning excellence should be incentivized. Funding and projects should be linked to operational readiness through a specific task or capability in a plan or plan annex.
20. Federal, State, and local governments should increase the participation of people with disabilities and disability subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises.
21. The Federal Government should provide technical assistance to clarify the extent to which emergency communications, including public information associatedwith emergencies, must be in accessible formats for persons with disabilities. This assistance should address all aspects of communication, including, for example, televised and other types of emergency notification and instructions, shelter announcements, and applications and forms for government and private disaster benefits.
22. The status of the Nation’s plans should be a central focus of the annual report to the President on the Nation’s preparedness required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8).
23. Emergency Operations Plans should be a focal point for resource allocation, accountability, and assessments of operational readiness.
24. Performance management frameworks to support the National Preparedness Goal should measure the ability to:
    - Integrate a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response based on the intersection of tasks and capabilities in combined plans; and
    - Maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical resources.

This is a worrying list for the cities, states, and federal government, and it’s important now that they work to prioritize and address these deficiencies. This was a necessary planning exercise, to establish a baseline in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, but now it’s time to focus on execution.

Update (6/16): Here’s the DHS press release announcing the report.

Update 2 (6/16): An AP story this afternoon adds details on how various states fared in this review:

New Orleans is still woefully unprepared for catastrophes 10 months after Hurricane Katrina, and the two cities targeted by the 9/11 attacks don’t meet all guidelines for responding to major disasters, a federal security analysis concluded Friday.

Ten states were rated in a Homeland Security Department scorecard as having sufficient plans to respond to disasters: Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Vermont.

Florida, accustomed to being whipped with hurricane winds, was the only state to meet all of the department’s basic requirements for planning for catastrophes. Response plans for Louisiana, still devastated from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, were deemed insufficient to manage huge emergencies.

….New York and Washington, al-Qaida’s targets on Sept. 11, 2001, received lukewarm ratings. Seventy-one percent of New York’s emergency plans were described as only partially sufficient. In Washington, 67 percent of the plans were deemed partially sufficient and 2 percent insufficient.

Update 3 (6/19): Here’s the link to the official DHS document that shows the preparedness statistics for all 50 states and dozens of major U.S. cities.

Update 4 (6/19): A good post from David Stephenson on the report.