By Peter J. Brown

Besides its recent decision to terminate the National Applications Office (NAO), DHS/FEMA — along with NGA — has several other satellite-related issues that warrant immediate attention.

The first responders we were in touch with recently use satellite communications (satcom) equipment routinely in their assigned missions, and they want DHS to hear their concerns. It is clear that from the standpoint of satcom operations and training, improvements are in order. By the way, we were also in touch with an MIT-trained professional space systems engineer who served as an instructor for a satcom training course attended by a team of first responders as well.

First, DHS has no single point of contact which handles satcom questions for first responders. Or if one exists, it is not well known.

“Yes, I agree that a single point of contact at the Federal level for satcom questions would be of great benefit,” says one tech specialist who supports a rapid response team on the East Coast.

Second, while satcom appears to be a simple and straightforward solution, these first responders report that there are many issues that make satcom not as user-friendly as it could otherwise be.
 
- High recurring costs restrain or even prevent many first responders from utilizing the equipment.
- Satcom usage fees are increasing — with some service providers — while available bandwidth is being reduced in some instances.
- Teams need to be more highly trained, and more technically proficient in the use of satcom including troubleshooting when higher level satcom activities beyond simple remote Web access are underway. (”I would say that the grasp is getting firmer, but is not as firm as it should be,” says one first responder.) Radio over IP, Voice over IP and video streaming warrant further training.
- Only a finite pool of people tend to have a complete understanding of the entire scope of the communications network end-to-end.
- Many if not all federal agency and DoD satcom systems use firewalls that prohibit first responders from utilizing their systems.
- When NGA makes an effort to provide GIS data to first responders, more often than not, it only supplies low resolution, dated imagery. The ability to access real or near real time imagery is still a major challenge.

The good news is that a terrestrial alternative — Cellular 3G technology — has seen a notable improvement in availability and use over the past year or so.  This includes redundancy - dual carrier service options (AT&T / Sprint) or failover to one if the other is not available in an area. 

Our instructor recommends that response teams should meet with a representative for the service provider(s) to explain specifics of the network, troubleshooting options, etc. Besides providing specific technical resources for troubleshooting in the field, this could greatly assist the team to improve its set up.

By the way, DHS needs to be aware that occasional denials of service due to the high volume of traffic in the aftermath of an emergency are being reported. Perhaps DHS — and the FCC too — needs to sit down with first responders, disaster assistance teams and service providers to establish a WPS or GETS-type high-priority service channel / policy for satcom users.

One first responder reported that he could not get a special category designation, or a “Fair Use Policy” waiver on short notice to override limits on bandwidth usage. This is very restrictive and upsetting for emergency users in particular since a few minutes of video or a bundle of aerial image downloads can quickly exceed the contractual cap in question. Because unexpected service interruptions in the middle of operations can occur for reasons such as unannounced software upgrades too, our instructor thinks it may be useful to develop a guidebook that would walk a team through negotiating their service contracts to avoid similar pitfalls.

Otherwise, one first responder points out that DHS, FEMA and NGA also need to do a better job of addressing the satcom “culture gap” or what is simply the fact that in the field, federal agency employees and local first responders have completely different needs.

“We just need basic information in a one or two shift operation, and we need to have the complete response quickly in the first request cycle, and not after 3 requests have been made and 36 hours have passed,” says one first responder.
 
While first responders are well versed in IP and even IPv6, cybersecurity is not a top priority. In fact, our instructor reports that in one 6-hour session, “I don’t recall cybersecurity ever being brought up; rather, the team seemed mostly concerned about physical trailer security. In other words, they didn’t want people to enter their trailer and steal their equipment.”

DHS might find this observation troubling.

Finally, with this year’s “Amateur Radio Week” drawing to a close this past weekend, this satellite guy want to salute all the members of the American Radio Relay League (ARRL) who contribute so much of their time as volunteer communications personnel in emergency situations large and small. These people ensure that vital ham radio services are available on short notice whenever needed. They are truly the finest kind of first responders.

How do we know when we, as a nation, are getting better at this homeland security business?  How do we know when the effort all levels of government, the private sector, and the people who live in this country have been making is actually improving things –  that we are better prepared, more resilient, and more secure than we were on September 10, 2001?

I think the country – writ large — responded very well to Chapter 1 of the to-be-continued H1N1 saga.  I think that response is one indicator the nation is better prepared than it used to be.

But I use anecdotes – stories — filtered through my biases to support that belief.    My subjective perception seeks examples that help me sustain my hope that we are doing better.  I tend to dismiss counter examples as, “Well, nothing’s perfect.”

I don’t know what objective data I would accept that would lead me to believe we are less prepared, less resilient, less secure.  I have no performance measures.  I don’t think I want any.

In April, GAO reported on FEMA’s efforts to coordinate national catastrophic preparedness efforts.  In one of the more understated sentences in recent homeland security memory, GAO noted, “The size and complexity of the nation’s preparedness activities and the number of organizations involved make developing a national preparedness system a difficult task.”  That difficulty did not prevent GAO from measuring FEMA’s performance anyway.

For reasons David Snowden described elsewhere , I don’t think the traditional understanding of performance measures will help answer the big questions about national preparedness or resilience.  Performance measures may work very well for engineered systems.  My experience is they provide a distorted picture of performance in complex systems.  And whatever else homeland security may be, it clearly is — as Carafano and Weitz (along with GAO) argued last month – a multi-dimensional complex system.

Some things one has to see before one believes.  For other things, belief may have to come before sight.

You may have seen the Washington Post article last week  about a group of science fiction writers, called Sigma, who offer to use their imagination to help homeland security.

According to the article, the DHS deputy director of research thinks fiction writers can “help managers think more broadly about projects, especially about potential reactions and unintended consequences….”

The chief information officer for the DHS Office of Operations Coordination & Planning believes the writers might help break old thinking habits.  “We’re stuck in a paradigm of databases,” he said …. “How do we jump out of our infrastructure and start conceptualizing those threats? ….”

Bravo for taking such risks with imagination.

Long ago a friend told me, “If you want to get better at solving problems, read detective stories.  If you want to know how to create the future, read science fiction.”

What kind of homeland security future might be created by science fiction writers?

Cory Doctorow’s 2008 book “Little Brother” about good hackers battling the evil DHS immediately comes to mind. (The protagonist, w1n5t0n, pays visual homage to George Orwell’s Winston.)

One blogger, commenting on the Post story, suggests science fiction could lead to an enhanced government program that transported “undesirables” to another planet for … well, enhanced questioning.  Other blogolic apprehensiveness about science fiction/homeland security mashups can be found here, here, and here.

But science fiction can also imagine a better future.

Appreciative inquiry is about imagination.  It is about looking toward what might actually go right in the world.  It rejects a knee-jerk negativity and – in a non-Pollyannaish way – looks instead for the best of what could be.

What would Homeland Security meets Science Fiction meets Appreciative Inquiry look like?

In the wonderful way the Intertube Gods can sometimes work, I found an answer to my question on the Sigma website.  “Fresh Flowers and Small Robots,” written by Michael Swanwick, and reprinted below (permission requested), is a gem crystallized from security, fiction and inquiry.  Please enjoy.

Fresh Flowers and Small Robots

The Open-Security Airport of 2010

Like most Americans regularly subjected to the discomforts and indignities of airport security, I have concluded that it is almost all “security theater.” That is, a series of empty gestures meant to reassure travelers that it is safe to board an airplane. Conceivably it may also help deter would-be terrorists. Certainly it has captured none – or we would surely have been told.

Why not exchange this Theater of Misery, then, for a Theater of Optimism? Something equally reassuring, potentially more effective, and not at all oppressive. It could be done with minimal preparation, modest cost, and no new technology. I propose a voluntary pilot program of one small airport, where security is so easy to pass through that it is once again possible for families to meet a traveling relative as he or she gets off the jetliner.

Imagine this happy airport of the very near future: Gone are the TSA employees who currently check boarding passes to make certain that only passengers enter the waiting areas. They’ve been replaced by or retrained as concierges – politely and efficiently taking coats and carry-on and placing them on the conveyor belts for the X-ray machines. They also answer questions about schedules and airport facilities, which is not technically the job of security, but makes life more pleasant for everybody. There are no lines for the metal detectors, because their numbers have been doubled or tripled. Passengers now stroll through casually, with their dignities and tempers intact.

Most amazingly, nobody takes their shoes off. The possibility of shoe bombs is still very real. But so is the possibility of an obsidian knife or a ceramic gun strapped to a passenger’s body – and only a select few are checked for those. However, no one thinks for an instant that they are less safe than before. This is because small robots trundle up and down the lines, projecting a laser grid over their shoes, and occasionally stopping to inhale a sudden whoosh of air. These robots are not at all threatening – their housing has been designed by Industrial Light and Magic, the same people who created R2D2 for George Lukas’s Star Wars movies – but they are reassuringly high-tech. They are clearly sampling the air for trace chemicals associated with explosives.

While this is a worthy and admirable emphasis for protectors to take, it is also profoundly and narrowly overspecialized.  It reflects a counterfactual assumption that, given sufficient funding, these communities can not only anticipate all future shocks, but prepare adequately to deal with them on a strictly in-house basis, through the application of fiercely effective professional action.

It is not necessary that the robots actually function as bomb sniffers. (Though I’m sure the defense industry would be happy to design such devices.) All that is needed is that they reassure our friends and unnerve our foes. The DHS is widely believed to possess sinister technology and worse intentions. It is time to recognize this as being not a weakness but an advantage.

In this scenario the DHS has embraced its evil image and put it to work. Cheap silvered plastic bubbles, of the sort used to hide surveillance cameras in casinos, are bolted to the walls. Electric cables run to them, painted the same color as the wall, obviously to camouflage them. Sconces directly below the bubbles hold ceramic vases containing fresh-cut flowers. The flowers draw the eye right to the bubbles, while looking like an attempt to disguise their presence. Passengers feel safer. Evildoers assume the worst.

Similar examples of benign deceit come and go, as the DHS fine-tunes public awareness of its presence. Trip-beams cause green lights to flash reassuringly as a traveler passes. Stepping on a pressure plate triggers a musical “all-clear” note. Decorative kinetic sculpture moves gracefully in time with foot traffic.

Passengers chosen for random security checks no longer resent this necessity. They are taken to a pleasant and comfortable room where, after their interview, they are given complimentary chits for food and drink on their airliners. At random intervals, two or three times a day, a bell rings and a cheerful voice announces over the intercom that another lucky passenger being checked has just received a hundred-dollar credit for the duty-free shops. Light applause fills the airport.

In such an environment, a nervous or fearful individual stands out more clearly than is the case today.

All this is done with existing technology. (The wall-bubbles are sometimes used to field-test a variety of passive detectors, but that is just a side benefit.) The added cost is moderate, and the bulk of it – particularly the added space required to make the security process comfortably uncrowded – is absorbed by the airport itself. It is considered a small price to pay for a great deal of positive publicity.

Best of all, since the security process has been simplified and sped up, it is no longer necessary to keep non-passengers out of the waiting areas. Once again, the weary traveler can come up the ramp from the plane to find his or her family waiting with smiles and open arms.

In their hurry to get home, not one in ten passengers notes the plaque reading, “This Facility Meets DHS Open Security Standards.” Nor do they notice the program’s certification that the airport is Security Hardened and Family Safe. They only know that they feel safer and more at ease than any commercial air traveler has since the Twentieth Century.

The DHS has won one small, quiet victory in the War on Terror.

“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.” - A. Einstein

(The following is a guest feature. More information on the NAO and Peter J. Brown is available in a post immediately below)

Prodded by members of the House Homeland Security Committee in particular, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano initiated a review of the National Applications Office (NAO) on April 1. Among other things, NAO is designated as the chief source of satellite imagery in support of homeland security, and, state, local, and tribal law enforcement operations.

NAO is overseen by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis / Chief Intelligence Officer at DHS. President Obama has nominated Philip Mudd to succeed Mr. Allen in this position.

“The NAO charter, signed by the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, Interior, as well as the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, certifies that the NAO complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards. The NAO is prepared to begin operations to support civil and Homeland security domains. This program is another step in the right direction to leverage geospatial intelligence as we work to secure the Homeland,” stated Mr. Allen last fall.

Last November, a report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) — “National Applications Office: Certification of Compliance With Legal, Privacy, and Civil Liberties Standards Needs to Be More Fully Justified” — challenged that assertion and raised questions about unresolved legal and policy issues. Many members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, government watchdog and civil rights organizations remain unconvinced that a suitable set of checks and balances are in place so that the NAO can go about effectively processing requests for satellite imagery, and then either approving and rejecting them in turn in support of law enforcement operations — engaging in satellite surveillance while upholding an individual’s civil rights, right to privacy, and other legal rights under existing law.

DHS responded late last week to a number of questions, we posed in order to help determine where things stand now. Here are the unedited responses to our questions.

– What is the status of NAO Operations today?

The National Applications Office (NAO) has not yet initiated operations. Secretary Napolitano is reviewing all aspects of the NAO program. The NAO will not begin operations until the Secretary and the other four signatories (Secretaries of Defense and Interior, AG, DNI) to the NAO Charter have approved the NAO to do so.

– Questions have been raised about “DHS Earth” and how this
project overlaps with NAO. Has DHS examined this and what is the recommendation from DHS concerning this situation?

DHS Earth provides a “Google Earth” based platform for the provision of some general layers of information that are relevant to DHS agency use.

DHS Earth is solely a dissemination method and analytic tool for some uses and users. To the extent DHS Earth has controls in place to protect individual privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, it could provide a good dissemination means for some unclassified NAO products in the future, consistent with all other proper use requirements under law and policy.

By contrast, NAO was established to meet the needs of non-traditional intelligence users by facilitating access to national intelligence capabilities by such users. NAO will also provide analytical capabilities for the many non-traditional users who do not have such specialized capabilities themselves. As a component of the federal government, NAO is necessarily bound by applicable laws, regulations, policies and procedures as it performs its mission. These multiple layers of safeguards are designed to ensure that all NAO operations respect and preserve the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of the American public.

– Regarding the NGA Support Team (NST) embedded within DHS which facilitates NGA’s collaboration with DHS, what role does - or will - the NAO play with the NST in developing an effective and elastic common operational picture (COP) for local law enforcement as part of the Homeland Security Information Network?

Through the NST, NGA will partner closely with NAO to support the information requirements of NAO customers. In addition, NGA has a long-standing history of providing geospatial intelligence to both federal government and non-federal government customers. It has well-established, time-tested procedures in place for ensuring that it meets its customer needs in the best way possible, within all legal and policy boundaries. Through the NST, NGA is sharing its corporate knowledge and experience with NAO to ensure that NAO also acts efficiently, legally, and properly in all its operations.

Under current law, NAO is precluded from working on law enforcement issues until the Secretary has certified that NAO meets all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards, and that certification has been reviewed by GAO, with results communicated to the Congress. NAO future plans are premised on handling customer requests and providing requested information through the mechanisms that customers use, and not creating new delivery methods. NGA, through the NST, will be a key partner in meeting that objective.

– And how does this COP-related activity relate or tie into broader efforts at DHS to ensure that layered geospatial visualization supports critical infrastructure protection at the local level via an open architecture-based and enterprise-based approach accessed across all components of DHS?

The National Operations Center (NOC) is in charge of the DHS COP. If the NOC requests geospatial support from the NAO, those requests will be handled consistent with all legal, privacy, and civil rights/civil liberties concerns and guidelines.

– Is the current satellite imagery analysis capability of the FEMA Mapping and Analysis Center deemed adequate? If not, what is being done to address this situation? How is the uncertainty surrounding NAO impacting FEMA in this regard?

NAO’s current status has not had a direct impact on FEMA’s capabilities because FEMA is directly serviced by NGA and others for current imagery needs.

– Can you comment on the status of the proposed shift of the Civil Applications Committee from Interior to DHS?

The Civil Applications Committee (CAC) itself will not shift from
Interior to DHS. The functions of the CAC will transition to the NAO, per the requirements of the NAO Charter. The NAO charter spells out that when these functions shift, the CAC and its Charter will sunset and the former CAC functions would be fully integrated into the NAO.

– Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued an RFI for Multi-role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) last year. Is there a mechanism in place whereby the imagery and other sensor data gathered by DHS aircraft or Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is shared with local law enforcement?

The MEA and UAS programs fall under CBP - please contact the CBP Public Affairs office at 202-344-1780. (Update: In early May, CBP issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for up to 40 MEA’s for use by CBP’s Air and Marine Office. The goal is to procure commercially-available turboprop aircraft primarily for maritime and ground surveillance missions as well as for tracking other aircraft. The RFP requests MEA support for other missions as well.)

– Is the growing conflict along the US - Mexico border changing the debate over NAO or triggering any discussion of possible changes to NAO or the (potential for) imagery-sharing raised in Question #8?

The Secretary has made no decision regarding NAO missions at this time.

Immediately following is a guest post by Peter J. Brown, a close observer of emergency communications and satellite operations at DHS and FEMA.   The post consists of questions Mr. Brown posed to the Department of Homeland Security about five weeks ago and the answers he received last  Friday. 

According to the official DHS backgrounder the National Applications Office, “is the executive agent to facilitate the use of intelligence community technological assets for civil, homeland security and law enforcement purposes within the United States.”  For more detailed background see the NAO Charter.

NAO has attracted scrutiny, skepticism, and more for the alleged use of satellites to spy on the American people.  Last July, Charlie Allen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, made a case for continuation of the NAO.

Peter J. Brown’s most recent published commentary on emergency communications and related matters appears in the October 2008 issue of  “Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness“, a journal of the American Medical Association (subscription required).  He has also previously addressed the NAO and the National Emergency Communications Plan here at HLSwatch.

In testimony yesterday, Dr. David  Boyd, Director of Command, Control and Interoperability Division of the DHS S&T Directorate, explained that an effective national network for interoperable communications need not connect every first responder in San Diego to every first responder in Miami. The tactical and operational needs of different communities are too diverse to be encompassed by any single system.  “A system of systems is the only viable solution for the next two decades,” he told the House Appropriations Homeland Security subcommittee.

Developing and implementing standards that will ensure effective linkage within this system of systems would produce three benefits according to Boyd:

1. Allow the system of systems to be built on the back of exisiting investments and networks, potentially saving substantial time and money.

2. Allow the system of systems to reflect very real, sometimes daunting, differences in local geography, structural density, and other crucial variabilities.

3.  Eliminate the risk of a single point of failure that a monolithic national system would probably entail.

Dr. Boyd’s prepared testimony is available. The prepared testimony of others who were testifying is also available at the Committee website.  Boyd’s comments were the only part of the webcast I was able to catch.

The White House issued President Bush’s final Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-24) on June 5, 2008. Entitled “Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security,” HSPD-24 provides a framework to align Federal executive departments and agencies in the “collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals.”

The PD tasks multiple agencies – led by the AG – with developing an implementation plan by June 2009. DHS has a significant stake in coordinating federal use of biometrics. DHS is the steward of the Biometric Storage System. DHS runs the Screening Coordination Office. DHS operates the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which conducts 135,000 national security background checks, including the collection of 11,000 sets of fingerprints, every day.

On Jan 27-28, 2009, NDIA convenes its Biometric Conference 2009, which is intended to bring together stakeholders (including federal implementers) to address challenges of successfully implementing HSPD-24, along the lines of the following:
• Policy development
• Existing and planned U.S. Government programs
• Examples of commercial application of biometrics to address mission critical business goals
• Enabling technologies
• Initiatives within the international community
• Challenges to achieving true interoperability and information sharing.

NDIA states that the conference’s goal is to develop a “mutual understanding and cardinal direction for possible solutions wherein jurisdiction gaps are closed, technologies are interoperable and policies are cohesive.”

For more one the conference, check out the agenda here.

The 9/11 Commission Act included a section called The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, which requires the DHS Privacy Office, led by the Chief Privacy Officer, to report to Congress on its implementation of the Act. The Privacy Office just released its report. The new report, “Data Mining: Technology and Policy,” discusses current data mining activities, as well as those under development in the Department. It covers the following ground:

• How DHS programs satisfy the Act’s definition of “data mining”

• The Privacy Office’s public workshop, Implementing Privacy Protections in Government Data Mining (July 24-25, 2008)

• The Principles for Implementing Privacy Protections in S&T Research Projects, which are the newly-announced privacy principles, including those that involve data mining

The report focuses on three major programs:

1. Automated Targeting System (ATS) Inbound, Outbound, and Passenger modules (CBP)

2. the Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency System, (ICE)

3. Freight Assessment System, (TSA)

The report provides each program’s purpose and methodology, technology, legal authority, and sources of data, along with an assessment of how well the program is doing.

A challenge for the homeland security community has been the reactive nature of the privacy-related efforts undertaken. Often the Privacy Impact Assessments and other measures are conducted after a technology is developed. Many in the broader policy community and industry have begun suggesting that privacy protections be made a part of technologies, or that technologies be developed for the sole purpose of protecting privacy.

The Privacy Office’s public workshop on Implementing Privacy Protections in Government Data Mining assembled academics, government researchers, policy and technology experts, and privacy advocates this summer to discuss the privacy issues associated with government data mining. One of the outcomes of the workshop was an effort by the Privacy Office and DHS S&T to develop privacy principles that could be embedded in S&T’s research and development projects involving data mining.

This effort led to a set of Principles for Implementing Privacy Protections in S&T Research, which S&T has agreed will govern “new research performed at S&T laboratories, S&T-sponsored research conducted in cooperation with other Federal government entities, and research conducted by external performers under a contract with S&T.”

Many thanks to reader WRC for sending in the notice about this report’s release.

A story in yesterday’s Boston Globe entitled, “Homeland Security in Disarray” prompted this next installment in our series of posts on specific programs at DHS that need the next Administration’s attention. Our series, “What Awaits Dems at DHS,” continues with a look at the ever expanding Homeland Security Information Network.

The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a computer-based counterterrorism communications system intended to connect all states and tribal areas and 50 major urban areas with access to sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information.

HSIN is intended to enable the collection and dissemination of SBU information between federal, state, and local agencies through real-time interactive connectivity with the National Operations Center at DHS. While the senior official in charge of this program was intended to be Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charlie Allen, he has largely delegated the program to Admiral Rufe, Director of the DHS Operations Directorate. General Dynamics is the prime contractor for the HSIN.

Sources with oversight responsibility of HSIN cite disconnects between DHS and its state and local partners who are the intended consumers of HSIN content. Critics explain that the Department never adequately defined the requirements for HSIN with the end user’s needs in mind. Today, the content, technical interoperability, and user interface of HSIN are impractical for the state and local officials intended as its users. An advisory council established to overcome these challenges (the HSIN Advisory Council, or HSIN-AC) issued a report to the Secretary of Homeland Security with recommendations for enabling the HSIN to meet its obligation to states and localities. DHS took the unprecedented decision to issue a rebuttal to the advisory council’s findings.

The Department has already spent $91M in 2008 on HSIN. They are asking Congress to spend an additional $60M on its current trajectory. A report by the DHS Inspector General about the HSIN program is expected to be issued soon.

But HSIN is also on auto-pilot while its successor is being developed. DHS has begun a replacement program called “HSIN Next Gen,” which is intended to provide better security and information-sharing capabilities that the current HSIN platform. It will also consolidate the number of systems within DHS that share SBU information.

As part of a four-phase implementation, DHS plans to begin shifting current HSIN users to the new network beginning in May 2009. DHS intends to continue to use the existing HSIN with the goal of terminating its use in September 2009 when HSIN Next Gen is to be fully completed. DHS estimates it will cost $3.1 million to operate and maintain HSIN between now and its planned September 2009 termination. That’s minor league compared to its successor. DHS issued a task order this summer to acquire, deploy, operate, and maintain HSIN Next Gen for as many as five years at an estimated contract value of as much as $62 million.

SBInet is intended to become an integrated system of personnel, infrastructure, technology, and rapid response measures to secure the northern and southern land borders of the U.S. by replacing two former programs, America’s Shield Initiative and the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System. Both of these programs had similar goals, but were ended due to mismanagement and failure of equipment. Former Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson played a large role initiating SBInet.

DHS estimates that it will need $7.6 billion through 2011 to acquire and deploy the necessary technology and fencing along the Southwest border to carry out SBInet. The first phase of SBInet, called Project 28, is intended to demonstrate SBInet technology across a 28-mile stretch of the Arizona-Mexico border.

SBInet is managed by Boeing with subcontractors Centech Group, DRS Technologies, Kollsman, L-3 Communications Government Services Inc., L-3 Communication Systems – West, LGS, Perot Systems, Unisys Global Public Sector, and USIS.

The SBInet contract runs through September 30, 2009, with three one-year options. The cost of Project 28 is estimated at $67 million. The value of Boeing’s three-year contract to build SBInet is estimated to be between $2 billion and $8 billion. Greggory L. Giddens Mark Borkowski is the current executive director of the SBI Program Management Office at CBP.

Boeing planned to have Project 28 operational in June 2007. Problems with software and other technology led to high profile delays. With Project 28 implementation delayed until October 2007, Secretary Chertoff told a Congressional hearing that he is “not going to buy something with U.S. government money unless I’m satisfied it works in the real world.” He added, “And if it can’t be made to work, I’m prepared to go and find something that will be made to work, although I’ll obviously be disappointed.”

The system is designed to detect a “target” with radar, and then use video cameras to determine whether the radar encountered a person, vehicle, or an animal. In February 2008, the GAO reported that radar readings were too slow and were being triggered by rain and other weather-related false alarms. Moreover, camera couldn’t identify subjects beyond 3.1 miles.

Senior members of the Senate (i.e. Lieberman, Collins, Akaka, Voinovich) have expressed concerns about SBInet’s management challenges. The senators also cited an over-reliance on contractors as one of their chief concerns, raising issues about whether DHS can properly oversee the project.

So can it work? Border patrol agents began using SBInet in December 2007, and the system was officially accepted by DHS in February 2008. Boeing was awarded further contracts to upgrade software and hardware, which I believe still expects to have done by the end of 2008.

CORRECTION: Thanks to reader D.O., please note that Greg Giddens was succeeded as head of the SBI Program Office by Mark Borkowski, a retired USAF Col. who served previously as director of mission support for the U.S. border patrol. Giddens left Sept. 19 to become executive director of facilities management and engineering for CBP.

I’m in Sante Fe, New Mexico, this week with the Stimson Center’s Task Force on Leveraging National Laboratory S&T Assets for 21st Century Security. Today we’re at Los Alamos National Lab, tomorrow at Sandia National Lab. Blogging will be sporadic until I return.

I’ve covered the work of the DHS Essential Technology Task Force here and here, and yesterday the ETTF reported out its final recommendations to the Secretary during the public portion of the HSAC’s bi-annual meeting with the Secretary.

The Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council with establishing an Essential Technologies Task Force (ETTF) to address the following questions:

• What are the legal, financial and operational issues that must be understood to assess whether and to what extent DHS should acquire various types of technology on a service or lease basis, rather than as a purchase/capital investment?

• What types of technology might be considered as candidates for different approaches?

• What types of financial arrangements would the private sector likely be prepared to accept, and how should DHS assess the pros and cons of each?

IBM’s Scott Gould and I were among those invited to testify before the Task Force. On the two occasions that I presented to them, my testimony focused on key attributes of successful technology acquisition from other parts of the USG, as well as opportunities for DHS to collaborate with international partners for joint technology development, the models for which reside at the EU, NATO, and elsewhere.

Both Scott and I made the point that without an overarching framework to guide a Department-wide acquisition strategy, little progress is likely. Scott actually recommended using the Global Movement Management framework as a model, which the Task Force chose to include as a specific example in their final report. That report described in detail the following seven top-level recommendations:

1. Build a high performance acquisitions and program management function implemented by capable staff.

2. Adopt a rigorous Department-wide requirements management process.

3. Develop a Department-wide acquisition strategy with a clear implementation plan.

4. Improve engagement with the private sector.

5. Manage innovation though a variety of approaches.

6. Use the regulatory and standards setting role of DHS to generate economies of scale across stakeholder domains.

7. Continue to advocate for the reduction of homeland security Congressional committees.

The Secretary stayed only to delivery praise to the Task Force and swear in three new members to the HSAC. He left before ETTF chairman George Vradenburg delivered his presentation on the Task Force’s findings. This is unfortunate. The ETTF is another example of how the HSAC is becoming a more focused and more useful advisory entity to the DHS leadership. Kudos to Chuck Adams and Amanda Rittenhouse for their tireless efforts over the last several months in leading the Task Force’s staff team.

Before he left, Chertoff charged the HSAC membership with one more task: “What are the ten tasks for the next Administration to take up and accomplish over its first year or two?”

It seemed odd to charge this group with something so trite. However, he explained, rightly, that it is important that efforts be made to preserve the institutional knowledge of the Department into and through its first ever Presidential transition.

I’d like to know what you think should make the top ten list. Comment below.

The Stimson Center’s Cooperative Nonproliferation Program (CNP) announced the launch of a new task force charged with leveraging national laboratory S&T for the 21st century security environment. Fran Townsend, President Bush’s former Homeland Security Advisor, and Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton, will serve as co-chairs. The bipartisan group, composed of national security experts, scientists, and businesspeople, will convene for the first time on June 27th, 2008 in Washington, DC.

The Task Force is led by The Stimson Center’s Libby Turpen, with clear involvement of Ellen Laipson, who was vice-chair at the National Intelligence Council the first time I met her. She was appointed president and CEO at Stimson in 2002. Libby used to be on the Hill before she joined Stimson in 2001 to establish the Security for a New Century congressional study group.

I have the privilege of serving on this taskforce over the next several months. While the proceedings of this Task Force will be private until reporting out to sponsors at DOE and the Lounsbery Foundation, I’ll do my best to keep readers informed of the work. After our first meeting is on the 27th, we’ll be heading out to Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, to visit with the people at Los Alamos National Lab, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) ongoing transformation from a Cold War complex to a modern national security enterprise is faced with the distinct challenge of repurposing to some extent the overall mission and focus of the nuclear labs, namely Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore.

The Task Force’s key objective is to develop a strategy to ensure retention of nuclear weapons related core competencies at the national labs while better leveraging their scientific and technological capabilities to serve a broader set of 21st-century national and homeland security needs. This initiative should create a comprehensive R&D strategy to serve this objective. One can anticipate a likely slate of issues to include cybersecurity, climate change modeling, and possibly energy security issues.

Yesterday IBM and GW’s Homeland Security Policy Institute convened a panel event and discussion entitled “Technology in Homeland Security: A Double-Edged Sword.”

Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for S&T at DHS kicked it off with a presentation on how his directorate views the technology landscape, with a focus on not falling victim to the “failure of imagination” the 9/11 Commission blamed as one of the reasons the 9/1 attacks were not disrupted. This notion caused a number of us to ask about the practical limits on such an approach to technology. Specifically, how to insure against spending money on an “anything’s possible” mentality that invests in countermeasures against any threat imaginable? Buswell explained that White House guidance, Department level plans, and input from the customer community (the component agencies at DHS) helps bound the imagination.

Jan Lane stepped in for Frank Cilluffo to moderate Busewell’s presentation and Q&A and I joined the panel as moderator and occasional referee. Frank was able to join toward the latter half and weigh in on the issues.

Our panelists provided a diverse treatment of this challenging topic. Parney Albright, former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, and now Managing Director & Vice Chairman at Civitas, weighed in on the challenges confronting the innovators on the business side of the equation who seek to take pre-prototype solutions to market and how that shapes the spectrum of technology solutions deployed at the state level.

Christian Beckner, Professional Staff Member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, explained some of the rough patches still preventing a more accelerated trend in technology as a homeland security advantage, as well as indications of areas of interest from an oversight perspective. (Note that Christian spoke not on behalf of the Committee.)

Greg Nojeim, Director of the Project on Freedom, Security, and Technology at the Center for Democracy and Technology offered insightful warnings about the unintended consequences of technology when it is not developed or deployed with privacy protections at the initial stages. He cited such things as the PATRIOT Act and government wire-tapping outside of FISA.

Langdon Greenhalgh, CEO of Global Emergency Group, provided the needed perspective of the international emergency response community, which depends to an ever increasing degree on technology as an enabler.

I’m working with Jan and Frank to generate an after action report that condenses the highlights of the discussion. Look for it to be available here and possibly on the HSPI website.

Over 70 participants attended representing the following, among other, organizations:

• DHS, NPPD, IP, HITRAC
• DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council
• Homeland Security Institute (DHS S&T)
• DHS S&T
• U.S. Secret Service
• Department of State
• Department of Energy
• The White House
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
• Government Accountability Office
• European Union
• IBM
• Bingham Consulting Group
• Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Lockheed Martin
• Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
• Trade Security Institute
• Dutko Worldwide
• The Washington Times
• USA Today
• Swedish Institute of International Affairs
• Embassy of El Salvador
• Embassy of Switzerland
• International Association of Fire Chiefs
• Embassy of Australia
• International Development Bank
• Latin America Working Group
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Partnership for Public Service
• Center for Democracy and Technology
• MSCL, LLC International Maritime Consultancy
• Oxford Analytica, Inc.
• American Red Cross
• Institute for Regulatory Science

The DHS S&T Stakeholders conference taking place this week is a sprawling array of panels, booths, displays, and coffee breaks. Nearly one hundred speakers by my estimate, and perhaps one thousand attendees. The event is sometimes organized along the paradigm of bugs, bombs, borders, bodies (people), business, and buildings.

Today’s panel discussion under the Bodies channel was chaired by Sharla Rausch, head of the Department of Homeland Security’s Human Factors Division. Her panelists represented TSA and the Screening Coordination Office. I interviewed the Associate Director of the SCO, Patricia Cogswell, after the panel adjourned and asked about what’s on the horizon for the SCO because it’s a unique kind of office with a strategic, cross-DHS mission.

First, a bit about the SCO. It was born in the FY06 President’s Budget Request as part of a program consolidation effort, and was followed up in FY07 as part of a program coordination effort. Note the difference. Rather than have the SCO absorb programs, it now coordinates them. Today, the SCO is part of the DHS Policy Directorate.

Its director, Kathy Kraninger, is technically an Assistant Secretary of Policy. Of the SCO’s two Associate Directors, Patty Cogswell mainly handles the SCO’s Credentialing Framework, Immigration Reform/USCIS Transformation, FBI Name Checks/IAFIS, the Information Sharing Council, and matters dealing with biometrics and DHS’s IDENT program. I understand the lead-up to yesterday’s announcement of the Pre-Travel Authorization Program for Visa Waiver travelers has kept the SCO rather busy.

Screening is actually a rather specific term for DHS with a discrete definition. A DHS briefing obtained by HLSWatch defines screening as “the process of identifying, enrolling, and checking applicants to determine their eligibility for entry into the US, or access to privileged travel and transportation programs.” Given the added scope of such things as USCIS benefits, the “access” scope might be broadened to include immigration benefits.

To give you an idea of the SCO’s purview, consider these numbers:

DHS component agencies:

Process over 1.2 million travelers at the border, including over 630,000 aliens,

Screen over 1.8 million domestic air travelers,

Process 30,000 applicants for immigration benefits, and

Conduct 135,000 national security background checks relating to immigration benefits.

Credentials 750,000 workers requiring unescorted access to facilities and maritime vessels (through the TWIC program)

Today the SCO also serves as something of a budgetary pilot program itself by planning its requirements and budget needs through 2014. A Department-wide 5-year budget planning process is likely a far way off still. In its coordinating, its clear from Patty’s portfolio alone that this relatively small office has its hands in almost everything. We discussed today the ways in which SCO supports the CIO, CFO, and USCIS.

Other issues on the horizon surely include the forthcoming presidential transition. The SCO, like other offices (DNDO, ONA, Operations Coordination) will face a change in the presidency that could bring a change in priorities that’ll demote or devolve such things as screening coordination. Were that to be proposed, it would seem the SCO could count on champions from across the agency to speak to its value and utility.

Here’s another thought on that: If the budget is looking five years out, then it ought to be reflective of the Quadrennial (four-year) Homeland Security Review. Since the next Administration will inherit a draft QHSR, among other things, it would make sense for that document to be explicit about this priority.

IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative and GWU’s Homeland Security Policy Institute are teaming up for an event next Monday, June 9th. The panel kicks off with Bradley Buswell, DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Technology, followed by a unique panel of experts:

Parney Albright
Former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology
Currently Managing Director & Vice Chairman of Civitas, LLC

Christian Beckner
Professional Staff Member
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

Greg Nojeim
Director, Project on Freedom, Security and Technology, Center for Democracy and Technology

Langdon Greenhalgh
CEO
Global Emergency Group

The panel and discussion will examine the critical role of technology in homeland security, both as an opportunity and as a challenge. For many, technology holds forth the promise of solving a host of our greatest homeland security and counterterrorism challenges: providing the right information to the right people at the right time. For others, technology poses an abiding challenge: projects fall short of promises, privacy protections can become subjugated, and men and women on the front lines are often frustrated by new technologies that complicate their jobs before making them easier. The speakers will examine successes and failures from both the public and private sectors to draw lessons that guide the way for future investments and innovation.

I’ll moderate the discussion with Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. I hope to see some of our readers there.

RSVP to hspi1@gwumc.edu or at (202) 994-4787 by Friday, June 6th, 2008. Details below:

Monday, June 9, 2008
10:00 am – 1:15 pm
The George Washington University
Marvin Center, 800 21st Street, NW Washington, DC 20052
Third Floor
Continental Ballroom

Readers may recall the Global Security Challenge as the technology and innovation competition started a couple years ago to focus on homeland security and CT capabilities. This year, co-president of the GSC, Simon Schneider, wrote me to explain that they’ve expanded the competition in two important ways. First, they are inviting early-stage innovators to compete with ideas, not necessarily prototypes or finished products. Second, they’ve created a new category for the best solution for protecting crowded places – an area that is of particular concern to the UK Government.

This year’s Best Security Idea award is aimed to support researchers, infant companies with no revenue yet, and any other inventors who just have an idea for a security solution. Judges are seeking submissions with compelling “disruptive potential,” rather than product maturity. The prize for this competition category is mentorship by Siemens Venture Capital and the opportunity to present the winning idea on stage of the GSC Grand Final in London.

Secure Futures, the GSC’s partner company and a UK-based national security “innovation firm,” will provide financial and advisory support for a new award category in the Global Security Challenge competition to reward the most innovative ideas for securing crowded areas. Winning solutions, according to GSC, may include innovative video surveillance solutions, access control technologies, or solutions for better communicating with crowds. This award is a subcategory of the Best Security Idea Award with a focus on contributing to public safety. The winner receives $10,000. Since this is held in London, I’d recommend asking for that in pounds or euros.

The big fish at the GSC is of course the $500,000 grant sponsored by the Technical Support Working Group, an interagency technology development entity led by DOD, DHS, and State. This prize is open to competition from any security technology startups with less than $5 million in revenues in 2007 and a working prototype. All finalists receive mentorship by leading VC firms.

This week I’ll be attending the DHS S&T Stakeholders Conference. Beginning this morning with a series of training sessions and running through Thursday, the conference is one of the largest DHS events, if not the longest. This is the annual opportunity for DHS to present the S&T Directorate’s organization, vision, and key initiatives, gain input from S&T stakeholders at all levels (Federal, State, and Local), industry, academia, and the news media, explain business opportunities in S&T, and describe new and emerging technologies.

Today includes the Pre-Conference Training Workshop. Sessions are led mostly by DHS, and some private sector, experts about such topics as Doing Business with the S&T Directorate, Science & Technology for First Responders, IEDs, and Crisis Communication.

I’ll blog about the sessions I can attend, which likely will be “Human Factors Division: Social-Behavioral Threat Analysis,” DHS S&T “Special Programs Division,” and “Next Generation Tech Commercialization: IP Portals, Tech Scouting, Alumni Funds, and Clusters.” The entire agenda is available here. Let me know if there is a specific panel you’re interested in.

Tomorrow the official kick-off includes Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and Homeland Security Secretary Michale Chertoff. Two panels I’ll cover tomorrow are:

S&T Partners: Capitol Hill
Mr. Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Technology, S&T Directorate, DHS
Panelists:
Mr. James McGee, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Mr. Keyur Parikh, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Ms. Ellen Carlin, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives
Ms. Rachel A. Jagoda Brunette, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Science & Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
Mr. Tind Shepper Ryen, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Science & Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
Dr. Christopher Beck, Professional Staff, Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science & Technology, House Committee on Homeland Security

S&T Partners: International Partners
Ms. Lil Ramirez, Director of International Relations, S&T Directorate, DHS
Professor Israel L. Barak, Chief Scientist & Director. Bureau of the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Public Security, Israel
Mrs. Marcela Celorio, Deputy Director for North American Affairs, Centro de Información de Seguridad Nacional, Mexico
Dr Richard Davis, Head National Security Science & Technology Unit, Prime Minister & Cabinet Department, Australia
Dr. Michel Israël, Counselor for Science and Technology, Embassy of the French Republic
Dr. Stefan Mengel, Deputy Director for Security Research, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Yongkyun Kim, National Emergency Management Agency, Republic of Korea

Secretary Chertoff and his Mexican counterpart, Juan Camilo Mouriño Terrazo, Secretary of the Interior, signed a binding agreement between the U.S. and Mexico on science and technology related to homeland security. The signing took place at last week’s annual North American Leaders Summit in New Orleans. President Bush and the leaders of Canada and Mexico also attended.

The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for executing on the agreement, which was described as focusing on cross-border cooperation, information sharing, research and development, test and evaluation, pilot projects, and vulnerability and risk assessments.

Readers may recall the posts here about missed opportunities for greater international coordination in combating terrorism by way of strategic relationships based on a common interest in protecting civilians. Well, I have to say that I was overly focused on Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean regions to even think of Mexico as a potential partner in this regard. Or maybe I’ve watched too much Lou Dobbs.

This agreement is being vaunted as a framework to enhance scientific and technical understanding for the benefit of both countries. Its mission-area focuses include maritime security, counter-explosives equipment, the detection of infectious diseases, travel and trade security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Not much is ruled out.

This will get the bizarre and misguided Minute Men and Mr. Dobbs talking: The agreement allows the sharing of classified information between Mexico and the United States and can be used across the federal government. The professionals in the intel community and law enforcement know the limits in this regard. As analysts become more proficient at writing to the tear line and open-source material becomes more instrumental in identifying and assessing risks, this type of information sharing only makes sense.

Models for this exist with long-time near-peer allies like the UK, Canada, and Australia. But Mexico is a different case altogether. That the focus is first on science and technology is worth pointing out. This effort is also intended to build the capacity of our Mexican partners so that better coordination can take place. S&T is not only less polarizing than building a wall, its also far and away a wiser investment for the long-term: We gain improved Mexican cooperation and capabilities.

Below the radar, similar efforts are taking place through non-government channels to engage countries such as Iran, Israel, and Palestine on the basis of science and technology. From what I can tell so far, this is time, expertise, and money well spent.

Richard Mangogna is the new DHS Chief Information Officer, according to a DHS press release. The announcement is noteworthy for its brevity.

Before we get into the investigation, DHS deck chairs move as follows: Mangogna succeeds Scott Charbo, who was appointed deputy undersecretary of National Protection and Programs. Since Charbo’s departure, Deputy CIO Charles Armstrong has served as acting CIO. Armstrong will support Mangogna’s on-boarding before moving over to become CIO for Customs and Border Protection.

Not a lot out there on Mr. Mangogna. He is identified in the official release as an independent consultant with the Mason Harriman Group. MHG doesn’t list any of its staff on its website. It characterizes its employees as consultants who “are 45 seasoned former C-Level executives from the Fortune 200.” Only generic contact information is available, but at least we can tell where MHG is located: Towaco, N.J.

The White House and DHS releases cite Mangogna as a former president and CEO of Covidea. You don’t know Covidea? The New York Times and Covidea announced a videotex service on September 16, 1986, with a product called New York Pulse. On December 6, 1988, Covidea closed its videotex services, Pronto and Business Banking. New York Pulse shut down the following year.

So what’s the new DHS CIO been up to for the last twenty one years? The Administration only acknowledges that Mangogna worked as executive vice president and CIO at JP Morgan Chase and was the division head of Business Re-engineering Management at Chase Manhattan Bank. I found no evidence of the Business Re-engineering Management role. In its 1999 annual report, Chase Bank refers to him as Global Bank CIO.

It is unclear why more wasn’t said about his experience there. When Chase and JP Morgan merged in 2000, a massive systems and business integration project began. As CIO for the newly created company, Mangogna co-chaired the technology and operations steering committee that guided the integration of the technology that supported the operations of about 100,000 employees with systems across the country and on six continents, involving more than 90 data and processing centers, according to a 2001 piece in InfoWorld. You might say that’s a transferable skill set.

However, DHS is a larger undertaking. With over 200,000 employees operating in a different paradigm than pre-9/11 banking, DHS represents a challenge for anyone. USCIS alone is embarking on a major overhaul of its business processes and technology foundation under its $3.5 billion Transformation program. Perhaps more details about Mangogna’s resume will come out in the press. But since the CIO at DHS doesn’t need to be Senate confirmed, it won’t come easily.

Final note: When Chase Bank purchased a major new Sun Microsystems server for about $900K back in 1999 (that was big then), Mangogna justified the investment, explaining “IT performance is a competitive weapon in the global economy.” He might easily update that assessment to include the bigger picture that DHS is responsible for.

Looking forward to writing up something on the SOTU from last night, but I have to run to this meeting of the Essential Technologies Task Force, under the Homeland Security Advisory Council.  The agenda follows and my remarks for the hearing are here.  Nothing profound, but the subject matter for this group is important: Find ways for DHS to better think about — and acquire — essential technologies.

International cooperation in combating terrorism is a no-brainer value add.  And we often try to address on this blog ways in which cooperation can be deepened – or established in the first place as the case may be.  So I was interested — and concerned — to read about a database under joint development by the U.S. Australia, UK, Canada, Japan, and China. 

The database will house biometric data on individuals in order to identify people based on fingerprints, but also such things as voice and facial expression.  These “signatures” are intended to help homeland security authorities better identify and trace terrorists and other suspects.

A story today on News.com.au covered an international forensics conference taking place this week in Australia where this developing database was described by American Patrick Wang, a professor at Northeastern University who spoke at the event. Wang explained that “cross-country collaboration is already under way. There have been some very minor achievements, but people still expect to spend more money and time and to achieve a solution that cannot afford any more mistakes - aiming for 100 per cent accuracy.”

Biometrics are used across many parts of the private sector for facility entry credentials.  But the homeland security and law enforcement communities are gaining momentum. Next month, the FBI will let a contract for a $1 billion revamp of their fingerprints database (IAFIS) into a robust multi-metric identification database called Next Generation Identification that will include the ability to process, store, and analyze several other biometrics. DHS recently started its Biometric Storage System to support its immigration services and other credentialing programs. Could the international database gain access to NGI and BSS? Perhaps these U.S. databases will hoover the international sources.

Professor Wang scopes the effort as follows: “We’re talking about the internet, telephony, mobile phones, mobile phone cameras, digital cameras - all of these are being used not only to commit crimes but also to solve crimes,” he said.

DHS has formed a new Task Force under the Advisory Council Act to assess the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security can improve its acquisition of essential technologies. Under the auspices of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, the Essential Technologies Task Force, as it is called, is sponsored mainly by Under Secretary for Management Paul Schneider, TSA Administrator Kip Hawley, and Chief Information Officer Scott Charbo.

With very explicit terms of reference, and a very short amount of time to do its work, this may be one of the better run advisory councils yet for DHS. The topics under discussion ranged into critical areas of strategy, process, and leadership during the Task Force’s first hearing this past Thursday.

Both Scott Gould, VP of Strategy & Change at IBM Public Sector, and I were invited to testify before the Task Force to address a number of issues we believe ought to inform the process of improving DHS decision making in this area, as well as a number of options for immediate, near term, and long term improvements to DHS technology acquisition. The hearing was closed and so I’ll refrain from uploading our comments here or those of others who appeared before the panel. However, the Task Force’s final report will be made public. Following are the members of the Essential Technologies Task Force for DHS.

The Security Breakfast Series launched in WDC this morning. Titled “What’s Next: The Future of Homeland Security Technology,” the event included a mix of official DHS representatives and private sector leaders mainly from the venture capital and investment banking community. Crowell Moring and Legend Merchant Group were core sponsors.

Main theme over danishes: there’s money to be made in homeland security and the government is looking for us to wise up to the fact.

Bob Hooks, Director of Transition for DHS S&T, made two important points. First, the asymmetric nature of the threat faced by DHS and its component agencies is far broader than that which DOD must confront. Second, technology as a “force multiplier” serves a central role in meeting DHS needs in this mission. To make it even easier for the investors in the room, Hooks brought an unclassified document that lists (without too much specification, of course) the high priority technology needs the Department seeks.

Drawing a difference between DHS and DOD is easy to do, but Hooks’ point suggested an added challenge. Technology is in great need at DHS, but the budget is far smaller than anything similar at DOD. Hence the market forces that came for coffee this morning. An underlying assumption made explicit by almost every panelist was that the most successful technologies for homeland security will require a commercial application. Michael Steed of Paladin Capital drove this home with a drumbeat of investments his group has made in funds valued at several million dollars. Heck, the Department was even smart enough to bring on a Chief Commercialization Officer to help the private firms get the idea.

Tom McMillen of Homeland Security Capital Corp spoke to the trajectory of the threats DHS will likely consider top priorities while suggesting that a Democratic win of the White House in 2008 is sure to generate greater federal investment in homeland security (at the expense of Iraq funding, which is about $452, 447, 997, 763 to date).

However, another important role of the private sector in securing the homeland was out of scope for today’s discussion. In addition to selling services and solutions for DHS to defend against terrorism, the private sector is also in many ways the target of terrorism. What makes the asymmetry in protecting the homeland so much broader than that which the Pentagon deals with has both to do with the methods that must be defended against and the spectrum of targets that includes almost anything in the civilian domain. Private industry, however, is not only a target or vector for terrorism. There are ways in which the private sector — global shipping, banking industry, HAZMAT, etc — can become part of the defense in doing daily business.

The guys at the DNDO call this “grafting security onto the private sector.” In this way, a globally flung network of shipping fleets could be vectors for detecting the presence of dangerous materials. The international banking industry could partner as they sometimes do through SWIFT to detect the presence of dangerous money flows. As the public and private sector begin to work more collaboratively from this standpoint, we might see the asymmetry winnow. Moreover, if terrorists use our weaknesses against us, let’s use theirs against them: they don’t have international alliances through the World Customs Organization, but we do. They don’t have working relationships with the global banking community, and yet we do. Indeed when panelists this morning spoke of how technology has the potential of being a “force multiplier” for federal efforts to secure the homeland they may have sold it short. A broader perspective on how the public and private sectors can work together and exploit our shared strengths – “grafting security” onto the private sector – could go a long way in shifting the asymmetry.

The launch of the DC Security Breakfast Series takes place next month. Begun at the Harvard Club in New York in June, this appears to be a valuable addition to Washington wonkdom, albeit with an earlier start on the day. Details:

Title:
What’s Next: The Future of Homeland Security Tech

When:
September 18, 2007, 8:00-9:30am

Moderator:
David Bodenheimer, Partner, Crowell & Moring

Panelists:

• Scott Greiper, Managing Director, Legend Merchant
• Robert Hooks, Director of Transition Science & Technology, Department of Homeland Security 
• Tom McMillen, CEO, Homeland Security Capital Corp  
• Michael Steed, Founder & Managing Partner, Paladin Capital
   

Sponsors:

RSVP required: Gordon Platt via gordonplatt [at] yahoo [dot] com

Note: Thanks to reader Claire for noticing a missing piece of information: The host asked that I not disclose the location.  Those interested in attending may contact via RSVP.  I do not believe that there is a cost associated with this event.

DHS announced today passenger prescreening measures to improve matching against government watch lists.  To do this, DHS is publishing two regulations:

(1) Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) Predeparture Final Rule, which enables DHS to collect manifest information for international flights departing from or arriving in the United States prior to boarding; and

(2) Secure Flight Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), which lays out DHS plans to assume watch list matching responsibilities from air carriers for domestic flights and align domestic and international passenger prescreening.

According to the DHS announcement, the changes are intended to improve targeting for determining which passengers pose a threat.  The result should be more accurate assessments of potentially dangerous passengers while easing the imposition on legitimate travelers.   This includes “better resolution for misidentified passengers,” the announcement says.  I presume this means applying more effective redress protocols to enable passengers wrongly identified as being on a watchlist so that they may be removed from it.  Presently, it is not clear how this change affects the existing DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP).

APIS results from a mandate in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).  The new measure will require air carriers to submit passenger data 30 minutes prior to departure or as each passenger checks in for the flight.  According to the statement:

Receiving both APIS and PNR data at least 30 minutes before a plane departs allows DHS to perform security checks against federal watch lists prior to passenger boarding, taking this responsibility from carriers and eliminating potential flight diversions due to watch list concerns.  For vessels departing from foreign ports bound for the United States, current requirements to transmit passenger and crew arrival manifest data between 24 to 96 hours prior to arrival will remain unchanged, but requires vessel carriers to transmit APIS data 60 minutes prior to departure from the United States. The APIS final rule follows an NPRM [notice of proposed rulemaking] published in the Federal Register on July 14, 2006.

 The Screening Coordination Office, which is led by Kathy Kraninger at DHS, is leading an effort to provide air carriers with “consolidated data submission requirements,” according to the statement.  This is to be done by integrating Secure Flight data and the APIS data into one stream. This is a helpful fact sheet describing implications of this change.

Once published in the Federal Register, the APIS final rule and the Secure Flight NPRM will be open for comment via the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal.

US-VISIT last week opened a newly remodeled Biometric Support Center (BSC) in
San Diego, Calif. The BSC/West was established in 1995. Initially, it was opened to provide fingerprint verification services to Immigration and Naturalization Service.  The BSC/West operates 24/7 with a staff of twenty-seven.  The BSC/West counts the following metrics:

•        54,962 fugitive warrant verifications.

•        622,000 fingerprint comparisons in FY 2007.

•        81 verifications of unknown deceased subjects in FY 2007. 

TSA last week announced contract awards to begin testing millimeter wave imaging machines and backscatter machines at airports in Phoenix, Los Angeles, and New York’s JFK. These passenger imaging technologies screen passengers for weapons, explosives, and other metallic and non-metallic threats under layers of clothing.

The announcement includes contract awards to American Science & Engineering (backscatter), L-3 Communications (millimeter wave), and Rapiscan Systems (backscatter). Total cost of the initial contracts is ~$2.3 million, with options to escalate. More information available here.

When the GAO foiled DHS efforts to detect smuggled nuclear material coming across the border last year, they did so without actually having to dupe the detection equipment.  They forged the associated documentation from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  That shifted blame from the DNDO to the strategy itself and the coherence among the motley web of agencies involved in securing the Homeland. 

GAO’s investigators were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs using counterfeit documents.  

To be sure, CBP felt the heat for this, too, since their strategy allowed the documentation to travel separately from the material it described.

The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. 

And the NRC had to do some soul searching about the part it plays in this strategy.  But whatever happened to the issue of dealing with the forgery? 

While this was another example of both imperfect strategy as well as technology, the technology issue is almost always easier to solve.  Here’s an interesting option: Something called the Laser Surface Authentication or LSATM (developed by Ingenia Technology) reads the surface of paper, plastics, and metals with a low cost laser to determine its structure and veracity.  It generates a signature or “fingerprint” to verify a material for authentication and tracking of anything from credit cards to passports to medicines.  Perhaps even NRC documentation someday. 

Groundbreaking stuff – especially for a company only a few years old.  Last year it was this breakthrough technology that won Ingenia the Global Security Challenge, an international competition run by students at the London Business School. 

The LSATM snagged the top prize of $10,000 bestowed by the jurors.  The jurors were not students, but rather the Director of Siemens Venture Capital, the Global Director of Information Risk Management for Barclays Capital, the Deputy Director of the DOD Technical Support Working Group, and the Strategy Director of BAE Systems Integrated System Technologies, among others. 

Not bad for a bunch of grad students. 

Here’s another way to gauge the success of a competition: The top prize this year jumps to $500,000.  Get to work though because the deadline was already extended from June 30 to July 15.  Check out the press release here. 

Who knows, this year the winner may offer an exit function for US-VISIT.  

Happy Fourth of July!