Homeland Security Watch

I’ve covered the work of the DHS Essential Technology Task Force here and here, and yesterday the ETTF reported out its final recommendations to the Secretary during the public portion of the HSAC’s bi-annual meeting with the Secretary.

The Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council with establishing an Essential Technologies Task Force (ETTF) to address the following questions:

• What are the legal, financial and operational issues that must be understood to assess whether and to what extent DHS should acquire various types of technology on a service or lease basis, rather than as a purchase/capital investment?

• What types of technology might be considered as candidates for different approaches?

• What types of financial arrangements would the private sector likely be prepared to accept, and how should DHS assess the pros and cons of each?

IBM’s Scott Gould and I were among those invited to testify before the Task Force. On the two occasions that I presented to them, my testimony focused on key attributes of successful technology acquisition from other parts of the USG, as well as opportunities for DHS to collaborate with international partners for joint technology development, the models for which reside at the EU, NATO, and elsewhere.

Both Scott and I made the point that without an overarching framework to guide a Department-wide acquisition strategy, little progress is likely. Scott actually recommended using the Global Movement Management framework as a model, which the Task Force chose to include as a specific example in their final report. That report described in detail the following seven top-level recommendations:

1. Build a high performance acquisitions and program management function implemented by capable staff.

2. Adopt a rigorous Department-wide requirements management process.

3. Develop a Department-wide acquisition strategy with a clear implementation plan.

4. Improve engagement with the private sector.

5. Manage innovation though a variety of approaches.

6. Use the regulatory and standards setting role of DHS to generate economies of scale across stakeholder domains.

7. Continue to advocate for the reduction of homeland security Congressional committees.

The Secretary stayed only to delivery praise to the Task Force and swear in three new members to the HSAC. He left before ETTF chairman George Vradenburg delivered his presentation on the Task Force’s findings. This is unfortunate. The ETTF is another example of how the HSAC is becoming a more focused and more useful advisory entity to the DHS leadership. Kudos to Chuck Adams and Amanda Rittenhouse for their tireless efforts over the last several months in leading the Task Force’s staff team.

Before he left, Chertoff charged the HSAC membership with one more task: “What are the ten tasks for the next Administration to take up and accomplish over its first year or two?”

It seemed odd to charge this group with something so trite. However, he explained, rightly, that it is important that efforts be made to preserve the institutional knowledge of the Department into and through its first ever Presidential transition.

I’d like to know what you think should make the top ten list. Comment below.

The Stimson Center’s Cooperative Nonproliferation Program (CNP) announced the launch of a new task force charged with leveraging national laboratory S&T for the 21st century security environment. Fran Townsend, President Bush’s former Homeland Security Advisor, and Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton, will serve as co-chairs. The bipartisan group, composed of national security experts, scientists, and businesspeople, will convene for the first time on June 27th, 2008 in Washington, DC.

The Task Force is led by The Stimson Center’s Libby Turpen, with clear involvement of Ellen Laipson, who was vice-chair at the National Intelligence Council the first time I met her. She was appointed president and CEO at Stimson in 2002. Libby used to be on the Hill before she joined Stimson in 2001 to establish the Security for a New Century congressional study group.

I have the privilege of serving on this taskforce over the next several months. While the proceedings of this Task Force will be private until reporting out to sponsors at DOE and the Lounsbery Foundation, I’ll do my best to keep readers informed of the work. After our first meeting is on the 27th, we’ll be heading out to Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, to visit with the people at Los Alamos National Lab, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) ongoing transformation from a Cold War complex to a modern national security enterprise is faced with the distinct challenge of repurposing to some extent the overall mission and focus of the nuclear labs, namely Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore.

The Task Force’s key objective is to develop a strategy to ensure retention of nuclear weapons related core competencies at the national labs while better leveraging their scientific and technological capabilities to serve a broader set of 21st-century national and homeland security needs. This initiative should create a comprehensive R&D strategy to serve this objective. One can anticipate a likely slate of issues to include cybersecurity, climate change modeling, and possibly energy security issues.

Yesterday IBM and GW’s Homeland Security Policy Institute convened a panel event and discussion entitled “Technology in Homeland Security: A Double-Edged Sword.”

Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for S&T at DHS kicked it off with a presentation on how his directorate views the technology landscape, with a focus on not falling victim to the “failure of imagination” the 9/11 Commission blamed as one of the reasons the 9/1 attacks were not disrupted. This notion caused a number of us to ask about the practical limits on such an approach to technology. Specifically, how to insure against spending money on an “anything’s possible” mentality that invests in countermeasures against any threat imaginable? Buswell explained that White House guidance, Department level plans, and input from the customer community (the component agencies at DHS) helps bound the imagination.

Jan Lane stepped in for Frank Cilluffo to moderate Busewell’s presentation and Q&A and I joined the panel as moderator and occasional referee. Frank was able to join toward the latter half and weigh in on the issues.

Our panelists provided a diverse treatment of this challenging topic. Parney Albright, former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, and now Managing Director & Vice Chairman at Civitas, weighed in on the challenges confronting the innovators on the business side of the equation who seek to take pre-prototype solutions to market and how that shapes the spectrum of technology solutions deployed at the state level.

Christian Beckner, Professional Staff Member on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, explained some of the rough patches still preventing a more accelerated trend in technology as a homeland security advantage, as well as indications of areas of interest from an oversight perspective. (Note that Christian spoke not on behalf of the Committee.)

Greg Nojeim, Director of the Project on Freedom, Security, and Technology at the Center for Democracy and Technology offered insightful warnings about the unintended consequences of technology when it is not developed or deployed with privacy protections at the initial stages. He cited such things as the PATRIOT Act and government wire-tapping outside of FISA.

Langdon Greenhalgh, CEO of Global Emergency Group, provided the needed perspective of the international emergency response community, which depends to an ever increasing degree on technology as an enabler.

I’m working with Jan and Frank to generate an after action report that condenses the highlights of the discussion. Look for it to be available here and possibly on the HSPI website.

Over 70 participants attended representing the following, among other, organizations:

• DHS, NPPD, IP, HITRAC
• DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council
• Homeland Security Institute (DHS S&T)
• DHS S&T
• U.S. Secret Service
• Department of State
• Department of Energy
• The White House
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
• Government Accountability Office
• European Union
• IBM
• Bingham Consulting Group
• Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Lockheed Martin
• Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
• Trade Security Institute
• Dutko Worldwide
• The Washington Times
• USA Today
• Swedish Institute of International Affairs
• Embassy of El Salvador
• Embassy of Switzerland
• International Association of Fire Chiefs
• Embassy of Australia
• International Development Bank
• Latin America Working Group
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Partnership for Public Service
• Center for Democracy and Technology
• MSCL, LLC International Maritime Consultancy
• Oxford Analytica, Inc.
• American Red Cross
• Institute for Regulatory Science

The DHS S&T Stakeholders conference taking place this week is a sprawling array of panels, booths, displays, and coffee breaks. Nearly one hundred speakers by my estimate, and perhaps one thousand attendees. The event is sometimes organized along the paradigm of bugs, bombs, borders, bodies (people), business, and buildings.

Today’s panel discussion under the Bodies channel was chaired by Sharla Rausch, head of the Department of Homeland Security’s Human Factors Division. Her panelists represented TSA and the Screening Coordination Office. I interviewed the Associate Director of the SCO, Patricia Cogswell, after the panel adjourned and asked about what’s on the horizon for the SCO because it’s a unique kind of office with a strategic, cross-DHS mission.

First, a bit about the SCO. It was born in the FY06 President’s Budget Request as part of a program consolidation effort, and was followed up in FY07 as part of a program coordination effort. Note the difference. Rather than have the SCO absorb programs, it now coordinates them. Today, the SCO is part of the DHS Policy Directorate.

Its director, Kathy Kraninger, is technically an Assistant Secretary of Policy. Of the SCO’s two Associate Directors, Patty Cogswell mainly handles the SCO’s Credentialing Framework, Immigration Reform/USCIS Transformation, FBI Name Checks/IAFIS, the Information Sharing Council, and matters dealing with biometrics and DHS’s IDENT program. I understand the lead-up to yesterday’s announcement of the Pre-Travel Authorization Program for Visa Waiver travelers has kept the SCO rather busy.

Screening is actually a rather specific term for DHS with a discrete definition. A DHS briefing obtained by HLSWatch defines screening as “the process of identifying, enrolling, and checking applicants to determine their eligibility for entry into the US, or access to privileged travel and transportation programs.” Given the added scope of such things as USCIS benefits, the “access” scope might be broadened to include immigration benefits.

To give you an idea of the SCO’s purview, consider these numbers:

DHS component agencies:

Process over 1.2 million travelers at the border, including over 630,000 aliens,

Screen over 1.8 million domestic air travelers,

Process 30,000 applicants for immigration benefits, and

Conduct 135,000 national security background checks relating to immigration benefits.

Credentials 750,000 workers requiring unescorted access to facilities and maritime vessels (through the TWIC program)

Today the SCO also serves as something of a budgetary pilot program itself by planning its requirements and budget needs through 2014. A Department-wide 5-year budget planning process is likely a far way off still. In its coordinating, its clear from Patty’s portfolio alone that this relatively small office has its hands in almost everything. We discussed today the ways in which SCO supports the CIO, CFO, and USCIS.

Other issues on the horizon surely include the forthcoming presidential transition. The SCO, like other offices (DNDO, ONA, Operations Coordination) will face a change in the presidency that could bring a change in priorities that’ll demote or devolve such things as screening coordination. Were that to be proposed, it would seem the SCO could count on champions from across the agency to speak to its value and utility.

Here’s another thought on that: If the budget is looking five years out, then it ought to be reflective of the Quadrennial (four-year) Homeland Security Review. Since the next Administration will inherit a draft QHSR, among other things, it would make sense for that document to be explicit about this priority.

IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative and GWU’s Homeland Security Policy Institute are teaming up for an event next Monday, June 9th. The panel kicks off with Bradley Buswell, DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Technology, followed by a unique panel of experts:

Parney Albright
Former DHS Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology
Currently Managing Director & Vice Chairman of Civitas, LLC

Christian Beckner
Professional Staff Member
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

Greg Nojeim
Director, Project on Freedom, Security and Technology, Center for Democracy and Technology

Langdon Greenhalgh
CEO
Global Emergency Group

The panel and discussion will examine the critical role of technology in homeland security, both as an opportunity and as a challenge. For many, technology holds forth the promise of solving a host of our greatest homeland security and counterterrorism challenges: providing the right information to the right people at the right time. For others, technology poses an abiding challenge: projects fall short of promises, privacy protections can become subjugated, and men and women on the front lines are often frustrated by new technologies that complicate their jobs before making them easier. The speakers will examine successes and failures from both the public and private sectors to draw lessons that guide the way for future investments and innovation.

I’ll moderate the discussion with Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. I hope to see some of our readers there.

RSVP to hspi1@gwumc.edu or at (202) 994-4787 by Friday, June 6th, 2008. Details below:

Monday, June 9, 2008
10:00 am – 1:15 pm
The George Washington University
Marvin Center, 800 21st Street, NW Washington, DC 20052
Third Floor
Continental Ballroom

Readers may recall the Global Security Challenge as the technology and innovation competition started a couple years ago to focus on homeland security and CT capabilities. This year, co-president of the GSC, Simon Schneider, wrote me to explain that they’ve expanded the competition in two important ways. First, they are inviting early-stage innovators to compete with ideas, not necessarily prototypes or finished products. Second, they’ve created a new category for the best solution for protecting crowded places – an area that is of particular concern to the UK Government.

This year’s Best Security Idea award is aimed to support researchers, infant companies with no revenue yet, and any other inventors who just have an idea for a security solution. Judges are seeking submissions with compelling “disruptive potential,” rather than product maturity. The prize for this competition category is mentorship by Siemens Venture Capital and the opportunity to present the winning idea on stage of the GSC Grand Final in London.

Secure Futures, the GSC’s partner company and a UK-based national security “innovation firm,” will provide financial and advisory support for a new award category in the Global Security Challenge competition to reward the most innovative ideas for securing crowded areas. Winning solutions, according to GSC, may include innovative video surveillance solutions, access control technologies, or solutions for better communicating with crowds. This award is a subcategory of the Best Security Idea Award with a focus on contributing to public safety. The winner receives $10,000. Since this is held in London, I’d recommend asking for that in pounds or euros.

The big fish at the GSC is of course the $500,000 grant sponsored by the Technical Support Working Group, an interagency technology development entity led by DOD, DHS, and State. This prize is open to competition from any security technology startups with less than $5 million in revenues in 2007 and a working prototype. All finalists receive mentorship by leading VC firms.

This week I’ll be attending the DHS S&T Stakeholders Conference. Beginning this morning with a series of training sessions and running through Thursday, the conference is one of the largest DHS events, if not the longest. This is the annual opportunity for DHS to present the S&T Directorate’s organization, vision, and key initiatives, gain input from S&T stakeholders at all levels (Federal, State, and Local), industry, academia, and the news media, explain business opportunities in S&T, and describe new and emerging technologies.

Today includes the Pre-Conference Training Workshop. Sessions are led mostly by DHS, and some private sector, experts about such topics as Doing Business with the S&T Directorate, Science & Technology for First Responders, IEDs, and Crisis Communication.

I’ll blog about the sessions I can attend, which likely will be “Human Factors Division: Social-Behavioral Threat Analysis,” DHS S&T “Special Programs Division,” and “Next Generation Tech Commercialization: IP Portals, Tech Scouting, Alumni Funds, and Clusters.” The entire agenda is available here. Let me know if there is a specific panel you’re interested in.

Tomorrow the official kick-off includes Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and Homeland Security Secretary Michale Chertoff. Two panels I’ll cover tomorrow are:

S&T Partners: Capitol Hill
Mr. Brad Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary for Science & Technology, S&T Directorate, DHS
Panelists:
Mr. James McGee, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Mr. Keyur Parikh, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Ms. Ellen Carlin, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives
Ms. Rachel A. Jagoda Brunette, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Science & Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
Mr. Tind Shepper Ryen, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Science & Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
Dr. Christopher Beck, Professional Staff, Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science & Technology, House Committee on Homeland Security

S&T Partners: International Partners
Ms. Lil Ramirez, Director of International Relations, S&T Directorate, DHS
Professor Israel L. Barak, Chief Scientist & Director. Bureau of the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Public Security, Israel
Mrs. Marcela Celorio, Deputy Director for North American Affairs, Centro de Información de Seguridad Nacional, Mexico
Dr Richard Davis, Head National Security Science & Technology Unit, Prime Minister & Cabinet Department, Australia
Dr. Michel Israël, Counselor for Science and Technology, Embassy of the French Republic
Dr. Stefan Mengel, Deputy Director for Security Research, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Yongkyun Kim, National Emergency Management Agency, Republic of Korea

Secretary Chertoff and his Mexican counterpart, Juan Camilo Mouriño Terrazo, Secretary of the Interior, signed a binding agreement between the U.S. and Mexico on science and technology related to homeland security. The signing took place at last week’s annual North American Leaders Summit in New Orleans. President Bush and the leaders of Canada and Mexico also attended.

The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for executing on the agreement, which was described as focusing on cross-border cooperation, information sharing, research and development, test and evaluation, pilot projects, and vulnerability and risk assessments.

Readers may recall the posts here about missed opportunities for greater international coordination in combating terrorism by way of strategic relationships based on a common interest in protecting civilians. Well, I have to say that I was overly focused on Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean regions to even think of Mexico as a potential partner in this regard. Or maybe I’ve watched too much Lou Dobbs.

This agreement is being vaunted as a framework to enhance scientific and technical understanding for the benefit of both countries. Its mission-area focuses include maritime security, counter-explosives equipment, the detection of infectious diseases, travel and trade security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Not much is ruled out.

This will get the bizarre and misguided Minute Men and Mr. Dobbs talking: The agreement allows the sharing of classified information between Mexico and the United States and can be used across the federal government. The professionals in the intel community and law enforcement know the limits in this regard. As analysts become more proficient at writing to the tear line and open-source material becomes more instrumental in identifying and assessing risks, this type of information sharing only makes sense.

Models for this exist with long-time near-peer allies like the UK, Canada, and Australia. But Mexico is a different case altogether. That the focus is first on science and technology is worth pointing out. This effort is also intended to build the capacity of our Mexican partners so that better coordination can take place. S&T is not only less polarizing than building a wall, its also far and away a wiser investment for the long-term: We gain improved Mexican cooperation and capabilities.

Below the radar, similar efforts are taking place through non-government channels to engage countries such as Iran, Israel, and Palestine on the basis of science and technology. From what I can tell so far, this is time, expertise, and money well spent.

Richard Mangogna is the new DHS Chief Information Officer, according to a DHS press release. The announcement is noteworthy for its brevity.

Before we get into the investigation, DHS deck chairs move as follows: Mangogna succeeds Scott Charbo, who was appointed deputy undersecretary of National Protection and Programs. Since Charbo’s departure, Deputy CIO Charles Armstrong has served as acting CIO. Armstrong will support Mangogna’s on-boarding before moving over to become CIO for Customs and Border Protection.

Not a lot out there on Mr. Mangogna. He is identified in the official release as an independent consultant with the Mason Harriman Group. MHG doesn’t list any of its staff on its website. It characterizes its employees as consultants who “are 45 seasoned former C-Level executives from the Fortune 200.” Only generic contact information is available, but at least we can tell where MHG is located: Towaco, N.J.

The White House and DHS releases cite Mangogna as a former president and CEO of Covidea. You don’t know Covidea? The New York Times and Covidea announced a videotex service on September 16, 1986, with a product called New York Pulse. On December 6, 1988, Covidea closed its videotex services, Pronto and Business Banking. New York Pulse shut down the following year.

So what’s the new DHS CIO been up to for the last twenty one years? The Administration only acknowledges that Mangogna worked as executive vice president and CIO at JP Morgan Chase and was the division head of Business Re-engineering Management at Chase Manhattan Bank. I found no evidence of the Business Re-engineering Management role. In its 1999 annual report, Chase Bank refers to him as Global Bank CIO.

It is unclear why more wasn’t said about his experience there. When Chase and JP Morgan merged in 2000, a massive systems and business integration project began. As CIO for the newly created company, Mangogna co-chaired the technology and operations steering committee that guided the integration of the technology that supported the operations of about 100,000 employees with systems across the country and on six continents, involving more than 90 data and processing centers, according to a 2001 piece in InfoWorld. You might say that’s a transferable skill set.

However, DHS is a larger undertaking. With over 200,000 employees operating in a different paradigm than pre-9/11 banking, DHS represents a challenge for anyone. USCIS alone is embarking on a major overhaul of its business processes and technology foundation under its $3.5 billion Transformation program. Perhaps more details about Mangogna’s resume will come out in the press. But since the CIO at DHS doesn’t need to be Senate confirmed, it won’t come easily.

Final note: When Chase Bank purchased a major new Sun Microsystems server for about $900K back in 1999 (that was big then), Mangogna justified the investment, explaining “IT performance is a competitive weapon in the global economy.” He might easily update that assessment to include the bigger picture that DHS is responsible for.

Looking forward to writing up something on the SOTU from last night, but I have to run to this meeting of the Essential Technologies Task Force, under the Homeland Security Advisory Council.  The agenda follows and my remarks for the hearing are here.  Nothing profound, but the subject matter for this group is important: Find ways for DHS to better think about — and acquire — essential technologies.

International cooperation in combating terrorism is a no-brainer value add.  And we often try to address on this blog ways in which cooperation can be deepened – or established in the first place as the case may be.  So I was interested — and concerned — to read about a database under joint development by the U.S. Australia, UK, Canada, Japan, and China. 

The database will house biometric data on individuals in order to identify people based on fingerprints, but also such things as voice and facial expression.  These “signatures” are intended to help homeland security authorities better identify and trace terrorists and other suspects.

A story today on News.com.au covered an international forensics conference taking place this week in Australia where this developing database was described by American Patrick Wang, a professor at Northeastern University who spoke at the event. Wang explained that “cross-country collaboration is already under way. There have been some very minor achievements, but people still expect to spend more money and time and to achieve a solution that cannot afford any more mistakes - aiming for 100 per cent accuracy.”

Biometrics are used across many parts of the private sector for facility entry credentials.  But the homeland security and law enforcement communities are gaining momentum. Next month, the FBI will let a contract for a $1 billion revamp of their fingerprints database (IAFIS) into a robust multi-metric identification database called Next Generation Identification that will include the ability to process, store, and analyze several other biometrics. DHS recently started its Biometric Storage System to support its immigration services and other credentialing programs. Could the international database gain access to NGI and BSS? Perhaps these U.S. databases will hoover the international sources.

Professor Wang scopes the effort as follows: “We’re talking about the internet, telephony, mobile phones, mobile phone cameras, digital cameras - all of these are being used not only to commit crimes but also to solve crimes,” he said.

DHS has formed a new Task Force under the Advisory Council Act to assess the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security can improve its acquisition of essential technologies. Under the auspices of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, the Essential Technologies Task Force, as it is called, is sponsored mainly by Under Secretary for Management Paul Schneider, TSA Administrator Kip Hawley, and Chief Information Officer Scott Charbo.

With very explicit terms of reference, and a very short amount of time to do its work, this may be one of the better run advisory councils yet for DHS. The topics under discussion ranged into critical areas of strategy, process, and leadership during the Task Force’s first hearing this past Thursday.

Both Scott Gould, VP of Strategy & Change at IBM Public Sector, and I were invited to testify before the Task Force to address a number of issues we believe ought to inform the process of improving DHS decision making in this area, as well as a number of options for immediate, near term, and long term improvements to DHS technology acquisition. The hearing was closed and so I’ll refrain from uploading our comments here or those of others who appeared before the panel. However, the Task Force’s final report will be made public. Following are the members of the Essential Technologies Task Force for DHS.

The Security Breakfast Series launched in WDC this morning. Titled “What’s Next: The Future of Homeland Security Technology,” the event included a mix of official DHS representatives and private sector leaders mainly from the venture capital and investment banking community. Crowell Moring and Legend Merchant Group were core sponsors.

Main theme over danishes: there’s money to be made in homeland security and the government is looking for us to wise up to the fact.

Bob Hooks, Director of Transition for DHS S&T, made two important points. First, the asymmetric nature of the threat faced by DHS and its component agencies is far broader than that which DOD must confront. Second, technology as a “force multiplier” serves a central role in meeting DHS needs in this mission. To make it even easier for the investors in the room, Hooks brought an unclassified document that lists (without too much specification, of course) the high priority technology needs the Department seeks.

Drawing a difference between DHS and DOD is easy to do, but Hooks’ point suggested an added challenge. Technology is in great need at DHS, but the budget is far smaller than anything similar at DOD. Hence the market forces that came for coffee this morning. An underlying assumption made explicit by almost every panelist was that the most successful technologies for homeland security will require a commercial application. Michael Steed of Paladin Capital drove this home with a drumbeat of investments his group has made in funds valued at several million dollars. Heck, the Department was even smart enough to bring on a Chief Commercialization Officer to help the private firms get the idea.

Tom McMillen of Homeland Security Capital Corp spoke to the trajectory of the threats DHS will likely consider top priorities while suggesting that a Democratic win of the White House in 2008 is sure to generate greater federal investment in homeland security (at the expense of Iraq funding, which is about $452, 447, 997, 763 to date).

However, another important role of the private sector in securing the homeland was out of scope for today’s discussion. In addition to selling services and solutions for DHS to defend against terrorism, the private sector is also in many ways the target of terrorism. What makes the asymmetry in protecting the homeland so much broader than that which the Pentagon deals with has both to do with the methods that must be defended against and the spectrum of targets that includes almost anything in the civilian domain. Private industry, however, is not only a target or vector for terrorism. There are ways in which the private sector — global shipping, banking industry, HAZMAT, etc — can become part of the defense in doing daily business.

The guys at the DNDO call this “grafting security onto the private sector.” In this way, a globally flung network of shipping fleets could be vectors for detecting the presence of dangerous materials. The international banking industry could partner as they sometimes do through SWIFT to detect the presence of dangerous money flows. As the public and private sector begin to work more collaboratively from this standpoint, we might see the asymmetry winnow. Moreover, if terrorists use our weaknesses against us, let’s use theirs against them: they don’t have international alliances through the World Customs Organization, but we do. They don’t have working relationships with the global banking community, and yet we do. Indeed when panelists this morning spoke of how technology has the potential of being a “force multiplier” for federal efforts to secure the homeland they may have sold it short. A broader perspective on how the public and private sectors can work together and exploit our shared strengths – “grafting security” onto the private sector – could go a long way in shifting the asymmetry.

The launch of the DC Security Breakfast Series takes place next month. Begun at the Harvard Club in New York in June, this appears to be a valuable addition to Washington wonkdom, albeit with an earlier start on the day. Details:

Title:
What’s Next: The Future of Homeland Security Tech

When:
September 18, 2007, 8:00-9:30am

Moderator:
David Bodenheimer, Partner, Crowell & Moring

Panelists:

• Scott Greiper, Managing Director, Legend Merchant
• Robert Hooks, Director of Transition Science & Technology, Department of Homeland Security 
• Tom McMillen, CEO, Homeland Security Capital Corp  
• Michael Steed, Founder & Managing Partner, Paladin Capital
   

Sponsors:

RSVP required: Gordon Platt via gordonplatt [at] yahoo [dot] com

Note: Thanks to reader Claire for noticing a missing piece of information: The host asked that I not disclose the location.  Those interested in attending may contact via RSVP.  I do not believe that there is a cost associated with this event.

DHS announced today passenger prescreening measures to improve matching against government watch lists.  To do this, DHS is publishing two regulations:

(1) Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) Predeparture Final Rule, which enables DHS to collect manifest information for international flights departing from or arriving in the United States prior to boarding; and

(2) Secure Flight Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), which lays out DHS plans to assume watch list matching responsibilities from air carriers for domestic flights and align domestic and international passenger prescreening.

According to the DHS announcement, the changes are intended to improve targeting for determining which passengers pose a threat.  The result should be more accurate assessments of potentially dangerous passengers while easing the imposition on legitimate travelers.   This includes “better resolution for misidentified passengers,” the announcement says.  I presume this means applying more effective redress protocols to enable passengers wrongly identified as being on a watchlist so that they may be removed from it.  Presently, it is not clear how this change affects the existing DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP).

APIS results from a mandate in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).  The new measure will require air carriers to submit passenger data 30 minutes prior to departure or as each passenger checks in for the flight.  According to the statement:

Receiving both APIS and PNR data at least 30 minutes before a plane departs allows DHS to perform security checks against federal watch lists prior to passenger boarding, taking this responsibility from carriers and eliminating potential flight diversions due to watch list concerns.  For vessels departing from foreign ports bound for the United States, current requirements to transmit passenger and crew arrival manifest data between 24 to 96 hours prior to arrival will remain unchanged, but requires vessel carriers to transmit APIS data 60 minutes prior to departure from the United States. The APIS final rule follows an NPRM [notice of proposed rulemaking] published in the Federal Register on July 14, 2006.

 The Screening Coordination Office, which is led by Kathy Kraninger at DHS, is leading an effort to provide air carriers with “consolidated data submission requirements,” according to the statement.  This is to be done by integrating Secure Flight data and the APIS data into one stream. This is a helpful fact sheet describing implications of this change.

Once published in the Federal Register, the APIS final rule and the Secure Flight NPRM will be open for comment via the Federal e-Rulemaking Portal.

US-VISIT last week opened a newly remodeled Biometric Support Center (BSC) in
San Diego, Calif. The BSC/West was established in 1995. Initially, it was opened to provide fingerprint verification services to Immigration and Naturalization Service.  The BSC/West operates 24/7 with a staff of twenty-seven.  The BSC/West counts the following metrics:

•        54,962 fugitive warrant verifications.

•        622,000 fingerprint comparisons in FY 2007.

•        81 verifications of unknown deceased subjects in FY 2007. 

TSA last week announced contract awards to begin testing millimeter wave imaging machines and backscatter machines at airports in Phoenix, Los Angeles, and New York’s JFK. These passenger imaging technologies screen passengers for weapons, explosives, and other metallic and non-metallic threats under layers of clothing.

The announcement includes contract awards to American Science & Engineering (backscatter), L-3 Communications (millimeter wave), and Rapiscan Systems (backscatter). Total cost of the initial contracts is ~$2.3 million, with options to escalate. More information available here.

When the GAO foiled DHS efforts to detect smuggled nuclear material coming across the border last year, they did so without actually having to dupe the detection equipment.  They forged the associated documentation from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  That shifted blame from the DNDO to the strategy itself and the coherence among the motley web of agencies involved in securing the Homeland. 

GAO’s investigators were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs using counterfeit documents.  

To be sure, CBP felt the heat for this, too, since their strategy allowed the documentation to travel separately from the material it described.

The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. 

And the NRC had to do some soul searching about the part it plays in this strategy.  But whatever happened to the issue of dealing with the forgery? 

While this was another example of both imperfect strategy as well as technology, the technology issue is almost always easier to solve.  Here’s an interesting option: Something called the Laser Surface Authentication or LSATM (developed by Ingenia Technology) reads the surface of paper, plastics, and metals with a low cost laser to determine its structure and veracity.  It generates a signature or “fingerprint” to verify a material for authentication and tracking of anything from credit cards to passports to medicines.  Perhaps even NRC documentation someday. 

Groundbreaking stuff – especially for a company only a few years old.  Last year it was this breakthrough technology that won Ingenia the Global Security Challenge, an international competition run by students at the London Business School. 

The LSATM snagged the top prize of $10,000 bestowed by the jurors.  The jurors were not students, but rather the Director of Siemens Venture Capital, the Global Director of Information Risk Management for Barclays Capital, the Deputy Director of the DOD Technical Support Working Group, and the Strategy Director of BAE Systems Integrated System Technologies, among others. 

Not bad for a bunch of grad students. 

Here’s another way to gauge the success of a competition: The top prize this year jumps to $500,000.  Get to work though because the deadline was already extended from June 30 to July 15.  Check out the press release here. 

Who knows, this year the winner may offer an exit function for US-VISIT.  

Happy Fourth of July!

Sincere apologies for the absence.  Just coming up for air and noticed a new release from the Government Accountability Office taking DHS to task on yet another front.  This time the S&T Directorate is in its crosshairs.  Seems the full-speed-ahead approach taken by Under Secretary (ADM) Cohen left some knotty little details undone.  According to GAO:

The S&T fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, including related documentation and other information provided by program officials, did not fully satisfy the conditions set forth in the Appropriations Act.

Minor detail.  

The current trajectory of S&T spending — accounting notwithstanding, apparently — represents a good start toward energizing what has been a difficult mission space to manage.  This deck used by U/S Cohen at a presentation hosted by the American Association for the Advancement of Science provides a quick overview of the solutions they’re aiming for.  (You can also see this post about a Congressional hearing in March at which both U/S Cohen and I testified.)  Take a look at the org chart in particular and you’ll notice the “Human Factors” division, which is led by Sharla Rausch. I’ve met her a few times and I believe she might have the most interesting portfolio of the group.

While a good portion of it deals with understanding the process of radicalization as a spectrum from sympathetic to operational, she also takes a look at leadership challenges for the stressed decision maker at the federal, state, or local level during a crisis in order to identify best practices and to support technology that can in turn support the decision maker.  We did some work at CSP on crisis leadership in partnership with Sweden’s version of DHS late last year.  Dr. Rausch attended and discussed some of her team’s interests.  I’ll be curious to see any developments on that front. 

Update 6/26: CQ’s Rob Margetta ran a piece today about the GAO report with a more technical run-down of its findings.  He notes also that U/S Cohen will testify tomorrow before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology about the Directorate’s strategic plans.

This is another question for the record Chairman Wu submitted after the March 8 hearing on the DNDO and DHS S&T budgets (previous post here).  His question gets to the heart of how technology and strategy should be required to work together.  He rightly points out that too much emphasis on technology (detectors) at the expense of smart tactics (deployment strategy) results in a waste of money and time, not to mention the introduction of unnecessary vulnerabilities.  In some ways, this issue is central to rationalizing what DHS calls a global nuclear detection architecture.

From the FY 2008 budget request and information I’ve received from DNDO, It seems that deployment of detection technologies is limited to highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of entry with relatively little attention given to intercepting smuggled materials in foreign countries or detecting materials smuggled across more remote borders. Is this an appropriate way to deploy detection technologies? If not, what factors should DNDO consider when determining where to deploy their detectors?

The deployment strategy of detectors and other countermeasures in combating smuggling nuclear weapons may be one of the most important considerations in assessing the DNDO strategy.  However, that the strategy and budget seem to indicate a focus on domestic choke points (i.e. highly trafficked points of entry) is appropriate at this stage for two reasons.  First, efforts to detect or otherwise counter the threat of smuggled nuclear material overseas are mainly conducted by other agencies, although there is an important role for the DNDO.  Second, the DNDO was wise to begin their deployment strategy at major points of entry first given the priority of closing obvious gaps soonest, but they must move forward with a plan to deploy along less populated, and therefore less guarded, sections of the
U.S. border, among other improvements.

The effort to combat smuggled nuclear material is a global one.  Indeed the DNDO was originally named the National Nuclear Defense Office to reflect a broader mission than the one it is perceived to have today.  After working its way through the interagency process, this title lost the word “national,” which was replaced with Domestic, and the word “defense” became detection, in an apparent effort to winnow the mission of this new office.  In practice, this makes some sense since both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense also play a role in this area.  The DHS office was given the detection mission only, but that has since evolved, and for good reason.  Today, the DNDO works very closely with other agencies to develop not only new capabilities, but also the global deployment strategy that reflects and informs the use of detection efforts by all federal agencies including DOE, DOD, and others.

When the DNDO was created in April 2005, the White House placed significant emphasis on deploying detection capabilities quickly and in the most needed places.  This had both positive and negative effects.  The priority on deploying detectors quickly naturally sacrificed quality in the short run.  The “pagers” and first-generation portal monitors (RPMs) suffered from poor selectivity that forced them to signal an alarm when encountering non-threatening materials that naturally contain radiation.  This led to news reports and internal assessments that showed RPMs signaling a “hit” when only ceramic tile or other commercial material was found in an a container or truck hold.  The other major trade-off that resulted from an accelerated deployment schedule was the low sensitivity of the earlier detectors (many of which are still in use).  Low sensitivity leads many detectors to be unable to sense the presence of source material because, ironically, HEU and other elements actually give off very low levels of radiation prior to detonation.  Current research and development underway at DNDO already shows major progress in both selectivity and sensitivity in a variety of settings.

The priority of placing detection capabilities at highly trafficked points of entry reflects a judgment call the DNDO and DHS leadership had to make at the time DNDO stood up and began using its first budget in FY 2005.  Given limited resources, the constraints of a new organization, and an evolving threat, the choice was made to start with the most likely choke points based on traffic patterns (both licit and illicit) and the risk these areas posed to surrounding infrastructure and populations.  Over time, the DNDO plan reflects an intention to contribute to anti-terrorism programs overseas by supporting the DHS-DOE-State Department Secure Freight Initiative and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor.  This is a positive development that also indicates the aggressive progress DNDO is making in the field of nuclear detection.  Future development in DNDO’s deployment strategy certainly includes efforts like Securing the Cities, but also networked detection capabilities in less traveled sections of the border to close those serious gaps you cited.  An important improvement in strategy would include the use of decoys, hidden detectors, and mobile sensors to offset the adversary and increase the deterrent value of our anti-terrorism capabilities.

If the Iraq supplemental bill (HR1591) becomes law, Congress will have added $400 million to the DNDO bank for purchasing radiation portal monitors to be placed at weak points along the borders.  This is in addition to the FY08 request in which DNDO’s overall budget is ~$500mil. 

In the meantime, DHS moves forward with another outlay to accelerate the research side of the equation.  Balancing the immediate needs for deployable technology and long-term needs for more effective nuclear defense capabilities is a difficult objective.  Observers usually prefer that investments show a near-term payoff ($400mil for more RPMs that show up on the border within months), but the real payoff in which game-changing capabilities reduce the likelihood of an attack while supporting the other nuclear non-proliferation imperatives takes years.

This is today’s press release from DHS:

DHS AWARDS $8.8 MILLION FOR EXPLORATORY RESEARCH IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) announced ten contract awards today totaling $8.8 million to nine companies that will perform exploratory research in advanced nuclear detection technology.  The Exploratory Research Program is designed to transform nuclear detection technology by funding aggressive research and development that is unconstrained by pre-existing user expectations and initial technical risks.

The nine companies selected are: Alliant Techsystems Incorporated, Mission Research Division; Canberra; EIC Laboratories, Incorporated; General Electric Global Research Center (two awards); Physical Optics Corporation; Radiation Monitoring Devices, Incorporated; Rapiscan Systems Corporation; Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); and Westinghouse Electric Company.

Each contract consists of multiple phases, including an advanced technology demonstration, before potentially transitioning to a systems development and acquisition program.  Successful technologies will be deployed to provide port-of-entry (POE) and non-POE radiological and nuclear detection capability.

Earlier this year, DHS announced the award of Exploratory Research Cooperative Agreements with Academia totaling approximately $3.1 million to make significant advances in basic nuclear detection technology.  Seven universities were awarded cooperative agreements: California Institute of Technology, Florida Institute of Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, State University of New York at Stony Brook, University of Michigan, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, and Washington University. 

###

Congressman David Wu, chairman of the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, convened a hearing today on funding for homeland security R&D.  Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Vayl Oxford testified, along with Admiral Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology at DHS.  I testified on the role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the applicability of risk assessments, and other items.  Jerry Epstein, Senior Fellow at CSIS, testified on the Department’s biosecurity investments.  And, from a first responder-as-user perspective, Marilyn Ward of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council testified.

Fortunately, the hearing avoided the non-starter subject of whether DNDO should be consolidated into the S&T Directorate.  The whole reason it is separate is due the special nature of nuclear terrorism and nuc detection R&D.  The hearing focused instead on the importance of strategic level judgments about how to balance near-term needs to deploy technology solutions to the challenges of securing the homeland with long-term commitments to R&D that can lead to major leaps in capability down the road.

My statement focused on the nuclear challenge from a non-physicist perspective by introducing a different view of success factors for the DNDO, and the public sector in general.  There’s a certain amount of attention given to the use of a broader framework for gauging value in R&D investments in there, too, that makes use of an IBM model — Global Movement Management – developed originally by Scott Gould and Christian Beckner.  Full disclosure: I’m now on that project to generate the 2.0 iteration.  I’d welcome any reactions to my testimony, and you can view the statements offered by the other expert witnesses by clicking below.

Vayl Oxford testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Admiral Cohen testimony for 3-8-07 hearing 

Dr. Epstein testimont for 3-8-07 hearing

Ms. Ward’s testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Czerwinski testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Update 3/11/07: GovExec’s Winter Casey covered the hearing in this story.

The new GAO study, rolled out in testimony this week by Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues Cathleen Berrick, suggested that DHS and the Transportation Security Administration should improve their risk-based decision making methods, planning and program evaluations, and the ways in which TSA collaborates with relevant stakeholders.

GAO cites Secure Flight – the domestic passenger prescreening system – as an example of disjointed or insufficient management attributes that have kept this program off schedule.  It’s worth reading the sections of this critique that make the case for better coordination across TSA and the international passenger screening efforts under the auspices of Customs and Border Protection.  This dimension of the report forces a more interesting discussion about how the different, but closely related, mission areas of the DHS components (TSA, CBP, S&T) could better reinforce one another and reduce duplication where similar objectives could be pursued with shared methods, data, technology, etc.  Screening of passengers lends itself perfectly to this ongoing challenge.

The new study also takes a look at how TSA and others could better partner with relevant private sector stakeholders.  Primary opportunities for better collaboration include:

• Reducing the time it takes to screen air cargo in order to diminish the disruption to delivery time for air carriers;
• Training individual cargo inspectors on more effective inspection technology;·       
• Supporting the development and deployment of improved inspection technologies; and
• Determining the best approach to implementing a “risk-based management approach to securing air cargo.”

The GAO report, entitled Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, is found here.  A one-page summary also is available.

Updated DHS Schedule:

Thursday, February 15

Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson will testify before the House Homeland Security Committee on the department’s 2007 goals: 9:00 AM EST/311 Cannon House Office Building/Washington, DC/OPEN PRESS

Friday, February 16

Secretary Michael Chertoff will deliver remarks to the American Chamber of Commerce: 7:45 AM CST/ Intercontinental Presidente Hotel/ Campos Eliseos 218/ Col Polanco Mexico City, Mexico/ OPEN PRESS

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Chief of Citizenship Alfonso Aguilar will deliver the keynote address on citizenship and immigration issues at the Puebla State Forum on U.S.-Mexico Immigration Reform Puebla: 8:30 AM CST/ State Congress/ Puebla, Mexico/ OPEN PRESS

U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad W. Allen will provide remarks on recreational boating safety and maritime security at the annual meeting of Boating Writers International:  8:30 AM EST/ Miami Beach Convention Center:/ 1901 Convention Center Drive/ Miami Beach, FL/ OPEN PRESS

US-VISIT Acting Director Robert Mocny will testify before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security on the fiscal year 2008 budget request for US-VISIT: 10:00 AM EST/ 2362 Rayburn House Office Building/ Washington, DC/ OPEN PRESS 

When Christian Beckner unplugged from Homeland Security Watch, which he created and led, he called on some of us to maintain the blog. His are big shoes to fill. My name is Jonah Czerwinski and I will be one of the many required to pick up where Christian left off. More about my background will follow shortly. In the meantime, on with the Watch:

House Homeland Chairman Outlines Committee Priorities

During a luncheon discussion today Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, offered a glimpse of what will populate his Committee’s agenda for the 110^th. Jointly hosted by the Homeland Security Policy Institute and The Aspen Institute , the luncheon was an opportunity for Chairman Thompson to introduce what he calls a “Real Deal for Homeland Security.” His prepared remarks can now be found on the Committee website, but there are some points he highlighted – and even added – during his delivery before a few dozen HLS wonks:

Mass transit. Chairman Thompson said to look for legislation next month aimed at strengthening mass transit security. In his remarks, he listed a few demands that legislation will likely include: vulnerability assessments, information sharing measures, and security training programs, among others.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represent a failure that should never be repeated, he said, but they also revealed equities that need better Congressional support. He called out the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard for special attention and suggested the two need better federal support. The USCG Deepwater Project must be fully funded. That was not in the prepared remarks.

FEMA reorganization is unfinished. Chairman Thompson characterized efforts to reorient FEMA as insufficient. The audience was given the impression that current plans fall short of a solution to prevent the kind of under-performance witnessed in the Gulf Coast.

Other aspects of the Department are due for “aggressive oversight.” The Chairman identified both the DHS Management and S&T Directorates as needing scrutiny in three areas: leadership, mission, and accounting. Both the House Homeland Security and House Science Committees are preparing for a hearing on S&T after the President’s budget is released next month.

The Chairman called out Biowatch by name. This is the program that deploys detectors to provide early warning of an intentionally introduced pathogen. According to today’s remarks, Biowatch can expect renewed scrutiny.

While it was not in his prepared remarks, Chairman Thomson pointed out during his comments the lack of screening for air cargo and suggested that his Committee would seek measures aimed providing some kind of visibility into the contents of cargo placed on passenger planes. He also noted that sea-borne cargo (“anything entering our ports”) must be subject to better screening. It was unclear if his call for transparency was intended to support 100% radiography screening of shipping container bound for the U.S. His prepared speech made no mention of ports or screening.

DHS contracting accountability made the list. The Chairman named both the Secure Border Initiative (SBI Net) and US-VISIT as likely targets of oversight. He directly questioned the use of a “border fence” to manage immigration and security needs.

“Secure Borders, Open Doors” Makes Progress, Sets Goals, Requests Input

That leads into another message today that Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, circulated through an email to outline measures intended to improve visa processing under the joint State Department-DHS “Secure Borders, Open Doors” policy. Her message as I received it today (bold emphasis added, immaterial language snipped):

January 29, 2007

SUBJECT: A Message from Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, regarding Improvements to U.S. Visa Processing

The United States is one of the most open and engaged societies on Earth, maintaining vibrant family, commercial and educational links with peoples and countries across the globe. As a leader in the travel industry, you fully appreciate the national economic impact of international visitors. Foreign travelers contribute almost $105 billion annually to the American economy; international students account for an additional $13 billion.

[…snip….]

Our task is to vigilantly protect U.S. border security and at the same time to maintain America’s openness to legitimate travelers - a policy we call “Secure Borders, Open Doors.” Working closely with the international business and travel community, academic groups, and other stakeholders, we have introduced features designed to streamline visa processing. Recent improvements include:

* An electronic visa application form, which reduces errors, eliminates duplicative data-entry, and so increases the number of applicants each office can interview daily;

* All consular offices post their visa appointment wait times on-line, so travelers can plan accordingly;

* We give scheduling and processing priority to students and urgent business travelers;

* We have added 570 consular positions worldwide, and are transferring some positions to ensure that workloads are evenly distributed;

* We are making significant investment in technology to speed processing and improve data sharing with other government agencies.

I am pleased to say that these efforts have produced results. In Fiscal Year 2006, overall nonimmigrant visa issuance rose 8% over the previous year. Business/tourist visa issuance rose 12% worldwide, and student visa issuances were up 14%. Processing delays have been cut dramatically: 98% of qualified visa applicants are approved within two days of their visa interview. We have “turned the corner” and will continue our efforts in this positive direction.

Meanwhile, visa demand is surging, especially in key emerging travel markets such as China, India and Brazil. Adding more staff and more resources are part of the answer; we are also piloting creative new approaches, leveraging technology and proven best business practices, to meet this challenge. Over the next two years we plan to introduce a variety of enhancements, including:

* A start-to-finish all-electronic visa process;

* A centralized visa appointment management system that will ensure that over 90% of requests for visa appointments can be handled within 30 business days;

* Technological innovations including remote data collection and interview via digital videoconference.

As we implement our plans, we genuinely welcome suggestions and comments from private sector stakeholders. At the same time, we depend on you and others in the private sector to help spread the word that the U.S. welcomes international visitors and that the visa application process is not a daunting ordeal, as it is sometimes still depicted in the press. News media are quick to report negative stories - many of which recycle complaints about problems that have long since been addressed and solved, or describe increasingly rare instances of long waits for visa approval.

We believe our efforts are striking the right balance between security and openness. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is committed to working with the international business and travel community to maintain and enhance our welcome to legitimate travelers. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Sincerely,

Maura Harty
Assistant Secretary
Bureau for Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, DC

More To Come

My posts on Homeland Security Watch will focus on organizational challenges, WMD issues, international aspects of homeland security, and developments that relate to the homeland security marketspace. Expect me to veer from this pretty regularly if I can. I’ll also make an effort to share useful materials pertaining to these and other issue areas as often as possible.

Final Note: I join Christian in thanking all the readers of Homeland Security Watch. Please keep up with this site as I’ll be joined by other contributors posting regularly. And, naturally, your comments are always greatly valued.

New on YouTube, a Daily Show oldie-but-goodie on homeland security technology:

Enjoy.

The Congressional Research Service released a new report recently looking at the agenda for emergency communications legislation in the next Congress, for now publicly available only here at Homeland Security Watch:

RL33747: Emergency Communications Legislation, 2002-2006: Implications for the 110th Congress, December 14, 2006

This site’s complete collection of CRS reports is available here. And hopefully posts such as this one will soon be obsolete.

Back in May of this year, a subcommittee of the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee released a draft report entitled “The Use of RFID for Human Identification.” That paper prompted a minor controversy within DHS, given the extent to which it questioned the Department’s use of RFID in homeland security programs and applications.

After several months of re-writing, a final version of the paper was approved by the Privacy Committee at its meeting last week. It’s not yet on the DHS website, but the RFID Journal has a copy, which you can download at this link and read about in this article. The article provides a useful discussion of the differences between the first draft and the final draft.

In June 2006 I wrote about a plan in Texas to put up live Internet webcams on the Texas-Mexico border as a border security tool. Washington Technology reports today that Texas has completed its initial pilot of this technology:

Texas’ month-long experiment with border surveillance Web cameras is being touted as a success with 221,000 people participating via the Internet, state officials said.

The Texas Border Watch Test Site operated for a month, closing on Dec. 3. During the experiment, live video feeds from border surveillance cameras in Texas were made available on a Web site. Subscribers registered to view the footage and report suspicious activity.

During the month, 221,562 subscribers visited the Web site and viewed footage 27 million times, generating more than 13,000 emails, according to an