Homeland Security Watch

News and analysis of critical issues in homeland security

April 30, 2013

What are the people around you reading?

Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Christopher Bellavita on April 30, 2013

“If you only read the books that everyone else is reading, you can only think what everyone else is thinking.”

I came across that quote from Haruki Murakami yesterday.

I don’t know what everyone else is reading, so I asked them.

OK, not everyone, but at least the people who were around me yesterday, either physically or virtually.

Since 99% of the people I know have something to do with homeland security (that’s another story), the resulting list is mostly about homeland security.

And I do work at a university; that probably influenced the list a bit.

Plus the university is on a military base, so there’s that.

I did ask one person who was fixing a video screen near my office what he was reading. I’d never met him before, but he had no trouble immediately replying.

Two other people who responded are parents of small children who, at least for today, were the focus of their homeland security attention.

Here’s the reading list. I learned about some books and other material I had not heard of.

If you’d like, try the same experiment wherever you are today. Ask people you work with what they are reading. Keep it to one book per person. If you have the chance, post the results in the comments section.

 

1. Armstrong, Karen. The Battle for God. 1st ed. Ballantine Books, 2001.

2. “Articles that explore the use of Social Network Analysis to better understand: 1) cohesion factors in groups, 2) structure of message contributions, 3) pattern of exchange, 4) the role of the critical mass, 5) role and power network structures as they related to various type of on-line collaboration and knowledge creation.” (Right, not a book; the person who sent me this also included 15 pdf articles to illustrate the point he was making.)

3. Berggruen Institute on Governance. “Think Long Committee for California” a new governance tool to repair California’s government. (Not a book, but it’s what she was reading.)

4. Carafano, James Jay, and Paul Rosenzweig. Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom. Heritage Books, 2005.

5. “Cub Scout Committee Chair Training Manual” (That was her third choice.  Her first choice was somewhat more “shaded.”  She also said if I planned to use her name I had to say she was reading the Bible.).

6. Deardorff, Brad. The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism. AgilePress, 2013.

7. Desmond, Leslie, and Bill Dorrance. True Horsemanship Through Feel, Second Edition. 2nd ed. Lyons Press, 2007. (At first I thought this had nothing to do with homeland security, but on second thought….)

8. Dumas, Alexandre. The Three Musketeers. Simon & Brown, 2013.

9. Eco, Umberto. Serendipities: Language and Lunacy. Mariner Books, 1999.

10. Gardner, Howard. Five Minds for the Future. Harvard Business Review Press, 2009.

11. Hirsch, James S. Willie Mays: The Life, The Legend. 1st ed. Scribner, 2010.

12. Lemov, Doug, Erica Woolway, and Katie Yezzi. Practice Perfect: 42 Rules for Getting Better at Getting Better. 1st ed. Jossey-Bass, 2012.

13. Lewis, Ted. “The Book of Extremes: Why the 21st century Isn’t Like the 20th Century.” 2013. (This book is in a prepublication format, and won’t be published for a few more months; it’s a follow up to Lewis’ Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World.)

14. Mackey, Sandra. Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.

15. McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. 1st ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2011.

16. Moghaddam, Fathali M. The Psychology of Dictatorship. 1st ed. American Psychological Association (APA), 2013.

17. Mudd, Philip. Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

18. Owen, Mark, and Kevin Maurer. No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden. First Edition. Dutton Adult, 2012.

19. Rejali, Darius. Torture and Democracy. Princeton University Press, 2009.

20. Sodium Polyacrylate: My life would be a mess without it. (Not actually a book. But it could be, should be, one.)

21. Stegner, Wallace. Angle of Repose. Penguin Classics, 2000.

22. Williams, Gary. Seal of Honor: Operation Red Wings and the Life of Lt. Michael P. Murphy, USN. Naval Institute Press, 2011.

23. “What am I reading? I can’t think of anything in particular…. Wow. How sad is that,” said a person who works as hard as almost anyone I know.

To paraphrase Mark Twain, “The person who doesn’t read good books has no advantage over the person who can’t read them.”

 

If you do ask people in your ecosystem what they’re reading, please post what you learn here.  And if you get to talk with each other about what you’re reading, that’s even better.

September 25, 2012

Growing more homeland security ideas

Filed under: Education — by Christopher Bellavita on September 25, 2012

On September 21st, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security graduated its 39th and 40th master’s degree class.

To suggest the ideas explored by those graduates, here are the titles of their theses.

Most of the theses — adding to the storehouse of what we know, do not know, and might know about homeland security — will be available through the NPS Dudley Knox library in a few weeks.

(If you know of any other recent master’s or doctoral theses related to homeland security policy and strategy, please let us know – - along with enough information to find the documents.)

——

  • Leveraging National Guard Intelligence: Analysts in State and Regional Fusion Centers
  • The Future Mission, Tasking and Resourcing of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary
  • The FBI is Leading the Way by Making the Private Sector Part of the Counterterrorism Homeland Security Enterprise
  • Policy Options to Address Crucial Communication Gaps in the Incident Command System
  • Utilizing Social Media to Further the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative
  • Federated Search Tools in Fusion Centers: Bridging Databases in the Information Sharing Environment
  • Creating a Learning Organization for State and Local Law Enforcement to Combat Violent Extremism
  • Start Making Sense: Exploring an Emergency Learning Framework
  • Evolving the Local Fire Service intelligence Enterprise in New York State: Implementing a Threat Liaison Officer Program
  • Shaping the National Guard in a Post War Environment
  • Effective Municipal Emergency Planning for People with Disabilities and Others with Access and Functional Needs
  • FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Teams: Considering an Improved Strategy for an Evolving Homeland Security Enterprise
  • Internet Radicalization: Actual Threat or Phantom Menace?
  • Incomplete Intelligence: Is the Information Sharing Environment an Effective Platform?
  • Ready for the Future: Assessing the Collaborative Capacity of State Emergency Management Agencies
  • Unity of Command for the Federal Operational Response to a Catastrophic Disaster
  • Social Media, Social Networking, Facial Recognition Technology and the Future of Law Enforcement Undercover Operations
  • Emergent Social Software Platforms for Sharing and Collaboration on Criminal Information and Intelligence
  • The Provision of Public Health Services for Illegal Migrant Populations: Policy Options for Improving Homeland Security
  • Applying Deterrence Strategy to Agents of Asymmetrical Threats
  • What is the Best Approach to Crisis Intervention?
  • Hunting a Black Swan: Policy Options for America’s Police in Preventing Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism
  • Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Where Do We Go from Here to Bring the Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community?
  • Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in Texas: Political Discourse and an Argument for Reality
  • Understanding “Swift Trust” to Improve Interagency Collaboration in New York City
  • Theory to Practice: How Developing a K-12 Curriculum in Emergency Preparedness, Life Safety, or Homeland Security can lead to Resiliency
  • Community Engagement for Collective Resilience: The Rising System
  • Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Modern Policing in an Urban Environment
  • Network Vulnerability Assessment of the U.S. Crude Pipeline Infrastructure

September 3, 2012

The blurring of homeland and national security

Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Arnold Bogis on September 3, 2012

[Forgive the rambling nature of this post.  I blame the long weekend, skimming an article I should read more carefully, and too much Doctor Who.]

The term “homeland security” is notoriously hard to define. Even more difficult is where to draw the line between “homeland” security and “national” security.  Simply perplexing is the issue of whether there should be a line or not, and the possibly negative effects of attempting to draw one.

Large natural events, such as Hurricane Issac or the western wildfires, serve to highlight the emergency management/preparedness/response/recovery/etc. portion of the enterprise.  Terrorism, health events, and technological disasters comfortably fit here as well, at least in terms of preparing for and responding to effects.

Preventing terrorism would seem, at first, to fit easily within the homeland security arena.  “See something, say something,” fusion centers, the concern about domestic radicalization, and the shift in FBI focus from criminal investigations to terrorism prevention.  But set alone, this effort seems a bit inconsequential in terms of fighting terrorism.  The minor leagues, if you will, to the game being played by intelligence services (and not just U.S. agencies…) and the military overseas.  What major, potentially catastrophic, and realistic (an aspect that is interpreted by different people for different reasons) plots have been disrupted solely on the basis of domestically-gathered information?  Besides the FBI and the NYPD, what domestic agencies are conducting true intelligence-type operations domestically?

This is not a bad thing.  I personally do not want the CIA carrying out operations against U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.  We do have rights…or so I was led to believe in civics class.  Intelligence gathered abroad can be filtered and shared with relevant domestic law enforcement agencies in the hope of preventing attacks.  Well…one hopes.  Radicalization of at-risk individuals can be countered by developing relationships with responsible authorities among particular (really wanted to avoid the term “suspect,” sounds a little too NYPD-ish…) populations. Well…perhaps. And is anyone paying attention to the non-Islamic groups? (I know they are, but I also know that the Red Sox are still playing games. The underlying issue is who’s paying attention?)

My point is that counter-terrorism is neither simply a home or away game–it’s a continuum better understood with sci-fi metaphors rather than sports.

So how do we talk about homeland vs. national security?  Should we even bother? (Though I suspect that if we don’t, the “national security” community will out of superior numbers and positioning take what it wants from “homeland security” and leave the rest to emergency management.  Kinda like if FEMA had been separated from DHS following Katrina.)

What prompts these rambling thoughts are two somewhat recent articles.  The first is a Washington Post story on the successful melding of a homeland security sector, customs at the border, with a traditional national security realm, counter-proliferation:

The Chinese toymaker said he was seeking parts for a “magic horse,” a metal-framed playground pony. But the exotic, wildly expensive raw material he wanted seemed better suited for space travel than backyard play.

Only in recent months did the full scope of the ruse become apparent. The destination for the specialty steel was not China but Iran, and the order had nothing to do with toy horses, U.S. investigators say.

“We are certain,” said a law enforcement official familiar with the case, “that the metal was meant for advanced centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear program.”

How this effort was discovered:

Perhaps the most striking fact about the toy-horse plot, investigators say, is that it was discovered at all. The tip came in late 2008 from an obscure Homeland Security program that involves occasional factory visits by U.S. officials to guard against foreign pilfering of sensitive U.S. technology.

During a visit to a Puget Sound steelmaker, an export manager there told a U.S. official about a bizarre query he had gotten from China.

Export controls have a long and important history in the national security efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  However, they remain a little publicized but very important mission of the Department of Homeland Security’s broader border security efforts.

The other nugget that got me thinking was this from a Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) news brief mounting a public health defense of the Biowatch program

Some public health officials’ discomfort with BioWatch also may be related to a culture clash between the public health world and the law enforcement and security realm, according to Biedrzycki.

“Public health typically hasn’t been part of that culture, of law enforcement or national security and the intelligence community,” he said. “This is new territory, and I think we don’t fully understand how to operate within that culture.

“It’s very difficult for us, coming from a very transparent, open, trust-building relationship with many of our clients, going into a less open environment in terms of information sharing. I can understand those criticisms, but in reality I think the trend is for public health to be integrated with the intelligence community.”

Emphasis added to underline my concern.

May 3, 2012

Reading over two terrorists shoulders

Filed under: Radicalization,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on May 3, 2012

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has released 17 of the documents retrieved from the compound in Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was killed.  In addition to English translations and the original Arabic versions  –  posted online today at 9:00 AM EST — the CTC has issued a short report contextualizing the documents.

See: Last Year at Abbottabad.

While you’re at the CTC site scan their other publications.  Good stuff.

Many HLSWatch readers will also be interested in a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs staff report on the radicalization of Zac Chesser.  Please access: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism.

In July 2010 I posted a piece entitled: Could you or I have talked Zac Chesser out of violent extremism? Arnold Bogis (not yet a fellow poster) and I had a quick exchange on the question.  In the Senate report there is  a tantalizing reference to Chesser almost being talked back from the edge.

Each set of resources offers fascinating insights into terrorist realities.

I recently discovered a cache of letters I had written (rough drafts) and received (in reply) from the early 1980s.  I came away wondering about the vagaries of memory and the often fluid nature of what purports to be real.

It’s a tad intimidating to think how these posts and comments may be read thirty years from now.  If we’re lucky these bytes may prove even more fragile than the thin airmail paper I found in a long forgotten file.   Based on all three examples, humility ages more gracefully than its opposite.

December 12, 2011

Locking up terrorists…but not in Guantánamo

Filed under: Legal Issues — by Arnold Bogis on December 12, 2011

This past weekend the New York Times published reporter Scott Shane’s investigation into the domestic system of detention for those convicted of terrorism.  It turns out Guantanamo, and military tribunals, are far from the full story when it comes to locking up terrorists:

In recent weeks, Congress has reignited an old debate, with some arguing that only military justice is appropriate for terrorist suspects. But military tribunals have proved excruciatingly slow and imprisonment at Guantánamo hugely costly — $800,000 per inmate a year, compared with $25,000 in federal prison.

The criminal justice system, meanwhile, has absorbed the surge of terrorism cases since 2001 without calamity, and without the international criticism that Guantánamo has attracted for holding prisoners without trial.

The numbers involved are eye-opening, even considering what I consider the generally inflated reporting on every far-fetched plot broken up in the planning stages (not to say there haven’t been serious threats, but to point out that groups that ask for boots from their FBI informant are likely not an imminent threat to blow up the Sears Tower):

Big numbers. Today, 171 prisoners remain at Guantánamo. As of Oct. 1, the federal Bureau of Prisons reported that it was holding 362 people convicted in terrorism-related cases, 269 with what the bureau calls a connection to international terrorism — up from just 50 in 2000. An additional 93 inmates have a connection to domestic terrorism.

Lengthy sentences. Terrorists who plotted to massacre Americans are likely to die in prison. Faisal Shahzad, who tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square in 2010, is serving a sentence of life without parole at the Supermax, as are Zacarias Moussaoui, a Qaeda operative arrested in 2001, and Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, among others. But many inmates whose conduct fell far short of outright terrorism are serving sentences of a decade or more, the result of a calculated prevention strategy to sideline radicals well before they could initiate deadly plots.

The conduct of those responsible for operating these detention centers is also called into question (for a summary of the issues involved, see this HSPI/CIAG joint report “Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization”:

Special units. Since 2006, the Bureau of Prisons has moved many of those convicted in terrorism cases to two special units that severely restrict visits and phone calls. But in creating what are Muslim-dominated units, prison officials have inadvertently fostered a sense of solidarity and defiance, and set off a long-running legal dispute over limits on group prayer. Officials have warned in court filings about the danger of radicalization, but the Bureau of Prisons has nothing comparable to the deradicalization programs instituted in many countries.

Both the Obama administration and Republicans in Congress often cite the threat of homegrown terrorism. But the Bureau of Prisons has proven remarkably resistant to outside scrutiny of the inmates it houses, who might offer a unique window on the problem.

In 2009, a group of scholars proposed interviewing people imprisoned in terrorism cases about how they took that path. The Department of Homeland Security approved the proposal and offered financing. But the Bureau of Prisons refused to grant access, saying the project would require too much staff time.

“There’s a huge national debate about how dangerous these people are,” said Gary LaFree, director of a national terrorism study center at the University of Maryland, who was lead author of the proposal. “I just think, as a citizen, somebody ought to be studying this.”

The article addresses the basic issue of the tradeoff between security and justice, and in my mind clearly comes out on the side of justice.  The reporter gives his story several faces in his exploration of a few cases.  The convicted, as well as their family and friends, can be read as arguing that sentences were too heavy for the infractions involved.  However there does not seem to be any true miscarriages of justice.  No innocent individual convicted on terrorism-related charges that in some way were not connected with the activities of which they were accused.  I do not believe that true justice has been carried out in every domestic terrorism case, history of the wrongly convicted in other criminal areas is too overwhelming.  Considering law enforcement’s focus on terrorism, perhaps the term near-hysteria could be applied for that period following shortly after 9/11 where a sleeper cell was suspected in every town, that the scales of justice do not appear dangerously unbalanced is of some relief.

The other important that emerges from this story is that our existing justice system appears up to the task of dealing with the issue of terrorism.  Compared against the costs and success of military tribunals and incarceration at Guantanamo, it should be a no-brainer to depend on domestic prisons and existing civilian judicial instruments.  Unfortunately, that is not happening.

December 8, 2011

Deterrence: Retrieving the full spectrum

Filed under: Strategy,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on December 8, 2011

Wednesday’s joint House-Senate hearing on homegrown terrorism was interesting, enlightening, painful, embarrassing, and infuriating… sometimes in the course of a single minute or two.  If you were not in the hearing room or missed the C-SPAN broadcast (available in archived entirety), individual videos and prepared testimonies are available at the House Homeland Security Committee website.

One of those testifying was LT. COL. Reid Sawyer, Director, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.  In his prepared testimony LT. COL. Sawyer noted,

The emergence of homegrown terrorism and the targeting of U.S. military forces requires a renewed examination of the nature of radicalization and the changing nature of autonomous radicalization—a process that today occurs largely in isolation from direct connection with external networks, creating new challenges for law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect, prevent and deter homegrown terrorism.

Most of Wednesday’s testimony, questions, answers, and occasional pontificating focused on detecting and preventing.  The lack of attention to deterring is unfortunate.  Especially in regard to homegrown terrorism there is a significant opportunity for deterrence… especially if deterrence is well-understood.

The Latin origin of deter, deterrent, and deterrence is deterrere.   During the classical era deterrere was much closer to our understanding of discourage or hinder than the Mutual Assured Destruction of Cold War deterrence.  There is even a positive aspect to the concept.

In Cicero’s Impeachment of Verres we read, “… testis praesertim , timidos homines et adflictos, non solum auctoritate deterrere, sed etiam consulari metu, et duorum praetorum potestate.”  A reasonable translation: “… witness in particular, timid and oppressed men, hindered not only by your own private influence, but fear of the consul, and the power of two praetors.”  The explicit distinction between deterrere (hindered) and metu (fear) is meaningful.  Moreover they are hindered by influence, while they fear power.

Deter entered English in the 1570s.  An early use is found in Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667):

Rather your dauntless virtue, whom the pain
Of death denounced, whatever thing Death be,
Deterred not from achieving what might lead
To happier life, knowledge of Good and Evil?
Of good, how just! Of evil-if what is evil
Be real, why not known, since easier shunned?

John Milton, Paradise Lost (l. Bk. IX, l)

Early English usage reflected the classical meaning.  In the passage above, dauntless virtue being not discouraged or not hindered seems more coherent with the tone than “not terrorized.”

In 1764  Cesare Beccaria published Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crime and Punishments) in which he argued for a systematic approach to what we would now call deterrence.

It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them. This is the fundamental principle of good legislation, which is the art of conducting men to the maximum of happiness, and to the minimum of misery, if we may apply this mathematical expression to the good and evil of life. But the means hitherto employed for that purpose are generally inadequate, or contrary to the end proposed. It is impossible to reduce the tumultuous activity of mankind to absolute regularity; for, amidst the various and opposite attractions of pleasure and pain, human laws are not sufficient entirely to prevent disorders in society.

To effectively prevent crime Beccaria recommended swift, consistent, and just punishment of proven wrongs combined with education, rewards, and application of science to encourage desired behavior.

The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham built on Beccaria’s foundation, gave considerable attention to the efficacy of punishment to prevent unwanted behavior, and called it a “deterrent” (introducing the word in 1829). But Bentham notes a distinction between a longer-term and nearer-term deterrent:

All punishment has a certain tendency to deter from the commission of offences; but if the delinquent, after he has been punished, is only deterred by fear from the repetition of his offence, he is not reformed. Reformation implies a change of character and moral dispositions.

The ultimate deterrent is change of disposition or what moderns might call motivation. Bentham certainly perceived we could be influenced by fear of detection, detention, and punishment.   But a more permanent form of prevention would, he argued at length, emerge from engaging the prospect of pleasure.  By understanding the fear of pain and the prospect of pleasure, Bentham perceived society can be constructively shaped:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.

From 1861, when “deterrence” first appeared in the English language, until the mid-Twentieth century the most common usage of the word related to issues of criminology.  Following World War II, however, deterrence was increasingly associated with military strategy and, particularly, the nuclear doctrine of Mutual Assurance Destruction.

In a January 1954 speech Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared,

We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.

This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost. What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

Rather than carrot and stick, after Dulles deterrence was understood as the prospect of a very big stick pounding as hard as possible.

This Cold War definition was so deeply ingrained in our political culture that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks President Bush asserted, “Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.”

Deterrence is being retrieved.  In defense policy there is considerable talk of a “new deterrence.”  In homeland security and counter-terrorism important work has been done by Matthew Kroenig, Brian Jenkins and Paul Davis. But we still tend to operate under the shadow of Dulles and his terrible swift sword.  For optimal deterrence we also need some beauty of the lilies, wisdom to the mighty, and succor to the brave.

October 11, 2011

The Naval Postgraduate School’s Homeland Security Reading List

Filed under: Education,General Homeland Security — by Christopher Bellavita on October 11, 2011

Here is a list of books the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center For Homeland Defense and Security use in its master degree program.

The works that follow, presented (mostly) in alphabetical order by author, include only books and monographs.  The list does not include the journal articles, reports, and other documents that make up the required reading in the program’s dozen master’s degree courses.  The list is current as of  late summer.

I took most of the brief descriptions that follow the book’s title from reviews I found on Amazon.

————————————-

  1. Adler, Mortimer J. & Charles Van Doren (1972). How to Read a Book: A Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading (rev): The New Yorker says “It shows concretely how the serious work of proper reading may be accomplished and how much it may yield in the way of instruction and delight.”
  2. Andrew S. Grove (1999). Only the Paranoid survive: How to exploit the crisis points that challenge every company: Steve Jobs said “This book is about one super-important concept. You must learn about Strategic Inflection Points, because sooner or later you are going to live through one.”
  3. Aslan, Reza. (2009) Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting the Religious Extremism in the Age of Globalization 2009: The School Library Journal says “This book offers an informed critique of good-and-evil dualisms on both sides in the war on terror.”
  4. Bardach, Eugene (2008). Practical Guide to Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving(3rd ed.): “Students consistently give this perspicacious presentation of policy analysis fundamentals high marks for its clarity and insight,” says Robert P. Goss
  5. Barrett, Frank J. and Ronald E. Fry (2005). Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building Cooperative Capacity: “This book provides a concise introduction to and overview of the growing discipline and practice of Appreciative Inquiry,” says one description of the book.
  6. Berger, Peter L. & Luckman, Thomas (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge: A long time ago the American Sociological Review called this book “… A major breakthrough in the  sociology of knowledge.” It still is.
  7. Berman, Paul (2004). Terror and Liberalism: Publishers Weekly said “Berman puts his leftist credentials … on the line by critiquing the left while presenting a liberal rationale for the war on terror, joining a discourse that has been dominated by conservatives.”
  8. Bernays, Edward (2004). Propaganda New York: Noam Chomsky said this “honest and practical manual [originally published in the 1920s] provides much insight into some of the most powerful and influential institutions of contemporary industrial state capitalist democracies.”
  9. Bobbitt, Philip (2009). Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century: This is the most thought provoking homeland security book I’ve read.

10.  Bongar, Bruce Michael, et al. (2007). Psychology of Terrorism: The International Journal of Emergency Mental Health says “it would be difficult to find a more thorough and comprehensive compendium on the psychology of terrorism in all its important aspects than that represented by this volume.”

11.  Booth, Wayne & Gregory G. Colomb & Joseph M. Williams (2008). Craft of Research (3rd ed.): This is “a well-constructed, articulate reminder of how important fundamental questions of style and approach … are to all research, says the Times Literary Supplement.  It is the “first option offered to students who ask ‘Just how should I begin my research?’” says someone from the Business Library Review.

12.  Brafman, Ori and Rod A. Beckstrom (2008). Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations: Publishers Weekly believes this book is “a breezy and entertaining look at how decentralization is changing many organizations.”

13.  Brannan, David, Bruce Hoffman, Eric Herren, and Robert Matthiessen (2007). Preparing for Suicide Terrorism: A Primer for American Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers: is a “for official use only monograph.”

14.  Brockman, John (2006). What We Believe but Cannot Prove: Today’s Leading Thinkers on Science in the Age of Uncertainty: The American Library Association says in this book “more than 100 notable scientists and scholars answer the question, ‘What do you believe even though you cannot prove it?’”

15.  Bryson, John M. (2004). Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations (3rd Edition): Hal G. Rainey says “Anyone professing competence in public and nonprofit management needs to know what Bryson says about strategic planning.”

16.  Bulliet, Richard W. (2004). Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization: The Washington Monthly says according to this book “there is a far better case for ‘Islamo-Christian civilization’ than there is for a clash of civilizations.”

17.  Chicago Manual of Style (16th): According to the New Yorker, “The Sixteenth Edition of the Chicago Manual of Style is here, and it’s hard for some of us to contain our excitement.”

18.  Clarke, Richard and Knake, Robert (2010). Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It: The Financial Times says “It is worth [reading] this book if only for [the] pithy five-page vision of [the] coming apocalypse and a return to stone-age conditions within a week, all because of a few pesky hackers and viruses.”

19.  Clayton M. Christensen (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma:  This book describes how disruptive technologies can redefine the landscape, sort of what Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party folks are trying to do.

20.  Covey, Stephen M.R. with Rebecca R. Merrill (2008). Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything: Warren Bennis says this book is “brave, imaginative, amazingly prescient, and backed up by empirical and analytical heft.”

21.  Creswell, John W. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches: This book provides a practical guide to designing, executing and presenting research.

22.  Cronin, Audrey Curth and Ludes, James M. (Eds.) (2004). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy: Kurt M. Campbell calls this an “unusually interesting, readable, and well integrated look at the essential elements needed for an American grand strategy to confront the scourge of global terrorism.”

23.  Davis, Paul K. & Brian M. Jenkins (2002). Deterrence & Intelligence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda: This monograph – available from RAND and elsewhere – “summarizes the findings of a six-month project on deterrence of terrorism.” It remains one of the most thoughtful and comprehensive discussions of deterrence.

24. Descartes, Rene (2006, by way of 1637). Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences: How “perfect knowledge can be achieved by means of perfect, individual reasoning.”

25.  Donatella Meadows (2008). Thinking in Systems: Peter Senge says “The publication of Meadows’ previously unfinished manuscript is a gift for leaders of all sorts and at all levels.”

26. Eggers, Dave (2010). Zeitoun: “the story of one man’s experience after Hurricane Katrina,… a successful Syrian-born painting contractor, decides to stay in New Orleans and protect his property while his family flees.”  A disturbing narrative.

27.  Entman, Robert (2003). Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The book jacket says this is “an essential guide for political scientists, students of the media, and anyone interested in the increasingly influential role of the media in foreign policy.”

28.  Fanon, Frantz (2005, via the 1961). The Wretched of the Earth 2005: Jean-Paul Sartre says “Have the courage to read this book.”

29.  Frankfurt, Harry G. (2005). On Bullshit: The author asks why “One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.”

30.  Freier, Nathan (2009). DoD Leaders, Strategists, and Operators in an Era of Persistent Unconventional Challenge: “This study argues that the future security environment will be dominated by unconventional threats and challenges that lie outside the boundaries of traditional warfighting.”

32. Gerencser, Mark (2008). Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together: Newt Gingrich  says “… these concepts work,” and promises that “We’ll be applying the methods explained in this important book even more ambitiously in the months ahead.”

33. Godin, Seth (2011). Poke the Box: When Was the Last Time you did something for the first time?: This powerfully irritating manifesto says all your good ideas matter little unless you ship something.

34.  Hewitt, Christopher (2002). Understanding Terrorism in America: This book “surveys the characteristics and causes of terrorism and governmental responses to it.”

35.  Hoffman, Bruce (2006). Inside Terrorism: The Washington Post calls this “The best one-volume introduction to” terrorism.

36.  Johnson, Loch K. and James J. Wirtz (2010). Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology: “An admirable contribution to the intelligence canon,” says Mark M. Lowenthal.

37.  Jones, Morgan D. (1998). The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving: “A collection of proven, practical methods for simplifying any problem and making faster, better decisions every time,” says the product description.

38.  Kelly, Joesph F. (2003). Responding to Evil: This book asks how good and evil can be reconciled.

39.  Kettl, Donald F. (2007). System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics: A public administration scholar looks at the first few years of homeland security.

40.  Kim, W. Chan & Renee Mauborgne (2005). Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant: A “vision of the kind of expanding, competitor-free markets that innovative companies can navigate….  Swim for open waters.”

41.  Laurence, Jonathan & Justin Vaisse (2006). Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France: The American Prospect calls this “an exceedingly important read for anyone trying to understand how governments can help promote (or stunt) the integration process of Muslim immigrants to Europe.”

42.  Leedy, Paul and Jeanne Ormand (2009). Practical Research: Planning and Design: A “’do-it-yourself, understand-it-yourself’ manual designed to help research students in any discipline understand the fundamental structure of quality research and the methodical process that leads to genuinely significant results,” promises the product description.

43.  Lewis, Ted (2006). Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation: Homeland Security Watch says “The book is written as a student textbook, but it should be equally valuable for current practitioners…this book is a very worthwhile investment.”

44.  Lewis, Ted. (2010) Bak’s Sand Pile: The author says “Modern societies want to avert catastrophes, but the drive to make things faster, cheaper, and more efficient leads to self-organized criticality-the condition of systems on the verge of disaster.”

45.  Lowenthal, Mark M (2011). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy: This is “the go-to book for the most comprehensive overview on the U.S. intelligence community,” says Michael Bennett .

46.  Mansfield, Laura (2006). His Own Words: A Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri: “The vision of Al Qaeda as it is articulated by one of its founders,” says a book reviewer.

47. Mintzberg, Henry (2005). Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through The Wilds of Strategic Management: I don’t know a better overview of strategy.

48.  Moghaddam, Fathali (2010). The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World:  The author “analyzes the elements and roots of global insecurity, discussing it in relation to terrorism, torture, economic instability, threatened identity, and religious fundamentalism.”

49.  Moghaddam, Fathali (2008). How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of “One World” and Why that Fuels Violence: Paul Ehrlich says this provides “the Big Picture for better understanding radicalization and terrorism in the 21st century.”

50.  Moghaddam, Fathali (2007). Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in a Global Context: An exploration of “the large-scale migration of refugees fleeing international conflict as well as the effects of 9/11 and the violent conflicts that have erupted in its wake.”

51.  Moghaddam, Fathali M. (2006). From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience & Why They Come to Destroy: Masur Lalljee  calls this “A fascinating study into the development of the perspective of the terrorist. The ‘Staircase to Terrorism’ is a powerful metaphor.”

52.  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004). 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Required reading, for as long as we talk about homeland security.

53.  Provost, Gary (1985). 100 Ways to Improve Your Writing: Way number 1 – get some reference books.

54.  Reynolds, Garr (2008). Presentation Zen: Simple Ideas on Presentation Design and Delivery: Check out the pecha-kucha style for powerpoint presentations (and the presentation zen website).

55.  Sims, Jennifer & Burton Gerber (2005). Transforming U.S. Intelligence: “[T]ransforming intelligence requires as much a look to the future as to the past and a focus more on the art and practice of intelligence rather than on its bureaucratic arrangements.”

56.  Stewart Baker (2010). Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism: The Wall Street Journal describes this as “a memoir of day-to-day life within a major Washington bureaucracy [DHS] and an insider’s analysis of the challenges to domestic security in the post 9/11 era.”

57.  Tajfel, Henri (2010). Social Identity and Intergroup Relations:a collection of articles about social identity theory.

58.  Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2010). The Black Swan: Second Edition: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: With a new section: “On Robustness and Fragility: Niall Ferguson says this is “Idiosyncratically brilliant.”

59.  Van Der Heijden, Kess (2005). Scenarios: the art of strategic conversation: Probably the definitive contemporary work on scenario planning.

60.  Wolf, Naomi (2007). End of America: Letter of Warning to a Young Patriot: Wolf cautions how “fascism can exist without dictatorship.”

61.  Zegart, Amy B. (2009). Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI & Origins of 9/11: Graham Allison believes this is “An outstanding demonstration of how the adaptation failures of the CIA and FBI before and after 9/11 lie in deep-rooted organizational deficiencies and not individuals asleep at the switch.”

62.  Zimbardo, Philip and John Boyd (2008). Time Paradox: The New Psychiatry of Time that Will Change your Life: This work will “help you understand the source of many of the world’s greatest triumphs and most pressing problems — from terrorism to homelessness, from religion to love, from the successes and failures of CEOs to those of marriages,” says Sonja Lyubomirsky.

63.  Zimbardo, Philip G. (2008). Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil: Zimbardo describes how “almost anyone, given the right ‘situational’ influences, can be made to abandon moral scruples and cooperate in violence and oppression.”

64.  Zimmerman, Doron & Andreas Wenger, eds (2006). How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West: The book describes “how national governments are struggling to cope with the complex threat of mass-casualty terrorist attacks carried out by armed groups driven by ideological and/or religious motivations.”

65.  Zinsser, William K. (2001). On Writing Well, 25th Anniversary: The Classic Guide to Writing Nonfiction: This is a book “for everybody who wants to learn how to write or who needs to do some writing to get through the day,” whether a memo, report or a blog post.

 

 

September 30, 2011

Anwar al-Awlaki said to be dead

Filed under: Radicalization,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on September 30, 2011

According to several news outlets, Anwar al-Awlaki, the New Mexico born evangelist of terrorism, was killed in an attack on his convoy traveling through the interior of Yemen.    This news is breaking between 0600 and 0800 (Eastern Time).  More here as more is known or claimed-to-be-known.

According to Al-Jazeera:

Yemen’s defence ministry has reported that Anwar al-Awlaki, a well-known and controversial imam with ties to al-Qaeda, was killed along with four others. A government statement released to the media on Friday said the dual US-Yemeni citizen was hunted down by Yemeni forces, but did not elaborate on the circumstances of his death. Awlaki was wanted by both the US and Yemen.”The terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki has been killed along with some of his companions,” said the statement sent by text message to journalists.

Tribal sources told the AFP news agency that Awlaki was killed early on Friday in an air strike that hit two vehicles travelling through an al-Qaeda stronghold in central Yemen. Government officials say he was targeted 8km from the town of Khashef in the province of al-Jawf, just 140km from Sanaa.

According to POLITICO:

Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric and an alleged terror suspect with links to al Qaeda in Yemen, has been killed, a senior administration official confirmed to POLITICO…  The U.S. government has called al-Awlaki a “key leader” of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an al Qaeda offshoot in Yemen. The U.S. has linked al-Awlaki to Nidal Malik Hasan, who is charged with killing 13 people in a shooting at a U.S. Army base at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and to a Nigerian student known as the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009. Last year, the Obama administration put the U.S.-born al-Awlaki on a CIA “kill or capture” list.

According to The Telegraph:

Yemeni security forces said they had conducted an operation to target Awlaki and his bodyguards in Marib province. Western sources said a US drone strike had hit his convoy in a remote area and that local military commanders had confirmed his death.

President Barack Obama authorised the US military to target Awlaki last year, a controversial and legally fraught move in light of his US citizenship. Awlaki had inspired serval audacious attacks in recent years including the 2009 Christmas underwear bomber, an attack in Fort Hood military base by a US army major and the stabbing of Stephen Timms MP.

One tribal chief in the area of the attack said that the plane that carried out the strike was likely to be American, adding that US aircraft had been patrolling the skies over Marib for the past several days.“US planes have been flying overhead for days now,” said the tribal source would requested anonymity. “Then this morning, at about 9:30, what appeared to be a US aircraft fired on the two cars Awlaqi and his fellow operatives are believed to have been travelling in.”

Last week the Washington Post reported:

The Obama administration is assembling a constellation of secret drone bases for counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as part of a newly aggressive campaign to attack al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia and Yemen… The rapid expansion of the undeclared drone wars is a reflection of the growing alarm with which U.S. officials view the activities of al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia.

The use of drones in such targeted attacks was also a significant element in a recent speech by John Brennan, given attention in a previous Homeland Security Watch post.

Born of Yemeni parents in the United States, Mr. Awlaki has been a charismatic communicator of the Al Qaeda message.  He is (was?) among the most prominent of a new generation of terrorist leaders, with particular  influence among English-speaking converts to Al Qaeda’s cause.  Especially since the death of Osama bin-Laden many considered Awlaki — and the Yemen based Al Qaeda franchise — as the most serious emergent threat.  As noted above, Awlaki has been directly connected to several cases of domestic radicalization in the United States.  He is considered the founder and has been a regular contributor to Inspire, the English-language web-based terrorist magazine.

Awlaki’s death is not necessarily significant to ongoing insurgent operations by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  But if Nasser al-Wahishi’s killing in late August is ultimately confirmed, losing these two leaders in such a short span of time suggests the intensity of the US effort in Yemen… even in the midst of the current civil unrest.

Writing in The Guardian, Jason Burke offers:

Awlaki’s primary role was that of an intermediary. He communicated the message and the ideology of extremist Islam. That message remains alive even if it has been rejected by the vast majority of Muslims. After a decade of polarising violent conflicts, its survival is now independent of the actions of individuals. The social movement of al-Qaida, the cult of violent extremism, the sub-culture of jihad, has sufficient momentum to continue to be effective. The educated Yemeni-American who himself straddled the cultural gaps between the Middle East and the west and who turned to extremism will now join the ranks of al-Qaida’s martyrs. He is thus likely to be an inspiration long after his death.

In an interesting coincidence, exactly one year ago today Homeland Security Watch posted: Killing a Fellow Citizen: Four frames on the present reality of Anwar al-Awlaki. This was one of several posts regarding Mr. Awlaki toward the end of September and beginning of October. Even while I hope the news of his death is accurate, the issues raised in the posts and comments from a year ago remain relevant.

The Washington Post is periodically updating its lead on Alwaki’s death.  According to the Post a second — unnamed — US citizen was also killed in the attack.

The New York Times is also adding to its coverage as additional information is available.  According to the Times the second individual killed is, “Samir Khan, an American citizen of Pakistani origin and the editor of Inspire, Al Qaeda’s English-language Internet magazine. Mr. Khan proclaimed in the magazine last yeasr that he was “pround (sic) to be a traitor to America.” (I don’t know if the sic is a NYT error or an Inspire error.)

Unless something especially interesting or odd emerges, I will let the mainstream media handle it from here.   Any of the links embedded above will take you to even more news and analysis.

Friday Evening Addition:

During a Friday late morning change-of-office ceremony for the new Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, the President commented on Alwaki’s killing:

The death of al-Awlaki marks another significant milestone in the broader effort to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates. Furthermore, this success is a tribute to our intelligence community, and to the efforts of Yemen and its security forces, who have worked closely with the United States over the course of several years.

Awlaki and his organization have been directly responsible for the deaths of many Yemeni citizens. His hateful ideology — and targeting of innocent civilians — has been rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, and people of all faiths. And he has met his demise because the government and the people of Yemen have joined the international community in a common effort against Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains a dangerous — though weakened — terrorist organization. And going forward, we will remain vigilant against any threats to the United States, or our allies and partners. But make no mistake: This is further proof that al Qaeda and its affiliates will find no safe haven anywhere in the world.

Working with Yemen and our other allies and partners, we will be determined, we will be deliberate, we will be relentless, we will be resolute in our commitment to destroy terrorist networks that aim to kill Americans, and to build a world in which people everywhere can live in greater peace, prosperity and security.

In the near term, Awlaki’s death is likely to increase interest in Inspire magazine, his online sermons, and other artifacts of his terrorist promotion.  But especially with the apparent demise of Samir Khan as well, there is no one on the Al Qaeda bench as proficient in mixing anger, aspiration, hate, and hope into such deadly temptation.

September 22, 2011

Authorizing Homeland Security…

Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Jessica Herrera-Flanigan on September 22, 2011

Yesterday, for the first time since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee passed a homeland security authorization bill, S. 1546 (Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2011).

The bill, which the Committee considered over two weeks, was limited in its reach, mostly due to the jurisdictional limits of the Committee.  The Committee focused only on those issues that would not trigger referrals to other Committees.

Much of the bill focused on making the Department a more efficient, whether it be in its acquisition practices or in its structure.  There were also a number of amendments that tackled -on both sides – the debate over radicalization and civil liberties issues.   More than 70 amendments were offered, many of which were agreed upon outside the Executive Meeting as part of a revised manager’s amendment.

Among the highlights:

  • The requirement of the development of  a long-term strategic human capital plan to build out DHS’ acquisition workforce.
  • The implementation of “open architecture approach to acquisitions.”  Specifically, this is intended to cover “the employment of business and technical practices that yield modular, interoperable systems that adhere to standards with open interfaces, with a goal of encouraging competitive proposals from multiple qualified sources and rapid incorporation of innovative technologies into systems.”
  • Elevating the Assistant Secretary of Policy to an Undersecretary position, an elevation that should have been made long ago given the responsibilities of that office.
  • Improving the Department’s efforts generally on preparedness, response and recovery.
  • The creation of an Office of International Travel Security & Screening, which would combine the efforts of US-VISIT, the Screening Coordination Office (currently residing in policy),  and the visa waiver program.

 

The passage of this bill is significant, especially as the House is working to take up its version of a homeland security authorization bill in the coming month or so.   We could very well see this Congress the first Homeland Security Authorization bill since the agency’s creation go to the President’s desk, which is ironic given that Congress is as a whole at a standstill and partisanship is standard course in D.C. these days.  Maybe it is because of the 9/11 anniversary or that truly is the case that homeland security is not a partisan issue — we’ll find out over the coming months.

July 19, 2011

America Rising – one community at a time

Filed under: General Homeland Security,Preparedness and Response,State and Local HLS — by Christopher Bellavita on July 19, 2011

I am fortunate to work with creative and committed public servants.  Today’s post was written by one such person, John L. Farrell, Deputy Managing Director, City of Philadelphia.

In this essay, John links prevention, de-radicalization and community development in a way I have not seen done before.

The usual caveat: The views are John’s and do not necessarily represent the views of any organization.

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US counterterrorism, military, and police forces are focused on executing tactics to disrupt activities that pose a threat to public safety.  These strategies have become increasingly effective and efficient, but they have a common shortcoming – they are all reactive.  The US lacks a strategy aimed at prevention – one that seeks to stop individuals from choosing an extremist path before they are fully committed.  However, the need for such efforts is recognized in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011).

The Cities of Philadelphia and Chicago have developed engagement strategies that aim to empower residents to make their communities safer.  I believe that these strategies can be applied to the larger homeland security (HS) enterprise, and that HS systems can operate more effectively by involving underrepresented communities in their processes.

The Rising System

To improve HS, the US should develop a domestic coordination and engagement system (“Rising System”) to link federal, state, and local governments (collectively, “government”).  The process would begin with the identification of communities that pose potential threats to public safety.  Local government officials would then begin dialogue to gain a deeper understanding of the targeted community, led by a single point of contact (“coordinator”).  The coordinator would lead the development of strategies through which the government and the group could work together to address issues identified by the community.

Though a simple idea, this runs counter to the traditional theory of government as a service provider.  Instead of “big brother” knowing what is best for a community, the community would prioritize its needs, and the coordinator would facilitate the delivery of resources.  The goal of this process would be to build trust with the targeted community.  By listening to community members and delivering on promises, government representatives may be able to develop relationships that help these communities identify themselves as partners rather than adversaries.

This strategy would not demand a large amount of new funding, an important aspect for two reasons.  First, significant financial investments are not practical or feasible for cash-strapped governments across the US.  Second, directing money to specific groups could reward negative behaviors (i.e. if a group wants money from the government, they should threaten public safety).  Instead, coordinators would be responsible for identifying existing organizations and programs (both inside and outside of government) that provide the services necessary to address the community’s needs.  Focusing existing resources and implementing policy changes could prove to be small investments with a large return on improved security.

Local governments are the logical choice to lead dialogue because in many cases they already have ties to either the targeted groups, or second level connections through credible sources that could provide introductions.  To support local efforts, the federal government would need to develop structures to organize the resources of various agencies involved.  In Robert Deardorff’s thesis Countering Violent Extremism: the Challenge and the Opportunity, he suggests the federal government develop Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) to help coordinate engagement activities.  Essentially, Deardorff envisions ROOCC as housing a wide variety of specialists to conduct outreach missions within the US.  The ROOCC could serve as the overarching mechanism to unite local outreach representatives with federal support in Rising Systems.

Defining the Problem

The Rising System would be geared toward developing a true prevention element for the HS enterprise.  Current US HS practices are primarily focused on disruption, not prevention – intelligence analysts and investigators seek connections to learn about terror plots and stop them before implementation.  True prevention, however, occurs long before this stage.  True prevention involves stopping individuals from becoming extremists in the first place.

Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt suggest there is a direct correlation between the level of crime in a community and the degree to which members of that community are organized.  They place neighborhoods in one of four types – Strong (low crime and high organization), Vulnerable (low crime and low organization), Anomic (high crime and low organization) or Responsive (high crime and high organization).  The primary goal of the Rising System, then, would be twofold:  to help Anomic neighborhoods become Responsive, if not Strong; and for government to gain access to Strong and Responsive communities that may not trust them.

Conducted properly, the Rising System can also help the US address the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to counter the terrorist narrative.  By bringing communities such as American Muslims into a partnership with the government, the US will have subject matter experts to help refine how its message is conveyed.  As is the case with deradicalization strategies, the use of respected members of targeted groups to convey a message will be critical to this program’s success. These practices should ultimately lead to closer ties between US Muslims and the government, which will eventually work to debunk myths that the government is anti-Muslim.  Countering extremist ideology may help eliminate the flow of recruits to extremist organizations, which will contribute to their demise.

An engagement strategy that builds relationships can also help to reduce the impact of several of the antinomies that Philip Bobbitt describes in Terror and Consent, namely “the separation between the domestic and the international,” “the different rules we apply to law enforcement and intelligence operations,” and “the different reliance we place on secret as opposed to open sources.” Relationships with leaders in local communities can build trust, which may encourage them to volunteer sensitive information.  This may help to eliminate, or at least reduce, the need for more invasive monitoring methods.  In cases where more invasive monitoring is necessary, the volunteered information may provide the probable cause needed to justify such actions in a criminal or FISA court, alleviating a concern associated with intelligence collection  standards usually applied to foreign agents.

The Rising System will also help to inform government about how to best deploy resources in a difficult fiscal environment.  By conducting the proper analysis of where grievances exist, government can provide opportunities where citizens leverage existing resources to improve their standing, and contribute to American society.  Implementation of the Rising System may thus aid in the shift to what Bobbitt describes as a government in a “market state” rather than a “nation state.” As community members use these resources and contribute to their neighborhood, they may also take ownership of their neighborhood, hopefully making them less likely to shield threats to security.

Whom Would the Rising System Benefit?

Those who stand to gain the most from such a program are the members of the targeted communities.  They will see an improved level of service in areas that may be described as underserved, poor, or forgotten.  Local elected officials will benefit, as their knowledge of the community will play an important role in lending legitimacy to the program.  A Rising System’s success will in turn lend local elected officials political capital as they bring improved quality of life to their community.

The HS enterprise in general will benefit, but certain organizations may oppose the idea.  In theory, everyone in the public safety and HS realms benefits from anything that reduces the number of threats.  However, the proposal itself could be intimidating to some agencies, as it will force them to either evolve their missions, or reduce the need for their services.  There will always be a need for enforcement, intelligence sharing, and most other aspects of the HS enterprise.  However, the reduced demand for service may also result in reduced levels of funding, a proposition that few agencies appreciate.  This may also be true for those receiving funding from the federal government that is not community-based, as a change in strategy may interfere with their funding streams.

A strong opposition for this process could come from civil libertarians.  They may be able to argue that the Rising System could lead communities to conduct witch-hunts for suspects, especially those who they may want to ostracize for reasons other than public safety.  The judiciary would need to be properly briefed on the process, and help create safeguards to prevent relationships from being exploited in this manner.

The Next Steps to Implement the Rising System

Versions of the Rising System are already being implemented at a local level in Philadelphia and Chicago, but without the connection to the federal government.  Philadelphia’s PhillyRising Collaborative is a geographically-based system for coordinating the services of the City government and outside organizations. Similarly, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) has conducted local coordination and outreach since 1993. PhillyRising and CAPS both rely on engagement and citizen participation to drive change in troubled neighborhoods, and have demonstrated success in their respective jurisdictions.

Assuming Philadelphia and/or Chicago were used as a pilot, the next immediate steps would be for the federal government to develop a formal support mechanism.  This could be done through the establishment of Deardorff’s ROOCC, but could also be less formal.  It could simply involve a high-level executive from the federal government conducting regular meetings with local representatives from PhillyRising and CAPS to gather information and coordinate resources.

There is a great need for this program to have support from the highest levels.  Though the operations are predicated on a bottom-up approach for determining strategies for each targeted community, support from the top is necessary to make implementation successful.

Outcomes of a Successful Implementation

In a successful implementation, governments at all levels would establish new relationships in communities where they previously had little access.  These relationships would inform civil servants and elected officials in a way that would make government more responsive to citizens’ needs.  While data analysis can provide a baseline for certain factors in a community, it cannot always determine which issues are the most significant to the everyday lives of residents.

If the Rising System were implemented correctly: government at all levels would be more responsive; communities would build capacity for assuring internal public safety; partnerships would develop sustainable solutions to local problems that produce opportunities for residents; governments would enhance intelligence capabilities; and governments would utilize resources more efficiently by gaining a better understanding of where funding is needed most.  The Rising System could lead governments to operate smarter, faster, and better:

Smarter Government – The Rising System would encourage agency representatives to meet regularly to identify overlapping problems and develop and deliver collaborative solutions to long-term, complex issues.  As officials adapt to serving residents in this manner, the Rising System would create a means for right-sizing resources as well as agency structures.

Faster Government – By improving front-line coordination among officials, service delivery would become more efficient.  As the system progresses, integration of technology systems would facilitate information-sharing, joint planning, and delivery of services.

Better Government – The Rising System would shift the determination for success from strictly agency-based measures to actual outcomes seen in targeted communities.  The Rising System would create a mechanism for regional accountability for public safety, and help define the public safety role of organizations outside of the traditional HS field.  On an external level, the Rising System would reform the governments’ relationship with targeted communities by fostering involvement by local groups to help continue progress.

While a successful implementation would bring many positive aspects, the relationship developed between the government and the community should also involve a degree of debate.  Discussion surrounding strategies, perceptions, and messaging is a healthy exercise that can lead to the improvement of government operations.  This is particularly true in the case of the “narrative” that the 9/11 Commission suggested is needed to counter recruitment efforts by terrorist organizations.

Measuring Success

There are many statistics that could be used to determine the success or failure of such an endeavor, and each stakeholder would likely have their own metrics to determine success.  Agencies such as the FBI, for instance, may evaluate success by the number of tips received from the targeted community, or the number of plots they are able to disrupt due to such information.  The local police department could measure success by the change in crime rate for the targeted community, as is the case for the Philadelphia Police Department’s evaluation of PhillyRising. Residents or members of the community may determine success by their perception of their quality of life, something that may need to be determined in a survey.

There are some factors that may be useful to evaluate for all stakeholders involved.  The first is the number of potential recruits who are dissuaded from taking an extremist path.  The number of people stopped shows that the program is credible and effective, and benefits every group involved.  It is a statistic that will also impact almost all of the others mentioned – if FBI does not have to disrupt a plot, no crime was committed, and the community can feel safer having that person as a productive member of society, rather than a fringe element determined to attack it.  A principal difficulty may come in measuring this number beyond those affected by direct intervention.

The Rising System would also track changes to the relationship between community members and agencies.  This may be measured by factors such as increases in the community’s faith that their requests will not only be heard, but completed to the greatest extent possible.  These responses, though difficult to quantify, will determine an initial acceptance of the Rising System by the local community.  Their acceptance is absolutely necessary for the positive changes in the targeted area to occur and continue.

Ultimately, a successful neighborhood will be one where the Rising System’s coordinated approach is no longer needed – the community members will have taken over the process themselves, and developed relationships with the government that no longer require a central coordinator.

We already know that existing US HS measures to disrupt terrorist/public safety activities are not always successful.  While our tactics for operations have become outstanding, they rely on the premise of detecting a threat before it is executed.  Because knowledge is inherently limited, this strategy cannot always be successful.  However, by developing a strategy that prevents at least some plots from reaching the point of execution, public safety officials may become more effective by focusing resources on a smaller number of threats.  Violent crime and terrorist activities in the US may never end, but by bringing more people into the government’s decision making process, and by providing more opportunities to those who may otherwise slip between the cracks, the US can develop more friends than enemies.

 

July 15, 2011

Text, subtext, and terrorism

Filed under: Strategy,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on July 15, 2011

The purpose of strategy — sez me — is to generate comparative advantage to deal with uncertainty.  The source of uncertainty — enemy, adversary, competitor, lover, child, weather, markets, or the innate complexity of the universe — is one influence on choosing a strategy.  But in many cases strategy is less about a specific source of uncertainty and much more a matter of capacity and opportunity.  We choose to do what we can do.

As of June 29 the United States has a new National Strategy for Counterterrorism.  This document replaces — or perhaps builds upon or clarifies or updates — the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.  There is considerable continuity.

The 2006 document states:

Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. This transnational movement is not monolithic.  Although al-Qaida functions as the movement’s vanguard and remains, along with its affiliate groups and those inspired by them, the most dangerous present manifestation of the enemy, the movement is not controlled by any single individual, group, or state.  What unites the movement is a common vision, a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule.  What unites the movement is the ideology of oppression, violence, and hate. Although its brutal tactics and mass murder of Muslims have undermined its appeal, al-Qa‘ida has had some success in rallying individuals and other militant groups to its cause. Where its ideology does resonate, the United States faces an evolving threat from groups and individuals that accept al-Qa‘ida’s agenda, whether through formal alliance, loose affiliation, or mere inspiration.

The new document states:

The preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents… In addition to plotting and carrying out specific attacks, al-Qa‘ida seeks to inspire a broader conflict against the United States and many of our allies and partners. To rally individuals and groups to its cause, al-Qa‘ida preys on local grievances and propagates a self-serving historical and political account. It draws on a distorted interpretation of Islam to justify the murder of Muslim and non-Muslim innocents. Countering this ideology—which has been rejected repeatedly and unequivocally by people of all faiths around the world—is an essential element of our strategy…  Adherence to al-Qa‘ida’s ideology may not require allegiance to al-Qa‘ida, the organization. Individuals who sympathize with or actively support al-Qa‘ida may be inspired to violence and can pose an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no formal contact with al-Qa‘ida.

There is a source of uncertainty, tension, and conflict that we call al-Qa’ida.  We also acknowledge important aspects of uncertainty beyond al-Qa’ida.  These relate to historical, ideological, economic, political and religious complexities that al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents draw upon and can exploit.

Neither the 2006 strategy nor the new strategy give much detailed attention to these deeper sources of uncertainty.   This reflects, I perceive, both a lack of consensus as to the nature of the deeper uncertainties and a lack of confidence in the ability of the government of the United States to positively engage these profound complexities.

So we do what we can do — or hope we can do — including:

  • Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests,
  • Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents,
  • Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
  • Eliminate Safehavens,
  • Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities,
  • Degrade Links between al-Qa’ida and its Affiliates and Adherents, and
  • Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means.

Each of these bullets are subtitles within the new strategy and each receive a long paragraph’s explanation. These are ambitious, difficult, but practical and measurable goals.  Choices are made.  Priorities established.  These each and all strike me as reasonable.  Elsewhere in the document there is a shout-out to resilience in case these efforts fail.

In the midst of the prior seven is the following goal with its own long paragraph.

Counter al-Qa‘ida Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qa‘ida Exploits. This Strategy prioritizes U.S. and partner efforts to undercut al-Qa‘ida’s fabricated legitimization of violence and its efforts to spread its ideology. As we have seen in the Middle East and North Africa, al-Qa‘ida’s calls for perpetual violence to address longstanding grievances have met a devastating rebuke in the face of nonviolent mass movements that seek solutions through expanded individual rights. Along with the majority of people across all religious and cultural traditions, we aim for a world in which al-Qa‘ida is openly and widely rejected by all audiences as irrelevant to their aspirations and concerns, a world where al-Qa‘ida’s ideology does not shape perceptions of world and local events, inspire violence, or serve as a recruiting tool for the group or its adherents. Although achieving this objective is likely to require a concerted long-term effort, we must retain a focus on addressing the near-term challenge of preventing those individuals already on the brink from embracing al-Qa‘ida ideology and resorting to violence. We will work closely with local and global partners, inside and outside governments, to discredit al-Qa‘ida ideology and reduce its resonance. We will put forward a positive vision of engagement with foreign publics and support for universal rights that demonstrates that the United States aims to build while al-Qa‘ida would only destroy. We will apply focused foreign and development assistance abroad. At the same time, we will continue to assist, engage, and connect communities to increase their collective resilience abroad and at home. These efforts strengthen bulwarks against radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence in the name of al-Qa‘ida and will focus in particular on those drivers that we know al-Qa‘ida exploits.

The intent of this paragraph is to move beyond treating symptoms and get to the heart of the problem.  With the possible exception of the sentence underlined (my underline), does this policy stance strike you as much more defensive than offensive?  Is this the sort of problem we mostly have to defend against and wait out?

Maybe the offense is being handled outside of CT per se. In explaining the new strategy John Brennan cautioned, “Our strategy recognizes that our counterterrorism efforts clearly benefit from—and at times depend on—broader foreign policy efforts, even as our CT strategy focuses more narrowly on preventing terrorist attacks against our interests, at home and abroad.”

Today Hillary Clinton begins an eleven-day round-the-world tour.  She will visit Turkey, Greece, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and China and engage in plenty of multilateral meetings along the way.  Writing in The Guardian Simon Tisdall offers, “But paradoxically, this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence.”

In this context, it is relevant that Public Diplomacy is on the GAO list of High Risks and Challenges.   This means, in my dictionary, its a tough and important job with a very uneven track record of success.

In the Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification for Public Diplomacy we read:

The FY 2012 request includes a $6.2 million dollar investment for the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (CSCC) which is tasked with leading a U. S. Government wide rapid guidance and communication effort to counter violent extremism.  As stated in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the CSCC will coordinate, orient, and inform whole-of-government communications activities targeted against violent extremism to audiences abroad.  The QDDR also acknowledges that the Center will work closely with the Secretary‘s Coordinator for Counterterrorism or its proposed successor Bureau of Counterterrorism, as well as the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice‘s National Security Division, the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies responsible for information programs related to counterterrorism.

Clearly the CSCC is only one small part of how we might put forward a “positive vision of engagement”.  But I will note the last time I heard, one predator drone cost $4.5 million.  The new reaper drones cost about $13 million each. Perhaps even in these tough times the CSCC might be worth an investment equivalent to two predators or even one reaper?  Apples and oranges some will complain.  Apple seeds and dragon’s teeth I am inclined to reply.

May 7, 2011

Al Qaeda Is Behind the Eight Ball

Filed under: Strategy,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Christopher Bellavita on May 7, 2011

This post was written by Mike Walker.  Mr. Walker was Acting Secretary of the Army and Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the Clinton Administration.  You can follow his comments on Twitter: @New_Narrative

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Osama bin Laden is dead. Remaining senior leaders are being relentlessly pursued. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to bungle attempted attacks in the West. And the FBI keeps stinging homegrown terror wannabes.

Al Qaeda was also irrelevant to this year’s Arab revolutions. Throughout the Muslim world Al Qaeda’s support is crumbling. Key supporters have abandoned the organization.

As a result, some pundits conclude the war on terror has already been won. That Al Qaeda died with Bin Laden. And that the ideological fuel driving radicalization has been rendered impotent.

Soon, government spending for homeland security will increasingly be questioned, as will expenditures by the private sector for infrastructure protection.

Now, just days after the death of Bin Laden, we find ourselves at a crossroads. It is important to get the direction right, because the threat is not over.

 

Al Qaeda Central has not been run by a bunch of yahoos. Al Qaeda has been led by a group of sophisticated, well educated, adaptive men who believe they are doing God’s work on earth.

No doubt, the terrorists already had a plan on the shelf for their next phase without Bin Laden, who was, after all, the most hunted man in the world. And long before Bin Laden was killed, Al Qaeda Central and its affiliate organizations were also planning specific attacks in the West. We must assume planning for those attacks continues and that terror operatives are now looking for ways to accelerate those plots.

Just as likely, self-selected terror wannabes here at home are quietly hatching their own crude, but potentially lethal plots, inspired by internet terrorists like Anwar al-Awlaki

These are some of the reasons the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security have all said Americans should be alert to the potential for revenge attacks by the Al Qaeda network.

Of course, the US intelligence community is exploiting every shred of evidence taken away from Bin Laden’s compound in an effort to detect plots in progress. But it would be a mistake to believe that an organization, which has deliberately decentralized since the 9-11 attacks, would leave all its secrets in one place.

 

Since 9-11, AQ has become a networked, learning organization. The terrorists have closely watched our tactics, techniques and procedures for a decade, and today they also have a much better understanding of our economic and social vulnerabilities.

Following the trauma of losing their most revered leader, the terrorists, though, must now be concerned about continuing to lose relevance in the Muslim world.

All these factors combine to make the next several months a very high threat period.

 

In the aftermath of the bold, successful operation by Seal Team Six, it’s easy to believe the Federal government will disrupt every plot. To believe that would be folly. The Federal government I was honored to serve for 32 years does have substantial capability. But that capability is not enough to keep Main Street America safe from attack.

The terrorists have made it clear: it is no longer just Washington, DC, and New York City at risk. The terrorists are planning to strike the heartland of America to shake our citizens’ confidence and harm the economy.

Dealing with the threat, in the aftermath of Bin Laden’s death, continues to be a shared responsibility. The responsibilities of state and local governments, the private sector and average Americans did not diminish when Bin Laden was killed. Already, almost a third of all terror plots have been foiled because someone called law enforcement and reported that something didn’t seem right.

So, during the post-Bin Laden period, we must continue to be vigilant. Months ago, the Secretary of Homeland security said we should assume terror operatives are already inside the country and could attack with little or no warning. We should especially be alert for a potential Mumbai in America, where lone wolves or small cells attack multiple soft targets with conventional weapons, and, perhaps, improvised explosive devices.

 

The good news is most analysts believe it unlikely the terrorists will be able to attack with weapons of mass destruction. For now, that potential may be beyond their capability despite efforts for two decades to achieve it. However, it is not out of the realm of possibility that radicalized scientists in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program could clandestinely funnel material for a dirty bomb or worse to their militant friends. The revelation that Bin Laden had been living for years in a community of active and retired Pakistani military officers only heightens this concern.

So, we must not let our guard down in the coming months. This is no time for complacency in America. The celebrations should wait until we deal with longer-term issues.

 

Al Qaeda’s strategy has been focused on attempting to persuade Muslims that Islam is under attack by the West and must be defended by any means. Clearly, the terrorists seek to provoke a clash of civilizations.

While many Muslims erroneously believe the West does want to divide and conquer Islam, the terrorists have only been successful in recruiting relatively small, but dedicated numbers to do their violent bidding. It is Al Qaeda’s own violence that has turned off the vast majority of Muslims, who are also repelled by the terrorists’ corrupt version of Islam. The failure by the terrorists to persuade Muslims that Al Qaeda is the vanguard of Islam has been the terrorists’ biggest downfall.

 

Despite the terrorists’ own failures, there are important long-term challenges we must address before we will tame the threat.

Gallup and Pew polls indicate that of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims, hundreds of millions want to rid Muslim countries of Western influence and perceived exploitation.

The American military footprint around the world is a leading cause of radicalization both here at home and abroad. How we project power and protect our own vital interests in the future will make a difference in terrorist recruiting. As we saw in Abbottabad, it doesn’t take military divisions to deal with terrorists.

Likewise, the West’s addiction to oil and drugs, much of which comes from countries in the Middle East and South Asia, continue to weaken our influence and increase our image as exploiting Muslim countries. Moving toward alternative energy sources and reducing the national appetite for illegal drugs must become a higher priority.

The perceived plight of the Palestinians continues to be a major source, if not the major source, of frustration in the Muslim world. A final agreement for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians would take this issue off the table.

Here at home, a growing misunderstanding of the religion of Islam actually increases the potential for radicalization. The terrorists continue to persuade disaffected Muslims that the handful of Americans who burn Korans and those who oppose the so-called Ground Zero Mosque actually prove America is at war with Islam.

How we deal with all these issues will have a significant impact on future radicalization inside America and overseas.

 

Radicalization in America will also be influenced by whether or not we remain true to our ideals and civil liberties. The terrorists are counting on us turning against our own fellow citizens out of fear, because they believe that will ensure jihad in America and help them buy time to build new capabilities.

The death of Bin Laden has given us a window of opportunity to seize the initiative at a time the terrorists are off balance. Today, the threat remains. In the short run we must remain vigilant. In the long term, we have some significant policy decisions to make.

 

 

 

 

March 22, 2011

Growing more homeland security ideas, volume 3

Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Christopher Bellavita on March 22, 2011

On Friday, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security will graduate its 31st and 32nd master’s degree class .

Here are the titles of the graduates’ theses (and short descriptions) to illustrate the topics covered.

Many of the theses — adding to the storehouse of what we know, do not know, and need to know about homeland security — will be available through the NPS Dudley Knox library in a few weeks.

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1. Assessing the effectiveness of current NYC radiological emergency response strategy in protecting responders immediately after detonation of an improvised nuclear device.

An analysis of current New York City radiological response plans compared against current research about the consequences of a terrorist attack using an improvised nuclear device on a major metropolitan city.  The analysis sought to determine if the plans offered effective guidance in protecting first responders.  Research indicates a need to revise current plans and change existing response tactics.

2. Compstat 2.0: an innovative police strategic management plan focusing on performance in the all crimes and all hazards environment.

This thesis examines the current research on CompStat (a law enforcement accountability system), focusing on the practical results agencies have seen, both good and bad, after employing today’s most popular model of strategic management in policing. By applying lessons learned from CompStat, and other strategic management models, this thesis proposes a strategy to improve CompStat over the next decade. In CompStat 2.0, agencies will use what works to rapidly identify and effectively address threats in the all crimes and all hazards environment.

3. The Transportation Security Administration’s four major security programs for mass transit – how they can be improved to address the security needs of Tier II transit agencies.

This thesis examined how the TSA has been carrying out its mandate to provide for the security of the mass transit sector of transportation against terrorism. The study recommends ways to increase the numbers of law enforcement officers and explosives detection canine teams for Tier II (medium) sized transit agencies.

4.  The evolution of the public administration education curriculum as a response to the complex issues created by a post 9/11 America.

Homeland security has developed as an educational discipline over the last ten years.  This thesis explores whether undergraduate public administration programs at Indiana colleges and universities have incorporated homeland security issues into their curriculum.  The thesis includes recommendations that can be taken to ensure that these institutions address the growing homeland security field.

5.  Non-pharmaceutical interventions to pandemic influenza and other biological events.

In the event of a novel influenza virus or an unknown biological event, it is important that organizations be prepared to institute infection control measures. The thesis is a study of how non-healthcare organizations can use a simple tool to identify needed inventions for an employee or group of employees.

6. United we stand, divided we fall: increasing response capability in Kentucky through regionalization and leadership.

This work focuses on the 2009 ice storm that devastated Kentucky. Although research indicates that regionalization has benefits, only a small portion of Kentucky collaboratively worked together during the storm. The thesis explores how regionalization could be used to improve future response throughout the state.

7. The New York City Urban Search & Rescue Team (NY-TF1), a case study of interagency effectiveness.

This thesis examined the NY-TF1 model to identify structural and procedural designs that foster interagency synergy between the Fire Department of New York and other emergency services.  The study provides direction for a closer alignment of NYC emergency first-responders.

8. Complacency: a threat to homeland security?

This thesis takes an unconventional approach to enhancing the resilience of homeland security by exploring the human factor of complacency. The research defines complacency for the homeland security discipline, explores its credibility as a threat and provides a baseline understanding from which to address it.

9. Effective selection: a study of first-line supervisor selection processes in the Department of Homeland Security.

This research examines the four most important tenets of a supervisor selection process. Using a multi-method approach, this study compares first-line supervisor selection processes for effective and less effective federal agencies as measured by Federal Human Capital Survey.

10.  Analyzing the need for special operations teams within the fire service.

Fire suppression and rescue are the primary missions of the fire service, but not all rescue efforts entail putting out fires.  For this reason the fire service created Special Operations Teams; however, they come at a high cost to fund and operate.  Reorganizing traditional fire service rank structure will allow tenure in developing subject matter experts who will ultimately save lives and property while reducing recovery cost.

11. Developing a set of measures demonstrating how regional collaboration builds preparedness capabilities.

The thesis identifies the critical components of the National Capital Region Fire Service jurisdictions.  It defines common terms that link community to community and enable measurement of collaborative activities that build preparedness capabilities.

12. Policy option analysis for Assistance to Firefighters grant program.

An analysis of approaches to distribute AFG program funds to increase the funding’s impact on national homeland security.  The presented approaches acknowledge the unique, first-responder contributions of fire services and EMS to homeland security.

13. Political subculture: a resilience multiplier.

Dr. Daniel Elazar’s theory of political subculture (i.e. how a community views politics and the role of government in their lives) acts as a modifier to the overall resilience of that community.  Knowing this and by mapping the dominant subcultures of communities, a better predictive model of resilience can be established for future planning and mitigation efforts.

14. Considerations to enhance Florida’s domestic security strategic plan.

The thesis identifies the potential benefits of including prioritization, assignment and metrics methodologies into Florida’s homeland security strategy.

15.  Addressing the Mumbai style attack: interstate law enforcement mutual aid in the absence of a declared emergency.

With an ever evolving terrorist threat, quick and efficient response by law enforcement across jurisdictional boundaries is needed. This thesis examines the existing methods for providing interstate law enforcement and applicability to the evolving threat, to determine what methods work and what new systems may be required.

16. Community preparedness: alternative approaches to citizen engagement in homeland security.

This thesis deals with community preparedness and citizen engagement in the United States.  It acknowledges that the approach we have taken since 9/11 has not been as effective as desired.  The research examines citizen engagement models that have had some success, such as fire prevention and seat belt safety, and explores the characteristics of these programs and their applicability to homeland security.

17. American institutions of higher education: reducing the vulnerability from acts of terrorism.

This thesis examines vulnerabilities on the campuses of American colleges and universities, including research laboratories, places of mass gatherings, and the potential for extremist radicalization of college students. The thesis also looks at insider threats and how threat assessment and behavioral intervention teams may help prevent attacks.

18.  Using DoD ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities in support of homeland security and defense: policy challenges and considerations for effective incident awareness and assessment.

United States Northern Command is responsible for providing military support to civil authorities during major disasters and homeland security events. The military can provide airborne intelligence capabilities that have the potential to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of response. However, there are doctrinal, legal, policy and ethical obstacles that reduce the military’s ability to deliver this capability. This thesis finds that the most significant challenges come from doctrine and policy and makes recommendations to align military doctrine with the National Response Framework to overcome these barriers.

19.  Freed: ripples of the convicted and released terrorist in America.

This thesis frames new discourse about an unexplored, yet inevitable phase of the terrorism continuum, by discussing the implications that follow the release of convicted terrorists from American prisons. It examines existing models ranging from sex offender registries to megacommunities and existing sociological theories of terrorism as potential tools with which to address this complex and interdisciplinary issue.

20. DOMESTIPOL.

The thesis argues that horizontal, inter-state, police-department to police-department sharing of information is where the most critical seams exist within U.S. law enforcement.  The study analyzes the 50 largest urban areas in the United States and asks how leveraging the disparate burgeoning banks of police data and resources that reside in each urban area against homegrown terrorism can increase national resilience.  The thesis defines DOMESTIPOL as a national system of police coordination between the 50 most vulnerable urban areas in the United States.

21. Operating in uncertainty: growing resilient critical infrastructure organizations.

Publicly owned utilities as natural monopolies have historically operated in a relatively controlled environment. As they have become increasingly networked and interdependent with similar enterprises, the level of management complexity has increased dramatically within their operating environment. Leadership skills, based on the management practices of the last century, have not kept pace with these rapidly changing environmental conditions. There exists a gap today among leaders in understanding that their environment and organization are part of complex adaptive systems and that the implications of operating in a complex environment are substantive. The pupose of this research is to provide management with a roadmap to fill this gap and guide utilities toward a more resilient organizational structure.

22. Mitigating decision making paralysis during catastrophic disasters.

Catastrophic disasters are overwhelming situations to the people they affect, including the decision makers managing the disaster. Making decisions about preserving life, the environment, and the economy during a catastrophic disaster requires a fast and flexile process, or the decision making of the emergency managers will become paralyzed. This thesis presents a process model for mitigating decision making paralysis so that life, the economy, and the environment are sustained during a catastrophic disaster.

23.  Planning for an integrated intergovernmental, interagency, and multi-disciplinary investigative response to a multi-jurisdictional series of crimes spanning the National Capital Region (NCR).

This thesis explores the development of an investigative model that will help the many local and federal law enforcment agencies serving within the NCR to work in an integrated manner to effectively and efficiently investigate serious crime sprees spanning the National Capital Region.  Additionally, this model seeks to integrate other disciplines such as fire/EMS, fusion centers, and public information into the model and the investigation.

24. Project management for homeland security.

This is a study about how we manage complex new homeland security initiatives. By standardizing and institutionalizing “project management” procedures, homeland security practitioners will save time, money, and possibly lives.

25. No emergency incident recognizes borders.

This research examines the development of a response framework for first responders to a bi-national incident along the Arizona and Mexico border. The study identifies the benefits of bi-national response and collaborative sharing of resources in times of disaster.

26. Implementation methods and standards for the National Guard’s Homeland Response Force.

The thesis offers standards for the employment of the Homeland Response Force in a domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive event and an all-hazard response mission. The study provides recommendations for the employment of military forces and advanced technologies in a domestic environment in accordance with U.S. response standards, intelligent oversight laws and civil liberties concerns.

27. Failing the grade: countering the effects of America’s declining global educational ranking on our national security.

In the last several decades, the United States has seen a dramatic decline in the global educational rankings of its students, specifically in the area of math and science.  This decline has a serious impact on the technological advantage, economy, and the national security of the United States.   Globalization is expanding areas of shared interests between nations, and the declining educational capabilities of U.S. students leaves the country vulnerable to an advancing threat and changing future battle spaces.  This thesis identifies potential educational policies and suggests recommendations aimed at re-establishing the United States as the world’s educational leader.

March 10, 2011

Inquiring about (radicalizing) Islam: Answering authentic questions?

Filed under: Congress and HLS,Radicalization — by Philip J. Palin on March 10, 2011

I expect Chairman King well understands the stakes.  He is an experienced, wily, and — at times — even a wise man.

There is great value in the authentic question — no matter how awkward — because an authentic question is open to new understanding.

The method of Socrates had no script.  It was a high wire act. The wisest of all could still stumble over preconceived notions, private prejudices, and Plato’s own purposes imposed post-hoc.

An authentic question need not be innocent, but it does require a spacious susceptibility to honest answers and (especially) to being surprised.

Each of us who listened today will likely judge Chairman King, the committee’s other members, and each witness in light of our own intent, our own innocence, our own authenticity… or in the dimness and darkness thereof.

I have lost my taste for the politics of these events.  Many others are offering their thoughts on that (linked below).

See if you share my sense of hearing an interesting answer to the committee’s questions (and comments) in these words written seventy years ago:

Now more than ever, when torches and snare-drum
Excite the squat women of the saurian brain
Till a milling mob of fears
Breaks in insultingly on anywhere, when in our dreams
Pigs play on the organs and the blue sky runs shrieking
As the Crack of Doom appears,

Are the good ghosts needed with the white magic
Of their subtle loves. War has no ambiguities
Like a marriage; the result
Required of its affaire fatale is simple and sad.
The physical removal of all human objects
That conceal the Difficult.

Then remember me that I may remember
The test we have to learn to shudder for is not
An historical event,
That neither the low democracy of a nightmare nor
An army’s primitive tidiness may deceive me
About our predicament,

That catastrophic situation which neither
Victory nor defeat can annul; to be
Deaf yet determined to sing,
To be lame and blind yet burning for the Great Good Place,
To be radically corrupt yet mournfully attracted
By the Real Distinguished Thing…

Into this city from the shining lowlands
Blows a wind that whispers of uncovered skulls
And fresh ruins under the moon.
Of hopes that will not survive the secousse of this spring
Of blood and flames, of the terror that walks by night and
The sickness that strikes at noon.

From By the Grave of Henry James by W. H. Auden.

Less poetic consideration of Thursday’s House Homeland Security Committee hearings:

Committee’s website with prepared testimony

Peter King’s Obsession (New York Times, editorial)

Homegrown Islamic Radicalization: Worth Studying (Washington Post, editorial)

Islamic Radicalization: The questions that Rep. Peter King is right to ask (Ruth Marcus, opinion)

The terrorist threat is real (Peter King, opinion)

Peter King defiant at tense Muslim hearing (Politico, news)

Witnesses at King hearing say US “failing” to confront radical Islam (FoxNews)

Islam show-trial opens in US Congress (Telegraph, news)

House hearing worries US Muslims (Al Jazerra, news)

Congressman defends panel on US Muslim community amid national uproar (Haaretz, news)

Republicans and Democrats disagree on Muslim hearings (Gallup, survey results)

Friday morning update:

The homegrown terror hearings (Wall Street Journal, opinion)

King: Next hearing is on Muslims in prison (AP, news)

Tears, fears at hearing on Muslims (The Hill, news)

Local Muslims slam hearings as unfair, unbalanced (Detroit Free Press, news)

Cries of McCarthyism over US Muslim hearing (Independent, news)

Spectre of McCarthy hangs over hearing into radicalization of American Muslims (The Australian, news)

Muslim hearings in US Congress dismissed as equivalent of reality TV (The Guardian, news)

February 10, 2011

“Uniquely Diabolical”

Filed under: Congress and HLS,General Homeland Security,Radicalization — by Arnold Bogis on February 10, 2011

That is how Peter King, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, characterized the threat of Islamic fundamentalist-connected terrorism to Ranking Minority Member Bennie Thompson in a letter.  The full quote:

While there have been extremist groups and random acts of political violence throughout our history, the al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 and the ongoing threat to our nation from Islamic jihad were uniquely diabolical and threatening to America’s security, both overseas and in our homeland.

King’s letter was a response to Thompson’s request to expand the subject of an upcoming hearing on radicalization within the Muslim-American community to a broader consideration of domestic extremism in general.  In defending his narrow focus, King goes on to compare the impacts of terrorism of different ideological stripes:

In short, the homeland has become a major front in the war with Islamic terrorism and it is our responsibility to fully examine this significant change in al Qaeda tactics and strategy. To include other groups such as neo-Nazis and extreme environmentalists in this hearing would be extraneous and diffuse its efficacy. It would also send the false message that our Committee believes there is any threat equivalency between these disparate groups and Islamist terrorism.

This seems a little short sighted to me as I think back to 1995:

It is just my opinion, but the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City seems pretty diabolical to me.  Homeland security should continue to be concerned about the present and evolving threat presented by Al Qaeda and like-minded groups.  However, too narrow of a focus will leave us vulnerable to a range of risks we choose to ignore or do not even notice exist.

I do not question the efficacy of hearings about radicalization in the U.S. Muslim community, but the reported tone of these hearings and the accusations that unidentified members of the law enforcement community have complained to King that they are not receiving cooperation from Muslim-Americans is troubling.  Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca seems to share these concerns, as reported by Politico’s Ben Smith:

Los Angeles County sheriff Lee Baca said Monday that there is nothing to support Rep. Peter King’s (R-N.Y.) view that American Muslims are being uncooperative with law enforcement.

“If he has evidence of non-cooperation, he should bring it forward,” said Baca at a forum held today by Muslim-American groups in advance of King’s hearings on radicalization in the Muslim community. “We have as much cooperation as we are capable of acquiring through public trust relationships.”

“I sit on the Major City chiefs association as one of three chairs,” said Baca. “I also sit on the Major County Sheriff’s Association and I’m on the national board of directors of the international association for the sheriffs departments. Here’s the thing: I don’t know what Mr. King is hearing or who he’s hearing it from.”

Community engagement across the entire spectrum of homeland security-related activities is required to build resilience (however one defines the concept).  Alienating a specific group due to unfounded fears seems not a particularly forward thinking strategy.  In the process of carrying out important and necessary investigations, I hope that proper balance can be found for current and future issues.

February 5, 2011

UK Prime Minister: Counter-terrorism requires “much more active, muscular liberalism”

Filed under: Radicalization,Terrorist Threats & Attacks — by Philip J. Palin on February 5, 2011

Earlier today, Saturday, at the Munich Security Conference UK Prime Minister David Cameron gave considerable attention to terrorism and radicalization.  Below are his prepared remarks in full.  The bold bits and hyperlinks are my contribution.   I do not agree with all the Prime Minister offers.  I do perceive he is speaking with helpful clarity regarding a crucial issue.

One pedantic note: the “state multiculturalism” referenced by the Prime Minister is a particularly European policy prescription.  There are echoes of it in some parts of the United States, but usually quite faint.  The American experience with immigration and national enculturation has been quite different than that in Europe, especially over the last generation.  Further, there is in the PM’s remarks a bias toward the centrality-of-the-state that is accurate in the European context and does not quite match the North American experience.

German Chancellor Merkel no doubt recognized — and appreciated — the solidarity Mr. Cameron demonstrated with similar remarks and policies undertaken by her government.  (Read more from a December post at HLSWatch)

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Today, I want to focus my remarks on terrorism.

But first, let me address one point.

Some have suggested that by holding a Strategic Defence and Security Review, Britain is somehow retreating from an activist role in the world.

This is the complete reversal of the truth.

Yes, we are dealing with the deficit, but we are also making sure our defences are strong.

Britain will continue to meet the NATO two per cent target for defence spending.

We still have the fourth largest military budget in the world.

And at the same time, we are putting that money to better use, focusing on conflict prevention and building a much more flexible army.

That’s not retreat, it’s hard headed. Every decision we take has three aims firmly in mind.

First, to support our continuing NATO mission in Afghanistan.

Second, to reinforce our actual military capability.

As Chancellor Merkel’s government is showing here in Germany what matters is not bureaucracy – which frankly Europe needs a lot less of – but the political will to build the military capability we need, as nations and allies, to deliver in the field.

And third, to make sure Britain is protected from the new and various threats it faces.

That’s why we’re investing in a national cyber-security programme and sharpening our readiness to act on counter-proliferation.

The biggest threat to our security comes from terrorist attacks – some of which are sadly carried out by our own citizens.

It’s important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group.

The UK still faces threats from dissident republicans.

Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and Italy.

And of course, yourselves in Germany were long-scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction.

Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse and warped interpretation of Islam and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens.

Last week at Davos, I rang the alarm bell for the urgent need for Europe to recover its economic dynamism.

And today, though the subject is complex, my message on security is equally stark.

We won’t defeat terrorism simply by the actions we take outside our borders.

Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries.

Root of the problem

Of course, that means strengthening the security aspects of our response – on tracing plots and stopping them, counter-surveillance and intelligence gathering.

But this is just part of the answer. We have to get to the root of the problem.

We need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie – and that is the existence of an ideology, ‘Islamist extremism’.

And we should be equally clear what we mean by this term, distinguishing it from Islam.

Islam is a religion, observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. Islamist extremism is a political ideology, supported by a minority.

At the furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of sharia.

Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility towards western democracy and liberal values.

It’s vital we make this distinction between the religion and the political ideology.

Time and again, people equate the two. They think whether someone is an extremist is dependent on how much they observe their religion.

So they talk about ‘moderate’ Muslims as if all devout Muslims must be extremist. This is wrong.

Someone can be a devout Muslim and not be an extremist.

We need to be clear: Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing.

Muddled thinking

This highlights a significant problem when discussing the terrorist threat we face: there is so much muddled thinking about this whole issue.

On the one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism and just say:

Islam and the West are in irreconcilable. This is a clash of civilisations.

So it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion – whether that’s through the forced repatriation favoured by some fascists or the banning of new mosques as suggested in some parts of Europe.

These people fuel Islamaphobia. And I completely reject their argument.

If they want an example of how Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible, they should look at what’s happened in the past few weeks on the streets of Tunis and Cairo.

Hundreds of thousands people demanding the universal right to free elections and democracy.

The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem.  Islam, emphatically, is not.

Picking a fight with the latter will do nothing to confront the former.

On the other hand, there are those on the soft left who also ignore this distinction.

They lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances and arguing if only governments addressed them, this terrorism would stop.

So they point to the poverty that so many Muslims live in and say: get rid of this injustice and the terrorism will end.

But this ignores that fact that many of those found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK have been graduates, and often middle class.

They point to the grievances about Western foreign policy and say: stop riding roughshod over Muslim countries and the terrorism will end.

But there are many people – Muslim and non-Muslim alike – who are angry about western foreign policy and don’t resort to acts of terrorism.

They also point to the profusion of unelected leaders across the Middle East and say: stop propping them up and creating the conditions for extremism to flourish.

But this raises the question: if a lack of democracy is the problem, why are there extremists in free and open societies?

Now, I am not saying these issues aren’t important.

Yes, we must tackle poverty.

Yes, we must resolve sources of tension – not least in Palestine.

And yes, we should be on the side of openness and political reform in the Middle East.

On Egypt, our position is clear: we want to see the transition to a more broadly based government with the proper building blocks of a free and democratic society.

I simply don’t accept that there’s a dead-end choice between a security state and Islamist resistance.

But let’s not fool ourselves, these are just contributory factors. Even if we sorted out all these problems, there would still be this terrorism.

Identity and radicalisation

The root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology.

And I would argue an important reason so many young Muslims are drawn to it comes down to a question of identity.

What I’m about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there are general lessons for us all.

In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries.

But they also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity.

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. (Note by Palin: See 2009 critique by Baroness Warsi of “state multiculturalism.”)

We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.

We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.

So when a white person holds objectionable views – racism, for example – we rightly condemn them.

But when equally unacceptable views or practices have come from someone who isn’t white, we’ve been too cautious, frankly even fearful, to stand up to them.

The failure of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone they don’t want to is a case in point.

This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared.

All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless.

And the search for something to belong to and believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology.

For sure, they don’t turn into terrorists overnight.

What we see is a process of radicalisation.

Internet chatrooms are virtual meeting places where attitudes are shared, strengthened and validated.

In some mosques, preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere.

In our communities, groups and organisations led by young, dynamic leaders promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion.

All these interactions engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply.

You might say: as long as they’re not hurting anyone, what’s the problem with all this?

I’ll tell you why.

As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’ and then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence.

And I say this is an indictment of our approach to these issues in the past.

And if we are to defeat this threat, I believe it’s time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past.

So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as governments and societies – have got to confront it, in all its forms.

And second, instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone.

Let me briefly take each in turn.

Tackle all forms of extremism

First, confronting and undermining his ideology.

Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed.

For governments, there are obvious ways we can do that.

We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries.

We must also proscribe organisations that incite terrorism – against people at home and abroad.

Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, while not violent, are certainly, in some cases, part of the problem.

We need to think much harder about who it’s in the public interest to work with.

Some organisations that seek to present themselves as a gateway to the Muslim community are showered with public money despite doing little to combat extremism.

As others have observed, this is like turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement.

So let’s properly judge these organisations:

Do they believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths?

Do they believe in equality of all before the law?

Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government?

Do they encourage integration or separatism?

These are the sorts of questions we need to ask.

Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations.

No public money. No sharing of platforms with Ministers at home.

At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly funded institutions – like universities and prisons.

Some say: this is incompatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry.

I say: would you take the same view if right-wing extremists were recruiting on campuses?

Would you advocate inaction if Christian fundamentalists who believe Muslims are the enemy were leading prayer groups in prison?

And to those who say these non-violent extremists are helping to keep young, vulnerable men away from violence, I say nonsense.

Would you allow the far right groups a share of public funds if they promise to lure young white men away from fascist terrorism?

But, at root, challenging this ideology means exposing its ideas for what they are –completely unjustifiable.

We need to argue that terrorism is wrong – in all circumstances.

We need to argue that their prophecies of a global war of religion pitting Muslims against the rest of the world are rubbish.

Governments cannot do this alone.

The extremism we face is a distortion of Islam so these arguments, in part, must be made by those within Islam.

So let’s give voice to those followers of Islam in our own countries – the vast often unheard majority – who despise the extremists and their worldview.

Let’s engage groups that share our aspirations.

Stronger citizenship

Second, we must build stronger societies and identities at home.

Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism.

A passively tolerant society says to its citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone.

It stands neutral between different values. A genuinely liberal country does much more.

It believes in certain values and actively promotes them.

Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality.

It says to its citizens: this is what defines us as a society.

To belong here is to believe in these things.

Each of us in our own countries must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty.

There are practical things we can do as well.

That includes making sure immigrants speak the language of their new home.

And ensuring that people are educated in elements of a common culture and curriculum.

Back home, we are introducing National Citizen Service – a two-month programme for sixteen year-olds from different backgrounds to live and work together.

I also believe we should encourage meaningful and active participation in society, by shifting the balance of power, away from the state and to people.

That way common purpose can be formed, as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods.

It will also help build stronger pride in local identity so people feel free to say yes, I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am Christian but I am also a Londonder or a Berliner too.

It’s that identity – that feeling of belonging in our countries that is the key to achieving true cohesion.

Conclusion

Let me end with this. This terrorism is completely indiscriminate and has been thrust upon us.

It can’t be ignored or contained.

We need to confront it with confidence.

Confront the ideology that drives it by defeating the ideas that warp so many minds at their root.

And confront the issues of identity that sustain it by standing for a much broader and generous vision of citizenship in our countries.

None of this will be easy. We need stamina, patience and endurance. And it won’t happen at all if we act alone.

This ideology crosses continents – we are all in this together.

At stake are not just lives, it’s our way of life.

That’s why this is a challenge we cannot avoid – and one we must meet.

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